[1]
The Chinese Communists had little need for a naval force prior to their recent civil war against the Nationalist government. Their loosely-knit guerrilla armies long ago proved themselves effective agents in the bitter struggle waged in the vast inland regions of the country. And war on the sea was a distant and unfamiliar concept to Red leaders and men alike.
Developments in early 1949, however, brought about a marked change in this traditional land-bound doctrine. Red field commanders, launching large scale offensive operations against the wavering armies of Chiang Kai-shek were for the first time running into major difficulties. Too often their massed forces piled-up one after another, stopped cold by a large river or lake. Too often encircled Nationalists would make an effective withdrawal down rivers or be completely evacuated from an isolated defensive seacoast pocket.
The Red tacticians were understandably irritated. Scribbled messages were rapidly relayed to staff headquarters pleading for trained naval personnel and amphibious craft—a must if their attacks were to continue.
But the field commanders were not alone in their concern. Strategic planners at headquarters were fully cognizant of the urgency for a naval force. Red politico-military thinkers had long considered China the springboard for further armed aggression in other parts of Asia, and the success or failure of these plans would depend on sea as well as land and air forces.
By May 1, 1949, initial blueprints began to take material form when the Tsinan Headquarters of the East China People’s Liberation Army (now the Third Field Army) announced the formal establishment of the “East China People’s Navy.” General Chang Ai-ping was named to the post of commander and concurrent political commissar of that force.
General Chang’s “navy” was the forerunner of Red China’s present navy; yet it was Communist in name only. Most of the officers and men were Nationalist deserters, while the naval craft were captured or brought over from the enemy. With the exception of the highest command echelon and the ever-watchful political commissars, Red China’s first navy was made up almost in toto of the enemy.
1949 marked the high point in Nationalist desertions and, of course, in the subsequent growth of the embryonic Red Naval force. Nationalist naval defections ran from one or two individuals to the wholesale sell-out of entire units, and the Communists did not hesitate to lay out the welcome mat for the badly needed men and material. One of the most stunning blows to the already badly demoralized Nationalist Navy occurred in the early spring, with the defection of the entire Second Coastal Defense Fleet, commanded by Admiral Lin Tsun.
This force, numbering twenty-five craft ranging from LCTs to destroyers, represented an estimated one-fourth of the total Nationalist naval force and, when augmented with additional unit “captures,” formed the early backbone of the Red navy.
The first concrete signs of official Communist doctrine began to take shape in a July 9, 1949, meeting held in Shanghai. This conference was attended by over 400 personnel, including former Nationalist naval officers, engineers, dockyard workers, and, of course, political commissars.
The chairman of the conference, General Chang Ai-ping, briefed the new naval cadre with the official word:
None can deny the vital importance of creating a People’s Navy to safeguard China’s independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty against imperialist aggression . . . China today has no navy of her own to speak of and the creation of a People’s Navy must start from scratch.
Chang continued:
The basic policy of the navy of the People’s Liberation Army at present is to build up a skeleton naval arm to be used as the basis for the creation of a powerful People’s Navy of the future, in order to destroy the sea blockade of liberated China, to support the land and air forces of the People’s Liberation Army in defense of Chinese soil and to wipe out all remnants of the reactionary forces.
By the close of the conference, a four-point program was laid out by the Communist high-command.
(1) Creation of a brand-new and advanced organization, and the drafting of the necessary regulations and laws in line with the basic policy of the People’s Navy.
(2) Re-education of former (Nationalist) naval personnel.
(3)Repairing damaged warships and other naval craft, naval dockyards and bases so as to enable the People’s Navy to take effective measures in coping with the sea blockade enforced by the enemy.[2]
(4) Establishment of naval schools to train naval personnel on a large scale. In addition to the present naval personnel, workers, peasants and educated youths will be encouraged to enter naval schools.
With the preliminary groundwork laid, Red China’s Navy was officially born at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference held at Peking. Article 22 of the Red “constitution” (known officially as the Common Program) stated: “The People’s Republic of China shall . . . establish a navy to consolidate the national defense.” This program was adopted on September 29, 1949.
As of this writing, the Chinese Communists have had three and a half years to transform plans into action—to develop their navy from a small ill-equipped and untrained embryonic force into a hard effective naval arm. Their success or failure in this task is essentially the subject of this report. And it is, in this writer’s opinion, a problem of vital import in the present Asian hot phase of the global cold war.
Today there are three critical areas in Red China’s naval expansion: strength, size, and leadership. And all three have undergone a marked change since those early days in Shanghai.
Probably the weakest and least-developed part of her strength lies in heavy surface craft. For, while the Red Navy consists of over 400 vessels, her total tonnage is estimated at no more than 80,000 tons. The largest heavy fleet unit is built around the light cruiser Victory, an obsolete 5,460 ton vessel mounting six-inch guns. This craft is reported to have a covering force of a few destroyers and destroyer-escorts. But as with the German Navy, the Red high command is most cautious in using the Victory in combat. So far at least, the Communists prefer to keep their one heavy craft in port or close to the protection of heavy shore batteries.[3]
In addition, there is good reason to believe that the Reds today are making use of a number of U. S. landing craft, most of which were captured during the civil war. This may number up to ten or fifteen LSTs in good operating condition, plus a few more in need of repair. Lighter vessels include ten or twelve gunboats averaging eight hundred tons, patrol boats mounting two inch guns and of anywhere from two hundred to four hundred tons, and a large number of LSMs,
LCIs, DUKWS, and armed Diesel powered junks.
Considering the above, it seems obvious that the Red Chinese would not be foolish enough to base their naval striking arm on such limited strength, or ever to attempt to contest the open seas with the forces of the West. They know all too well that their surface craft could put up no more than token battle, and that given even another decade to prepare, the lack of facilities, technicians, and equipment would preclude any first rate build up of a heavy naval force.
Rather, the Chinese Reds appear to have patterned themselves after a modified version of recent Russian naval doctrine. Concentration has been on two specialties: submarines and high speed motor torpedo boats.
Estimates as to the number of submarines now in the hands of the Chinese People’s Navy vary, but it may exceed thirty. A number of these, however, remain under nominal control of Russian training crews who devote their time as advisers to the Chinese naval units working out of sub bases in such places as Darien, Chingtao, and
Yülin, this latter located on the southern tip of Hainan Island. While some of these subs are no doubt obsolete, or at least obsolescent, it is reasonable to assume that China is now being equipped with newer snorkel-type undersea craft in the same manner as her air force is being supplied with the highly effective MIGs.
One report credits the Chinese with receiving an undetermined number of MB-5 subs late this year. This same usually reliable source notes that the MB-5s were manned by Russians from Vladivostok and turned over to the Chinese crews at Yülin.
The Reds have been a bit cozier, intelligence wise, in regard to their recent concentration on small high-speed surface craft. While there is some indication of plans for the tactical employment of these in a joint action with submarines, the major trend today appears to be in the direction of forming groups of these mosquito like boats into “naval shock patrols.”
Data as to the tonnage, speed, and armament is lacking, and the emergence of a number of diversified types (ranging anywhere from beefed-up armored junks to World War II type PT boats) may indicate that the Chinese are still in the experimental stage here. Most of these “shock boats” are being constructed at the naval shipyards in Shanghai, Whampoa, and Darien.
Chinese naval planning in this respect is probably developing along traditional defensive-offensive lines. Emphasis on land power, poor industrial potential, and an absence of technical know-how requires that her naval strategy be essentially a defensive one. To counterbalance this, serious attempts are being made to give the Chinese Red Navy effective tactical offensive power. There is, therefore, good reason for the current emphasis on submarines and fast torpedo boats. While there is as yet no serious danger, the value of such a force in countering a blockade, breaking up convoys, etc., is self-evident. Intelligent tactical employment of these elements, if coupled by apathy and indifference on our part, could prove most dangerous in any future conflict.
The organizational command of the new Red Navy (see Chart I) demonstrates one of its major drawbacks: i.e., the top strategic control rests firmly in the hands of the army, and as such, insures the continuance of traditional Chinese “land-bound” doctrine. Such a set-up is not unlike that currently existent in the Soviet Union. This acts not only as a block to independent thought and action, but will no doubt prove a major command handicap in time of war.
Forty-eight year old naval commander Hsiao Ching-kuan serves to point up this traditional army control. Trained at the Whampoa Military Academy in China and in the Eastern Toiler’s University and the Red Army Academy in Moscow, he can today boast over twenty-five years of field combat experience. Yet, while he has served in almost every army capacity, when appointed to his present post as Commander in Chief of the People’s Navy, Hsiao was completely ignorant of any and all phases of naval warfare.
No doubt his position as Alternate in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, a record of eight years training in the Soviet Union, a Soviet trained and Russian speaking wife, and almost three decades of loyal service to the Left cause were the critical selecting factors here. A close review of the backgrounds of a number of naval officers like Hsiao leads us to the conclusion that Red policy for the establishment of naval leadership is being based upon inexperience and loyally at the top)—experienced former Nationalist officers in the middle and lower echelons. In the future the tendency will be, of course, towards the gradual replacement of these former enemy officers by trained Party cadre.
The role of the Russian Naval Advisory Mission, indicated clearly in Chart I, insures a maximum of Soviet penetration, influence, and silent watchfulness over all sections of command, from the General Headquarters on down to the lowest tactical operational units in the navy.
It is probable that the size of this mission exceeds 1,500 men. This includes, of course, technicians, dockyard superintendents, training crews, line instructors, etc.
Further control and discipline is apparent in the dual role of Liu Tao-sheng, who is charged with the post of supervising all cadre training in the navy along with holding down the concurrent job of chief political commissar of the Red Navy. As with all
Chinese Communist military forces, the political commissar system is SOP. In the present People’s Navy, it has been given the all important task of keeping close check on the large body of former Nationalist naval officers now wearing the uniform of the People’s Navy.
One of the most important strategic naval areas at the present time is under the command of the North China Headquarters of the People’s Navy. (See Chart II.) This region, commanded by another high-ranking army officer, Lii Ch’eng-ts’ao, is a center of joint Sino-Soviet naval operations.[4]
The People’s Naval Academy at Darien has been in operation since March, 1950, and is reported to have an overall student body of some 3,000. Both the academy and the Submarine Training Group are largely staffed by Russians. They function on a stepped-up war footing.
The proportion of Koreans training at the submarine base is believed to be small and their participation in the overall naval program is probably very limited. In addition to some ten to fifteen submarines, the Training Command of the North China Headquarters is reported to have special radar and possibly sonar training groups.
Darien is also the home of considerable naval construction activity. In August, 1950, for example, the Kuan K’ou Shipyards were transfered in toto to Darien, put under Soviet direction, and re-tooled from Russian stocks. According to recent surveys, the Kuan K’ou Shipyards are currently producing 500 ton minesweepers, but are capable of building naval craft in excess of 1,000 tons.
Probably the most interesting Sino-Soviet venture was the establishing of the Darien Magnetic Mine Works, in February, 1951. One usually reliable report indicates that the Magnetic Mine Works employs 1,000 workers and is staffed by over thirty Russian and German mine experts, this latter group imported on a “lend-lease” basis from the Soviet technical pool. The Darien Magnetic Mine Works is located on Chang Hsing Island in Darien harbor and is reported to have been constructed so as to resist atomic attack. Heavy concentration on such weapons, of course, fits in well with the previously noted Chinese defensive-offensive strategy.
The East China Headquarters of the People’s Navy (see Chart III) is one of the largest and controls a number of torpedo works, naval arsenals, and shipyards. Aside from two newly activated naval academies, a special amphibious training group has been established for the purpose of training personnel for the projected assault on Formosa. This group works in close liaison with the Third Field Army, the force long marked for this invasion task. A reform Training Squadron, operating under close army supervision, is charged with the “re-education” of former Nationalist naval personnel. This group has been operating full force for the past three years.
Deputy Commander, Lin Tsun, is one of the few examples of a Nationalist defector now high in the Red naval hierarchy. Formerly commander of the Second Coastal Defense Fleet, Lin has been completely reeducated to Red doctrine. Yet there is little doubt that the ever suspicious Communist leaders are following the policy of replacing all key Nationalist deserters as soon as replacements of long term completely reliable Communists can be trained. Lin Tsun’s days in office appear to be very much limited in number.
The two commanders of the Central-South Headquarters of the People’s Navy (see Chart IV) only serve to re-emphasize the amazing contradiction in command today. Fang Hsiang is known by some humorous anti-Communists as the “water hating admiral.” Long a high ranking army commander, he gave up his ground past with the greatest reluctance for his present “unpleasant task.” Fang is reported to have tried on several occasions to move his headquarters to “some quiet inland spot,” but was refused permission by Peking.
British trained Admiral Teng Ch’ao-hsiang, on the other hand, is an old sea dog. Teng served over thirty of his fifty-two years on the sea and was formerly head of the Naval Bureau of the Nationalist government. Admiral Teng commanded the cruiser Chungking when it defected in 1949 and was later given the task of training naval cadets at Darien.
But like Lin Tsun, Teng Ch’ao-hsiang still enjoys his cup of tea in the afternoon in good British tradition, considering himself “British Navy.” He is, however, even now reported to be on the Red’s purge list. As with the other former Nationalist officers, Admiral Teng’s post is dependent upon the arrival of a more trusted Party replacement.
One of the principal tasks of the Central-South Headquarters is the patrolling of the long irregular coastline of the South, constantly on watch for Nationalist raiders, guerrilla liaison craft and smugglers. A large part of the southern naval units are believed to be armed junks, light gunboats, etc., whose duties approximate those of a Coast Guard.
The Whampoa Shipyards are reported to be devoting their energies to the production of speedy armored junks and motor-torpedo boats. These shipyards employ several thousand workers and turn out an estimated ten to twenty craft each month.
By far the most strategic port under the command of the Central-South Headquarters of the People’s Navy is Yülin, located on the southern tip of Hainan Island. Outside of Darien, Yülin is probably the largest submarine training base the Chinese have. Stretegically located, Hainan itself may prove a key jumping-off base for any projected armed attack on Southeast Asia. Already it is reported to be a focal point for liaison between the Chinese Communists and the Reds in Malaya, Indo-China, and the Philippines. There is good indication that a permanent communications-supply chain has been set up between Huk Communist Headquarters in the Philippines and Yülin on Red controlled Hainan Island.
Recently one of the toughest naval problems the Chinese have attempted to master is the proper application and development of amphibious doctrine. Since a number of U. S. Marine amphibious manuals have already been translated into Chinese, tactics have proved a lesser problem to the Reds than the training of personnel and development of proper amphibious craft.
A major manpower problem has been resultant from the intense fear of the sea manifested by the average Chinese soldier. Many have never been in swimming during their lifetimes and certain elements of the Third Field Army have reportedly been severely disciplined for failing to take part in amphibious maneuvers because of this fear.
Recent naval policy is circumventing this difficulty whenever possible by emphasizing the recruiting of islanders, river boatmen, and fishermen for this amphibious duty. Fishermen’s associations and seamen’s guilds have standing orders to submit lists of young men between the ages of sixteen and thirty- five for amphibious training.
Many of these are being inducted into the rapidly expanding Marine Corps of the People’s Navy. Marine elements are currently being organized under Soviet guidance from Port Arthur to Hainan Island, and the Corps now numbers in excess of 50,000 men.
While the overall quality and leadership of the People’s Marines is open to question, the Chinese Reds appear to be determined to weld together an amphibious army of better quality than the average ground soldier.
The problem of the number and quality of amphibious craft is one which remains a large question mark. Although the number of captured U. S. LSTs, LCMs, DUKWS, etc., is limited, it is common knowledge that the Chinese Communists have any number of armed diesel junks at their disposal.[5] Yet, for some reason they have not been employed. There is no way of telling whether the Reds are saving these craft for the supreme assault on Formosa, whether they are waiting for sufficient air cover, or whether these craft just aren’t satisfactory. As of today they must remain a mystery.
Rather, it is current invasion policy to use one vessel to pull along ten to twelve bamboo rafts, each containing three to four men. It’s not difficult to imagine what a rough sea or sudden air strike would do to such an “amphibious force.” Based upon these methods, past amphibious operations have proved costly ventures with the number of drownings often exceeding the casualties suffered from enemy fire.
It is doubtful if the Chinese commanders suffer any recriminations over the spending of lives in such an easy manner, but the loss of trained naval combat personnel is one they cannot readily afford. Further, in problems of an amphibious nature, the comparatively inexperienced Russians themselves can offer the Chinese Reds little in the way of advice. Know-how here must come through the costly and difficult method of trial and error.
These many shortcomings, however, are by no means the only problems facing the Chinese Communists: their lack of a naval air arm, shortage of key parts and diesel oil, meager pool of technicians, and ever-present reliance upon supplies from the Soviet Union must all be added to the many kinks in Red China’s naval armor.
In Communist China’s war machine this weakness in sea power is probably the most effective barrier of containment against further Red aggression today. Yet it would be dangerous indeed to underestimate the enemy’s potential. The Chinese Communists are an intelligent and determined lot and will take any and all gambits to realize their ends. Today the danger is relatively small— only our continued watchfulness and guarded security will keep it that way.
Serving three years in the Marine Corps during World War II, Mr. Hanrahan participated in the Guam and Iwo Jima campaigns and saw duty in China after the war. He is a consultant on Asian politico-military problems for the Operations Research Office, the Johns Hopkins University, and is currently studying for his doctorate in the Department of Chinese and Japanese at Columbia University.
★
SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY
Contributed by ALFRED W. MILLER
U.S.S. Portunus, on which my son served during the war, was a PT boat tender and had among its stores a perfect ocean of canned beer. Sailors being what they are, this was kept in a separate compartment secured with a Navy standard padlock—a fine cylinder lock, issued by the thousands, each with its separate setting and keys.
Whenever the storekeeper entered the compartment, he hung the open lock on the staple with its key inserted—it could not be withdrawn until the lock was closed again. The compartment was never left open in his absence.
Yet Portunus left a joyful trail of ravished beer cans all the way home from Okinawa, and certain crew members gurgled inwardly whenever they walked past the puzzled storekeeper.
Poor fellow, how was he to know that once when he was in the compartment, a low seaman had walked past the open door, snatched padlock and key from the staple and substituted another, outwardly identical open Navy padlock with inserted key—a lock to which certain depraved characters possessed the other key?
(The Proceedings will pay $5.00 for each anecdote submitted to, and printed in, the Proceedings.)
[1] The opinions of assertions in the articles are the private ones of the writer, and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the naval service at large.
[2] Reference is made to the Chinese Nationalist naval blockade partially instituted in 1949-50 against the Red seacoast.
[3] The Victory was originally the H.M.S. Aurora, a post-war British gift (1948) to the Chinese Nationalist Government. Recommissioned the Chungking she defected to the Communist side in early 1949 and was subsequently sunk by the Nationalist planes in Taku harbor. She was salvaged and recommissioned in late 1951.
[4] Lü was born in Manchuria and was graduated from the Northeast Military Academy. He is currently Alternate to the Central Committee, Vice-Director of the Railroad Dept., of the People’s Revolutionary Military Council and member of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army.
[5] A conservative report estimates that China has one million junks. The total tonnage is approximately three million tons. No doubt many of these are sail-type and of little value. But the number of speedy diesel powered junks runs to at least one or two thousand.