The Naval War College Today

I

The U. S. Naval War College must be by the very nature of its job, not just a very good War College, but the best War College in the world.” So stated Life magazine in its special Navy issue of October 28, 1940. Yet, hardly more than a year later there was a concerted move afoot to close down the college for the duration of the war and convert the buildings to barracks. This, in an era of naval war operations of unprecedented scope, complexity, and significance would have been a strange course indeed!

Through a masterful job of selling the Navy what it needed at a time when it needed it most, the wartime president, Admiral E. C. Kalbfus, succeeded in keeping the War College running throughout the war. Instead of the hallowed halls being used for barracks, they were used for the command and staff education of approximately seven hundred officers and for conducting correspondence courses for many hundreds more. The majority of these officers were U. S. Naval Reserves, and they are still heard from in letters expressing pride in their alma mater. These letters, along with the wartime records of these graduates, offer solid testimony to the effectiveness of the fore-shortened wartime courses and to the wisdom of the decision to stay open for business during the war.

In the unsettled conditions following World War II there were many, including the author, who took little note of the Naval War College as a choice of duty assignment. Having just been to a war, we had no inclination to start right in to study it, especially since there was some suspicion that the Battle of Jutland was still a major vehicle of the education. Then there came a change in the news. Graduates of the post war courses were heard to speak with great enthusiasm about their experience at the college. Why? Primarily because the. Naval War College had been brought up to date.

In 1946, when Admiral Spruance became President of the College, the wartime speedup courses had served their purpose, and the full length courses were reinstalled. These courses were again eleven months in length, but bore few other points of resemblance to the “prewar” courses, for they were completely revised and invigorated with recent war experience under the stimulating guidance of a great Navy leader in that war. Dogma and teaching were now things of the past, and “guided self-education” took their place.

II

The post-war curricula have been built upon and further improved under succeeding incumbencies. Keeping up to date has become a strong habit. The College lays ever increasing stress on its present mission:

To further an understanding of the fundamentals of warfare with emphasis on future naval warfare, in order to prepare officers for higher command.

This is a Mission with plenty of room in it. At the same time it has a definite form. It is possible to support this mission with a comprehensive but tailored curriculum.

Fundamentals of warfare include political, sociological, and economic aspects in addition to the military. It has been necessary to limit the study of the history of warfare, except as necessary to illustrate the consistency of fundamentals and to extract lessons for future application. For example, World War II occupies far less curricular time than the Battle of Jutland, now happily laid to rest, occupied prior to World War II. The Advanced Studies Course, enrolling four to ten officers, is an exception, since it places greater emphasis on viewing warfare in its historical setting.

Future naval warfare receives the greater emphasis. The lessons of the past are applied to the future. The political, economic, psychological, social, and geographic factors of war are studied in addition to the strictly military factors. The objectives which war is intended to attain are kept in the forefront of the student’s thinking. The tools, techniques, and forces that will be available in the near future are regularly put to work in the solution of problems in significant strategic areas. Graduates must be more than up to date when they leave Newport; they must be able to look well into the future.

The purpose of the mission is to prepare officers for higher command. This preparation begins on “Day One” and continues throughout the course. Each student is required to make the estimates, the decisions, and the plans of the commander, and at all levels from task group to theatre. In one problem he may elect to make himself the President of the United States or, more modestly, the Secretary of Defense. The student must wrest the solutions single- handedly from several of these problems, while in others he has the help of a staff or serves as a member of a staff.

III

In the olden days it was customary to travel at a leisurely rate. Not so today. A major problem of curriculum planners now is to ensure that the student does not work under such pressure that his “digestion” is impaired. It is important that he have time to think, for it is recognized that the college may be the only place during his career where an officer can pause and regroup his thoughts, evaluate his own naval experience in relation to the whole service, and gain a thorough understanding of the fundamentals which control the increasingly complicated profession of arms. Here, for once, he should have the opportunity to give his attention to studied and long range methods by which durable plans and policies can be created, as opposed to the “fire brigade” technique of rushing from crisis to crisis. The problem is not an easy one. World War II and subsequent developments have expanded many- fold the fields with which a high commander must be familiar. In the War College the problem of providing adequate time has been met in part by such steps as reduction of time-consuming game board problem plays and chart plot problem plays to one each, reduction of International Law from a leisurely three months to an intensive five days,* and simplification of student research by providing compilations of useful information and by convenient layouts of currently applicable material. Staff advisers seek to assist the student to get the most out of his time without in any way guiding him to a solution or doing his thinking for him. A constant review and redesign of curriculum items is carried out to make each package give full value in the time available for that item.

IV

Other service colleges conduct one resident course. The Naval War College groups four resident courses under one administration and stands ready to activate a fifth, the Flag Officer’s Refresher Course, on demand. The four active resident courses have separate purposes, but, thanks to a common administration, it is possible to obtain many benefits and economies from mutual support and mutual participation. In many cases one of the departments conducts a curriculum item for two or more courses simultaneously. Staff members render advice and assistance as required to any department. Many lectures are found suitable for all courses. Committee work is productive of more ideas by reason of mixing several categories of students, and student-commanders’ staffs can be realistically organized as to rank and specialty distribution.

V

The description of Naval War College courses is published annually in the Naval War College Catalog of Courses. For those who do not have access to this publication a brief statement of the purposes of these courses is given here:

Flag Officers Refresher Course: To provide flag officers with an opportunity to further their understanding of the fundamentals of warfare with an emphasis on:

A review of the essentials of the exercise of high command.

The advancement of their strategic thinking.

This course includes an analysis of sea- power in future warfare, a review of problem solving techniques and planning procedures, problems relating to national strategy and the employment of seapower and research into subjects of current national and international importance. The Flag Officer student will have some latitude in shaping his course to fit his own needs, expected length of stay, and prospective duty assignment. He will be assisted by briefings, take part in lectures, studies, and problems related to his needs, and engage in independent research.

Advanced Study in Strategy and Seapower: To provide a small group of officers with an opportunity for comprehensive study of the nature of war, the nature of sea power, and the employment of naval and other armed forces in coordination with non-military elements of the nation’s strength in pursuit of the nation’s aims.

Strategy and Tactics Course: To provide senior officers with an opportunity to further their understanding of the fundamentals of warfare, with emphasis on naval strategy and the employment of naval strategy in future warfare.

Strategy and Logistics Course: To provide senior officers with an opportunity to further their understanding of the fundamentals of warfare, with emphasis on the nature of logistics and the possible influence of logistics in future naval warfare.

Command and Staff Course: To provide lieutenant commanders, junior commanders, and equivalent ranks with an opportunity to further their understanding of the fundamentals of warfare with emphasis upon the operational functions of command and the organization, functions, and procedures of operational staffs.

Correspondence Courses: Under the basic Mission of the College, its purpose is: To extend the facilities of the Naval War College as far as practicable to officers unable to attend the resident courses. Correspondence courses in Strategy and Tactics, Logistics, International Law, and Advanced International Law are offered by the College.

VI

The curriculum which supports the Strategy and Tactics, Strategy and Logistics, and Command and Staff Courses is made up of five programs. These are:

1. The Operations Problem Program
2. The Special Studies Program
3. The Writing Program
4. The Lecture Program
5. The Reading Program

The Advanced Studies course curriculum is a specialized one which participates selectively in the Lecture Program and the Special Studies Program, and carries out the remainder of its studies by means of research, discussions, and writing. This course also gives support to other departments, principally by means of lectures and consultation.

The five programs are mutually supporting. Generally speaking, however, the major support is rendered from the bottom of the list up; i.e., each of the last four programs supports every program above it.

The Operations Problem Program is the principal vehicle of learning. The three courses have a similar interest in these problems from the standpoint of staff and command features, military geography, and military, political, economic, and related factors which must be considered in the estimate of the situation. So far as the three factors of strategy, tactics, and logistics are concerned, the emphasis in the Strategy and Tactics Course is on strategy, in the Strategy and Logistics Course on logistics, and in the Command and Staff Course on tactics. Some of the operations problems serve all three courses, some serve two courses, and others are designed for the special needs of one department only. The solutions are sometimes individual and sometimes by groups of students organized as a commander and his staff.

The Special Studies Program provides a means for the students to study some of the weapons, techniques, and processes that they will later apply in solving operations problems. A second important purpose of the Special Studies is to pursue certain subjects which can be handled better by the study method than by the Operation Problem method. These studies cover a wide range of subject matter—Organization for National Security, The Planning Process, Atomic Energy, Carrier Task Force Operations, Undersea Warfare, World War II, Staffs, International Law, Strategy, to name a few.

The Writing Program requires the student to read as widely as possible on an assigned subject, to interpret and evaluate this reading, and to crystallize and record his thoughts and conclusions. The papers prepared by the Strategy and Tactics and Strategy and Logistics students are global in scope. They provide an excellent means of learning the important factors affecting the world situation today and the interrelationship of those factors. The student must project his thoughts well into the future in order that he will have an awareness of trends which may affect him in the exercise of his future duties. In the Strategy and Tactics Course the first term paper is a very broad foreign policy study, whereas in the Strategy and Logistics Course this same period is devoted to war potentials. In the second half year Strategy and Tactics and Strategy and Logistics students make individual studies of warfare on a global basis. The Command and Staff students write a series of shorter papers, equally appropriate in subject matter and scope to their rank bracket. Rarely can an officer complete this writing program without having acquired an added sense of responsibility in the light of his increased knowledge of world and national affairs as they relate to his profession, nor without a permanent interest in maintaining this knowledge.

The Lecture Program is designed as a supporting program, but is highly valued on its own merits by the students. Some even consider it to be the highlight of the course. The average quality of the outside lecturers is unexcelled, and the staff presentations are professionally excellent in content, and fit directly into the subjects under study at the time. The lecture program involves an all hands effort from the President down to the junior member of the team, and is a special point of pride at the War College.

The Reading Program is a supporting program, largely, since the reading which is prescribed in connection with the various studies, or which must be undertaken as background for the Writing Program, consumes most of the time the student has available for reading. However, lunch hours, the occasional research days, and nights and weekends find many students doing independent reading in this fine military library. The process of research itself pays many incidental dividends in fields other than the one being researched. The rich variety of material available here on all subjects of interest to the profession of arms is a constant incentive to intellectual exploration. The Reading Program is one of the most rewarding features of the course despite the fact that this exploration must often be done by short, rapid excursions rather than by leisurely safaris.

VII

The curriculum is so designed that the first half year is devoted to a study of the tools and weapons of warfare, the planning process, and acquiring an understanding of the world in which the modern military commander must carry out his functions. There are two important purposes served by this: first, students of widely diverse educational and professional backgrounds have an opportunity to refresh themselves on, or to learn about, these many elements of the larger problems they will face in the second half year; secondly, the process tends to level out the diversities of these officers so that they may undertake the second half year on a more even basis. The diversified background of students is in fact a major controlling factor in the academic activity of the college.

It is essentially a phenomenon produced by World War II. If students were all general line naval officers, graduates of the Naval Academy, and graduates of the line postgraduate school, and if World War II had not intruded with its revolutionary developments in weapons and techniques of warfare, and furthermore had unification not entered the picture, the task of the Naval War College would be simplicity itself (and far less interesting than now).

A few statistics on a recent Command and Staff Class of 72 members will show how different is the actual situation.

The members of this class had, at various times, attended over sixty colleges and universities. One-third were graduates of the Naval Academy. Two-thirds of the remainder had gone to general line school. Over one-third were naval aviators. There were scattered small groups of submariners, supply corps officers, Marine Corps aviators, soldiers and airmen, lawyers, communication postgraduates, and holders of masters degrees in engineering. Service school background was just as varied as college background. War and post war experience included every theatre in which American forces have operated.

Variations are even more pronounced in the Strategy and Tactics and Strategy and Logistics Courses. Here there is a more liberal mixture of non-naval officers, staff corps, and government officials. More of the students are graduates of Annapolis and West Point than in the younger bracket, but they offset this similarity by having had many more years of diversified service experience. The problems created by this dissimilarity of background are offset in part by the enrichment of the studies which results from pooling all this experience.

The results attest to the success of efforts to provide a common understanding among the students. It is not uncommon for an Army officer to turn in an outstanding job as a student-naval commander, a Foreign Service officer to write an outstanding military paper, or a naval staff corps officer to be a leading light in foreign policy, before the year is over. Throughout the whole process is maintained the strong emphasis on naval warfare, which is appropriate and basic to the mission of the Naval War College. Despite this emphasis, if not because of it, students from our sister services claim to get equal benefit from the courses. The records of many Army generals who are graduates of the Naval War College senior course (now S&T or S&L) add credence to this claim. In addition to their distinctions and promotions won in the field, the Naval War College was proud to claim as graduates the Army Commandants of the Army War College, Armed Forces Staff College, and National War College in 1951.

In speaking of emphasis on Naval Warfare, the marines are of course included because they are part of the Navy and because their role in Naval Warfare is so great. But since they occupy distinct position in the Naval Service it is worthwhile to note that several Marine general officers including the Commandant, are graduates of the Naval War College.

VIII

The Naval War College exists for the purpose of higher naval education, and quite naturally the major effort is expended on the resident courses. The picture of the college would be incomplete, however, unless certain other significant and far reaching educational activities were included. The correspondence courses alone carry about fifteen hundred students on the rolls, and this despite the fact that the courses are thorough and difficult, carry a moderate (although recently increased) reserve point credit, and do not exempt regular officers from promotion exams in the subjects covered. They do help to satisfy the urge for self-improvement felt by many officers amidst the modern complexities of the profession. The Naval War College Review (formerly the Information Service for Officers) goes out monthly to thousands of officers of lieutenant commander rank and above. The annual International Law Documents—“Blue Books”—are distributed widely in the Navy, among the legal profession, in government repository libraries, and abroad. In the three Naval Districts within practicable reach of the War College, a series of eight lectures on professional subjects is given to hundreds of reserve officers by members of the college staff. Annually, in the latter part of the year, global strategy discussions are held. To these discussions come some of the best minds and most eminent personalities in many walks of civilian life, highly selected Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Officers, and high ranking regular officers of all the armed services. For a five-day period they sit in groups with students and staff and engage in the give and take of democratic free discussion as they seek for themselves the answers to critical strategic problems confronting the United States.

An important activity domiciled at the War College is the World War II Battle Evaluation Group. The various commanders’ decisions and actions are analyzed and many important lessons are obtained. These studies and the lessons therefrom are well known among Flag Officers. Films of the Coral Sea and Midway battles are regularly included in the curriculum and provide a command analysis of those battles that is readily available in no other way. Although the World War II Battle Evaluation Group is a non-curricular group, their presence at the War College permits an additional valuable purpose to be served by the facilities of the college and, in turn, provides high order research and analysis of naval exercise of command.

This list could go on to include a description of the Research and Analysis Department which keeps the academic departments up to date on all applicable information from the various research agencies, and the Intelligence Department which among its many duties besides intelligence has cognizance of the official Logistic Archives for the Navy and also exercises supervision over the Naval War College Museum. These activities, while highly important, are detours from the central theme of this article.

IX

The Secretary of the Navy, supporting the establishment of the Naval War College, wrote to Congress in 1884 that the introduction of “armored ships, swift cruisers, rams, seagoing torpedo-boats, and high- powered guns” had so complicated the art of naval warfare that some measures were essential to enable senior officers to keep up with the advances in these complicated matters. If this was the case in 1884, it is certainly not less so today. The multiple complications within each service today are further multiplied by the pace of developments, the criticality of the times, and prodigious problems of human relationships involved in arriving at a practical harmony of ideas among three powerful services and among representatives of the many other elements of national power. The global character rapidly assumed by many significant problems, and the prospective totality and universality of any future war give an air of consequence to matters that could once be planned out in unilateral seclusion. Officers of all ranks and services, immersed in these matters, are literally too busy to think far beyond the immediate problems, and the premium on professional background and staff work is mounting daily.

In this situation the Navy needs officers of many qualifications in its upper brackets. The first requirement is that they be naval officers who think of their duties in naval terms rather than in personal or specialty terms. Internecine rivalries or struggle for position among these officers has no legitimate place, for there is no way in which the impressive and inspiring unified power of the Navy can be so quickly reduced as by friction among the working parts. Nevertheless, the upper ranks must include many aviators, submariners, surface ship sailors, EDO, and Staff Corps, graduates of the service colleges, and some who have not been to any school except that of experience. It needs a balanced roster of operators, planners, logisticians, technicians, and it also needs its proportion of officers who are particularly qualified in joint matters. For despite the cherished and laudable principle that any naval officer can do anything and do it well, there is no question that individual experience, capacity, and temperament combine to give an officer especial aptitudes in one type of billet more than another. The Navy needs all these aptitudes complementing each other in its top leadership.

Let us not forget, in this complexity of requirements, that the Navy has a very vital need for officers who are students and exponents of the basic naval profession, students and exponents of seapower, who recognize from the study of the subject where naval power fits into the requirements of the nation. This knowledge is not easily or automatically come by. Seapower is not a widely understood concept, for despite the plethora of sea stories, seapower has not been widely studied or written about in recent times. This may explain many of the difficulties the Navy has encountered in making its position clear in joint matters. Naval officers, with an intuitive appreciation of the importance of their profession, have taken too little pains to study it or to articulate it except in terms of tactical capabilities.

At the Naval War College, and only there, an opportunity is presented for an officer to study this important higher side of his profession calmly and in an atmosphere of complete freedom of thought and expression. He has available to him a professional library equal to any in the world. Whereas his problems are primarily naval, the well presented facts of modern warfare, world politics, and national economics make it impossible for him to ignore these factors in arriving at his own understanding and concepts of the use of naval power. The presence of so many officers and officials of diverse backgrounds among the student body and staff increase his understanding of the whole fabric of national defense so that he can represent his service learnedly in joint councils, and thus contribute to the wise balance of decisions arrived at jointly.

X

The Naval War College recognizes its responsibility as the Navy’s own top educational institution to develop in its students a sound and inclusive appreciation of the naval profession. In no sense does it propound a naval dogma. It merely believes that the graduate must know what he is talking about when he talks Navy, be it to civilians or within the Defense Department. He must be not only a joint and combined planner, he must be a naval planner, and he must leave this College with his ability to command naval forces, as well as joint or combined forces, much enhanced by virtue of having come here.

This is the concept. Insofar as the President and Staff of the College are able, the concept is carried out, for they believe that Life's statement of 12 years ago, that the Naval War College must be “the best War College in the world,” is still the valid goal.

To make this possible there is needed an ever closer relationship between the College and the rest of the Naval Establishment. Service requirements should be applied to the curriculum as they develop or as they show up in the evaluation of the “product” of the courses in their post-college assignments. The student, being responsive to normal human stimuli, must also have incentive in the knowledge that he is enhancing his professional qualifications and along with it his chances of promotion.

With suitable student input, suitably educated, suitably assigned, and suitably credited, the navy can look forward to ever increasing benefits to the service from its College on Coaster’s Harbor Island.