The German and Italian Navies’ lack of aircraft carriers had a pronounced effect on the Axis conduct of war at sea. Goering’s Luftwaffe was not an adequate substitute. Italian naval operations in the Mediterranean served to accentuate further the need for carriers. As the struggle for control of the sea progressed, it soon became evident to the Axis that the carrier was the weapon most needed in a balanced naval force. Since aircraft carriers obviously would have given Axis ships greater freedom of the seas, the reasons underlying the German and Italian Navies’ neglect of this weapon deserve some explanation.
In considering Germany’s approach to the carrier problem, we find that the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, had counted on more time. Hitler had asserted right up to the last minute that there was no need to expect war before 1944 and by that time his “Z Plan”—the longterm 1939-1945 ship construction program— would be completed, thus placing Germany in a position to begin a war against Britain. But even then, she would be only a two-carrier Navy!
No sooner had World War II begun than the “Z Plan” was suspended, leaving the Germania, one of the two proposed carriers, on the slipway with all work on it abandoned, just as it was on all other surface craft which had not been launched.
Even though the other large carrier, the Graf Zeppelin, was at an advanced stage and under peacetime conditions would have been commissioned during the latter part of 1940, she appeared to share the fate of the Germania. In fact, the German surface forces were considered so inferior in numbers and strength to the British Fleet, that, even at full strength, they were regarded as only capable of showing that they knew how to die gallantly.
Since the German Navy had made U- boat warfare in the Atlantic its chief objective, the Naval Staff on October 2, 1939, issued the following order concerning work on the Graf Zeppelin: “At the moment there is no particular demand for the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin to operate in this war. In any case, work on the building of this ship must take second place to the most urgent building demands of the mobilization plan.” This order prompted Hitler to ask whether it was necessary to complete the Graf Zeppelin. When Raeder stated that the carrier might be needed to escort the 10,000 ton cruisers to sea and operate with them, Hitler agreed that the Graf Zeppelin should be completed.
But doubt as to the value of the carrier was on the increase. In an early report during the first phase of the war, the Naval Staff insisted that the Graf Zeppelin could not possibly operate in home waters since it would too easily fall victim to Britain’s coastal weapons. Furthermore, the Navy at this stage believed that the duties of the carrier planes could be undertaken by German coastal aircraft.
As for Atlantic operations, it was believed that the carrier would be in even greater jeopardy for it would be no easy task to break out through the North Sea passages and any return would be equally hazardous. Without bases in the Atlantic, she could not be used in a battle force. Clearly the Naval Staff was skeptical of any value in the carrier as the situation stood at that time. In light of this attitude, it is not surprising that they decided to discontinue work on the aircraft carrier. This decision was made even though the occupation of Norway afforded greater freedom of naval operations and eased the difficulties of passing between the Shetlands and Norway.
In recommending this step to Hitler, Raeder pointed out that, with time for the necessary trials, the carrier could not be ready before the end of 1941. Since the Staff had decided to stop work on the Graf Zeppelin, it was suggested that the carrier’s anti-aircraft guns be utilized in the defense of Norwegian coastal waters.
By late June, 1940, the campaign in the Netherlands and France was over, and the second phase of the war had begun. Now that the French ports in the Bay of Biscay were available to the Germans, the pendulum of naval opinion once again swung towards carriers. In view of these developments, it was not difficult to convince the naval staff that aircraft carriers were a vital necessity to the operations of a balanced fleet.
In a meeting with Hitler, all readily agreed that the Graf Zeppelin must be completed and sent on trials. In addition, it was considered that cruisers equipped with flight decks were necessary for warfare against merchant shipping on the high seas. Taking advantage of this favorable period of the war, Raeder a few months later, in a memorandum for the report to Hitler, stressed the importance of building up the German Navy to the highest degree possible in anticipation of the eventual entry of the United States into the war. These new plans were wrecked, however, when German surface force warfare in the Atlantic collapsed with the loss of the battleship Bismarck.
Again work on the carrier was postponed by Hitler until after the end of Operation Barbarossa—the Russian campaign. Thus, in the Spring of 1941, the Graf Zeppelin’s construction had hardly progressed beyond its September, 1939, level. Since Hitler and the Naval Staff had twice in two years completely reversed their views on the value of aircraft carriers, it was not surprising that the Graf Zeppelin remained unfinished.
This second stop-work decision was made in the face of the successes of the British carrier planes in the May, 1941, Bismarck operation. Apparently the skillful handling of the carrier Ark Royal during the course of the pursuit and destruction of the Bismarck drove home to the Germans the value of the aircraft carrier in large scale operations. At a conference with Hitler in June, 1941, Raeder said, “If the battle group Bismarck had had its own carrier, the whole story might have been entirely different.” Notwithstanding this setback, Hitler was still optimistic that England was breaking up and the Russian campaign would end by September, 1941.
Hitler’s optimism, however, was not shared by the German Naval Staff. Faced with the prospect of a longer war than they had anticipated, the Naval Staff was beginning to realize that the Luftwaffe could be of little assistance to the Navy. This realization, together with the loss of the Bismarck, made the need for a carrier Fleet Air Arm all too clear to the Naval Staff.
By December, 1941, it was evident that the initial attack on Russia had failed to achieve victory. This failure, together with America’s entry into the war, complicated matters still further for the Naval War Staff. Allied convoys to Russia were getting through and increasing Russia’s capacity to resist. The unsuccessful offensive operation undertaken by the battleship Tirpitz from a base in northern Norway at the beginning of 1942 against Allied convoys PQ 12 and QP 8,1 showed that without a carrier, the Germans could not equal the British at sea. Only the greatest luck permitted the Tirpitz to beat off attacks by British carrier-borne aircraft.
Contemplating these new obstacles to victory of German surface craft in northern waters, German leaders again revised their attitude toward the need for aircraft carriers. Thus, in March, 1942, during a review of the naval situation, the completion of Graf Zeppelin was brought up for discussion. It was pointed out that it would take at least until the summer of 1943 to complete the hull and install the engines, provided that construction work in the harbors of Kiel and Wilhelmshaven was not interrupted by air raids.
Since the carrier Graf Zeppelin was originally designed and laid down as a passenger ship, its name was to have been Deutsche Werke, while its intended sister carrier, the Peter Strasser, also designed for passenger service, had been named the Germania. Both ships were laid down in 1936. Standard displacement of the Graf Zeppelin, as originally designed, was 19,250 tons, but the actual displacement was around 25,000 tons. Its length was 820 feet, while its beam was 88½ feet. As a carrier, the Graf Zeppelin was designed to carry fifty-five aircraft. The flight deck measured 790'X 88½' with three elevators installed to move the aircraft below to the hangar deck. Unlike American carriers, it had no side elevator. Planned armament included sixteen 5.9" antiaircraft guns, ten 4.1" antiaircraft guns, and twenty-two 73 mm antiaircraft guns. The designed top speed of the carrier was 34.5 knots, while its radius of action was estimated at about 6,000 nautical miles.
At this stage of the war, the carrier was considered of decisive importance for the operation of the German Navy’s heavy ships. Since aircraft were needed for the carrier, it was suggested to Hitler that Goering should investigate whether it might not be feasible to convert current models into carrier planes or to order the development of new carrier planes. When questioned about the aircraft types, Goering revealed that only a small number of the aircraft originally designed for the Graf Zeppelin were still available. There were enough for test runs of the carrier, but not for combat. Furthermore, construction could not be resumed at that time, and even if a new special carrier plane had been developed, mass production could not have started before 1946.
Thus, the only types of carrier planes the Luftwaffe could have delivered at that time were converted Me. 109 interceptors and Ju. 87 bombers, adaptations which were considered by the Navy to be inadequate and to have serious disadvantages. In addition to a minimum of ten interceptor planes, there were only 21 to 23 Ju. 87D’s and six of these were not ready for immediate use. The original plans had called for 33 bombers. There were no torpedo planes.
For flight operations aboard the carrier with these interim aircraft, it would have been necessary to re-design and construct new winches for the arresting gear. Furthermore, the flight deck and the hangar deck, as well as the elevators, would have had to be reinforced because of the increased weight of the planes. Technical difficulties involving taking off and landing the aircraft were also anticipated. It was estimated that a catapult would have to be used for all takeoffs except with a few Ju. 87D’s used for reconnaissance. They would be able to take off from the deck with favorable headwinds plus the speed of the ship.
The high speed of the BF 109T2 was considered another complication. Both adaptions were heavier than their Luftwaffe counterparts, and the Ju. 87D was considered unwieldy. With these aircraft in operation, it was believed that the whole rhythm of movement on the carrier would be slowed down, and the planes would be delayed in getting into action. Because of these difficulties, final completion of the entire carrier, including changes in flight installations for the planes, was estimated for the winter 1943-44.
In a summary to Hitler in April, 1942, the Naval Staff maintained, “The results of our efforts so far do not justify continuing work on the carrier. While the technical problems concerning ship construction and plane conversion can evidently be solved, the disadvantages which still remain reduce the carrier’s tactical value to a critical point. We must expect heavy losses which we cannot afford due to these causes. Take-off without catapult is possible only under favorable conditions; most of the planes depend completely on catapults; there is no smoke-laying equipment for aircraft available; the planes are too heavy and cumbersome; and the landing of the planes presents a difficult technical problem. The attempt to use converted aircraft should therefore be discouraged. If the Luftwaffe is not in a position to reconsider the construction of the originally planned carrier plane, the request for the development of a new plane especially adapted for aircraft carriers must be maintained.”
By May, 1942, Hitler, certain that the aircraft carrier and its protecting force of airplanes was indispensable for the operation of surface vessels, insisted that the Graf Zeppelin be completed as soon as possible. Time was slipping by, however, and because of difficulties in working conditions, the ship could not be readied for sea before autumn, 1944. In spite of these delays and setbacks, Hitler, for the time being, remained favorably disposed towards carriers and, as a further reinforcement to naval air power at sea, gave orders for the conversion of several ships into carriers. On May 13, 1942, therefore, in a conference with Minister Speer, Vice Admiral Krancks, and Rear Admiral Kleikamp, Hitler decided that the Europa, the Potsdam, the Gneisenau, and the Seydlilz be converted into auxiliary aircraft carriers. The Military Problems and Shipyards Branch, Naval Construction Division, were directed to have the plans ready in three months. Conversion of the ships was expected to take about twelve months from the time the necessary plans were made available.
Raeder, pleased as he was with Hitler’s instructions concerning the auxiliary carriers, realized that construction conditions had not improved since September, 1940. He was, therefore, insistent that priority ratings of submarines and everything affecting them not be disturbed by these other factors.
Already it was apparent that manpower requirements could not be expanded. The number of workers in the shipyards was insufficient to handle the work scheduled. At this time, Raeder found it necessary once again to press Hitler on the matter of Goering providing new carrier-type planes. Hitler, on the other hand, thought that problems of mass producing suitable types of carrier planes could be solved more easily now that there were to be five carriers instead of only one.
In spite of unfavorable developments in Germany’s campaigns, plans for the German post-war fleet were discussed at this time. Super battleships, up to 124,000 tons displacement, eight aircraft carriers and numerous' similar units were to be included. The construction of this fleet would have to be completed in twelve, or at the most, fifteen years.
About this time, Hitler expressed a belief that it was impossible to build up a naval air force during war. He still believed, however, in the necessity of accelerating construction of aircraft carriers even at that late date. It was pointed out to Hitler that a naval air force with excellent personnel and planes existed at the time the Air Ministry was established. Since that time, the Navy had attempted to maintain a Naval Air Arm trained in operations over the sea, equipped with planes suited to that kind of warfare; but the Luftwaffe had opposed the principle of the Naval Air Arm and had done everything possible to nullify its progress. Owing to Goering’s position within the Reich Government, the Naval Air Arm had never really had a chance.
Hitler’s belated respect for the aircraft carrier was borne out when, prior to the attack of the Norway surface forces on the Allied convoy, PQ 17, he expressed a belief that aircraft carriers constituted a great threat to the large vessels. It was considered mandatory that the Allied carriers be located prior to the attack and rendered harmless by Luftwaffe Ju. 88’s. The Luftwaffe, however, was unable to give precise information as to the location of the carriers, which were with the force covering the convoy proceeding around North Cape. Because of the Luftwaffe’s failure, the employment of the German heavy fleet units was held up. In the Naval Staff’s report on the failure of this operation, it was stated with resignation that the two attempts at employing heavy ships against the Allied convoys to Russia had been unsuccessful because of the British superiority in aircraft carriers.
When a few months later, convoy PQ-18 put to sea with a British escort carrier to strengthen the close escort of the convoy, Hitler again indicated to Raeder that unnecessary losses were to be avoided. Under these conditions, Raeder believed that lacking coordinated naval air cover he could not accept responsibility for the risk entailed, and so cancelled the operation. Goering’s Luftwaffe, on the other hand, attacked the convoy with a great number of planes over a period of several days. The action was fierce and while a number of ships were lost, the carrier took a heavy toll of the attackers.
It was not only at sea that the value of the aircraft carrier was evident. British carriers carried out attacks against German shore bases in northern Norway and against German shipping off the Norwegian coast. This endangered German sea transportation, which was indispensable for the German-Arctic front against Russia. Already overtaxed, the small escort forces of the German Navy and the Luftwaffe could not cope with the problem. The ensuing problems resulted in the diversion of troop transports through the Baltic to the Gulf of Bothnia and brought about delays. It is accepted that British carrier operations in northern waters contributed greatly to relieving the pressure on the Russian Army in the north during the winter of 1941-1942.
The aircraft carrier also played a vital part in the U-boat war. Because there were extensive areas in the mid-Atlantic which British shore-based reconnaissance planes could not reach, German U-boats were able to operate with greater freedom. During the summer and autumn of 1942, some of the largest convoy battles were fought in these areas, resulting in heavy losses to British shipping. In closing this gap in the Atlantic, escort carriers, used most effectively, brought about the eventual defeat of the German U-boat.
On June 15, 1942, Raeder briefed Hitler on the progress of plans for auxiliary aircraft carriers. He promised that plans would be submitted within a week and that four weeks later preliminary construction would reach the stage where the materials could be ordered. The ships under consideration for conversion and their complement of planes included:
Europa |
18 bombers 24 fighters |
Potsdam |
8 bombers 12 fighters |
Seydlitz |
12 bombers 6 fighters |
Gneisenau |
8 bombers 12 fighers |
Raeder did not believe it would pay to convert Seydlitz, which was 90% completed, since the superstructure of the vessel would have to be removed to the level of the armor deck.
Immediately following the poor showing in the action between the Hipper group and a British force in Norwegian waters on December 30, 1942, Hitler criticized the morale of the Navy and raved about the uselessness of his big ships. This tirade proved to be the breaking point; as a consequence, Raeder asked for his release and Doenitz took over the command of the German Navy on January 30, 1943. Hitler exhibited a more reasonable mood, however, on January 6, 1943, during talks with the Commander in Chief Navy. Although still critical of the Navy’s large ships, he pointed out how important in the present unfavorable situation it was for all fighting power to be brought into action. Furthermore, while the Navy’s large ships rode idly at anchor for months, they required constant protection by the Luftwaffe as well as smaller surface craft.
At this time, Hitler directed Raeder to prepare a last memorandum giving his views on the following problems:
1. Should the three aircraft carriers (Europa, Potsdam, Gneisenau) which were planned, be retained?
2. Should other ships be converted into aircraft carriers?
3. Are the Hipper and the Prince Eugene, because of their great speed, more suited than the Luetzow and the Scheer, which have more extensive operating radius?
4. If the latter were lengthened, could they develop greater speed and be given a larger landing deck?
Raeder rarely had an opportunity to comment, but his final impression was that Hitler, even though he described his decision as final, would reconsider some of his views if sound arguments were presented. But notwithstanding a favorable view towards the carrier, Raeder knew that it was now too late to push the matter further.
On February 2, 1943, a plan was approved by Hitler for the big ships of the German Navy to be paid off in such a way that no sudden work stoppage would be noticeable. This plan included the aircraft carriers, and work finally ceased on ships of this type which were building or being converted.
In retrospect, the Naval War Staff was very bitter about the lack of capital ships. A memorandum on the German Battleships produced by them in May, 1944, stated: “If only there had been German battleships supported by a strong German Naval Air Force in the Mediterranean, there would have been no Tunis, no Sicily, no Salerno, no Nettuno.”
Certainly the German Navy could have had an aircraft carrier to support its operations on the high seas if the value of the carrier had not been underestimated and work on it abandoned before the practical need arose. Continual vacillation by Hitler inspired by Goering’s greed for absolute power over everything connected with aviation, completely wrecked any chance the Navy might have had in completing an aircraft carrier.
The same plot with a similar denouncement but with Fascist actors was played in Italy. While the Italians matched the Germans’ inaction by failing to provide a carrier component for their fleet, it soon became apparent that the carrier was valuable even in the limited area of the Mediterranean. It was the mistake of the Italian Naval leaders to regard Italy itself as a “Flattop” equal to the aircraft carriers of the British, not taking into account the fact that the length of the Mediterranean made it possible for both belligerents to be well beyond the range of each other’s shorebased planes. While the British carriers stationed at both ends of the Mediterranean were not deterred by this circumstance, the Italians on the other hand had none of these ships.
Italy’s course was determined in 1923 when Mussolini decreed that Italy should have a separate Air Force, thereby depriving the Navy of its own Air Arm. This eventually hastened the Italian Navy’s defeat in the Mediterranean, for once aviation was handed over to the Italian Air Force, the Navy became a fleet without eyes. Only one concession was squeezed out of Mussolini: he allowed catapult planes aboard the battleships and cruisers. This proved of little value, however, since they were not manned by naval officers, but by fliers who belonged to, and had been trained by, the Air Force.
The pre-war recommendation of the Navy that an aircraft carrier be built got nowhere, for the Italian Air Force insisted that, in the event of war with France, shore-based aircraft would be able to take over the necessary flying operations in the confines of the Tyrrhenian Sea or over the immediate area of the western Mediterranean. Money, therefore, need not be wasted on carriers since Italy itself was a huge flattop jutting into the Mediterranean. The Italian Air Force estimated that from Italy’s 120,000 square-mile deck, her planes could dominate and control the entire sea and at the same time give aerial assistance to the fleet. This strategy would obviate—the Air Force said —the necessity of taking the great risk attached to all carriers which, from their point of view, were extremely vulnerable.
In the early disputes between the two services, which raged from 1923 to 1927, Mussolini decided against the Italian Navy. The Air Force’s argument of “Italy the flat- top” was considered only a cloak for their real reason for fighting carriers—it was not desired that the Navy should regain control over its own Air Arm.
The battle for carriers raged for ten more years. Even the intervention of Grand Admiral Thaon de Revel, leader of the victorious fleets in the First World War and Minister of Marine during the twenties, failed to win the Navy its objective. In 1936, Mussolini placed a gag on the Italian Navy and they were ordered to stop agitating for carriers. As a result, the Italian Navy went to war against the British without an aircraft carrier, a shortcoming that was to prove disastrous.
From the beginning of the war, there was a decided difference in power in the Mediterranean, owing to the fact that the British dominated the sea with their carriers. Because the Italian air force was inadequate and certainly not skilled in naval warfare, it was tied down to land fighting and its effectiveness over coastal waters was limited. Even in the central Mediterranean, the fighting efficiency of the Italian Fleet was considerably lower than that of the British Fleet supported by carriers. A determining factor was the lack of adequate cover for the Italian Fleet owing to the limited range of their fighter aircraft.
During the first engagement between the two navies at the Battle of Punto Stilo, in July, 1940, the British Alexandria Fleet, with its aircraft carriers, was able to operate successfully out of range of Italian shore- based fighters. The ensuing action was inconclusive as both fleets were escorting convoys and were restricted in their movements. Towards the end of the engagement, the Italian Air Force put in an appearance and proceeded to attack the Italian ships. For six hours they had to fight off seventeen attacks by their own planes. Little damage was done, however, as the Air Force’s marksmanship was poor. A few months later, the lack of an aircraft carrier again proved disastrous to the Italians. Sailing from Taranto, the Italian Fleet was intercepted by aircraft from a British carrier, and the Italian sortie failed in its purpose.
The use of carriers not only made for British supremacy in naval operations at sea, but also made its effect felt when its power was used against Libyan harbors, the Taranto Naval Base, and Italian ports in the Western Mediterranean. In the February, 1941, carrier attack against the ports of Genoa, Spezia, and Leghorn, the British were required to maneuver their ships close to the coast of Italy. Owing to the risk involved in this operation, the Italian Naval Staff wished to take advantage of the situation by deploying its own fleet west of Sardinia in greater strength than the British. To bring the British force to action on its way back through the strait between Corsica and the French coast, the Italian Air Force had to find the British and determine their course.
In spite of the proximity of Italian air bases, fighters from the British carrier successfully prevented the Italian Air Force from making, the necessary observations and the Italians failed again in the operation. The carrier had proved a vital asset in extracting the British from an unfavorable situation; and by failing to intercept this force, the Italian Navy missed one of its best opportunities of the war.
Just as the defeat of the Bismarck had disturbed Hitler, so the Battle of Cape Matapan caused Mussolini to reconsider his earlier decisions on the value of aircraft carriers. The action developed between March 27 and 29, 1941, while the Italian fleet was attempting to break the British line of communications which extended between Greece and Alexandria, Egypt. This operation had been strongly backed by the German Luftwaffe, which had promised maximum air cover.
After coordinating the operation with the Italian Air Ministry and cooperating with Supermarine and German Luftwaffe to guarantee the greatest air support, the Italian fleet departed for the area of attack. At noon of the first day out, the Italian fleet was sighted by a British Sunderland flying boat. Although the Italian air coverage failed to appear and Alexandria was not bombed by the Luftwaffe as planned because of bad weather, the Italian fleet was ordered to steam ahead and on the following morning a catapult plane from the battleship Vittorio Veneto sighted the British fleet.
After establishing contact, the British carrier Formidable launched Swordfish torpedo planes against the Italian Fleet. Throughout the afternoon, the carrier planes continued to attack the Italian Ships. Later these carrier planes were joined in the attack by land-based bombers and fighters from Crete. During this day of air attack, the Italian Fleet was fairly helpless, having only anti-aircraft guns for defense. Neither the Italian Air Force nor the Luftwaffe put in an appearance.
Later that night, after the torpedo bombers had crippled the Italian Fleet, the British Fleet, aided by radar, surprised and sank five Italian ships. After the sinkings, the British began rescue operations, meanwhile radioing Rome, in the clear, that several hundred men were in the sea and suggesting that a hospital ship be sent.
At this point the Italian Air Force chose to put in an appearance and fell upon the British with savage fury. Misplaced bombs and wild strafing scarcely damaged the British ships but succeeded only in driving the British away from their rescue operations.
In April, 1941, after the fleet disaster at Matapan, Mussolini, realizing the blunder in naval planning, reversed his earlier decision and rushed to provide the Navy with aircraft carriers. He stated that this was necessary “as planes based on land cannot carry out the flying operations necessary at sea.”
To expedite work, the liner Roma was chosen to be converted into a carrier and renamed the Aquila (Eagle). Launched in 1926, the liner Roma had a gross tonnage of 30,800 and a top speed of 21 knots. Conversion of this liner for military transport service had already started at Genoa in early 1941. Its conversion called for a displacement of 27,000 tons fully loaded. Its flight deck was 709 feet long and 83 feet wide. Armament was to consist of eight 5.3" 45 caliber guns, twelve 64 mm guns, and eighty-two 20 mm guns. The Aquila was to carry thirty-six aircraft with fourteen additional planes suspended from the overhead in the hangar.
The hangar, 500 feet long, 59 feet wide and 16 feet high, was divided by screens into four sections. Two elevators, 44X48 feet, had a capacity of five tons each and were located fairly close together, one being exactly amid- ship and the other about 90 feet forward. Two five-ton cranes were carried.
The Aquila was equipped with the usual two catapults designed to launch a deck load of sixty aircraft in one hour, one aircraft every two minutes. Placed on the port and starboard side of the flight deck, they consisted of a set of rails over which a catapult sledge rolled.
From a recognition viewpoint, the superstructure of the Italian carrier was similar to British aircraft carriers. In planning the construction of the ship, the Italians were assisted by German engineers. As a matter of interest, a good deal of the equipment originally intended for the German Graf Zeppelin was transferred to the Aquila. The four engines of the Italian carrier were designed to give the ship a 32-knot top speed.
The conversion of the Roma to a carrier was the subject of bitter jealousy on the part of the Navy and the Air Force. It was very natural that the Navy desired complete control of the carrier, but the Air Force remained obdurate and the differing policies of the two services impeded the program. These difficulties were aggravated by construction troubles involving the flight deck. It appeared impossible to design and install a satisfactory arresting system.
In July, 1943, despite the hundreds of obstacles, the carrier neared completion, with trials scheduled for that fall. The engines and catapults were completed a few months later and successful tests were carried out at Genoa. Unfortunately, for the Italians, no suitable aircraft were available. At one time it had been planned to use German crews, as they had progressed further in the training of pilots for carrier work. It was not expected that the forthcoming trials would be altogether successful owing to the faulty arresting gear system which would not allow the planes to land aboard. The plan was for the aircraft to take off from the carrier and after carrying out their mission, fly to the nearest shore and land. At one time, the Italians considered using the Re-2005 type aircraft aboard the carrier.
Notwithstanding these technical difficulties, the job was made harder by Allied air raids. After the Italian armistice, an attempt was made by the Germans to close the narrow gate at Genoa, between the old and the new port, by sinking the incompleted carrier. The attempt failed.
A sister ship, Spaviero, ex-Augustus, was put in hand for conversion to a carrier in March, 1942. At Genoa, portions of the Augustus were removed, including the masts, the forward funnel and the bridge, and the top decks were stripped away. In December, 1942, the hull was moved to Molo Vecchio in Genoa and work stopped. Work was resumed in March, 1943, and in September it was estimated that one year would be required for its completion.
Actually the difficult task of converting large Italian passenger liners was made practically impossible by the reduced efficiency of Italian shipyards and industry. In such circumstances, it was inevitable that no carrier could be completed before the end of the war. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Aquila was about 80% completed when the Italian Armistice came on September 8, 1943.
In August, 1943, while being transported to the island of Maddalena for safe keeping, Mussolini in retrospect bemoaned the fact that he had failed to build aircraft carriers and torpedo planes. His mistake, he believed, had been his yielding to the opinion of the aviators who were, in final analysis, experts, and were supposed to know much more about it than he.
The Axis powers in Europe did not have aircraft carriers on hand because they had mistakenly assumed that carrier missions could be performed by shore-based aircraft. This assumption, made in peacetime, proved unsound in war. Again and again, it was driven home to the pseudo-military geniuses of the Axis powers that control of the sea is dependent upon the control of the air over it directed by the operational command of the naval forces in the area. This control is based on aircraft in the air at the point of contact, not on planes en route or on the ground. To the detriment of Axis naval operations, the support given by shore-based aircraft was to all practical purposes pitifully inadequate.
The Germans and Italians, in neglecting to consider the carrier seriously, created a one-sided instrument of war. Their preconceived opinions and assumptions that the war would be won by use of land forces and land-based air resulted in a fatal underestimation of the requirements of naval air power and the value of carrier warfare. In disregarding the aircraft carrier, the Axis attempts at countering Allied sea power without support from the air were doomed to failure. While on the other hand, contrary to the voices of doom, World War II proved conclusively that aircraft carriers were capable of providing effective naval air power for the control of the seas.
1. “PQ” was the designation for Russian-bound convoys, and “QP” for those returning.
2. Same as Me. 109; BF—Bayerische Flyzengwerke, superseded by Messerschmitt Firm. The letter “T” following the identification number, 109, indicates “Trager” (carrier).