Down through the centuries peoples of many tongues, even of different civilizations, and greatly varied modes of fighting, have often found themselves alined against a common enemy in struggles deciding the course of history. Frequently their efforts have been independent, disjointed, and without timetable or plan to bring to bear the true potential of their strength.
Exercise Mainbrace, carried out by NATO nations in the North Atlantic in September, was planned to assure the massing of full strength should an aggressor launch a third World War. It was designed to practice ways of bringing to a weak or hard-pressed member the vast combined strength of all.
For the exercise compressed into the two short weeks, some 160 vessels from the greatest of the world’s battleships and carriers down to mine-sweepers and torpedo boats North Atlantic in an area constituting the northern flank of Europe. They carried the flags of eight NATO Nations—Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. From the other side of the World came New Zealand with its cruiser Bellona.
Under the over-all command of Admiral Lynde P. McCormick, U. S. Navy, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), these 160 ships and 80,000 men of many tongues operated as if they were one great nation. In two weeks of intensive operation under simulated battle conditions with every man and officer carrying out his duties as earnestly as if in real war, these forces conducted major assaults against a common enemy. Simultaneously they went through the grinding procedure of detecting and “destroying” enemy submarines, of protecting convoys, of refueling and restocking at sea under weather conditions that could be no more adverse in real war. Different nationalities learned better how to work with one another, to adapt their equipment for refueling from each other, to communicate regardless of the barriers of language.
Said Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, Royal Navy, in over-all command at sea, land and air forces in Northern Europe: “We could not have done this on paper. It was a great experience of high value to the command system and understanding. A big NATO potential is no good without a working command system, tried out and efficient.
“We have shown that one part of NATO can come to the aid of another part in great force. We practiced the mechanics of doing so.”
For Exercise Mainbrace the assumed situation was this:
It is plus 30 since “Orange” forces, the common enemy, have attacked the NATO nations. Western land and air power is engaged by “Orange” forces in Germany, France, and the Lowlands. The northern flank is heavily threatened by land attacks against Denmark and Northern Norway.
General Matthew B. Ridgway, U. S. Army, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) calls upon Admiral McCormick (SACLANT) for support from the sea for Admiral Brind (CINCNORTH) who is endeavoring to hold the “Orange” enemy. Admiral McCormick directs Admiral Sir George Creasy, Royal Navy, Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic (CINCEASTLANT) to aid Admiral Brind (CINCNORTH). To assist Admiral Creasy in his assigned task, Admiral McCormick makes available a powerful carrier force under the command of Vice- Admiral Felix B. Stump, U. S. Navy.
Such was the situation when the fleets, the greatest ever assembled in peace time, put to sea on September 12, 1952, in Exercise Mainbrace.
Flying his flag on the battleship Wisconsin, Admiral Stump raced his powerful “blue” naval air force northward from Scotland to a point beyond the Arctic Circle to strike in the vicinity of Bodo, Norway, against the enemy. His carriers included Britain’s Eagle and Illustrious; the United States carriers Franklin D. Roosevelt (universally called the F.D.R.), Wasp, Midway, and Wright. With them went the British battleship Vanguard and cruiser Swiftsure; the United States cruisers Quincy, Des Moines, and Columbus and a great screen of United States, British, Netherlands, and Norwegian destroyers. The carrier group in Admiral Stump’s great striking fleet was commanded by Rear Admiral Austin K. Doyle, U. S. Navy.
En route north, they fought submarines, some of which obtained theoretical hits on capital ships; contended against enemy land based air; and successfully sank an “Orange” raider, the Canadian cruiser Quebec. Incidentally, they destroyed a number of floating mines from World War II which were not imaginary.
With his half dozen carriers, the task force commander had at hand far greater air striking power than an enemy would have at any one air base. With it, he could achieve heavy local air superiority; smash the enemy on the ground and in the air, then swiftly disappear to bring the same heavy balance of power against another enemy stronghold.
It was this technique that the United States Navy developed and so successfully used in the Pacific War and maintained a ratio of around sixteen to one against the Japanese in aircraft losses.
Had such forces been available to Britain in the first two years of the war with Germany, it is highly unlikely that the Germans could have achieved the success they did. Certainly they would have made the occupation of Norway by Germany an exceedingly hazardous if not impossible undertaking.
The destruction that four great carriers like those in the striking fleet could pour on target areas in western or southern Europe in less than a month would surpass that in the worst month of Germany’s blitz against England. It is the mobility of massed power that makes this possible.
Such massed air power also could be thrown against submarine bases of an enemy to cut their use or completely neutralize them.
Vicious weather conditions in northern waters during Mainbrace caused cancellation of some of the planned Bodo air strikes. In actual war, the operational loss of planes and pilots would have been taken or the strikes postponed a day when, as staff weather people predicted, conditions became favorable. However, with a compressed timetable the striking fleet turned and steamed down Norway’s coast to Denmark to give support to a “Blue” force amphibious landing executed to relieve hard-pressed allied land based forces. The landing was made on the tip of Jutland, gateway to the Baltic. The actual landing force was small, the Third Battalion of the Second United States Marine Division. But it had the ships and support that would have permitted the landing of a greatly multiplied force.
Unless one sees them at work, he can not appreciate the vital part played by the aerologists or weather officers of the fleet. The task force commander many times at all hours climbed out of his bunk to confer with his staff aerologist. On the predictions of his weatherman, he ordered changes in dates of refueling. Had he not done so, his ships would have faced impossible, or at best highly dangerous undertakings in the job of getting fresh supplies of oil aboard. It is amazing to watch one of these experts take weather data from a couple of distant points at a specific time and predict almost exactly the atmospheric conditions that will prevail 24 or 36 hours in advance in his own area; how high the seas will be running; how distant from wave crest to crest. They do it, and fleet commanders make their decisions accordingly.
Simultaneous with the drama of the great dash by the big capital ships, far north beyond the Arctic Circle, thence southward to Denmark, the carrier support forces, a hunter- killer unit, and the logistics support group went about their vital work.
And the training was real. Officers and men who piled out from their bunks on aircraft alerts time after time on the call of “Condition Able Able” or raced to posts at “General Quarters,” found no element of play in their jobs, which they carried out just as seriously as if the enemy were genuine with bomb, shell, and torpedo. Coldly real it was to the families and friends of pilots who were lost in air accidents.
Because the exercise had to be compressed into two short weeks, many of its phases had to be artificial rather than carried out under the more realistic manner that added time would have made possible. But training, not a theoretical war game with “sunken” ships and “splashed” planes, was the primary objective.
True, there were weaknesses and rough spots developed. This happens even when a major force of one nationality is assembled for the first time. Continued operation and repeated practice is essential to eliminate them.
There was trouble in communications, at times—trouble that was to be expected in a suddenly created great volume of traffic involving men of different languages. Even Americans and Britishers, who speak the same tongue, had trouble understanding one another in radio phone conversation. Sometimes even in written words, Americans and Englishmen have to think twice to ascertain correctly each other’s expressions. For example, to a Britisher, “petrol” is gasoline, and to the average U. S. officer or sailor it is an abbreviation for petroleum.
Some American newspaper men along to chronicle the exercise, felt that communications were generally a failure simply because there was some difficulty in transmitting their own copy from shipboard by radio high frequency teletype to Londonderry, Ireland, from which point it was relayed to the United States. The fleet’s communication staff, before they sailed from Norfolk for the maneuvers, anticipated difficulties in this particular phase of transmission. They knew that in northern latitudes with magnetic and electric disturbances, difficulties were likely to occur even when messages had to travel only a few hundred air miles. And they did. Contact between a ship’s radio plant and Londonderry would simply fade out, perhaps for minutes; sometimes for hours.
But so far as communications within the striking fleet were concerned, there was no time at which they were not adequate, according to the task force commander who directed the actions of the great armada. Like others of his command, he too was aware of improvements needed.
In a joint statement by General Ridgway and Admiral McCormick at the conclusion of the exercise, they said: “We are highly satisfied with the manner in which Mainbrace was planned and executed. We are equally satisfied that it achieved the full purpose for which it was designated . . . Mainbrace not only offered an outstanding opportunity for international cooperation but provided a testing ground for tactical and strategic coordination between the two NATO commands.
“A great number of lessons will evolve as we continue the evaluation of the exercise. These lessons will serve to better our means of cooperation.
“A test of this sort enables us to determine our weaknesses and the corrective measures we must take. Thus far certain weaknesses have been revealed, but we regard none of them as insurmountable.
“Mainbrace is not an ending; it is merely a beginning.”
Vice Admiral Stump, who commanded the fleet at sea and to whose staff the author of this article was attached, had this to say: “Exercise Mainbrace was set up entirely as a training exercise and not as a strategic or even tactical problem. As such I consider that it was eminently successful. Naval, air, and ground units of the NATO nations conducted a coordinated joint problem with ease and facility, overcoming language, material, and operational differences in such a manner that the entire forces worked as a team.
“Possibly the greatest benefits derived were psychological. As the pilots from our carriers, both British and American, flew their missions over Denmark, they looked them and saw in every little city, village, and hamlet both adults and children running out in the streets to wave at them; a friendly gesture that could only have been spontaneous and not planned.
“The people of Norway were equally cordial.
“The logistic support rendered the units of the United States Navy in United Kingdom ports went even beyond the high state of helpful cooperation which I would have expected.
“An instance of such help was manifested in the assistance the British gave us in repairing a catapult in the F. D. Roosevelt, which was seriously damaged by a runaway shot just prior to arrival in the Clyde. The naval officer in charge at Greenock, Scotland, just prior to Mainbrace, had moved up from South England and reopened an establishment which had been completely in a caretaker status. On his own initiative, he moved a deadload by truck moving overnight from the south of England so that after the catapult was repaired, the deadload tests were made, thus absolutely insuring after repairs had been made that the catapult was fully ready for operation. I had not expected that it would be possible to even attempt deadload tests.
“Mainbrace showed some material deficiencies but none that were unsurmountable.
“While communications were in some ways unsatisfactory, there was no time at which, within the Striking Fleet, communications were not completely adequate to fleet needs, although the Striking Fleet was composed of an American and British carrier group with small units of other navies represented therein. The logistics group was composed of both British and American tankers. The British tankers were manned by merchant crews who were not as experienced in the maneuvering as were our naval tankers and were unable to pump oil as rapidly. Nevertheless, large and small American ships successfully fueled at sea under other than ideal conditions from British tankers, and British ships expeditiously fueled at sea from American tankers.”
From the standpoint of an observer, it was heartening to see the harmonious relationship between nationals conscious of a common bond and a desire to give of their best efforts to one another. The British and Americans regarded the Norwegians, Danes, and other smaller groups not as incidental or insignificant elements but as partners whose share in a common cause and undertaking was equal. And in talking with Norwegians, Danes, Frenchmen, and others ashore after the exercise, one was conscious from their warmth and greeting that they realized such was the viewpoint of their stronger partners. It was reflected, too, in the friendly relationships and mutual respect of the sailors of the various nationalities both among each other and in their relationship with civilians ashore.
If this start in international coordination of effort can be nurtured through to maturity, which means by the full hearted and physical support of the nations concerned, it is inconceivable to believe that any aggressor would dare the powers that could be brought against him. Exercise Mainbrace, in this writer’s opinion, was a long and major step on the path to world peace through the cooperative efforts of the free nations.