Of all the basic issues that have confronted both the Congress and the American people in the last quarter century, none has been more like a hardy perennial than the idea of adopting a supreme general staff over the United States armed forces.
The concept is a persistent thing. Each time a supreme staff campaign has progressed as far as Congress, our lawmakers have rejected the proposal. But, refusing to accept congressional mandate as final, the scheme to impose the ways of Prussianism in this country retires from the scene of its congressional renunciation and patiently awaits the opportunity to be presented in a new wrapping, tied with a different ribbon, at some future occasion.
In its basic form, a supreme general staff is not complex. It is essentially a top-level staff organization headed by one officer who has the power of decision. That power of decision vested in the Chief of Staff of the supreme or national general staff may be legal or be the product of usurpation. Regardless of this, when one man, assisted by a staff, directly or indirectly exercises power of decision over all the land, air, and sea forces of a nation, that country has a supreme general staff.
By its very nature, the supreme general staff, with its concentration of power in a select group headed by a single chief of staff, is a dynamic, power-seeking institution. And, because practically everything a modern nation does in its function of government relates either directly or indirectly to national security, the supreme general staff extends its tentacles not only around the military but the quasi-military as well. Such a system properly carries a Prussian-German label. Having its inception in early Prussian militarism, the system reached its zenith of political and military power under the Empire. After the supreme general staff’s long and successful struggle for power, it was finally able, under Von Moltke and his successors in the office of chief of the great general staff, to dominate the armed forces of the country, and to reduce the emperor—the legal head of the military forces—to a rubberstamping role. Significantly, all this acquisition of general staff power was achieved by the chief of staff while the legal status of the Emperor as Commander-in-Chief was ostensibly, but certainly not actually, observed. This, incidentally, provided but another example of the indirect, but effective, methods by which a supreme general staff system dominates the military and, eventually, the political life of a nation, and while doing so gives lip service observance to the legal, but fictional, higher governmental authorities.
History has demonstrated the certain progress by which the supreme general staff gathers to itself the reins of governmental powers. It is now a matter of record how such a system eradicates, often surreptitiously but nevertheless relentlessly, whatever liberal or democratic features a government possesses. Much like a cancer, the germ of the supreme staff starts to grow, unnoticed and painless at first, within the body politic, initially neither burdening nor impeding the non-military functions of government. Finally, the supreme general staff becomes the ultimate factor of the government, but like a malignancy it, too, is incapable of supplanting the agencies it destroyed in its growth, and hence has signed its own death warrant, as well as that of the government it dominated.
This has been the historic course of events of those nations which adopted the supreme general staff idea. Examination of all the substantiating examples is beyond the limits of available space. Sceptics who doubt that misfortune follows in the wake of a supreme staff need only to delve into the history of Prussia and Germany. There, it was proven that the supreme staff could not restrain itself so as to function smoothly and objectively along with the other agencies of government. The course of Prussian-German staff history demonstrates that political and military disaster is the fate of any nation which, by the adoption of the supreme national staff, starts the bumpy ride down the road to militarism.
Enlightened governments, particularly those of Anglo-Saxon tradition, have long demonstrated a basic and justified suspicion of the Prussian-German staff system. Both the United States and Great Britain, the world’s stalwart bulwarks of democracy, have continuously and deliberately rejected the way of Scharnhorst, Bismarck, and Von Moltke, and have chosen to place their reliance in top-level military organizations and methods that are in accord not only with their free principles, but with their specific requirements for national security.
Although the United States has consistently rejected the supreme general staff concept, the effort to induce its adoption in this country still continues. To prevent this nation from being so induced requires a high order of national alertness, for the sponsors of the “simple” and deceptively attractive Prussian system seldom peddle it under its true label of militarism.
This points up one of the problems encountered by those who strive to prevent the imposition of Prussian command methods and philosophies over our armed forces— the problem created by the masquerading nature of supreme general staff proposals. For seldom is the proposal presented with a factual and dispassionate description of its true characteristics. Seldom, if ever, is it offered for what it is—an alien philosophy imported from continental Europe where it was matured and developed by nations to whom democratic ideals and institutions were anathema.
Never do proponents of a supreme general staff admit that their proposed system has flourished only when its roots sink deeply into the poisoned soil of militarism, dictatorship, and anti-democratic beliefs, or that it is a system employed by those who have sought to destroy all that America and our way of life stands for. However, on every occasion in the past when the Prussian supreme general staff idea has been proposed, Congress has pierced the disguise around the proposal. And Congress, demonstrating its proven wisdom in matters of national security, has continuously rejected all such plans to impose a supreme general staff over our armed forces. However, it is entirely understandable that even some leading public figure should, in an honest and sincere effort to improve our national security, propose adoption of methods that seemed, at the time, a means of effecting such desired improvements. And it is entirely possible that such proposals could be conceived by a thoughtful individual, without specific reference to the Prussian system, and without realization that these proposals would in effect transplant that alien method in this country.
Consequently, there is good reason to believe that some who advocate a Prussian- German supreme national staff do not, themselves, realize the true nature of what they propose. Recent speeches on national security reforms by the eminent scientist, Dr. Vannevar Bush, are excellent examples of the manner in which proposals intended to improve national security may, without it being the intent of the sponsor of the proposals, contain key features of the Prussian-German supreme staff system, and how adoption of such proposals would, upon analysis, create the very conditions the proponent seeks to avoid.
Dr. Bush has justly earned nation-wide esteem not only as a result of his scientific achievements, but for his valuable contributions to the technological advancement of the United States armed forces. As those who are acquainted with Dr. Bush’s work and contributions well know, it is inconceivable that he would knowingly sponsor a Prussian staff system for this country or advocate measures that would open the door to eventual establishment of such a system, with its attendant decline of civilian control.
Yet, Dr. Bush’s speech at Medford, Massachusetts, on October 11, 1952, warrants a close look, for it serves to illustrate how the basic features of the deceptively attractive supreme general staff system apparently gain acceptance even by those who deplore the very results their proposals would bring.
So, with recognition of Dr. Bush’s great service to our nation, let us examine key passages of his recent speech that bear significantly on the subject of a supreme national staff for this nation.
Early in his address Dr. Bush said:
“The Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises command, which is utterly foreign to its duties as our top military planning agency, advisory to the chief civilian authority. It fails to bring well considered resolutions to our most serious military problems. It dissipates its energies on the inconsequential. Its members are overburdened, and have little time for deep continuous thought which is essential to wise planning.”
Dr. Bush has made two points in this statement. The first is that command and planning are foreign to each other; the second, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not function well.
We will discuss the first part of this statement later, so let us turn to the second statement, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff fails in it duties.
To contend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot bring “well considered resolutions to our most serious military problems” is to assert that the Joint Chiefs of Staff that assisted President Roosevelt in guiding our nation through the serious years of World War II brought us to victory in spile of our top command. The fact of the matter is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff was equal to the task of the recent great global war. To say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff today, improved and strengthened with legal status and delineated functions, and assisted by a formally organized Joint Staff, cannot function as well as it did during World War II is a reflection on the capacity and determination of our joint military leadership.
This is not to say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff is functioning perfectly, with no room for improvement. Whenever it is believed that any agency of mortal man has achieved that exalted status, that belief should be condemned and discarded, for, in organizations as in individuals, the contemplation of self-perfection is but a prelude to the deluge.
Ferdinand Eberstadt, the widely recognized authority on national security problems, and head of the Hoover Commission National Security “task force,” testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee at hearings on the proposed 1949 amendment to the Unification Act of 1947, said with respect to the effectiveness of the JCS:
“Our Joint Chiefs of Staff in the last war may not have been perfect—the system had some deficiencies—but it was just about as perfect as any institution in human affairs is likely to be.”
And, as the National Security Task Force of the Hoover Commission reported after detailed investigation of the problem:
“During the war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff justified its existence as an excellent mechanism for strategic planning and for carrying strategic plans into effect.”
Let us return now to the first statement of Dr. Bush in which he stated:
“The Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises command, which is utterly foreign to its duties as our top military planning agency, advisory to the chief civilian authority.”
Dr. Bush amplified his views, when, in a later statement, he said:
“The Joint Chiefs of Staff should emphatically not be in the line of command . . . Joint Chiefs of Staff is a staff. To place it in the line of command is to invite military command by a committee, than which there is nothing worse.”
A careful reading of the Security Act’s Joint Chiefs of Staff provisions will disclose that the JCS is not specifically charged with strategic command over the armed forces. What the law does charge the JCS with is preparation of top level plans and the responsibility of providing for the strategic direction of the military forces.
Preparation of plans does not in itself constitute command. Approval of Joint Chiefs of Staff plans is the function of the President or Secretary of Defense. After approval of such plans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides for strategic command by designating one of the JCS members as “executive agent” of the JCS, and in such capacity the member so designated is responsible for execution of the plan.
Actually it is highly questionable if the Joint Chiefs of Staff methods could be described as command by committee. True, the planning process is deliberative—or committee—in nature. However, execution of the plans so formulated is, through the device of the “executive agent,” an individual and hence centralized responsibility. The JCS member who, by nature of the plans, by the location of the contemplated activity, or by the composition of forces involved, has primary interest is usually designated as the executive agent of the JCS. In such a status he directs and is responsible for the execution of the specified plans. Such procedure serves to point up the dual status of JCS members, who are also heads of military services. This duality is a fundamental advantage and is the means by which authority to plan is combined with responsibility for execution.
Taken from a negative aspect, Dr. Bush recommends that JCS planning and service command should be separated at the top level of our military system. By so doing, he would destroy the great and proven advantage of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff members are both architects and executants of high strategy.
The alleged superiority of a system in which authority and responsibility would be separated was carefully considered by the British during their post World War II national security organization. The British “White Paper” on “Central Organization for Defense” gave a clear and strong reason why the British government rejected proposals to adopt the German high command system of giving top military planners directional authority while not at the same time charging them with the responsibility for carrying out their own plans. This was the British verdict in the “White Paper”:
“The German system failed because the Planning Staffs of the O.K.W. were not drawn from the headquarters of the three services. The plans they produced had later to be handed to those Headquarters for execution and were often found to be unrealistic. The cleavage between planning and execution set up dangerous antagonisms, and entirely nullified any theoretical advantages of the German system.
“It has always been a cardinal principle of the British organization that, alike in the Chiefs of Staff Committee and in the Joint Staffs, it should be the men responsible in the Service Departments for carrying out the approved policy who are brought together in the central machine to formulate it.”
It would certainly be amiss to believe that the British government was alone in its fears of a supreme staff system’s separation of authority and responsibility. Three years after the British decision to reject Prussian concepts and to adhere to reality, the United States undertook through the national security “Task Force” of the famed Hoover Commission, an unparalleled examination of the entire defense organization. A primary subject of consideration was the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After long and detailed investigation the Hoover investigators submitted their report. This National Security “Task Force” report stands as the most important document of its kind produced by this nation. It should be required reading for all those who would discard the Joint Chiefs of Staff and adopt the Prussian-German methods. The Hoover investigators seemed to anticipate Dr. Bush when they said:
“There has been much loose criticism of the war effort of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as constituting ‘command by committee’; yet there can be no doubt whatsoever that in the broad field of grand strategy a meeting of several minds is far safer —and in the end more sound—than the dictates of one. The responsibilities for strategic planning and the conduct of war are soundly on the shoulders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who, in turn, are under the authority, and subject to the control of, the President and the Secretary of Defense. There should be no change in this concept.”
What both of these statements are condemning is commonly referred to as the “Ivory Tower” concept. The British expressed it well when they said that the plans were “often found to be unrealistic.”
Perhaps one of the best examples in modern history of “unrealistic” plans were those drawn up by the German high command for the proposed landing against England during the last war.
Situated in their “ivory tower,” the land- minded OKW considered all amphibious operations to be much like river crossings. Hence, when the time to plan for operation “Sea Lion” against the British came about, the Germans found themselves without any adequate amphibious doctrine. In fact, it is pertinent to note that the only nation with an amphibious doctrine was the United States, where there was no National General Staff to hamper the development of naval warfare.
Russia, under the Soviets as under the Tzars, suffered from the “ivory tower” status of its military planners, who were not responsible for execution of their plans. Just one example is the failure in World War II to take advantage of the Black Sea area with its open door to the flank of Hitler’s army. Proper use was not made in this area of Russian naval forces, a deficiency common to the land-locked, land-minded concept of war so often manifested by supreme national staffs.
In our Joint Chiefs of Staff we have the highly effective procedure by which the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff plan what is to be done and then the Joint Chiefs of Staff members as service heads execute those plans. By such an organizational device, as previously pointed out, authority is combined with responsibility. This assures a strong note of realism in the actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for while deciding what to do there is the continual realization that they will have to do it.
Continuing his analysis of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dr. Bush brought out what appears to be his primary criticism of that organization. He said:
“The chairman [of the JCS] should have authority to resolve it [any disagreement], so that there may be clear cut recommendations available to the Commander-in-Chief and not divided councils, continued bickering, or end moves. War is a serious business, where prompt decisions are essential, and civilians should not be forced to resolve military arguments.”
This is an important passage for two reasons. First, it compresses into a few words an indictment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, second, it contains the essentials of a system with which Dr. Bush would supplant the JCS.
Secretary James Forrestal, in defending the Joint Chiefs of Staff system against criticism of its detractors, who seemed all too willing to emphasize differences of opinion within that body, stated that he doubted “if there were more than two or three issues [in World War II] on which agreement could not be reached” and which had to be referred to President Roosevelt for resolution. “I know,” he stated, “that mistakes of judgment are far less likely to occur if the proponent of any plan or idea has to justify his case before a group of intelligent partners.”
Ferdinand Eberstadt has a word of warning for those who thought that “bickering” was the greatest evil for a military staff. Speaking of the danger of letting one man resolve all difficulties, he said:
“It is no accident of modern warfare that military organizations headed by a single military chief of staff have, so far as I know, invariably been on the losing side. This type of organization is conducive to static military thinking and to a ‘military line’—to Maginot Line psychology. It discourages debate and tends to foster an unjustified sense of security in one weapon, one arm, or one service. Debates and wrangles are trying, but military defeat is far worse.”
It is in this proposal to give the chairman power to resolve Joint Chief of Staff disputes that we find one of the basic features of Dr. Bush’s remedial system. To give such power to the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman warrants most careful scrutiny and consideration, for it amounts to far more than a minor change in the present system.
Further, it constitutes an advocacy of adoption of the indispensable feature of the Prussian-German supreme general staff, and a single military commander of the nation’s entire armed forces is a certainty. Military policy at the governmental level (the JCS) involves determination of the purpose, composition, and employment of the armed forces. The power to resolve disputes concerning such military policy is tantamount to the power of command. Those who doubt that such would be the case need but to examine the evolution of the Great German General Staff from Jena (1806) to its acquisition of unfettered power under Von Moltke and Ludendorff.
Actually, the proposal of Dr. Bush for increasing the power of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not a new idea. It was considered while Congress was making the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act, and it was pointedly rejected because Congress, with its traditional wisdom in national security matters, did not want to establish a Prussian-type single chief of staff and in so doing open the door to the supreme national staff which would inevitably follow. James Forrestal, testifying before the Senate Committee on Armed Services at hearings on the 1949 amendment, made a strong point against giving the power of decision to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Said Mr. Forrestal:
“I want to make it clear that I do not advocate the power of surrender of decision to any such military person. A surrender of the power of decision would involve the surrender of the principle of civilian control.”
Congress, by its action, agreed with Secretary Forrestal, rightfully realizing that the title of “chairman” for anyone possessing power to resolve policy disputes would be only a euphemism. The title might be American, but the role of the individual' would be Prussian.
Others have preceded Dr. Bush in perceiving that the deliberative nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff procedure is slower in reaching a decision than would be the case if the power of decision were vested in one man. But as they have proceeded further in their evaluation, they have discovered the advantages of such JCS procedure.
As we have already noted, one who recognized the deliberative nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was Ferdinand Eberstadt. Mr. Eberstadt’s opinion in this matter is quoted at length, for it is a pertinent rebuttal to the thesis of Dr. Bush:
“Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff has operated very satisfactorily, there does exist a weakness of delay in reaching coordinated decision in comparison with one man decision. However, in the requirement for unanimity there also lies the fundamental strength of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Free expression of opinion is had at the highest level and all sides of a problem can be thoroughly examined. This avoids the danger of serious mistakes inherent in any setup where final military control is lodged in the hands of one man. Any professional military man chosen for such a position would necessarily come from one of the services and would remain subject to the influences of this early training. This has been the result in other countries whenever over-all military control has been exercised by one man. The most recent example is Germany where Hitler’s predilection for the ground forces led to the subordination of the air and naval arms.”
Then, Mr. Eberstadt addressed himself pointedly to the same issue as has been raised by Dr. Bush’s proposal to vest power of decision in the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Eberstadt succinctly summarized the problem as follows:
“The choice in the strategic planning area lies between an organization headed by one man and a joint organization such as our Joint Chiefs of Staff. The first type of organization insures speedy action, but at the cost of a marked increase in the probability of fatal mistakes. A deliberate approach is acceptable in military planning in contrast with execution of plans where prompt action is the primary requisite.”
Thus, Mr. Eberstadt not only exposed the inherent advantages of the joint planning system at the national level, but he also placed it in proper perspective to command at the theater or operation level, where a single commander is more responsive to the requirements of the tactical situation. Speedy decisions are often required in actual operations, but such requirements are exceptional at the national level.
And yet, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have proven equal to quick decisions when necessary. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in 1945, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King said:
“As for rapidity of decision, the recent biennial report of the Chief of Staff of the Army relates major decision made—when the premises were all available—and in the hands of General Mac- Arthur and Admiral Nimitz in 90 minutes. This was the decision to attack Leyte 2 months ahead of schedule. I can say that while such speed was rare, the case is not an isolated one.”
Aside from his original proposals, Dr. Bush introduces a very serious thought with respect to civilian control of the military. In the above quotation Dr. Bush observes that “war is a serious business, where prompt decisions are essential, and civilians should not be forced to resolve military arguments.”
This is an important statement, for it advances the argument invariably advanced by supporters of a supreme general staff—that the Chief of Staff should settle disputes as to military policy. This would be an advantage, the theory’s proponents say, for such military disagreements should not properly be resolved by civilians. All of which is a present day re-enunciation of the party line of the architects of Prussian militarism who continually contended that only military men should resolve military matters. Obviously such a theory, giving in effect a “closed shop” status to the military, 'if accepted, would give the military a monopolistic control of the nation’s armed forces, free from civilian interference. As history has so forcefully demonstrated, the military’s control of the military is but the prelude of the military’s control of the nation.
Again, Dr. Bush was not the first to recognize the problem of disagreement in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As in the case of practically all current criticisms, the particular subject of divided opinion was examined by the Hoover Commission. The report of the Hoover Commission’s national security investigators serves as a pointed and formidable answer to Dr. Bush. Said the report:
“If a ‘split decision’ [in the JCS] occurs, it would, normally, imply that the issue is beyond solution by the resources of military technology and experience, and is therefore, within the competence of civilian judgment and authority.”
Then, almost as if again anticipating Dr. Bush’s speech, the report continued:
“Much has been written about the incapacity of civilians to deal with military matters. Military science, it is said, can only be the province of the military. That may be true on the battlefield; but it is not true in the realm of grand strategy. Modern war cannot be left solely to the generals.”
Thus, rejecting the military “closed shop” theory, that military matters are only the province of the military “trade unions,” the report aligned itself with the views of one of the 20th century’s greatest authorities on military-civilian relationships. It was the old “Tiger of France,” Clemenceau, who drove, whipped, and led his nation to World War I victory, and who observed near the end of his brilliant career, “War is too important to be left to the military.”
The Hoover Commission investigators also directed their attention to the idea of creating a position of higher military authority than the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This position, on analysis, would not be unlike a single chief of staff having authority to resolve disputes in the JCS and to supersede the JCS as the highest military agency for giving advice to the Secretary of Defense or to the President. Again, in this instance, the logic of the Hoover Commission went directly to the heart of the issue by stating:
“The committee is opposed to the Secretary of Defense having a chief of staff of his own or a military staff in his office. The Joint Chiefs are, by statute, and should remain, the single highest responsible source of military advice within the National Security Organization. It would be unwise, if not dangerous, to create a parallel, or rival, or overriding source of military advice.
“. . . Placing another military adviser, whether it be an individual chief of staff or a staff, over or along side the Joint Chiefs would tend to relieve them of responsibility and would be more likely to retard and confuse than expedite.”
It might be pertinent, in view of the above quotations, to observe that the nation should think deeply and long before it adopts a change that is so thoughtfully and forcefully condemned by the Hoover investigations.
Tied in closely with the preceding paragraph of Dr. Bush’s .is another assertion made in his speech:
“I am convinced that the organization under which our planning is being done is defective, and that the nation is in serious danger.”
It is granted that we as a nation are, from the standpoint of international developments, in danger. Also, as we have mentioned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff never has been, and probably never will be, perfect. But to give the impression that the JCS is faulty to the point of imperiling the nation is not a view on which Dr. Bush will find unanimous support. In fact, he will find his views pointedly disputed by the most significant kind of testimony.
The late James Forrestal is recognized as one of the most able students of our national security ever produced in this country. On the matter of effectiveness and capabilities of the JCS, Secretary Forrestal wrote:
“The conception of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has proved successful. It has been one of the great developments of the war and I think no one can gainsay the fact after a look at the captured documents of the German Wehrmacht that the Chiefs of Staff functioned more effectively.”
Thus, not only did Mr. Forrestal recognize the success and achievements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but he pointed out that it was superior to the German system, which so many detractors of the JCS advocate in place of the American system.
Advocacy of further key features of the Prussian supreme national staff system, though Dr. Bush does not identify them as such, are found in another passage of his Medford address. In describing the system he proposed, Dr. Bush said:
“Its [the JCS] chairman should be an officer of great distinction, selected by the President, and serving for an extended tour at his pleasure, and he should appoint, or approve the selection of, all members of the subordinate bodies within the JCS organization.”
Under such a plan, the chairman (de facto single chief of staff) would be given two of the principal instruments with which the Prussian military fashioned their supreme national staff.
First, the plan would abolish the present statutory limit on the term of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This present limitation of one two-year term, with authority for one reappointment in peacetime, was no legislative accident. As the legislative history so well proves, the limitation was deliberately applied by Congress as a conscious effort to erect a barrier against the chairman developing into a single chief of staff. Removal of such a wisely imposed congressional barrier would go far in laying a supreme general staff foundation. As Prussian-German staff history so clearly establishes, it was the long terms of the chiefs of staff that contributed to the continuity of militaristic policies and the acquisition of power by the general staff until Prussia, and later Germany, became for practical purposes a general staff state.
Second, the above quotation urges adoption, in actual effect, of the cardinal organizational device that brought the Prussian supreme national staff system into real being—the means of creating a self-perpetuating military clique directing the nation’s armed forces. This was accomplished by appointive power of the chief of staff.
Combine the power to select only those whose professional record and views are in accord with the chairman, with an unlimited term, and the self perpetuating system is the result.
Mr. Eberstadt saw clearly the organizational and political dangers of the single chief of staff. He warned against adoption of such a theory in his testimony before the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, on which occasion he stated:
“In my opinion, if the chief of staff is a strong and ambitious man, he will, subject to the President, be in control of the military policy, strategy, and military budget, and of everything else in the department that he wants to control. If both the Secretary and chief of staff are strong characters, there will be a running fight.”
Current government fiscal problems point up the significance of the above reference to control of the military budget by a single chief of staff. With this country spending almost 85 per cent of its total budget for purposes associated with military activities, it takes no strong imagination to appreciate how a single chief of staff who controlled the bulk of the nation’s finances would in effect control the nation.
However, opposition to the supreme national staff is not only based upon the political and economic dangers inherent in such a concept. Another, and perhaps even more significant reason, is that from the military standpoint it would weaken, rather than strengthen, our national security.
Under a supreme national staff one philosophy, one element of the armed forces, dominates. Usually, by sheer force of numbers, it is land-power thinking that dominates. While such a situation weakened the German war effort and was the root of the basic German strategic errors in both World Wars, domination of all the armed forces by one element would be even far more dangerous to the United States.
Unlike Prussia and Germany, the United States is a great island nation and maritime power. Our national security rests not on one kind of military power, but rather on the total combined, and properly employed, strength of army, air, and naval forces. It is not a matter of which element should dominate the others; rather it is a fundamental principle that, for the requirements of American national defense, no one element should dominate the others. Any organization which focuses power in a single chief of staff would, as Secretary Forrestal pointed out, enhance the possibility of making strategic mistakes. Again, Germany’s fate is an example. For good reason British Air Vice- Marshal Kingston-McCloughry said, “The OKW (the German high command) is generally regarded as having been one of the most important factors leading to Germany’s defeat.”
Secretary Forrestal summarized the vital inadequacy of the supreme national staff’s single chief by observing:
“The strategic decisions as to the conduct of global war are beyond the capacity of any man, even when assisted by a brilliant and competent staff.”
In summation, proposals for American adoption of a Prussian-German supreme national staff are again being voiced, in spite of repeated congressional rejection in the past.
To justify adoption of that alien system of militarism, its proponents first seek to discredit and abolish the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In so doing they prefer to junk the war-proven Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than to improve it.
The recent speeches of Dr. Vannevar Bush, while not specifically advocating the Prussian-German system, are useful, upon analysis, in illustrating how adoption of separate key features of that system would in effect result in adoption of the system itself. Such a result would destroy the civilian control that Dr. Bush, and others who hold similar views, wish to protect.
This is but another example of the subtle manner in which the supreme national staff could gain admittance in our governmental and military systems. It is high time to cease this dangerous adoration of a system that was spawned by militarism and nurtured on the blood of democratic beliefs. It is time that Congress and the nation gives the Prussian system and its advocates a final and definite legislative rebuke. Far too much congressional effort in the past twenty years has been, by necessity, devoted to protecting our nation and its way of life from the political evils and military weakness that would be engendered by adoption of the supreme national staff. There must be new and widespread faith in things American, a recognition that the supreme national staff with its single chief was the method of the defeated and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which some are so eager to discredit, was the instrument of victory.
The question must have an adequate answer, “Why should we abandon that which won for that which lost!” America should remember well that the highway of man’s history is littered with the wreckage of nations which, in victory, adopted the way of the vanquished.
It would indeed be a paradox if America, in defending her way of life, should adopt the supreme staff system that was the wicked brain of Nazi conquest, and which, in keeping with the system’s associated characteristics, now provides the military brain for the proposed Communist conquest of the world. With even its minor faults, which discerning effort and strict adherence to law can eliminate, the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been, and can be, a strong pillar of our security.
Those who would relegate the JCS to the ash can of history will have a hard time justifying their effort by trying to prove the Joint Chiefs of Staff a failure. For, whatever their arguments are, they are faced by the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff was vindicated, and the Prussian system condemned, not only by the acid test of global war, but also by the Hoover Commission’s special committee on national security. Such verdicts, like those of Congress, cannot be easily brushed aside.
The road, though clear, is not always well marked. An alert citizenry and Congress are still needed to prevent American acceptance of the Prussian “concept for catastrophe.”