Upon the 19th of February, 1915, guns of the British Fleet shattered the Mediterranean calm off the tiny peninsula of Gallipoli and thus opened one of the most fateful operations in history. Eventually troops were .poured ashore, and for months locked in dreadful, indecisive combat, in which thousands were ground into a compost of mud and flesh that, unknown to these valiant dead, was to form the fertilizer of a new amphibious age.
Thirty years later and half a world away, ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet cast their shells toward another bit of land to herald the classic assault of modern amphibious war—the seizure of Iwo Jima. Both Gallipoli and Iwo Jima were the sort of intense butcheries which must inevitably break the lulls of war; the difference lay in the management. And the management at Iwo was a product of patient and persistent effort by the Navy and Marine Corps in the quiet years between the World Wars. The techniques and equipment so developed made possible the great sweeping drives against Japan and the rupture of Hitler’s Festung.
Yet in the typical American post-war reaction this vast outlay of armed might was rendered nigh impotent.
For five years, half the world seems to have stood mesmerized by a gigantic ball of fire and a mushroom cloud while the crimson octopus of Communism slowly spread its tentacles over the other half of the globe. Statesmen and soldiers alike indulged in apocalyptic prophecies, most of which hinged on the atom bomb. The landing operation was declared a thing of the past by some; others conceded that landings might have to be made but thought they would take the form of simple occupations in the wake of atomic bombardment. Few were the voices of moderation and common sense.
Fortunately, those few were heard to the extent that a minimum force was kept in being and could be brought to bear in the brilliant turning movement against the Communists at Inchon. The hypnotic spell appeared for a time to be broken; but some men still clamor for atomic weapons and tremendous air power as though such weapons were the Open Sesame to all things international. Little is said, and less is known, of the value of balanced naval forces and the potential of amphibious power in this time of global tension. Why have such attitudes developed? Is it that the mélange of new weapons has not yet been assimilated into proven systems? That atomic energy has so engaged the American mind that it has eclipsed consideration of the older forms of war? Or is it simply that America has not until very recently begun to understand one- tenth of the relation of sea power to the maintenance of peace and the winning of war? Whatever the reasons may be, it is certain that the concepts of naval and amphibious warfare that matured during the recent world conflict should not be lightly turned aside. The bedrock of Western power is sea control, and beyond that, control of the Eurasian perimeter. Today, the West is unchallenged upon the sea but controls only a part of the Rimland. It seems only logical that sea control extended landward by means of amphibious power can play a considerable part in the resolution of differences between the East and West—if the landing operation can be conducted in the face of modern instruments of mass destruction.
II
From the debris of World War II there has emerged a vast array of new weapons— recoilless rifles, proximity fuzes, intercontinental bombers, rockets, guided missiles, jet aircraft, and so on—many of which affect amphibious war in one way or another. But transcending all in importance are the atomic bomb and the helicopter, for the first is such a concentration of destructive power as to render certain aspects of the World War II landing attack obsolescent, while the second provides the means of solving the problems posed by atomic explosives and of returning the landing attack to effective status as a tool of national power.
No military development of the century, except possibly the airplane, has caused such confusion, speculation, and downright worry as the atomic bomb. This weapon, because of its vastly superior destructive power, is difficult to comprehend and even more difficult to weave into the pattern of modern war. Views of its effectiveness have consequently been many and varied. The most apocryphal claim in the military world has been that atomic explosives, if properly delivered, would be sufficient in themselves to win a war quickly, thus making other forms of war obsolete, or at best only adjuncts of this weapon. We do not intend here to argue the moral, military, or political merits of strategic atomic bombing. Let it suffice to say that no nation as prepared for war as, for example, Russia is, will be defeated in one fell swoop. Other forms of war will become immediately necessary to counter mobilized enemy power. Strategic placement of atomic bombs may cripple industry and snarl communications, but the full harvest cannot be reaped unless the enemy is forced to exhaust his power on various fronts and through the more mundane forms of war. In short, war may start in the air with atomic bombardment but final decision will still be gained in the mud.
A second claim is that the “tactical” A-bomb will stop troops in the field. This may be valid only if troops are caught bunched and upon terrain favorable to the bomb’s use. A single bomb of the Hiroshima type exploded over a division of troops properly disposed in defense would cause casualties equal to about a company of infantry; if exploded over an attacking division, the bomb might make three companies ineffective. Furthermore, the A-bomb is not likely to become strictly speaking a frontline weapon, for it is doubtful if it can be detonated within less than a couple of miles of the user’s front without running the danger of a short drop and consequent damage to his own forces. Once troops have engaged, the A-bomb could no longer be used with direct effect upon those troops committed. Nevertheless, the A-bomb can be a potent weapon of opportunity against massed troops, artillery, key points upon lines of communication, and logistic installations; and its possible use must always be taken into account by both the attacker and the defender.
The great effect of atomic weapons upon the landing operation is that they force dispersion, making it necessary to deploy amphibious attack forces over a vastly greater area, to bring the landing force to grips with the enemy by means of a rapid and less vulnerable ship-to-shore movement, and to expand the beachhead quickly and provide ample space for the build-up ashore. Also higher premiums are placed upon security and surprise.
The dispersion factor has led at least two prominent analysts to suggest that the classic principle of concentration, or mass, may have to be discarded in favor of a new principle of dispersion. If this were true, the death knell of amphibious war would have been struck at Hiroshima, for all forms of war have depended upon decisive concentration for success. The analysts fail to realize that concentration is relative with respect to power, not simply numbers of men; that atomic weapons will not put all the high cards in the defender’s hand. These weapons cut both ways, require dispersion on the part of both sides, although admittedly less dispersion in defense than attack. Dispersion notwithstanding, success in air, sea, or land combat will continue to depend upon one belligerent’s bringing to play a greater amount of power at the point in time and space which results in destroying his opponent’s ability or will to fight. The arrow- sleet of Crecy, the needle-gun of Sadowa, and the field gun of Flanders all forced dispersion but did not cancel the principle of concentration; neither will nuclear explosives.
The problem, then, is how to achieve a sufficient concentration of the landing force to overcome the defender ashore. The techniques so effective in World War II are certainly not adequate in this regard. For example, one atomic bomb dropped in the midst of the ship-to-shore move at Iwo Jima a few minutes prior to H-hour would have badly upset the operation. A half dozen bombs would have had the same disastrous effect at Normandy. To meet the demands of the atomic age, the methods of amphibious warfare must therefore undergo certain fundamental changes, the more important of which are outlined below.
1. Staging: Staging areas must be far more dispersed than has been the practice, as long as air and sea superiority is not complete enough to prevent atomic bombardment by the enemy. As many port areas as practicable should be used for out- loading, and within those areas, loading zones and supplies should be separated or carefully protected.
2. Movement to the objective: This phase is the most adaptable to atomic conditions because the sea surface is an unrestricted freeway of great expanse. It would seem that the effects of atomic weapons could be minimized by assuming more open convoy formations and forming a larger number of small convoys, each following deceptive and divergent tracks until near the objective.
3. Landing and assault: This phase presents by far the greatest difficulties. The transports must be dispersed in several transport areas located a good distance offshore, possibly fifteen to twenty miles or more. This immediately creates a time-space problem that cannot be solved by the surface type of ship-to-shore movement. Furthermore, the conventional ship-to-shore movement is in itself unacceptably risky, what with its parallel, slowly moving waves of landing craft. Fortunately, the helicopter can be used as a means of revising the ship- to-shore movement. It is free of the limitations found in conventional aircraft and has almost all the advantages. It can fly in any direction at varying rates of speed, can hover, can land almost anywhere, and has a long radius of action that may in the future reach 1,000 miles. Its greatest present disadvantages are its small payload and vulnerability to enemy fire. The payload is being increased, although it probably will not be great enough to include light tanks in the near future. Vulnerability is offset by its maneuverability, speed, and ability to utilize protective avenues of approach in the terrain. The prime effect of the helicopter is that it now makes possible rapid projection of assault infantry, light artillery, and the less bulky supplies deep inshore.
Use of the helicopter will not solve all problems of the landing phase, however. Heavier equipment and armor will still have to be landed by surface landing craft, or brought in by transport aircraft, if a friendly airfield is within radius of the beachhead and if assault infantry can seize and prepare an air landing area rapidly.
The fact that bulky supplies, heavy equipment, armor, and some troops will have to be landed by surface craft will require some innovations in control and movement of craft, not to speak of the fact that a speedier surface landing craft is desirable. Instead of waves being dispatched from a single line parallel to the beach, they might be formed on several separated and staggered lines of departure, dispatched at appropriate intervals, converging as they approach the beach and so arranged that at no time would more than a small number of craft be affected by an atomic missile falling in the midst of the movement.
There is an essential difference between this new form of landing attack and the more conventional assault. Think of the enemy position, for a moment, as being an inflated balloon, the conventional surface assault as a large blunted spike, and the helicopter assault as a board from which a number of smaller but sharper spikes project. Mentally place the balloon on a table and commence to push slowly against it sidewise with the spike; it gives until caught against an object, and is finally punctured and deflated. Now take the spike-filled board and, using a new balloon, come down atop the balloon with a rapid motion and the balloon is punctured in many places and destroyed immediately. The illustration is a bit crude; the point is that the conventional assault is slow and dependent for success upon great, concentrated weight thrown against the enemy’s coastal defenses; whereas the helicopter assault is initially dependent for success upon velocity and surprise by striking a number of points within the objective area, not just upon the beach. At the outset surprise, speed, and depth of attack bear greater weight on the scales of success than massed firepower.
The question may properly be asked, would such a concept as outlined above be practical against a small, strongly defended objective such as Iwo Jima? It probably would be difficult. Inland helicopter landings would be extremely risky because of the lack of areas relatively free of enemy troops. A partial return to the conventional ship-to- shore movement in the initial stages of the assault might be required, using helicopters for landing assault infantry upon the beach only, with surface craft immediately following with heavy equipment.
Would not the return to the conventional ship-to-shore move be courting disaster from atomic attack? Probably not, so long as the small island objective is susceptible to complete isolation from outside enemy support. With relatively complete sea-air superiority, there need be little risk of an atomic attack upsetting the assault. The risk increases, however, the closer the island is to enemy continental areas or other island bases from which atomic attacks could be launched.
One point not yet discussed is that involving armor in the landing force. In most of the assaults of World War II, there was a time interval of an hour or more between H-hour and the landing of armored forces. This situation has brought forth the suggestion from several quarters that the landing force should be more highly mechanized and that means should be found by which tanks could be landed very much earlier in the assault. Unfortunately, no rapid means of landing tanks has yet been developed and the use of slow tank landing craft in the assault does not fit too well with the concept of initial, rapid helicopter landings. The presence of armor is desirable, however, and it should be put ashore as soon as practicable in order to assist infantry in destroying enemy pockets and to exploit opportunities created by assault infantry for rapid advance inland.
In view of atomic weapons, armor is not the solution to rapid expansion of the beachhead. Admittedly we are now in an armored period, but slow, massed armored thrusts will be risky business. Armor, in most beach terrain, is forced to channelize its effort and presents a large and vulnerable target. It is more likely that armor will find its best amphibious use now as a follow-up force to support the combined arms team. If and when a tank-carrying helicopter is developed, the combined arms team can be rounded out to include all components of modern power in the initial assaults upon inland objectives as well as the beach proper.
All things considered, the amphibious assault, as outlined above, can be conducted successfully and provides the one sure means of retaining the effectiveness of this great instrument in the atomic age.
The next question is, what part can amphibious power play in the years of tension ahead and in possible global war?
III
The exercise of national power in peace or war is always tempered by the “situation.” No better proof of this can be found than in World War II, wherein two concepts of the amphibious operation arose primarily because of the differences in geography between the European and Pacific theaters. While success in both theaters was predicated upon sea control, the decisive operations against Japan were predominantly naval, whereas in the European theater action was naval up to a certain point where it became predominantly military.
Japan expanded upon interior lines to the point where she held a vast arc of islands. Her strategy was, or should have been, one of limited objectives, but she extended her land holdings beyond her capability to control the sea between. Nevertheless, Japan’s island empire, temporary though it proved to be, was strongly garrisoned and posed a difficult problem to Allied commanders. The dominant strategy chosen was a great drive up the Central Pacific, an island-hopping campaign which involved a series of assaults upon relatively small, fortified islands. The bludgeoning, difficult landing attack became part and parcel of the strategy and developed into a distinct form of operation.
This form of amphibious operation might be termed the pure assault and was part of an almost purely naval campaign. The assault was characterized by complete local sea and air control, isolation of the objective, and subordination of surprise in favor of a softening-up period of some length. Landing beaches were generally restricted and were strongly defended; the actual landing was a powerful frontal assault to gain a beachhead, followed by continuation of the attack by initial assault troops utilizing naval air and surface support until the whole island was seized. These affairs were assault from start to finish, and the end result was acquisition of a base for further sea-air operations.
On the other hand, European operations were projections of military forces from the sea upon large land masses, with the end result being military campaigns waged along continental lines. By nature, the landing areas could not be completely isolated by naval forces nor could they be bombarded at the leisure of the fleet for fear of strong aerial counterattack and possibly concentration of hostile forces opposite the selected landing beaches. On the other hand, the long coastlines and vast hinterland could not be strongly garrisoned at every point by Axis forces. There was, therefore, more latitude in choice of landing areas away from the strongest enemy forces, and more emphasis upon surprise.
Unfortunately, amphibious operations were not used to the fullest extent possible in the European theater. There was, to be sure, a hampering shortage of landing craft. Even so, there were several opportunities for landings to relieve pressure upon the established land front and to assist the main overland drives.
Today the world military-geographic situation is such that the United States and its Allies are faced with continental power rather than insular sea power. The Communist bloc dominates the Eurasian coast from Northern Scandinavia around to South China as well as portions of the Mediterranean and Baltic coasts. Communist military forces are composed of vast land armies, with a supporting land based air force; naval forces are limited to a relatively small surface fleet with little air, but a large submarine fleet; amphibious capabilities are rather limited, certainly far, far below those of Japan in 1941. Furthermore, the Red empire is faced with a great naval disadvantage in that it has no central system of bases from which to operate or upon which to retire; its naval power cannot be concentrated without leaving tremendous areas unprotected.
The Communist empire is not likely to expand far beyond continental limits. At any rate the prospect of a vast Red-held oceanic area, with strongly garrisoned, small islands, is remote as long as U.S. and other friendly fleets maintain their margin of naval superiority. The obvious conclusion is that, while sea control would still be the bedrock of success in war with the Communist horde, there would not be naval war of the sort recently fought in the Pacific.
No one can say whether the Communist bloc will ultimately gain control of the entire Eurasian rim. One can say that the Western nations cannot afford to let such a situation come to pass. The North Atlantic countries are slowly building military and air power that may ultimately deter Russia from outright armed action and give the Allies sufficient bargaining power to force a change in aggressive Communist policy. But if Russia strikes before the Allied force is built, she will certainly be able to cut off an additional slice of Europe, “tactical” A-bombs to the contrary notwithstanding.
Also, no one can say where Communist expansion in Asia will come to a halt. Neither simple surface sea power of a half century ago nor more modern sea-air power is adequate for control of the Asian rim. Transportation and industrial development, while still far below Western standards, have greatly improved in this area; so much so that power exercised only upon the littoral zone does not necessarily constitute an effective lever upon the hinterland. Furthermore, the flame of latent nationalism among the Orientals is being fanned by a combination of Communist propaganda and a rising conviction that the White Man has only selfish motives in Asia and is not necessary anyway.
Regardless of where the final line is drawn in Europe and Asia, the Communist dominated geographic areas will continue to present a vast continental complex, loosely connected by rail, inland waterways, and tenuous coastal routes, and having a very long, vulnerable coastline.
From a view of the situation as it would stand in total war, certain conclusions can be drawn regarding amphibious power. First of all, the picture is continental and indicates that landing attacks will tend to follow the European pattern discussed earlier. Landings will more often be a means of establishing military forces ashore, rather than an end as they were in the Pacific. The important point is that the sort of operation outlined in Part II can be conducted very successfully in the “continental” situation. A hostile power expanding from Central Eurasia cannot be strong along the whole coast. Consequently, a large number of lightly defended landing areas will be open to attack. Long preliminary bombardment will be .neither necessary nor desirable, and tactical as well as strategic surprise can be achieved. The amphibious force, utilizing its superior mobility, should be able to strike with velocity, explode enemy coastal defenses, and pave the way for the inland thrusts by mechanized land forces.
Should war come to Europe proper, it is probable that the West will be able to hold a somewhat restricted land position in the face of attack from the East. In order to launch a counteroffensive there will exist three principal lines of armed action: 1) mounting a land counteroffensive aimed at penetrating the hostile land force; 2) mounting a major airborne effort aimed at vertical envelopment; and 3) mounting one or more amphibious attacks to envelope the hostile lines by sea. Each of these courses can (and probably would) be combined with the other two. Certain advantages are apparent in the amphibious attack as a dominant line of action: 1) The amphibious force can be organized and staged outside the range of hostile land based air and threat of atomic counter action is greatly reduced; 2) The enemy can be prevented from knowing where the force will strike until the last moment; 3) The superior carrying capacity of naval vessels would allow the amphibious force to put into play a large land force immediately following the landing assault. The airborne force would have the advantage of surprise but would have the disadvantages of having to be mounted from immobile bases closer to the enemy and of not being able to follow up immediately with the heavier land forces that could come with the amphibious attack force. The land penetration would have the disadvantage of having to build forces under the very nose of the enemy land force and of having to operate in an area where the enemy would presumably be strongest. The shocking, paralyzing effects of an enveloping amphibious attack with mobile forces pouring into the enemy’s rear would inevitably cause collapse of the enemy front, forcing retreat or annihilation. Assaults from the sea in the European theater would be, therefore, the best means of regaining and keeping the initiative and moving toward an early victory.
In Asia, possibilities for amphibious operations in a future war are almost as interesting as in Europe. It may be assumed that Asia would be a secondary theater and that the problem there would be to keep hostile hordes occupied and to hold or regain certain vital areas. Amphibious task forces ranging the long coastline and striking at will should be able to amuse the Communist armies sufficiently to keep them thinly spread, and to seize and hold desired objectives.
Incidentally, operations in the Orient may follow in some respects the “island” pattern of the Pacific. Landings would not be designed so much as preludes to major land offensives, but rather as attacks to gain control of limited areas containing air facilities, communication centers, raw material sources, and naval bases. Weaknesses in the transportation system and compartmentation of terrain produce “island” effects so that certain areas could be isolated by naval air and surface action and the landing force could proceed to seize the entire objective area.
In addition to the execution of major amphibious assaults, there are other operations that will be valuable in future war. The long coasts of Eurasia will present excellent opportunities for helicopter-borne raiding parties to destroy submarine bases, radar and radio stations, and to disrupt coastal and inland communications. Even the Arctic fringes of Asia and northern Europe are vulnerable to attacks of this nature, since the capabilities of the helicopter bring certain localities within range of attack without requiring the ships to enter sea-ice.
Considerations of total war aside for the moment, of what value is amphibious power today and in the situation short of total war? This question is partly answered already by the existence and operations of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. There is no question that this combination of tri-elemental power will continue to have a stabilizing effect upon Europe’s southern flank. In Korean operations amphibious power recently played the decisive role in routing and destroying the North Korean forces.
In other Far Eastern areas there is no reason why this form of power cannot be exercised effectively to stabilize the political situation and to deter further plans of Communist aggrandizement. Something more than just a “show of force” will be necessary, however. Vigorous and honest efforts in political and economic spheres should be directed toward helping the Orientals, who are yet free, toward better living standards, toward solution of their vital problems. By these means the Asian peoples must be pursuaded that the West does not aim at purely selfish exploitation of their lands, that it is interested in helping those people to help themselves and to keep themselves free of the diabolical yoke of Communism. When this sort of policy becomes effective, amphibious forces, with their unsurpassed mobility and ability to strike deep inland from any point on the coast, can be put to play—not to impose economic reforms or to impose internal political stability by police action, but to act with the consent of the country concerned as a powerful stabilizing element in countering Communist aggression.
IV
A fair analysis of the situation as it stands today and as it may develop in the foreseeable future leads to the following summary conclusions:
1. That from a purely technical point of view, the landing operation can be conducted successfully despite the threat of atomic weapons; that assault techniques, utilizing the helicopter, will provide the means for offsetting dispersion required by the atom bomb, achieving surprise and striking an enemy coastal area deeply and with great velocity.
2. That the military-geographic situation likely to face the West in event of unlimited war will be continental in character, and that this situation will make for greater success in executing the new form of amphibious operation by providing wider choice of landing areas and greater opportunity to hit the enemy where he is weakest.
3. That powerful amphibious assault forces, utilizing their superior qualities of range and mobility can be one of the best means of regaining and maintaining the initiative in a future world war; and that the mere existence of roving, striking forces will inevitably require an enemy to spread his power in order to attempt to guard long, vulnerable coasts.
4. That, if smoldering Communist aims toward aggression on the Eurasian littoral flame up into other peripheral or limited wars similar to Korea, a powerful amphibious force would be the best and quickest means to smother the effort.
5. And that, even if no major wars come to plague the human race, amphibious power can be further utilized, in conjunction with economic and political efforts, to stabilize many of the areas lying between the Communist sphere and the West.
In this year of 1952 we find the United States at its greatest peak of world leadership and yet in its greatest peril since the Civil War. It would be the height of folly to fail to build adequate, up-to-date amphibious power now, for such power, plied across the great seaways of the world, can go far toward maintaining a modicum of international stability; and if war must come, the full fury of the landing assault can be unleashed in combination with the other elements of Western power to carry the forces of Freedom forward to victory.