The great numbers of men who have been gathered together in the U.S. Navy at different times throughout our history have been so congregated but for one reason: success in battle and the resultant security of the United States. To date we have been eminently successful in guarding that security. The mere presence of large numbers of good and valiant men, however, has not in the past guaranteed the success in battle upon which our security depends, nor will it in the future. Men must be properly led, properly trained, disciplined, and be themselves convinced that the cause for which they fight is a just and necessary one.
The transition of a group or body of men into a formidable fighting team, in which each man, though self-reliant, is conscious of the interdependence of all, calls for a command system which to succeed must have reliability throughout. The assurance of this reliability is the primary and legitimate end of discipline. In civil life a person can be said to have good discipline if he places such restraints upon himself that his freedom under law does not interfere with the freedom of other free men. In the Navy a person has good discipline when he subordinates his role and rights as an individual to the duties imposed upon him by the command system. The command system must be sensitive to the mission of the Navy throughout its length. The petty officer is a key man in the line of command and he must not falter in his prosecution of the tasks assigned him by the command system.
At what point does the petty officer enter the command system of the Navy? He enters the command system at that point where a physical action takes place. The petty officer’s command or order should be followed immediately by the action required to carry out an order issued at any point in the chain of naval command. The petty officer is the last man in the chain of command. For instance, the captain may want more speed from the ship; he orders another boiler cut in on the line. This order passes normally through the chief engineer, the “B” Division Officer, and finally to the chief petty officer or petty officer in charge of the fireroom; or, the orders could come through the Officer of the Deck and the engineering Officer of the Watch to the petty officer concerned. In any event the boiler is not lighted off until the petty officer issues the orders to his firemen that will result in the boiler being placed on the line. Regardless of where the order is issued in the command system, whether it is by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Senior Officer Present, the Navigator, or the chief petty officer concerned, the final orders of execution will be issued by the petty officer in a well administrated and disciplined organization that adheres to the chain of command.
It can be seen that the petty officer has a responsible place in the chain of command. He cannot be a weak link. Anything that adds to his knowledge, authority, or prestige cannot help but redound to the benefit of the entire Navy. He should receive the strongest support from his officers. In fact this assured support from his superiors is his strongest armor. Nonrated men will not fail to recognize this backing or the lack of it. The complete endorsement by our officers of the necessity for the chief petty officer and petty officer having an assured place in the command system of the Navy may well be the secret of the spirit and success of the U. S. Navy as a fighting organization. Without this decades-old endorsement, the petty officer would be naked of his authority. If the Navy Regulations and the petty officer’s acceptance of appointment are the substance, the support 'of his officers is the spirit of a petty officer’s authority.
The Navy, of necessity, such as in times of great expansion, appoints many men as petty officers on the basis of future promise and the barest minimum of training, rather than on actual proven accomplishment. It is a tribute to our American way of life that most of these men live up to the responsibilities vested in them and prove often as capable, or more so, than the men who have been chosen in times when appointments are few and competition keen. During the development of these men as petty officers, officers may be tempted to assume some of the petty officer’s duties themselves, either as a gesture of good will or to ensure that the man’s immaturity and inexperience does not leave something essential unattended. Or, to lessen the petty officer’s load, officers may at times bypass him and deal with the men directly. This consideration by our officers and chief petty officers in helping petty officers adjust to their new responsibilities is commendable, but the petty officer must develop his own initiative and self-reliance. That’s what makes a petty officer. Such is the crucible through which all of us must pass on our way to success in our calling. One is led to believe that in the long run it is better to tolerate, temporarily, a lower standard of performance by a petty officer, who is doing his best with the promise of a higher performance later, than possibly to stop his progress and growth by too great a show of paternalism. Each problem of this kind must be treated individually. Caution is necessary to ensure that the temporary removal of a petty officer from the line of command is merely a necessary and temporary expedient and that it does not become the method by which an officer deals regularly with his petty officers.
Early in World War II, the late General Leslie McNair assigned additional officers at company level to Army units then committed to action in Africa. It was his intention to give as many officers as possible combat experience before assigning them to new units being formed in the United States. Although the primary role of these officers was one of observation, they were very energetic, and in a sincere effort to help as much as possible they began looking about for things to do. In the process, they began taking over many of the duties of the noncommissioned officers, causing considerable uncertainty among the noncommissioned personnel as to where their duties ended and began. Unwittingly, they had removed the noncommissioned officers from the chain of command. This condition soon came to light, and in a report submitted later, General McNair pointed out that not even the training of officers must interfere with the normal duties assigned the non-commissioned officer in the chain of command. Instances are known where officers have ignored the important place that tradition gives to our petty officers in the command system of the Navy. Suffice it to say that in these instances the petty officer became nothing more than a technician and, for all practical purposes, was relieved of all his military and command duties.
Many attribute the high esprit de corps and combat efficiency of the Marines to the fact that they have the best noncommissioned officers in the world. Officers as a result never have to worry about details. Free from this concern, Marine officers can stress their primary duties of command, leadership, and planning on a high level. One need not leave our own service however, to find unbeatable examples of fighting spirit and morale. Our UDT men, air crews, Seabees, and submarine and destroyer sailors are fine examples of the lofty heights to which the spirits of men may soar with good leadership and esprit de corps.
A man deserving of the confidence of his officers and the right to be vested with authority over other men must be of the highest type. He should be carefully chosen. His technical excellence should reach a reliably high level, but it should be subordinate to his qualities of command and leadership. All too often the best technician fails when placed in a position of command; the man with a command may not always rise to the heights as a leader. Technical ability is based on knowledge and aptitude. The ability to command requires loyalty, initiative, drive, intelligence, and energy. Leadership is more difficult to explain; it is certainly something more of the spirit. Whereas the ability to command may be acquired and might be called a science, the ability to lead is definitely an art. It might be called a flair for controlling people and making them like it.
The officers and chief petty officers who have made the highest impression on me as leaders, I remember as having an instinct for so handling each man that he contributed the utmost that his capacity permitted. They seemed to be able to promote team work and left me with a feeling that I could not let them down. Justice, I believe, was their paramount virtue. These officers and petty officers, whom I most esteem as leaders, were wary of making a promise that they might not be able to fulfill; but once committed, their word was their bond. They were firm and played no favorites. The merit system alone was their criterion of performance. I felt at ease with them. They seemed to exude confidence and readily communicated that feeling to you. There is no doubt of the effectiveness of these outstanding officers and chief petty officers as salesmen of the Navy way of life, with its honors, its ceremonies, its traditions, and sense of dedication. Leaders seem to have what good commanders have, plus an intangible quality that colors all their actions. They possess a warmth of personality which immediately allies you with them. If you are the focal point of your little world, you no doubt have some of those magnetic, intangible qualities we call leadership. It implies qualities that all persons in command of men should strive to develop.
Many excellent leaders do not have these qualities in their entirety. They all, however, have them in some measure or degree. In the search for a guide to help him develop as a leader, the petty officer will in the future, as he has in the past, turn to the officers and chief petty officers who most stand out in this respect. He could use no better standard. The qualities that make for success as a leader apply to general and sergeant, admiral and petty officer. The differences in degree of leadership lie more in qualification and education than in fundamental qualities. How can you measure the extent of loyalty, honesty, integrity, initiative, courage, or justice? It is in the possibilities for application of these qualities where the differences lie between outstanding leaders in orbits of different diameter. Thankfully, in both its officers and petty officers, the United States Navy has always had its share of leadership permeating the entire command structure.
In the one hundred and seventy-five fighting years of our Navy, has the petty officer measured up to the responsibilities thrust upon him by the command system? Many who are long dead and safely billeted on the staff of the Supreme Commander could best answer that question; so we must turn to history and its record of the exploits of our Navy for the answer, which reveals itself as a ringing affirmative.
Napoleon once said, “Steadfastness, not courage, is the first requirement of a soldier; courage is a second choice.” In rallying to the cry of “boarders” with Paul Jones in Bon Homme Richard against Serapis, coming about to “rake” Levant and Cyane with Stewart in Old Ironsides, heedless of the mines with Farragut in Hartford at Mobile Bay, in battle with the Kamikaze at Okinawa and the shore batteries at Normandy, in our submarines against the Japanese in the Pacific and against German submarines in our destroyers in the Atlantic, our petty officers have been found strong in both steadfastness and courage. The brilliance of our strategy and tactics, the loyal support of our people at home, the professional zeal and courage of our officers could well have been all for naught, if at the crucial point of execution, either as a gun captain, plane captain, helmsman, or throttleman, and at numerous other positions, the petty officer did not respond loyally and nobly to the stern test of battle.
With so much expected of our petty officer, it is important that we constantly attune his selection and training to the changing times. In doing this we must be certain that the petty officer realizes that, although means may differ and ratings may be added or eliminated, his position in the line of command remains unchanged. The- excellent petty officers whom the Navy acquired in the decade 1930-40 were the product of many pressures, all acting, fortunately, towards a favorable end. During this period the Navy was small, having on its rolls less than 100,000 men. There was considerable unemployment, and the applicants for enlistment far outnumbered the billets that were open to them. As a result the Navy fell heir to all the blessings and benefits possible under a system of selective recruiting. The standards set were so high that almost every man enlisted was of the highest petty officer caliber. These were the men who formed the petty officer nucleus around whom our vast force of wartime petty officers was built. This well-screened group of young men and the officers who were their leaders made possible our successful wartime expansion. The loyalty, the patriotism, the success of our wartime petty officers rested firmly upon the “know how” taught them by the men who first introduced them to their naval duties, the Navy career petty officers. The holding of the fort while new men rallied to the colors and the training of these men so that they could fill responsible petty officer billets was perhaps the greatest contribution of the Navy career petty officer to the war effort. Admiral Halsey has called the chief petty officer, “the thin red line between defeat and victory.”
In moulding new petty officers from the raw material of civilian life, the career petty officer had the finest of young American manhood and womanhood to work with. Many of these men and women had already proven themselves as leaders in their civilian pursuits and by war’s end had surpassed their first teachers in rating or rank. Together, the Navy career petty officer and his brother petty officers from civilian life made an unbeatable team that boded ill for our enemies. Five years after World War II, in Korean waters this team has been called together again, and its continued effectiveness reveals it as one of America’s strongest assets in the great struggle between those who love freedom and those who pervert it.
The regular Navy of the next twenty years may well have to maintain a force of 600,000 men or more. Can we continue in good times with little unemployment to recruit men who will measure up to the high standards of our petty officers of the past? In spirit or in loyalty to our Union and our Navy, the petty officer of tomorrow may equal but certainly not surpass the petty officer of yesteryear. New advances made in our country in all branches of knowledge and the extension of our excellent system of compulsory education into fields of higher learning will permit the petty officer of the future to enter the Navy with a better educational background than his predecessors. On a per capita basis, however, in competition with our sister services and American industry for the able young manhood of America, can all our petty officer billets be filled without lowering the standards that were established, to the satisfaction of all in the era immediately preceding World War II? Either the failure to procure sufficient men of high caliber for the necessary petty officer positions or the lowering of the standards to permit the filling of these positions by less qualified men will wreak havoc with a hitherto key point in the Navy command structure. Let us continue the system now used for the selection of our petty officers, if it will meet the demands made upon it by a greatly expanded regular Navy. The importance one must attach to the selection of our Navy petty officer makes it mandatory, however, that as a safeguard against a possible depreciation of standards we examine other possible methods of petty officer selection.
Personal experience and close observation of the experience of other petty officers discloses that (excepting in the Boatswain’s Mate rating) few petty officers are placed in command of other men until they are advanced to petty officer, first class. The duties of petty officers, second and third class, are primarily military and technical in nature, and do not often embrace the command of men. With advancement to petty officer, first class, however, a vast change takes place. The military duties remain, but the stress is shifted from the performance of technical duties to the performance of supervisory duties. The first class petty officer is usually a division petty officer or a section leader. In many instances he is filling a chief petty officer’s billet. He is definitely a key man in the Navy command structure. In most cases he is the last man in the line of command. This appraisal of the practical workings of our petty officer system reveals a new method that might be employed in the selection of our petty officers.
Is it necessary that a man be made a petty officer, with all its implications of command, because of technical excellence in one specialty? Why must a man because he is a storekeeper or aviation machinist’s mate be also a petty officer? If a rated man were stripped of his authority as a petty officer, it would in no way lessen his technical skill. His rating insignia and the number of chevrons below it would continue to show his specialty and his degree of excellence in that specialty. Missing from his rating badge would be the eagle, which since 1884 has been the insignia of the petty officer. The loss of petty officer standing by a specialist would not lessen his military responsibilities. He would still be, by virtue of his oath, subject to the lawful orders of his officers and petty officers.
But who will be the petty officer and where will he come from in this new system of petty officer selection under examination? He would be selected from the first class technicians who have displayed outstanding ability as leaders. He should be examined on military and petty officer duties only, his successfully advancing to first class technician having demonstrated his technical fitness. To determine the ability of a first class technician as a leader worthy to take his place as a key member of the naval command structure, he should be judged on fitness reports. These fitness reports would be submitted by his head of department annually in the case of technicians, second and third class, and semi-annually for technicians, first class. The fitness report should be comprehensive, covering all facets of the petty officer’s character and personality and those qualities that are inimical with leadership and command. Personal interviews with an examining board of officers would appraise his poise, fluency, and military bearing. His ability as an instructor, his organizing ability, and interest in athletics or other extracurricular activities should be considered. The education of the prospective petty officer, his hobbies, and any aptitude for public speaking or foreign languages should not be overlooked. After his selection and before his assignment to new duties as a petty officer, he could be sent to a petty officer school of the line for additional instruction. Under this system the technician would not be neglected. He would continue receiving instruction in the school of the ship, and the excellent service schools we now have would continue, as in the past, to produce the finest of technicians. Although in his new duties the stress would be placed upon command, the petty officer’s background as a technician would continue to be of value to the Navy. The petty officers would have their own mess or be billeted with the chief petty officers.
The selection of men for chief petty officer suggests itself. From the petty officers and chief petty officers selections would be made for warrant officer and limited duty officer programs. Warrant rank would attract those petty officers who were interested in highly specialized technical duties; petty officers who wished to enter a broader field, with the stress on executive and command work, could strive for a commission as a limited duty officer. The petty officer should be rotated every two years in a manner similar to the way officers are now rotated.
At the beginning of every enlistment the petty officer could be sent to a training center for refresher training in those skills all good sailors should be proficient in that shipboard life often precludes covering frequently. Examples would be infantry drill, first and second aid, and small arms qualification. Nothing in this new petty officer training and selection program would have for its goal the creation of a “jack of all trades and master of none.” The petty officer would command men in his own rating background as is now the custom. However, his military authority would extend into all fields as is currently the practice, but with more emphasis on that authority. The petty officer would still feel he is a fighter first, last, and always. The special application he makes of his energy is his contribution to the fighting of the ship. The Captain in making his decision to stand and fight combines his own resolve with that of every fighter in the ship.
When Admiral Dan Callaghan on that memorable night off Guadalcanal said, “Take the big ones first,” he was expressing not only his own will to fight but equally that of the firemen on the burners, the radio messenger, and the cook strikers in San Francisco's magazines. It was this leadership, this loyalty up and down, this fighting spirit, that makes the difference between the U.S.S. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Empire State building. As Callaghan went heroically, with many of his officers and men, to join Stephen Decatur, Dewey, and Paul Jones on the staff of the Supreme Commander, the petty officers who remained to direct the fighting of the twenty-odd fires throughout San Francisco’s length justified their Admiral’s faith in them. To the petty officer of the future, regardless of the method of his selection, we say: let the spirit of San Francisco be your heritage; the courage of Enterprise and Laffey your shining beacon; and the saga of Bon Homme Richard and Intrepid your tradition. What finer task could a petty officer have than to emulate the deeds of the officers and men who fought these fine ships. Their victories are the stories of the finest hours in American history.
The present system of petty officer selection could readily be adapted to the new one under discussion. A change could be made that would not affect the pay status of anyone. Some men now petty officers would lose this distinction. However, the petty officers selected would receive a raise in prestige that could not be measured. It would not interfere with the technical requirements of the Navy but would in fact emphasize them. The petty officer, clad in a uniform similar to that of the chief petty officer, would stand out as a man who had succeeded in his calling as a skilled technician, who had demonstrated his ability as a leader, and was now worthy of admittance to his rightful place in the chain of command. Freed of his petty officer responsibilities but not of his military duties, the technician could give his full attention to his technical duties. Not being eligible for selection for petty officer until he became a first class technician, the new petty officer would be an older, more mature, and more responsible man. Putting into effect the new system of petty officer selection would reduce sharply the number of petty officers required, but not the number of men in the various pay grades. All the men who are now first class would probably retain their petty officer status, since they are the men who to a large extent are performing the petty officer duties in the Navy at the present time. That would leave the Navy with only second and third class technicians, but this shortage could be alleviated by advancing these men to first and second class technician, respectively, without changing their pay grade. This would reserve pay grade six for the petty officers and pay grades five and four for the first and second class technicians. Third class technician could be eliminated in the same manner that the Army eliminated the rate of sergeant without changing the pay grade of anyone. The other pay grades and ratings, being unaffected, would remain the same. Another method that could be used would advance a seaman recruit to seaman apprentice as is now the custom after four months of service, but without an increase in pay. Pay grade two would be for seaman and pay grade three for third class technician under this arrangement. But these are merely examples of how the transition to the new system of petty officer selection could be effected. Other solutions are available.
Will this system work? The oldest of all modern navies, the British Navy, from whom we have inherited so many of our own customs and traditions, uses a system of petty officer selection similar to the one just discussed. In conversations with petty officers and chief petty officers from H.M.S. Kenya, while they were our guests on board ship in Inchon port, I learned that about fifteen percent of ships’ companies of British ships are petty officers. About the same percentage would hold true for our ships under the new system of petty officer selection under examination. One of our British colleagues stated he was a chief petty officer, first class artificer; another was a chief petty officer, chief artificer. They explained this arrangement by the fact that one man had more experience than the other in his specialty. Evidently unusual ability as a leader is rewarded in the British Navy by advancing a man to chief petty officer before he reaches the top in his specialty. As the man increases his technical skill, he is advanced in his specialty, until finally reaching the top rating as an artificer. In any event his advancement to chief petty officer does not necessarily coincide with his advancement to chief artificer as is the case in our Navy.
Our present system of petty officer selection has passed through the crucible of the years. It not only has never let us down, but it has developed petty officers who are among the finest young leaders in the world. Its past successes build a case for it that justifies no radical change in the system. However, it must be remembered that never before in the history of our country have we been called upon to continue to maintain regular armed forces as large as we will probably have to maintain during the next twenty years. This new system of petty officer selection is offered for consideration, should a greatly expanded regular Navy justify some changes in the method of petty officer selection, to maintain the integrity of the petty officer’s place in the line of command. It is left to better and more learned minds to determine whether a change in the system of selecting petty officers is necessary. This paper will have served its purpose if it stimulates thinking on the subject. Change is the law of matter and it is certain that no one wants the Navy to be caught at cross purposes with this law. It is to perpetuate those high ideals and traditions, handed down to us by American sailors of other days, that we must constantly and searchingly review our methods. Let us not live off of the principal of our heritage. Let us add to it so* that our children’s children will not inherit less than we ourselves did from our fathers.
The responsibilities thrust upon the United States Navy today are greater than any ever imposed in the past. Not only America, but the entire free world, looks to the Navy and her sister services of the Armed Forces for their defense. The success of our near two hundred year old experiment, our democratic American way of life, has thrown this responsibility our way. In helping the Navy achieve its mission, which now includes not only the security of the United States but, in conjunction with the forces of other members of the United Nations, the security of the whole free world as well, the role played by our petty officer is as important as at any previous time in our short but proud history. Still ably led by Paul Jones, Stephen Decatur, and Marc Mitscher, American sailors of two centuries are looking down upon us. With their own great spirit added to our own, with the faith it inspires in ourselves, our Navy, and our country, the petty officer can show the world that the Navy still produces fighting men. “What we from our fathers have inherited, let us earn is, that we may possess it.”
Forty-five years ago the late President Theodore Roosevelt, loyal and good friend of the Navy, in justifying the existence of “the great white fleet,” said, “The Navy of the United States is the strong right arm of the United States; let us not palsy that arm.” Since the days of John Barry, American naval officers have referred to our petty officers as the “backbone” of the American Navy. What finer honor could our officers have conferred on us, the petty officers of the Navy? In our modern Navy, as in the Navy of another day, whether under, on the surface of, or flying above the sea, on the beaches with our amphibious forces, or in the field with our Marines, may our petty officers continue to be the “backbone” of that fighting team—the United States Navy.