Professional Notes

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United States..................................................................................................... 450

The Core of Naval Power Is the Carrier Task Force—Work on Super Car­rier Saratoga Proceeding—President’s Action Heralds New Impetus for Psychological Warfare

U.S.S.R................................................................................................................... 454

Russian Army Held Riddled with Anti-Soviet Elements—Sea Routes North of Russia Described—How Many Russians Support the Soviet Regime?— Soviet Fortifying Baltic in Attempt to Form a Russian Lake—Mission of Russian Navy Discussed

Other Countries..................................................................................................... 460

French Vice-Admiral Nomy Looks Ahead—British Observations on Ameri­can Aircraft Design—Norwegian Newspaper Reveals Soviet Air Bases Near Border

Science..................................................................................................................    463

Low Frequency Radio Ranges Blamed for Air Force Crashes in Alaska—■ Human Behavior Research Spurred by Large Gift from Ford Foundation

UNITED STATES

The Core of Naval Power Is the Carrier Task Force

Ordnance, January-February, 1953.—In the final analysis, victory in war is brought about by the application of intolerable pres­sures on the peoples of enemy nations. It is the destruction of the enemy’s will to con­tinue to resist. The end result is sometimes achieved by physical occupation of enemy territory and the taking over of enemy insti­tutions and government.

Can this happen to us? If so, how could it come to pass that our country could be occupied and our people governed by an enemy?

The history of less than a hundred years is useful to us. French territory has been oc­cupied three times by enemy power since 1870. England, on the other hand, has not been successfully invaded by an occupying force for nearly nine centuries. England, in that period, has at least three times de­stroyed or frustrated major attempts at in­vasion.

English Victories

These attempts on England came from the sea. The Spanish Armada was driven off by Drake and destroyed by storm. After Trafal­gar, Napoleon did not dare to cross the sea for there were English ships of war between him and English shores.

Finally, in our time, the threat from the sea was poised by Hitler. It was not at­tempted by the conqueror of Western Europe. The English Channel was still con­trolled by an English fleet. Even though German airpower pounded English cities and the countryside at will, Hitler still could not get across to achieve ultimate victory with­out crossing the sea.

It was Sir Walter Raleigh who declared that “whosoever commands the sea, com­mands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world, commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.”

I do not advert to Sir Walter as authority for this Nation to seek command of anything more than our security or freedom from the fear of invasion. The thousands of miles of ocean still constitute for us a formidable barrier or a broad highway depending on how we are forced to regard it. As long as we can come and go on the sea as we need to; as long as we can keep our enemy from doing so when necessary—then can we be secure in our land and at peace with our neighbors.

This Nation’s control of the sea is, at present, so absolute that it is taken for granted. It would be a genuine surprise, at­tended with dismay, if we found ourselves unable to come and go by sea. This casual acceptance gives us a false sense of security-

Erroneous Belief

There is a popular but erroneous belief that if there is little or no opposing naval force then this Nation’s Navy can be safely reduced to the opposing minimum. With no fleet to oppose us then all we need is a transport or naval escort force—or so runs the argument. This reasoning sounds simple and economical. Let us apply it to the facts of life of the past thirty months.

In June 1950, the hostilities in Korea com­menced. The Navy was at its lowest strength since V-J Day, as were the rest of our armed forces. The first orders issued after the North Korean aggression against the Republic of Korea called on the Navy and the Air Force to act. It soon became apparent that avail­able ground forces would have to be com­mitted to slow the North Korean advance.

Two and one half years of fighting have passed. The combat has been as savage and bitter as any our forces have encountered in any war. We have control of the seas about Korea. We have almost complete control of the air. The war is not won. There is a stale­mate.

In the early days of the conflict our naval forces were barely adequate for the tasks to come. But if the Navy had been no more than a transport force, there would have been no amphibious landing at Inchon, the maneuver that broke the back of North Korean aggression. If our naval forces had been ships for transport, supply, and possibly antisubmarine work, the withdrawal of our forces at Hungnam would have been another Dunkerque. Some of the troops might have been saved. Their weapons would be ¹¹¹ enemy hands.

Serious Consequence

Assume that we should have had no air­craft carriers. The consequence would be that there would have been a third less of combat aircraft sorties flown in Korea. I have yet to hear any commander complain that we have too much air power in Korea.

The principal weapon the modern Navy uses to keep the sea lanes open is the carrier- based plane. It is no duplication of military effort for the Navy to use aircraft. If such were the case a strong but equally false con­tention could be made for other weapons.

The same argument could be applied to ordnance. The large-caliber gun is a piece of artillery. Should it belong to that branch of the service that has the word “artillery” in its title? If the argument were sound, Congress would never have appropriated money to arm our ships with guns above a certain caliber.

The airplane is simply a means of deliver­ing a weapon on the target. Like the gun, it puts an explosive charge on something the enemy can use to damage you.

Many Weapons Used

The Navy uses all sorts of weapons. The mine and torpedo are for use under water; the gun, rocket, guided missile, and bombs of all sizes are used on the surface and in the air.

The purpose of the Navy is simply to move a lot of power over the surface of the earth to the place where needed in order that we may be able to come and go on the sea.

Depend on the Sea

Today the United States depends on the sea to receive the multitude of raw materials we need. Our dependence is so great that enemy action against our shipping could re­duce or stop the flow of many key materials.

No one armed service and no one weapon in any single service will serve all purposes of our security.

This country needs a strong Air Force, but it needs a strong Army and Navy, too. The Navy needs its aircraft just as the Nation needs a reliable flow of many raw materials from overseas.

The core of naval power is the carrier task force. Without carriers a Navy can only operate in areas which are beyond the range of enemy aircraft. Without carriers our ships cannot cross the sea safely.

Without carriers, we will not be able to establish or maintain air bases overseas. This country needs its air bases overseas. But this country must have its naval power, centered on the carrier task force, capable of projec­tion into decisive areas.

The carrier task force can successfully op­erate against enemy opposition coming from land-based aircraft. This was done by our fleet off Okinawa in 1945. There, you will recall, we were engaged in seizing a base for operations against Japan. All the support of Army and Marine Corps forces came from the sea-borne forces.

Army troops and Marines were trans­ported on naval vessels. They were safe­guarded from surface and submarine attack by naval vessels—large and small. They were protected by carrier aircraft from enemy air opposition.

After the landings on the beaches, the fleet remained for eighty-seven days. The enemy air opposition was intense and sustained. Enemy pilots did their best to deliver their deadly weapons on board our ships per­sonally. These were the Kamikazes. They were dedicated human beings bent on de­stroying themselves in attempting to drive off our ships. They represented the ultimate in guided missiles. They failed to drive off the ships. Our ships remained.

Not one of our carriers was sunk in the eighty-seven days it took to secure the base we selected for seizure..

You may hear that atomic weapons render future amphibious operations impossible. The atomic weapons pose an added threat. They do not make future operations at sea or at the shore line impossible.

A ship at sea is a hard target to hit. The best defense against the atomic weapon is dispersion. The atomic weapon is a costly weapon by reason of its relative scarcity compared with conventional explosives. Sea areas in the vicinity of amphibious opera­tions are still wide enough to permit sup­porting vessels to be so dispersed as to re­quire one atomic weapon to destroy each ship.

What is more, our ships carry means of defending themselves and the troops they support in the critical landing phase. The carrier task force can suppress enemy air forces at the scene of action and within several hundred miles of it.

Navy Will Be Ready

Naval forces will still be able to discharge their functions at sea whatever weapons are produced.

Naval forces will still be required to sup­port our Army and the armies of our allies overseas.

Naval forces, centered about the carrier task force, can supply and support the Air Force at its bases overseas.

These are some of the normal, the routine tasks naval forces perform. They can be performed without extensive depots or bases on foreign soil. Our modern Navy supports itself at sea. Our Sixth Fieet in the Mediter­ranean has been doing just that for the past six years.

The Navy’s floating sea supply system is not fixed. To be attacked, it must be found. If found, it can dissolve itself by dispersion until the threat has passed over. It can then be assembled elsewhere.

That mobility, that flexibility, that persist­ence and continuity of effort is the true sea power. It is no mysterious force.

In this ability to project our power across the ocean we are supreme today. It is our one greatest military strength. We use it for but one purpose—to maintain peace.

This ability, this capacity will not remain fixed simply because we have supremacy now. Ships deteriorate. Aircraft as well as ships become obsolescent. To preserve our strength we need to replace them at a mod­erate rate now.

The orderly program for maintaining a first-class, first-rate Navy is my primary concern as Chief of Naval Operations.

The economic burden of security is too great for any responsible military leader in our Nation to advocate any more than that required to maintain peace and provide against disaster.

Demands for Economy

There were strong and persuasive demands for economy from 1946 onward. We disarmed with joyful abandon and relief. It was under­standable. In the postwar period, responsi­ble military opinion called for balanced forces. But a siren’s song gave us hope. The prevailing hope was that nobody wanted war and that if he did, well, the atom bomb was ours alone.

We are ever anxious and willing to try anything to achieve peace. Any one who could promise a quick, cheap, and easy means of getting back to a peaceful state of affairs could capture our attention. We wanted se­curity and we wanted prompt delivery. If there was an all-purpose remedy, we would buy that, too.

The new prophets promised serenity with security. It was unpopular to question its at­tainment. The doctrine was perfection, the creed harmonious, and detractors therefrom belonged to the ages past.

“Little War” Overlooked

Somehow or other we overlooked the “lit' tie war,” as it is sometimes loosely called. It became an obsession with us to cure only the big things. We overlooked the flea bites that sometimes plague us. Finding a flea on an elephant’s back, we are likely to become so intent on killing the flea that we forget about the elephant. No matter how desirable it might be to kill the flea, it would be most unwise to shoot him with an elephant gun.

Do not misunderstand me. There are times when you need not only an elephant but the gun, too, no matter which party i^s in power!

Let me expand upon my own job as it r^e' lates to our defense. Within the scope of naval function there is a complex diversity of duties. The readiness to perform these duties is the true measure of a Navy’s effec­tiveness. We cannot wait until after the need for action arises before determining what a Navy will need.

Our real security is latent. It lies in our industrial capacity. You who manage a pa^rt of the complex organization comprising American strength know what it would mean if we should be forced to fight in our own land against an invading enemy.

Disruptions and disturbances caused by an enemy invasion would be a sure consequence to our loss of control of the sea.

At present, our advantage on the sea is a safeguard. We must not let it lapse.

Not only this Nation, but all the free world counts on American naval power to in­sure Freedom’s use of the sea.

Work on Super Carrier Saratoga Proceeding

New York Times, February 10, 1953.—■ Work on the 60,000-ton super aircraft carrier Saratoga, destined to be the world’s most powerful vessel, has been proceeding smooth­ly and at a steadily increasing tempo since the keel was laid on Dec. 16, a visit to the New York Naval Shipyard in Brooklyn showed yesterday.

The carrier is a sister ship of the U.S.S. Forreslal, which has been under construction at Newport News, Va., since last July, but her newly designed high pressure engines will be considerably more powerful. The Navy would not discuss her potential speed except to say that it would be well in excess of thirty knots.

The manifold details involved in planning and constructing the huge vessel and in pre­paring her for a crew of 3,400 enlisted men and 470 officers were indicated in a casual reference Comdr. Carl R. Ffirschberger made during a tour of the yard to the fact that 10,000 blueprints would be used in the task.

As senior ship superintendent, Com­mander Hirschberger is in charge of building the Saratoga. Only 38 years old, he is un­usually young for the job, but he has had intensive training in Naval engineering and construction. A 1937 graduate of the Naval Academy, he received a Master’s degree in those fields after a three-year course at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In World War II he served in the South Pacific as chief engineer on the light cruiser Boise.

Little of Work Visible

Of all that has been accomplished, little was visible in the building dock where the Saratoga was being constructed. A large part of her steel bottom rested flat against wooden and concrete supports, but from the piers above it looked almost picayune.

In the cavernous, 1,000-foot long struc­tural shops, however, steel helmeted welders and shipfitters had put together additional sections of her bottom and thirty-ton seg­ments of her inner bottom and they were en­gaged in processing steel for her torpedo protection system.

President’s Action Heralds New Impetus for Psychological Warfare

Christian Science Monitor, January 27, 1953.—The Eisenhower-Dulles campaign promise to give America’s role in the great power struggle a more “positive” and more “dynamic” character was no idle or empty promise.

It has become the first operating target of the new administration.

The first operating agency of government to be taken into the White House for major overhaul under the personal supervision of the President himself is a hitherto obscure and relatively ineffective agency of govern­ment known as the Board of Psychological Strategy. It has been relatively ineffective because it was an experiment and because the concept of its possible use and its place in the hierarchy of government could not well be devised except by the trial-and-error method. But now it has been through the trial-and-error period and President Eisen- however already has set the machinery in motion for its rebuilding.

There is to be a new psychological strat­egy operation. Its function, as defined by the President during the campaign, will be to provide a “unified and coherent” American effort toward gaining “a victory without casualties” in the cold war. Its activities will include “selection of a broad national pur­pose and the designation within those pur­poses of principal targets.”

* * *

The organizational form of the operation is being planned now by a special commission headed by William H. Jackson, a New York investment banker, who served during World War II under Gen. Omar N. Bradley as his deputy chief of intelligence and later as deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The label of “psychological strategy” on the operation is confusing. It would be called more accurately a board of political warfare, but the other label was chosen because the word warfare carries a connotation of mili­tary action which in this case is neither in­tended nor desired.

The need for such an agency arises out of a gap between the operating agencies of gov­ernment and the top policy deciding agency, which is the National Security Council, a part of the executive offices of the President himself.

* * *

The National Security Council establishes the long-term policies of government and decides on major operations. But it does not have the staff for supervising or executing general policies. Political policies are carried out by the State Department, military poli­cies by the Defense Department, financial policies by the Treasury, and intelligence op­erations by the CIA. What is missing is a place where the activities of these agencies could be coordinated to carry out a specific policy set by the National Security Council.

For example, it might be decided that the long-term interests of the United States would be abetted by the political isolation of President Peron of Argentina from the rest of Latin America. Every agency of govern­ment would have a role in that operation, including, of course, the CIA which has weapons of sabotage and subversion at its disposal. But someone has to watch closely to see to it that State Department, Treasury, and CIA operations are timed and tailored to support one another. That is where politi­cal warfare under the label of “psychological strategy” comes in.

Another hypothetical example would be a decision by the National Security Council to encourage resistance movements in China. But there are many resistance groups. Some­times the groups are in conflict with one another. Which would be the most promis­ing? CIA has the means of getting propa­ganda, money, and guns to the selected group. But CIA is not qualified to make the decision between rival candidates for such

aid. The views of the State Department would be essential in reaching a decision.

Defense would have to provide the guns. Treasury the money. The new psychological strategy board would be the place where the choice between the rival Chinese resistance groups would be made after due considera­tion of all factors involved. And it also would supervise execution of the operation: seeing to it that each operating agency of govern­ment would play its part at the right time. It would become, in effect, the operations section of the White House general staff.

* * *

There is, however, no superintelligence in­herent in such a refurbished “psychological strategy” agency. The concept is not novel. The great decisions of high policy must be made, as always, by the President on the advice of his top advisers who must, of neces­sity, be the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

What can be improved is the machinery for perfecting coordination between these men and for supervising the execution of their decisions. This is regarded by the new President as his most immediately important project in remaking the machinery of govern­ment.

U.S.S.R.

Russian Army Held Riddled with Anti-Soviet Elements

Christian Science Monitor, February 1*> 1953.—Disaffection in the Soviet Army ^lS more widespread today, according to recent Russian refugees, than it was in the early stages of the German invasion when whole Army corps surrendered to the enemy.

A former colonel of Army intelligence who up to the time of his defection was with the Soviet occupation forces in Germany, de­clares that in the winter of 1941-42 many of the generals were reluctant to continue fighting for the regime, and only a combina­tion of fortuitous circumstances kept Prim^e Minister Joseph Stalin and his associates Uj power. A decisive factor was the blind and brutal policy of Hitler who, by his treat­ment of war prisoners and of civilians in the areas behind the German lines, convinced the Army and the people that Stalin was, after all, the lesser evil.

Acute Demoralizing Effect

After the war, thousands of Soviet troops remained abroad with the occupation forces, together with a large number of civilian personnel in various administrative and eco­nomic capacities. For the first time people of the Soviet generation came into contact with the outside world hitherto known to them only through the distorted lenses of Soviet propaganda.

Even in devastated Germany they saw living standards far superior to what they were accustomed to back home. Their re­ports filtered back despite stringent censor­ship. As early as December, 1946, the Mili­tary Council of the Soviet occupation troops in Germany stated in a resolution that the “Capitalist atmosphere” was having a de­moralizing effect on the troops.

By 1948 the danger to morale was deemed so acute that the command ordered total isolation of occupation personnel from the German population. But such a regulation proved not easy to enforce even by Soviet police methods.

Disaffection among the Soviet professional military caste has been enhanced by failure of the government to make good its wartime promises of a better, freer future, plus the shabby treatment generally meted out to war veterans, including the thousands of maimed and crippled who beg for a living in the streets.

While the regime offers the Army man, especially the officer, certain favors and priv­ileges over the civilian in order to secure his loyalty, it subjects him to greater pressures and restrictions in other respects. The Soviet officer has even less opportunity for free speech and personal initiative than the or­dinary Soviet civilian.

From six in the morning to eleven at night, the soldier’s day is completely regulated. His political indoctrination starts right after reveille with an early morning lecture on the “News,” when excerpts and articles from the Communist press are read to the soldiers by people billed as professional agitators. Throughout the day, these same agitators keep popping up during every “recreation” period. Finally, in the evening after the rou­tine tasks and chores, two solid hours are devoted to “mass political work.” This schedule leaves the soldier not a moment for leisure or private thoughts of his own. His role in Communist society is constantly dinned into him without a letup.

In Russia proper, the soldier seldom leaves the barracks save in marching order. But among the occupation troops, discipline is far more severe. In fact, the barracks routine differs little from prison regime. As part of the rule against fraternization, a hostile attitude toward the German popula­tion still is inculcated among the troops, al­though Stalin himself poses as “the best friend of the German people.”

Constant Surveillance

Back in 1947, Soviet officers received sub­stantial pay increases plus special allow­ances. Nevertheless their conditions re­mained inferior to those of western officers of equivalent rank. Moreover, all Soviet of­ficers, including generals—the generals even more so perhaps—are subject to the constant surveillance by the party machinery and the secret informers of the internal security or­gans. Not only does this inject an element of tension and constant fear into their daily lives, it also undermines their prestige and authority in the eyes of their subordinates.

The underlying reason for all this is essen­tially the same motive which prompted Stalin to decimate his corps of professional Army officers back in the late 1930’s, when three out of the five marshals of the Soviet Army and a commensurate portion of other ranks were executed.

A carefully checked list of Soviet marshals and general officers known to have been ex­ecuted in that period includes 113 names but is still far from complete even for these top categories. Uncharted legions of other of­ficers—senior and junior—perished at the same time.

In the last five years, 35 top military fig­ures either have passed on or simply disap­peared, among them some of the headline heroes of World War II—many of them still in the prime of their lives.

Stalin, who trusts no one, obviously trusts the Army least of all. Like all dictators, what he fears most is a military coup to overthrow him, for the military is the one section of society which is armed. Moreover, most of the officers, especially those of proven ability, came from the people, not from the party, and their loyalties and an­tagonisms to a large degree reflect those of the unarmed civilian population.

In his search for protection from his people, Stalin has tried to develop a corps of Soviet janizaries by setting up the Suvorov military academies and Nakhimov naval academies. In the original conception, these institutes were to select promising boys— orphans preferred—of preschool age and train them throughout their entire formative period until they came out full-fledged of­ficers thoroughly imbued with Stalinist communism, having heard and learned nothing else from the time they remember, completely cut off from all other influences and ideas including family ties.

Negative Reaction Noted

The first Suvorov academies were set up in 1943; the war provided the first conven­ient crop of orphans, but the scheme has not worked out as well as Stalin had hoped. On leaving the sheltered, incubator atmosphere of the academy, their carefully nurtured concepts are often rudely upset by the first clashes with Soviet reality. The result is sometimes a violent and negative reaction against everything pumped into them here­tofore.

The only group with the Soviet Army whose loyalty to the regime is unshakable are the political officers and members of the military intelligence. These are the projec­tion of the Soviet police into the Army, its spies and informers. Their personal aware­ness that in the event of a revolt they would be the first targets of popular vengeance renders them immune to argument.

But even now a vast mental gap and deep antagonism divides and isolates them from the other officers and soldiers. To a large extent they even think and speak in different terms. The bulk of the soldiers regard their lectures and propaganda sessions as so much rubbish which strict discipline compels them to endure.

Sea Routes North of Russia Described

La Revue Maritime, December, 1952. ' The Northern Sea Route across Siberia links the two oceanic theaters, eastern and west­ern. For this reason, it may be considered a line of the interior communications of the U.S.S.R.

Stretching from Murmansk and Ark­hangelsk to the Behring Strait, the route crosses the five seas constituting the Soviet Arctic: Barentz, Kara, Laptiev, East Si­beria, and Tchoukot. It is dotted with nu­merous islands, the most important of which are Novaya Zemlya, Severnaya Zemlya, the archipelago of New Siberia, and Wrangel Island.

Some distances should be mentioned (ac­cording to Soviet charts):

Nautical Miles

Arkhangelsk-Vladivostok                      6,220

Murmansk-Vladivostok                         6,000

Murmansk-Dikson                                     953

Dikson-Nordvik                                           772

Dikson-Tiksi                                             1,062

Norvik-Tiksi                                                 453

Tiksi-Providence Bay                             1,555

The climate is that of the polar zone and tundra, with severe cold in the eastern sec­tors. It will be recalled that Verkhoiansk on the Yana is the cold pole. Accumulations of ice, particularly in the eastern Siberian Sea, make navigation very difficult. However, the last 10 or 15 years appear to have brought a warming cycle in the northern polar regions. At least, explorers of an earlier generation insist that present-day feats of navigation over the northern sea route would have been impossible in the first quarter of this cen­tury.

Many ports have been set up along th^e route, among which from west to east are:

Amderma

Novi Port and Salekhard, at the mouth of the Ob

Oust Yenissei, Doudinka and Ingarka on the Yenessei

Dikson, extremely important center with a vast harbor and numerous installations

Nordvik, port of call east of the Taimyr Pen­insula

Tiksi, big port at the mouth of the Lena

Providence Bay, on the Behring Strait

The east-west traffic in summer consists chiefly of merchandise transported north by the great Siberian rivers such as the Ob, Yenissei, Lena, Kolyma, etc. The traffic westward in lumber, from Dikson on, is quite intense.

Resources of the region, aside from wood, are still relatively unexploited. Coal basins should be noted, however, along the Toun- gouss, Lena, and Kolyma-Indiguirka. Pe­troleum deposits have been found at Norilsk and Khatanga.

Administration of the Northern Sea Route is organized in a general department under the Council of Ministers, and has at its disposal polar weather stations, ice-breakers, cargo vessels equipped for arctic navigation, and a polar aviation unit. It will be noted that whereas the naval forces of the Arctic and Pacific are under the ministry of the Navy, the Northern Sea Route Department is directly under the Council of Ministers, which may give Sevmorput (Northern Sea Route) a certain autonomy and rather vast possibilities.

From the military point of view, the North has a double significance. First, it links the two Soviet oceanic theaters of operations during the summer season. Secondly, its in­stallations facing the pole constitute a po­tential surveillance network of the aerial frontier, and could give the alert against raids from the north.

How Many Russians Support the Soviet Regime?

Christian Science Monitor, February 10, 1953.—What is the inner strength ^and weakness—of the Soviet regime?

Who is for it; who is secretly opposed?

How effective is western propaganda di­rected toward Soviet listeners?

How does the Soviet Army feel?

What likelihood is there of an armed re­volt?

How would the Soviet Army and the popu­lation react in the event of conflict with the West?

Free world efforts to answer these and related vital questions are hampered by scarcity of source material, by paucity of direct access to the Soviet people and their real thoughts and opinions.

All the more valuable, consequently, is the testimony of recent escapees from the Soviet, the newest of the new in the long, straggled line of those who, facing desperate odds, have made the dash for hoped-for freedom. Besides plain Soviet Army recruits, they in­clude senior staff officers, officials, engineers, and university professors.

Under Soviet Shell . . .

“In order to understand us,” former Soviet Lt. Col. Gregory Klimov declared in his opening remarks to the recent congress of postwar defectors in Munich, “one must realize that there, on the other side, the Russian man in his true nature is hidden inside the outer shell of loyal Soviet citizen.”

From this standpoint these Soviets who have broken through the outer shell and emerged to express their feelings fully and openly on free western soil speak with the real voice of the Russian people.

There is little doubt that they reflect the views of at least a portion of the population, for, as Colonel Klimov pointed out, even by official Soviet figures more than 2,000,000 people record their rejection of the Soviet system at each “election,” despite the tre­mendous conformist pressure of the one- party balloting routine, in which the least tampering with the printed ballot is certain to be noted.

Sentiment Analyzed

The speakers who followed Colonel Kli­mov went considerably further toward dis­mantling the propaganda myth of a mono­lithic Soviet society in which everyone is only too eager to give his last ounce for Comrade Stalin. One man who until his de­fection held an important post in the Min­istry of State Control gave an analytical breakdown of Soviet political sentiment. He divides the population into three main cate­gories—pro-Soviet, neutral, and anti-Soviet.

In the first category he included the entire top party apparatus and secret police, but only 50 per cent of the upper stratum of the vast bureaucratic class that staffs the Soviet state and economic administrations. He like­wise listed only 50 per cent of the senior Army officers and only one-third of the office employees as pro-Soviet.

Among the “neutrals” he included the re­maining 50 per cent of the administrative class and of the senior Army officers; 50 per cent of the junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men; one-third of the office employees; 65 per cent of the industrial workers; 50 per cent of the intellectuals; and 50 per cent of the peasants. He explained that by neutral elements he meant those who, without any basic loyalty or conviction, nevertheless served the Soviet state obedi­ently for the sake of their livelihood and personal security.

Facade of Solidity

Among the anti-Soviet groups, the speaker included the remaining third of the office employees; 50 per cent of the intellectuals; 50 per cent of the junior officers, noncom­missioned officers, and enlisted men; 50 per cent of the peasants; 35 per cent of the workers; and 50 per cent of various other elements.

According to this view, the Soviet Union managed to survive and to maintain an ap­pearance of solidity despite such widespread internal disaffection, for the following rea­sons:

Isolation from contact with the outer world because of the Iron Curtain; internal police terror and espionage, including the extensive and highly developed informer network; intense daily propaganda whereby the Kremlin dinned into the population what it wanted the people to hear and think to the virtual exclusion of other sources; impo- tency of unarmed people against the heavily armed apparatus of the police state; the close-knit unity of the ruling Kremlin clique, which despite personal rivalries had managed to preserve a solid external front on all major issues of policy.

Refugees Criticize West

Most postwar refugees mince no words in criticizing the West. They charge it largely responsible for the survival of the Stalin regime, having gone to Stalin’s aid at vari­ous critical junctures. The conference speaker recalled, for example, that in the early 1930’s mass starvation stalked the Ukraine and the entire country seethed with discontent—all as a result of ruthless com­pulsory collectivization of the peasantry. At that point the United States chose to recog­nize the Soviet Government, bolstering its home and foreign prestige.

A few years later, when the great purge was taking a terrific toll of the population and in particular of Army officers, techni­cians, and intellectuals, when almost every family was afflicted, the American Ambassa­dor to Moscow whitewashed this brutality, condoning it as aimed against the Nazis. Finally, the speaker listed the forced re­patriation at the close of World War II, which sealed the fate of thousands of the most vigorous anti-Soviet elements.

It is symptomatic that the latest defec­tors, men who were born and brought up under the Soviet system, are more bitter against the Kremlin, more confident of its impending overthrow, and even more pre­pared to hasten a showdown than the elder generation of graybeard emigres who have been fighting bolshevism for the past 35 years.

Soviet Fortifying Baltic in Attempt to Form a Russian Lake

New York Times, February 6, 1953. ' The Russians intensified their attempts last week to make the Baltic a Soviet lake.

Since the spring of 1952, when Moscow replaced the carrot with the stick in its re­lationships with the Scandinavian countries, a campaign of force, fear, rumor and in­timidation has been waged by the Com­munists in Northern Europe.

Swedish planes have been shot down over the Baltic; Scandinavian fishermen cruising at sea have been detained and imprisoned on charges of “violating” the Soviet Union s unilaterally declared twelve-mile coastal waters; Russian fishermen have poached in Sweden’s internationally accepted three- mile coastal waters, and note after note have been sent Scandinavian countries accusing them of “aggressive” intentions against the Soviet Union.

At the same time there has been a gradual but continuous military consolidation and build-up of the Russian position in th^e Baltic-Barents Sea-Arctic area.

The objective of the Communist pressure appears to be:

1.       Security. In the northern area the Com­munists apparently plan to make the twelve mile coastal limit a fait accompli by force. Closing of the Baltic entrances to non-Baltic powers and hegemony over the Baltic appear to be ultimate objectives.

2.       Neutralization of the Scandinavian powers. Diplomatic “warnings” and inspired rumors are intended to make Sweden adhere to her traditional neutrality. Threats have been directed at Norway and Denmark to prevent these countries from permitting the use of airfields on their territory by the United States or other Atlantic Alliance fliers.

Red Position Strengthened

3.       Strengthening of the Russian military position in the entire Northern area. This has an offensive-defensive connotation. The Soviet naval position in the North is being strengthened with a view to submarine and limited cruiser operations from the Barents Sea base complex. Airfields are disposed to protect the Soviet motherland against air attacks based on Greenland, Iceland, Nor­way and/or Alaska.

Behind the Soviet threats and invective there is considerable, though by no means overwhelming, military strength in the Baltic-Arctic area. The area really embraces two regions; that from Leningrad to the north, and the coastal waters of the Baltic from Leningrad to East Germany.

Major industrial development has oc­curred since the war along the Pechora River well to the east of Archangel, and the so- called Vorkuta mining area is producing nickel, tin, coal, oil and other strategic ma­terials.

The population of the whole Northern re­gion, including the Pechora River-White Sea area has about quadrupled since 1945. Soviet trawlers and fishing fleets, based on the White Sea area but ranging far and wide from the Orkneys to Spitsbergen, have in­creased tremendously.

More than 300 sturdy, good-sized steam trawlers built in Finland (as reparations) or in the Baltic states have stood out of the

Baltic for the Arctic in recent years. This fishing fleet is estimated at a total of about 90,000 tons; the merchant fleet, based in the same region, approximates 150,000 tons.

Russian Sea Power Estimated

The Russians are believed to have at least forty submarines (probably none of them have snorkels) based in the White Sea- Barents area, and the Arctic Fleet includes three cruisers (including the Tchapayev and Zhelesnyakov), which displace about 13,000 tons full load and are believed to be armed with twelve 7.1-inch guns and ten 4-inch. There are also about twelve destroyers and about sixteen destroyer escorts in the Far North.

The main Soviet naval base in the area is at Polyarny and Vayenga on the Kola Peninsula, with other bases at Pechenza (Petsamo) and Molotovsk (the latter near Archangel). During the summer months the White Sea Canal, which connects with the Baltic, can handle small destroyers and fairly large-sized submarines, and the road and rail network is being improved.

At several big airfields near Petsamo, about sixty or more MIG-15 jet interceptors have been based for some time and there are about 100 airstrips (only a few of them, however, modern and in operational use) between Murmansk and Leningrad. Soviet planes in this area are estimated at con­siderably fewer than 1,000, most of them propeller-driven. A recent Norwegian news­paper     estimate—probably too large

credited the Russians with about 900 planes in the Kandalaksha-Murmansk area alone.

Mission of the Russian Navy Is Discussed

Captain M. Peltier, French Navy, in La Revue Maritime, December, 1952.—In the event of conflict, the Soviet Navy would op­pose the master of the sea and would be on the defensive, save for possible submarine or aerial offensive on a limited scale. It is logi­cal to believe that the solidity of the western theater would be increased by the early oc­cupation of Finnmark and Spitzbergen. The Northern Fleet would then have bases for

attack on Iceland, Greenland and Atlantic communications.

In the eastern theater, on the other hand, while the operations of the enemy could be greatly hampered, the Soviet position would be mainly defensive.

Thus we can see the role of the Soviet Navy on the two oceans that wash the shores of the U.S.S.R., and there emerges the concept of an oceanic navy so dear to the hearts of the rulers of that country.

We can be sure that they will exert them­selves to bring this concept into reality by developing the two ocean fleets and giving them the means of exercising their activity by virtue of the principles of unity and homogeneity of effort .characteristic of the Soviet economy. This means that the fleets will have small surface craft, planes, coastal organizations, territorial services and trans­port; and the administrative and political institutions of the regions on which they are based will be ready to support them ef­fectively.

Personnel represents a minor difficulty.

Young officers are eager to serve in the Far East and the Arctic. They apparently know, or so the indoctrination effort would imply, that their present task is to study the techniques and tactics of the submarine and naval air, which are the chief weapons now at the disposal of the Soviet ocean navies. It would be unwise and vain to underestimate them by saying, as do some, that the U.S.S.R. has no maritime traditions. That is incorrect: Soviet seamen work, and work hard.

To conclude, one important fact: The supreme leadership of the Soviet Union, de­siring to develop the Navy, deliberately broke with the practice of other post-war military establishments and returned au­tonomy to the Ministry of the Navy in February, 1950, splitting the Ministry of the Armed Forces into a Ministry of War and a Ministry of the Navy, the aerial forces being assigned organically to the two min­istries.

This event, coming a few days after dec­larations about the oceanic mission of the Navy, seems to indicate a firm resolve to implement the development of that arm by all means possible.

In any event, it is a step that deserves careful study.

OTHER COUNTRIES

French Vice-Admiral Nomy Looks Ahead

La Revue Maritime, January, 1953.—In his New Year’s message to the fleet, Vice­Admiral Nomy made the following predic­tions for the year ahead:

“While the fleet has seen few modifications during the past 12 months, we now have the certainty of seeing 9 vessels of French con­struction added to our fleet, which has such great need of them.

“We now have under construction in our yards and docks 70,000 tons of naval vessels. With the naval section provided in the 1953 budget, 18 vessels, including one cruiser, will be added, bringing the total tonnage under construction to 100,000 tons. This figure does not include the 44 minesweepers to be de­livered to us under the Mutual Aid Program.

“Already some vessels from preceding pro­grams have been launched, such as the escorts Le Corse and Le Brestois, as well as the 3 sweepers of the Sirius class.

“Twenty-five other units will be launched during the year, including the 6 first vessels of the Surcouf class, regular little anti-air­craft cruisers.

“In 1953, the fleet in service will be strengthened by the light cruisers Guichen and Chdleaurenault, which have been mod­ernized. The submarine Andromede and nu­merous sweepers will enter service.

“The situation of our Naval Air is en­couraging. We are receiving from America both Corsair fighters and Neptune antisub­marine planes.

“ These deliveries will enable us to equip 4 new flotillas. Finally, the last quarter of 1953 will see the first of a series of Sea Venoms to be built under license by French industry. The delivery of these planes will give our naval fighter pilots their first jet planes.”

British Observations on American Aircraft Design

The Aeroplane, January 1953.—The “pod” engine mounted on thin wings appears to be a permanent feature in American aircraft layout, especially for the larger machines,

whereas the British still prefer the faired-in power plant as much as possible.

From the point of view of appearance and drag there is much to be said for the British point of view—the Americans do not disagree with this. However, when one considers all factors, particularly simplicity and weight, there is much to be said for the American arrangement.

For example, how many times has the air­craft designer been embarrassed by the ne­cessity of switching engine types or sizes, in­volving considerable structural alteration in the wing? Again, how often has he wished or found it necessary to move the engines to adjust the centre of gravity to where it should be, at the last minute. Once more, how very frequent have been the air-intake troubles and modifications, usually involving the wing structure? These are some of the penalties for the characteristic, clean British line.

The buried engine in the wing also ruins the wing structure in bending and torsion, but, of course, it could be argued that a re­tracted undercarriage into the wing ruins it in any case.

These are all serious disadvantages in the buried installation approach, resulting in weight increase, complication and inacces­sibility. On the other hand, 5 per cent in­crease in drag might well mean about 3,000 lb. of additional fuel in the sort of jet aircraft we have in mind, which makes the addi­tional installation weight a comparatively trivial matter.

With the desire for still thinner wings, the structural and weight problems become worse, but at the same time it becomes in­creasingly obvious that eventually the en­gines are going to be outside, in any case, and with the selection of optimum wing loca­tion, the conception and advantages of the “pod” become immediately obvious.

The thin wing demands maximum utiliza­tion of available depth in material for bend­ing strength, which necessitates a multi-spar or multi-box type of construction. This com­bination makes it highly desirable to pre­serve continuity throughout the span, and we see an increasing number of such thin efficient wing structures on modern American aircraft.

The attachment of the “pod” to the wing is a relatively simple matter, but its correct position is important if minimum drag and least interference with wing pressure dis­tribution and effective wing sweepback are to be obtained. It can be taken that the American installation of this kind represents the best practice, consistent with the other variables of centre of gravity balance and ground clearance.

Accessibility and interchangeability be­come simple and easy. The latter is exempli­fied in the fitting of the B.47 “pods” to the B.36.

The engine accessory problem is not quite so simple. It will be apparent that a closely cowled “pod” does not permit a convenient mechanical accessory drive unless this can be led straight up into the wing. The in­evitable generator could be housed in the intake. Although this idea is popular at the moment, it is hardly convenient, especially if it is of the A.C. variety with constant- speed drive therefore becoming involved with intake nozzle and shutter controls.

However, the only alternative is a remote drive of some sort. It is not surprising, there­fore, to find attention being focused on air- turbine and gas-turbine units. Whereas the first derives its power from compressor “bleed” air, the latter is of the “bleed and burn” variety, or in effect, an additional engine with all the snags and control features that must go with it.

Expansion turbines have been projected of the radial flow-type of up to 100 h.p. or so, for a weight of about 80 lb. They actually have to function through a wide range of operating conditions from the main jet en­gine compressor and consequently are sub­ject to broad compromises in design. As would be anticipated, flow-control problems are somewhat difficult. '

Greater Power at Higher Efficiency

On the other hand, the gas turbine, which bleeds air from the main compressor and burns its own fuel should be able to provide greater power at a higher overall aircraft efficiency. However, the increased complica­tion and difficulty of control may deter its use for some time to come.

At any rate, the air-bleed turbine system

looks attractive and convenient with the “pod” installation and permits placing the accessories economically from a weight and servicing standpoint.

Having obtained a clean and sound struc­tural wing-engine combination, it is not un­natural to look around for another home for the undercarriage. The Martin and Boeing System appears to be the logical way, with light stabilizing wheels well outboard, where the structural penalty is least; on the other hand, some increase in undercarriage and fuselage weight seems inevitable.

A careful investigation would be necessary to determine the over-all gain in weight and performance. The bicycle arrangement also has its own peculiar take-off problems.

All in all, it seems that it is the combina­tion of structural and aerodynamic cleanness which favors the American arrangement. The delta should not modify this view, since minimum thickness-chord ratio should still be the aim.

It is interesting to record that Air Re­search is supplying air-turbine starters for Navy jet engines, rated at about 35 h.p. They run at 85,000 r.p.m. and start a jet in 15 seconds for a weight of 18 lb.

Missile names that will become more familiar are, ground to air, “Bowmark,” “Nike,” and “Terrier”; ground to ground, “Snark”; air to ground, “Rascal”; and air to air, “Falcon.”

In a talk before the Washington Section of the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences, one of America’s top designers, E. H. Heine- man, of Douglas, El Segundo, states that in 22 years the cost of fighters has increased tenfold and bombers 20 times, yet the speed has increased only twice. The present-day cost per pound is $400, so taking the all­important growth factor into account as around 10, the cost for every additional pound weight to the pseudo-finished aircraft is $4,000.

This is a factual statement which should hang in all government offices, instead of the more usual fretful reminders.

Norwegian Newspaper Reveals Soviet Air Bases Near Border

New York Times, January 29, 1953.— The Morgenposlen, an independent news­paper, published yesterday an article and map showing five Soviet airfields less than thirty-one miles from the Norwegian border. Some of the airfields have runways more than 2,000 yards long.

The Morgenposlen said the Soviet Union had fifty airfields in the Kandalaksha- Murmansk sector and that at present about 900 planes were stationed there.

The newspaper used these details of Soviet defenses as part of a reply to Soviet news­paper and radio attacks on Norway for con­structing military installations in northern Norway, allegedly close to the Norwegian- Soviet border.

The Soviet complaints have been based mainly on a decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to build a new airfield at Andenes, about 375 miles from the border.

The newspaper estimated the Soviet naval forces on the Arctic seaboard as three cruis­ers, twenty-five-to-thirty escort and anti­submarine units, seventy motor torpedo boats, forty minelayers and sweepers, and fifty landing craft. The Soviet land forces in the area were believed to amount to at least five divisions with modern equipment.

There are few Norwegian troops in the northern part of the country, although a unit of brigade strength is scheduled to be sta­tioned there soon.

The Morgenposten listed the five Russian airfields nearest the border as follows: One airfield is at about the center of the peninsula that juts out about forty miles north of Petsamo.

A second field is slightly north of the base of the peninsula at the center of the point that juts almost due west. It is just west of the thirty-second Meridian. The third field (the largest) is about fifteen and one-half miles south and slightly west of Petsamo.

The fourth field is fifteen and one-half miles south and slightly west of the third field.

The fifth field is fifteen and one-half miles south and slightly west of the fourth.

The five fields are almost in a line from the peninsula downward, grading them south­westerly so that the last comes about thirty miles from the border.