A principal provision of the Potsdam Declaration of July 25, 1945, setting forth the conditions of a Japanese surrender, called for the restriction of Japanese sovereignty to the home islands and “such minor islands” as the victorious powers might determine. In effect, this meant the utter destruction of the Japanese Empire which had been so laboriously constructed during the preceding seventy years. At the close of hostilities the United States, in keeping with this aim, proceeded to occupy all of Japan’s island possessions in the central and western Pacific. Since 1945 the United States has continued to occupy and to administer these territories.
Perhaps the most valuable of the former Japanese islands occupied by the United States is Okinawa. The legal basis for its occupation, however, differed from that involved in the deprivation of Japan of other territories in her Empire. At the Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences it had been agreed that Japan was to be divested of those areas acquired during her long career of force and aggression. Okinawa, however, had been acquired by Japan under circumstances not specifically covered by the wartime agreements. While, thus, military occupation was justified by the Potsdam Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender of September 2, 1945, the problem of the ultimate political disposition of Okinawa remained ill-defined. It is because of these peculiar considerations that various Japanese governments since 1945 have entertained high hopes for the recovery of the island.
After the close of World War II Okinawa was to acquire an even greater strategic importance than ever before. Because of political and military changes throughout the Far East the island was to become a keystone of the free world’s security system in the western Pacific area. As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared upon the occasion of the return of the small island group, the Amami-Gunto, to Japan in December, 1953, the restoration of Okinawa to its former owner could not be considered in the foreseeable future. In view of its strategic position Okinawa continues to remain under American military occupation, its political fate still being uncertain.
Militarily advantageous as control of Okinawa may be at the present time, its continued occupation by the United States has engendered many serious political problems. At a time when the United States is attempting to rally and to strengthen the peoples and governments of Asia against the expanding forces of Communism, the problem of the disposition of Okinawa has become increasingly complex, for Okinawa has in many ways become a world problem. If Americans are properly to appreciate the immense and intricate task of devising policies to promote peace and security, an understanding of the Okinawan problem is necessary.
II
Okinawa is the principal island of a long chain, known as the Ryukyus, strung out over a distance of some five hundred miles from the main Japanese island of Kyushu in the north almost as far as Formosa in the south. The island of Okinawa, situated in the central part of the archipelago, is about sixty miles long and two to fourteen wide. Its land area is about one-third of the 935 square miles made up of some fifty-five islands. The climate is subtropical, a moderating influence being exerted by the Kuro Shio, the “Gulf Stream” of the western Pacific, and by the Ogasawara Current. Unfortunately for the inhabitants of the island, the typhoon paths of the western Pacific criss-cross the area. Many a member of the American occupation forces will never forget the furious blow of July, 1949, which caused about $100,000,000 damage.
Little, unfortunately, is known of the early history of Okinawa. The entire Ryukyu archipelago, it is believed, was largely settled by branch streams of the emigrants who crossed to the main Japanese islands from the adjoining continent several thousand years ago and also, perhaps, by aboriginal inhabitants forced southward by the powerful newcomers. In medieval times the lords of Satsuma in Kyushu advanced vague claims to sovereignty over the southern islands. Though the precise nature of these claims is not too clear, the more positive and concrete claims put forward by Japan in later centuries were to rest upon these early relations.
Relations with distant China traditionally are dated from 605 A.D. but remained sporadic until 1372, a memorable year in the history of Okinawa. At that time the founder of the Ming Dynasty incorporated Okinawa and its surrounding islands into the Chinese tributary system. This tributary relationship between the King (or “kinglet,” as a wit has put it) of Okinawa and the Emperor of China was maintained for the next five hundred years.
The tributary relationship between Okinawa and China was to be greatly complicated by developments of the early seventeenth century. In 1609 the feudal lord of the powerful Kyushu fief of Satsuma dispatched an army of conquest to Okinawa and compelled the King to acknowledge the overlordship of Satsuma. In order, however, to carry on an otherwise forbidden trade with China, through the agency of Okinawa, Satsuma permitted the tributary relationship between Okinawa and China to continue. A curious political situation was thus created. For more than two hundred and fifty years Okinawa existed under the domination of Satsuma, whose overlordship was frequently acknowledged by the King; simultaneously China rested content with periodic expressions of Chinese suzerainty by the King of Okinawa.
In the nineteenth century, when western trading relations with the Far East were greatly expanded, Europeans and Americans occasionally visited the island. Perhaps the high point in western contact with Okinawa was in 1853-1854 when Commodore Perry’s expedition stopped off at the island during the course of the mission to open Japan. A treaty providing for the proper care of visiting American ships and sailors was negotiated with the Okinawan government. This agreement was of no great importance or consequence, since the island was far removed from the new Pacific steamship routes which were then in process of being established. It did, nevertheless, represent the first real breach in the isolationist policy of Okinawa.
The repercussions of the opening of Japan to relations with the outside world and of the Revolution of 1868 which followed shortly thereafter were not long in being felt in Okinawa. The Japanese government quickly determined to clarify the legally confused relationships which bound Okinawan loyalties to both China and Japan and, in 1871, forced the issue of sovereignty over Okinawa to a head. By skillful diplomacy the Japanese completely outmaneuvered China and in 1879 Okinawa and the entire Ryukyu archipelago were incorporated into the Japanese Empire. Though never officially approved by China, the act was given the stamp of recognition by the Western powers.
If Okinawa did not prosper as part of the Japanese Empire, the lack of success may not be attributed to Japanese policies. More important doubtlessly was the essential poverty of the island and its remoteness from overseas markets. Stimulate agricultural production, and develop secondary occupations as they would, the Japanese were to observe their achievements offset by a constant and rapid growth in population. When the United States occupied Okinawa in 1945 and thousands of former emigrants were compulsorily repatriated, the island was to be- come one of the most densely populated areas in the entire world. Before 1945 Okinawa was, thus, from a purely economic point of view, a liability to Japan.
To Japan, Okinawa was of far greater strategic than economic value. Less than two days sailing distance from the home islands, Okinawa lay athwart the southern approaches to Japan. Together with the Bonins and Iwo-Jima, not too far away to the northeast, and with Formosa, acquired as a result of the Sino-Japanese War, Okinawa was to become a vital part of a Japanese ring of advanced military and naval bases in the western Pacific. Although the Japanese did not exploit fully the naval potentialities of the island, with the rapid development of air power after World War I, a major base was constructed on Okinawa. At no time probably since its acquisition did the Japanese appreciate the worth of the island more than when the fall of Saipan and of Iwo Jima in World War II exposed the entire flank of the Japanese home islands to attack.
The American assault on Okinawa in 1945 was designed to secure a forward air base for the bombing of Japan as well as a staging area for the invasion of the enemy’s homeland which was expected shortly to follow. With the exception of perhaps Formosa no other island in the central and western Pacific was as well suited for these purposes as Okinawa. Possessing a large surface area by Pacific island standards, relatively level terrain in the southern part, and proximity to the Japanese home islands, Okinawa was deemed necessary for the launching of the final battle of the war. Naval and air bases on the island would, moreover, not only facilitate the softening up of Japan but would also help to choke off the remaining supply lines between the continent and Japan.
The Okinawan operation was fated to become one of the most memorable of the entire Pacific war. Before the initial landings were carried out, an overwhelming concentration of naval and air power was hurled against Japanese defenses in the entire western Pacific area. While famous Task Force 58 under Admiral Raymond Spruance roamed the seas from Japan to Formosa on a mission of destruction, American planes from the Marianas, the Philippines, and China pounded Japanese bases, installations, and shipping. The return of British sea power to the Pacific war was marked by the appearance of Task Force 57, a battleship and four carriers thirsting to avenge the ill-fated Prince of Wales and Repulse. When finally troops of the Tenth Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, stormed ashore on April 1, 1945, some 1,400 American ships carrying several hundred thousand men had successfully made rendezvous off Okinawa.
The struggle for Okinawa was to drag on for eighty-two agonizing days and nights. Before the island could be declared “secured” on June 21, it was necessary to overcome a desperately resisting garrison of almost 120,000 men, all but three or four thousand of whom were killed. American casualties for the entire campaign totaled about 12,000 killed and about 35,000 wounded. As bloody and exacting an ordeal as the Okinawan operation was ashore, it was no less so afloat. For the Fifth Fleet, the campaign was, as an observer put it, “a continuing crisis, with the fleet, including its hundreds of auxiliaries, paying a price without precedent.” Harassed by air attacks and by swarms of kamikaze planes, endangered by suicide-boats, by “baka” bombs, and by coastal artillery fire, the Navy suffered almost 10,000 casualties, slightly more being killed than wounded. Thirty-five ships of various types were sunk and 299 incurred varying degrees of damage. Although the high cost of the conquest of Okinawa was to evoke much bitter criticism, the operation was to be defended because of the immediate and long-range strategic advantages obtained.
The fall of Okinawa on June 21, 1945, marked the culmination of the American drive across the central Pacific and the end of major battle in the war against Japan. Even while the last-ditch remnants of the Japanese garrison were being mopped up, a tremendous array of military strength was being assembled on the island in preparation for an invasion of Japan. Before it became necessary to launch this final campaign, however, the Japanese government accepted the conditions of surrender laid down at the Potsdam Conference. Forces from Okinawa were consequently immediately dispatched to occupy Japan and neighboring Korea.
Considering the war aims of the United States and its allies as well as the mood and temper of the many peoples who had been arrayed against Japan during the war, the occupation of Okinawa and the other islands of the Ryukyu archipelago by the United States is understandable. Determined to destroy Japan as a military and naval power and to take precautions against a resurgence of Japanese might, the defeated nation was to be completely demilitarized. At the same time it was hoped that the political changes in the Far East resulting from the war would contribute to the realization of this aim. With Russian power firmly established in Eastern Siberia, the Kuriles, and Sakhalin; with a free and independent Korea; with a Nationalist China supreme on the continent and on Formosa; and with American power entrenched in the Ryukyus, Bonins, and the Marianas, Japan, it was anticipated, would be hemmed in by a cordon of Western and Asian strength. In such a scheme of power Okinawa could play an important role.
It is important to note that American control of Okinawa in 1945 was justified as a measure necessary to control Japan. Much as some Asian peoples, hypersensitive about imperialism, may have been uneasy at the thought of Western power entrenched in the western Pacific, memories of Japanese aggression were still fresh and vivid. It is clear that no significant objections were raised against the policy, set forth at Potsdam, of restricting Japanese sovereignty to the home islands. American occupation of Okinawa was thus implementation of a war aim which commanded widespread sympathy and support.
From the outset it was difficult for the United States to formulate a clear-cut policy with respect to Okinawa. But uncertain as the United States may have been about the political future of Okinawa, it was evident that the military occupation and administration of the island constituted a serious problem. With the establishment of American authority in Okinawa, its more than one half million inhabitants had become wards of the United States. Perhaps in no comparable area in the entire world had a people been rendered so destitute by the war as those of Okinawa. During the military operations Okinawa had literally been pulverized. As one member of the occupation forces said, “By the time the island was ‘officially’ secured on June 21, 1945, the operations of the United States and Japanese forces had destroyed practically everything that was above ground. . . . Unless one has actually seen the before and the after, it is almost impossible to comprehend the complete change in the whole appearance of the island. . . . The whole society as it had existed was for all practical purposes destroyed.”
The reconstruction and rehabilitation of Okinawa was literally a process of building from the ground up. Homes, schools, government buildings, hospitals, and warehouses had to be constructed. Roads had to be repaired, railroad lines be built anew, and port facilities replaced. Military operations having destroyed the crops in the fields as well as food stocks, provision had to be made for the feeding of over one-half million people. Medical care had to be provided for wounded civilians and public health facilities established to prevent the spread of disease among the horribly overcrowded inhabitants of the island. The economic life of the island had to be restored or replaced and the institutions of organized communities, political, social, and judicial, set up. Though progress was rather slow during the first two or three years, the appreciation of the Okinawans for the efforts of the occupying forces was well attested by their general good will.
What really hastened the program of reconstruction on Okinawa and simultaneously reduced the uncertainties in American policy were the sweeping political and military changes in the Far East from 1948 through 1950. In Korea Russian duplicity and intransigeance had cemented the division of that unfortunate country and laid the seeds for strife and war. With the military victory of Mao Tse-tung in China and the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek to Formosa in late 1949 and early 1950, the non-Communist position in East Asia had been reduced to a flimsy foothold in South Korea, to Nationalist Formosa, and to Occupied Japan. In Southeast Asia Communist parties had launched a whirlwind of terror and violence. In view of these developments in Eastern and Southeastern Asia, it is not surprising that the strategic importance of Okinawa was considered in a radically new light.
It was customary when Okinawa was originally occupied in 1945, and for several years thereafter, to evaluate the strategic position of the island in terms of air distances to key centers in Japan. With the revision of military thought concerning the function of Okinawa, however, a rapid buildup of air strength on the island took place. Airfields previously constructed for the containment of Japan were now hurriedly strengthened and supplemented. Before long there had been brought into being on Okinawa one of the most powerful complexes of airfields in the entire East, placing American air power, if necessary, in striking position against aggressive Communism throughout most of Asia. The China coast lay but 400 miles to the west, Peking, a mere 1150 miles distant, was within easy bomber range, while the Lake Baikal area of Central Siberia lay but 1000 miles further beyond. From bases on Okinawa, Japan, and the Philippines it was possible to patrol the entire coast of the Asian continent from Kamchatka to Singapore.
Of more immediate consideration, however, was actual war in Korea. Since the entire peninsula was within effective striking distance, it was not long after hostilities commenced that planes from Okinawa were conducting regular sorties against Communist-held positions in North Korea. The combination of fighters, based in Korea and Japan, and of bombers, based in Japan and Okinawa, was to provide the United Nations with the air supremacy in Korea which frequently marked the difference between victory and defeat. Whatever reservations about the strategic value of Okinawa were held before the Korean War, they were quickly dispelled during the course of the conflict.
As the United States became increasingly aware of the immense strategic value of Okinawa during the Korean conflict, it was simultaneously confronted with the necessity of making some decision with respect to its political disposition. As developments throughout the Far East and the world forced upon the United States the decision to terminate the military occupation of Japan and to conclude a peace treaty, the backwash was immediately felt on Okinawa. It was evident that the little island, which had for so many centuries existed off the beaten tracks of the world, had become inextricably involved in global politics and that its political fate was a matter of concern to nations in both the East and the West. It was, consequently, predictable that no solution of the problem of Okinawa could hope to satisfy the demands of all the interested governments and peoples and that few of the forthcoming proposals would meet with the approval of the people of Okinawa.
Okinawans have on the whole been pleased with the conduct of the American occupation. There is little doubt that the generosity and magnanimity of the United States Government and the cordiality of the occupying forces have made a favorable and lasting impression upon the island’s inhabitants. Thoughtful Okinawans have, however, been perturbed, realizing that postwar Okinawa rests upon an artificial and insecure foundation. In the event of a sizable reduction in or of a complete withdrawal of the American military base, it is most likely that the economy and way of life so painfully reconstructed during the occupation period would immediately collapse.
Many Okinawans understand that the material and other benefits of the military occupation cannot be expected to last indefinitely. They desire, consequently, a definitive solution to their fate and one which is oriented to the realities of Okinawan life. Independence, it is understood, is economically unfeasible. The establishment of a United Nations mandate or trusteeship, deemed the same by Okinawans, is considered degrading. In view of the attitude of Okinawans, any solution for the disposition of the island which does not hold out a reasonable prospect for the restoration of Japanese sovereignty in the near future can thus only serve to stir up resentment against the United States.
Far more complex than fulfilling the wishes of Okinawans is the problem of satisfying the Japanese. Although they have not protested against the disposition made of the greater part of their Empire after World War II, many Japanese have been deeply aroused by proposals that Okinawa be permanently alienated. Conveniently forgetting that Okinawa was militarily occupied to prevent the resurgence of aggressive militarism, it is maintained, and correctly so, that the island was not seized forcefully by Japan under the conditions outlined in the Potsdam Declaration, and that it should consequently have been restored to Japan upon the establishment of peaceful relations with the United Nations. Such was the position taken by Prime Minister Yoshida during the negotiations leading to the Treaty of San Francisco in 1951.
What responsible Japanese political leaders really think about the problem of Okinawa is difficult to say. For nationalistic reasons it is necessary to clamor for the restoration of the island to Japanese sovereignty. To do otherwise would in many instances be political suicide. As long as Okinawa remains under American control, incorrigible jingoists and imperialists will rant about insult and injustice; Communists will raise charges of truckling to American imperialism, finding receptive ears not only in Japan but throughout Asia. In such a dangerous political atmosphere it is expedient for Japanese political leaders to tread warily and to be careful of their every statement on Okinawa.
There can be little doubt that, despite their official declarations, many Japanese statesmen are privately reluctant to consider the restoration of Okinawa at the present time or even in the near future. They are familiar enough with conditions on Okinawa at the present moment to realize that the return of the island would entail a far greater financial and economic burden upon Japan than during the days of the Empire. At a time when Japan is struggling desperately to recover from the effects of World War II, when the stimulus to the Japanese economy provided by the Korean War is in process of being withdrawn, it is evident that additional responsibilities in Okinawa might well be ruinous.
Were the problems of the island’s fate restricted to the interests and wishes of the United States, Japan, and Okinawa, it would not be difficult to devise a mutually satisfactory solution. Okinawa, under these conditions, might well be restored to Japan with guarantees that the United States continue to maintain and operate its elaborate and expensive military installations. Such a solution, entailing substantial financial outlays by our government, would perhaps meet the security requirements of the United States, the nationalistic aspirations and present economic difficulties of Japan, and the hopes and needs of the people of Okinawa. There is little doubt, however, that this arrangement would arouse the opposition and criticism of many of the governments of the Far East and Pacific.
It is difficult for many Americans to appreciate the trepidation of Asian nations when suggestions are made that the post-war restrictions against Japan be lifted. The primary enemy in Asia is considered by Americans to be Communism. Although many Asian governments share our concern, they are as greatly, if not more, frightened by the thought of militarism reborn in Japan. Having felt the direct impact of Japanese expansionism in the twentieth century, few of these nations are willing to relax their vigilance or to curb their fears. Any concession to Japan which directly or indirectly bears upon the revival of her pre-war military and naval position can be counted upon to awaken protest from the Republic of Korea, Nationalist China, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. With all of these governments, save that of Chiang Kai-shek, the United States has concluded Mutual Security Pacts. Insofar as the United States is concerned, these pacts, as in the case of that with Japan, are designed to provide for defense against expanding Communism. Our allies, however, consider them equally applicable against a distrusted Japan. Any disposition of Okinawa which ignores these real and living fears would, thus only serve to arouse alarm among our Pacific allies.
Considering the many conflicting views and interests in the matter, it is evident that a final solution of the Okinawan problem was not achieved in the Treaty of San Francisco. Article Three of the Peace Treaty with Japan provided that, until such time as the United States proposed and the United Nations agreed to the establishment of a trusteeship under the United States, this country was to have “the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction” over the Ryukyu archipelago. Under this arrangement the requirements of the United States for security against Communism, and the desire of our Pacific allies for protection against both Communism and Japan, were satisfied. Needless to say, such an outcome hardly met the expectations of either Japan or Okinawa, while India was so incensed at the proposal for the retention of the island by the United States that she refused to attend the peace conference and to sign the peace treaty. All in all, the Treaty of San Francisco postponed rather than settled the problem of Okinawa.
That Okinawa remains a delicate issue is well attested by the reaction to the announcement of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles during Christmas week of 1953 that the Amam-Gunto was to be restored to Japan. Despite the fact that the United States was authorized to continue to operate radar and weather stations in these northern islands of the Ryukyu chain, protests were immediately forthcoming from some of Japan’s former enemies. While these objections could be politely ignored, since it was simultaneously made clear that the United States would not relax its hold on the main island of Okinawa, the incident served to emphasize the persistence of the basic problem.
All evidence at the present lime seems to indicate that the United States intends to remain in Okinawa for a long time to come. The assurance that American jurisdiction over the island will be maintained, despite the prospect of increasingly vociferous objections by Japanese and Okinawans, facilitates in many ways planning for the further development of the existing military base. Having proved its worth in the defense of Korea, there can be little doubt that the island will loom large in plans and projects to repel the further advance of Communism in the East. Okinawa, which was known before the invasion of 1945, according to Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, only to American historians, geographers, and missionaries, has become a key to the free world’s security system in the western Pacific.
Vital strategically as Okinawa is, the political implications of continued American control should not be overlooked. Given the political turmoil in the East today, the temporary retention of the island by the United States is undoubtedly necessary. That the United States, however, should not retain indefinite control over Okinawa is undeniable. In the present atmosphere of international tension and anxiety, there is little hope for a permanent and successful solution to the problem of Okinawa’s fate. Such a solution is likely only when there are reasonable prospects for peace and security in the Pacific and Far East.