Discussions, Comments and Notes

 

Sea Power and a National General Staff

(See page 1091, October, 1949, Proceedings and page 1107, October, 1951, Proceedings)

Lieutenant Colonel J. D. Hittle,

• S.M.C. Captain Krause has raised a number of questions relative to my October U949) article. Within the limitations of space I will try to clarify the main points on which he voices dissent.

_<(. First Captain Krause states that he is inclined to feel that some of . . . (my) argu- nients are not well founded and these par­ticularly apply to . . . modus operandi of the german High Command from World War I through World War II,” and that I am “in- u med to attribute influences to the German general Staff and the Armed Forces High Command which are improperly taken.” I urn at a loss to find the passage in my article hat could be construed as a discussion of the Junctioning (modus operandi) of the German «igh Command during World War I, or be- ween World War I and World War II. I 'd state as a matter of principle that the Great General Staff dominated the armed torces of Germany prior to and during _orld War I.” This is merely an explanation ? ^status; it is not an explanation of staff unctioning. For further evidence supporting •wy conclusion that the Great General Staff ^f ominated all the armed forces of Germany, ^may I suggest the following authoritative sources: Schellendorff, Duties of the General la#Whitton, Malike; The Great General ^laf (.German), a study by the French Gen­^eral Staff; Rosinski, The German Army (1940 ^e ition), and My Memoirs by Grand Ad­miral von Tirpitz, to mention a few.

Second Captain Krause questions my

statement: “There were those in Germany who understood sea power, but such indi­viduals could never prevail over the Great General Staff,” and he wants to know “Who were those individuals?” A detailed reply to this question is beyond the space limitations of what the Proceedings can possibly allot to this discussion. However, I will give one example, which well illustrates the lack of understanding of sea power by the Great General Staff. During the initial phases of the execution of the modified Schlieffen plan, von Moltke (the younger) was urged re­peatedly to seize the coastal ports which would have been his for the taking. Instead, he was so preoccupied with the prospect of fighting “the decisive battle” that he could not see the wisdom of taking the ports. Not until the ports had demonstrated their value to maintenance of British sea-borne com­munications did the land commanders en­deavor to correct their errors. In this we have a clear-cut example of how those who understood sea power failed to prevail over the Great General Staff. There are manv other examples of how those who understood sea power failed to prevail over the Great General Staff in World War I.

Third Captain Krause disapproves of my reference to the “all-powerful OKW,” as well as my reference to the German Armed Forces High Command as a “supreme gen­eral staff.” I cannot but suspect that the Captain has let a strict reading of command and staff organization delude him as to the true nature and authority of the OKW as it actually functioned. One of the things staff researchers must first realize is that the offi­cial and ostensible status and authority of a general staff often is not the same as its de facto authority and functioning. The powers that accrue to such supreme staffs seldom derive from a legal and specific grant of power. In short, supreme general staffs—• such as the Germans did have—often do things that are not officially prescribed in written law and regulation. It is in the sub­tility of their ways that they generate their danger to the government that permits them. As to Captain Krause’s dislike of the term “all-powerful OKW,” I merely want to say that if there was any German military com­mand and staff agency more powerful than the OKW, such information, if ascertainable, would rank with one of the great finds of military history. Jodi and Hitler, to mention a few, would have been surprised to know about it.

The facts of the matter are that when Hit­ler, dissatisfied with the progress against Russia, took over command, such over-all command was exercised by Hitler and his “Field Headquarters Staff,” which actually was an integral part of the Operational Staff of the OKW. Actually, Hitler went so far as to charge the OKW with cognizance over “all fields” of national defense.

Fourth—Captain Krause is in error in im­plying that I contended that the Norwegian operation was a failure. I simply stated that German sea power was not employed to realize its maximum value. I dispute the broad implication of the Captain’s statement that “if sea power was misused it was pri­marily the fault of the Navy because it willingly entered into the plan and itself made the commitments.” Submerged as it was in the High Command the Navy could do little else but play the role assigned. Being put in a position from which there was no recourse but to accept the decision of the non-naval elements of the High Command was not an unusual experience of the Ger­man Navy. That is the way the subtle viciousness of a supreme general staff is ap­plied. And such machinations are no mo­nopoly of the German system.

Fifth—Captain Krause, in his summary of the German Navy’s basic troubles in World War II presents a pretty complete point-by-point substantiation and resume of the fundamental conclusions advanced by my original article. However, I must take exception to his last point, the one criticizing

Raeder for keeping his naval headquarters separate as much as possible from the OKW. While I have no inclination to enter into a defense of Raeder for his insistence—wrong in the opinion of Captain Krause—in keep­ing his headquarters so separated, I can’t help but feel that Raeder must have chosen such a procedure after discovering that, from the naval standpoint, “coordination” with the OKW was just another word for getting his Navy’s pockets picked via the 2-1 vote in that supreme general staff. One who has been repeatedly robbed does not willingly frequent the den of thieves.

Mission to Turkey

(See page 1041, October, 1951, Proceedings)

(Editor’s Note: Admiral Herrmann was the Senior Naval Member of the initial Survey Mission to Turkey in May, 1947.)

Rear Admiral E. E. Herrmann, U. S. Navy.—I have read with much interest Commander Bowen’s article “Naval Aspects of the Mission to Turkey” in the October Proceedings, and would like to compliment him on the accuracy and soundness of it.

However, Commander Bowen has made an understandable error in describing the work of the initial Survey Mission as having been under the general direction of the senior Army member. To those who made up the Navy representation on that Mission it was significant that the senior Navy member and senior Army member each had entirely separate directives from their respective Sec­retaries to report to the Ambassador to Turkey to assist him in making the initial survey on which the aid program was to be based. The Ambassador, under Presidential appointment for that particular purpose, was named Chief of Mission. The Mission also included a State Department group. As originally constituted, the group included only one general officer for both Army and Army Air Corps. However, while the Mission was enroute to Ankara, representations were made for Air Corps representation by a gen­eral officer, and a major general of the Air Corps joined us immediately following our arrival at Ankara—though without separate directive, as the Air Corps was then still part of the Army.

Considering that our knowledge of Turkey was very sketchy indeed at that time, the constitution of the Survey Mission was more than ordinarily important. An organization “headed” by an officer of one of the services would necessarily have had to bring out a composite appraisal of the requirements of the Turkish forces. Thus the aid to be given the Turkish Navy would have been set at a figure agreed upon among the Army, Navy, and Air Corps members.

As Commander Bowen points out, the Turkish Navy in 1947 was a far cry from what it had been centuries ago. But it was evident to the U. S. Navy members of the Survey Mission that the Turkish Navy’s spirit was excellent, and that there was enough competence in its officers and men to warrant a substantial investment of Ameri­can aid toward re-building. Others on the Mission took a dim view of such a proposal. And, as the Turkish Chief of Naval Staff (equivalent of our own CNO) told us, the Turkish Navy’s share of the defense budget had fallen to about 8%, and even this 8% was usually drawn on for unforeseen con­tingencies of all kinds. To the Turkish Naval Staff, the recommendation which our Survey Mission would make was as vital as life itself for the General Staff was inclined to view with some doubt the investment of much of Turkey’s limited resources in a Navy; but it was evident that the General Staff would place great faith in the Survey Mission’s recommendations.

When the time came to work up a program which would fit within the $100,000,000 al­lotted by Public Law 375 of the 80th Con­gress, discussions among members of the Survey Mission naturally turned to per­centage apportionments among the four claimants for aid, viz., Turkish Army, Navy, Air Force, and economic aid (particularly non-military public works, such as roads). In these discussions the Army’s viewpoint on the Survey Mission was that the apportion­ment to the Turkish Navy should not be in excess of about 5%—and there was no en­thusiasm in offering even this small amount. The Air Corps view was that with potential enemy air power in the picture, aid to the Turkish Navy was too risky an investment to warrant any share of the aid program. It was agreed, however, that the responsibility for advising the Chief of Mission (ambas­sador) what kind of program should be rec­ommended for the Turkish Navy had been assigned to the senior U. S. Navy member of the Survey Mission, and that there was no occasion for other members to comment on the matter except as the Chief of Mission requested. The senior U. S. Navy member submitted a program calling for 15% of the total aid to be granted; Army and State senior members submitted programs for ground forces, air forces, and economic aid. The total considerably exceeded the $100,­000,000 available. The Chief of Mission trimmed the Navy program to $14,750,000 (or to 14f% of the total). It was an impor­tant event for the Turkish Navy, and subse­quent events have indicated that the Chief of Mission’s judgment was justified.

Wireless in Warfare

(See page 117, February, 1951, Proceedings;

page 763, July, 1951, Proceedings; and page 989, September, 1951, Proceedings)

PRorESSOR Edwin H. Armstrong, Co­lumbia University.—In Mr. Robert P. Bigelow’s article, “Wireless in Warfare, 1885-1914” (February issue) and in Dr. Louis B. Amyot’s comment thereon (July issue), ancient radio history appears to have become somewhat scrambled. For the benefit of the present generation, may I endeavor to set the record straight.

Reference is made in these articles to the work of Mahlon Loomis and Sir William Preece as preceding Marconi in the invention of “wireless” telegraphy—presumably of that method of communications now called radio. Marconi’s achievement is represented as an extension of what these experimenters proposed to do. That is not the fact.

An examination of Loomis’ patent indi­cates that he proposed some form of conduc­tion system (somewhat similar to Nikola Tesla’s later proposal), one path between the two stations to be the earth and the other path to be a conducting upper atmospheric layer, tapped into by means of elevated con­ductors. Sir William Preece made use of an induction system of the type used by Phelps, Edison and others in this country. While it was “wireless” in the sense of there being no conducting wires between transmitter and receiver, it was not the “wireless” or “radio” of Marconi’s great discovery.

Marconi’s discovery of the grounded wave whereby high frequency energy could be effectively radiated from an antenna and guided around the curvature of the earth was the thing that brought into being the real radio art. Once this secret of Marconi’s success became known, there were, of course, numerous inventors of rival “systems.”

Mr. Bigelow’s article also states, “In 1906, DeForest invented the A UDION which greatly improved transmission.” It is true that the audion was invented in 1906 but it is not true that transmission was thereby greatly improved. The audion as invented by DeForest had a sensitivity but slightly greater than the crystal detectors of the day and it is doubtful if 1/10 of 1% of the sta­tions operating between 1906 and 1912 made use of it. Its lack of importance at the time may be judged from the fact that in 1914 in a total of over 3,000 pages of the seven leading textbooks in the art, less than one page for the seven combined was devoted to the audion. Not until 1912, when the invention of the regenerative circuit increased its sensi­tivity hundreds or thousands of times, did the audion become of any importance in the radio art.

Mr. Bigelow’s very interesting article un­fortunately closes a few years too soon. The greatest “Wireless in Warfare” story of all time took place in 1916. It concerns the bringing about and the fighting of the Battle of Jutland. The world today would be a dif­ferent sort of place had certain radio opera­tions come off a bit differently. I hope that at some future time Mr. Bigelow will be able to supplement his most interesting account to include this story also.

Mr. Arthur H. Morse’s comments in the September issue makes the same error as the original article in failing to point out what Marconi discovered.

It is quite true that Marconi’s original work followed in the footsteps of Hertz by using rellectors and ungrounded oscillating systems at the transmitter and receiver. It is not true, however, as inferred in Mr. Morse’s comments, that Marconi’s great discovery came from the teaching of Edison’s U. S. Patent 465,591 which Mr. Morse refers to as “the earthed aerial.”

What Marconi did was to ground one terminal of his high frequency oscillating sys­tem, producing thereby a double effect—first, that of greatly enhancing the radiated power, and second (and more important),- that of attaching the radiated waves to the surface of the earth, i.e., the grounded wave.

Not until signals so produced had been detected by Marconi beyond the horizon, where “science” predicted they could not go, was the existence of an unknown phenome­non brought to light. That was the discovery that created “wireless” as a practical entity.

What Is a Knot?

Mr. Frank R. Davis.—Herewith is an article that recently appeared in a local house paper. I have never heard of such a method of determining the speed of a ship, and I would greatly appreciate your com­ments as to the accuracy of this article:

Museum Exhibit Explains Source of Nautical Terms

In front of the East India Merchant Shop in the Museum there is an exhibit which illustrates the derivation of the nautical term “knots per hour.” On top of a coil of knotted rope rests a rock through which a hole has been bored.

In the early days of sailing there was no ac­curate method of determining the speed of a ship. Through the years one or several ingenious indi­viduals dreamed up an idea to tic knots in a rope at certain specified intervals and then fasten the end of the rope around the hole in the rock.

When the ship was out to sea, the coil of rope and attached rock were tossed over the stern of the ship and trailed behind in the wake. The faster the speed the more knots would rise above the water. When a certain knot remained above the surface for any length of time, the captain knew the ship was traveling at a certain rate of speed. Hence we get the term “knots per hour.”

Some sailors preferred to use a log as a weight instead of a rock. From this beginning the term “ship’s log” arose.

(Editor’s Note: The generally accepted explanation of the nautical term “knot” may be found in Lt. Cdr. Alton Ii. Moody’s article “The Nautical Mile,” page 1259, November, 1949, Proceedings. If any readers of the Proceedings can cite authenticated instances of the use of a rock-weighted log line as described in the quotation above, the Editor will be happy to pass this information on to Mr. Davis.)

Command—The Ultimate Specialty

(See page 473, May, 1951, Proceedings)

Lieutenant Edward F. McCartan, U. S. Navy.—In the May, 1951, issue Lt. (jg) Rairden has presented some thought-pro­voking suggestions in his article “Command '—the Ultimate Specialty.” However, while agreeing with his analysis of the problem, I question his means of solution.

First, defining command as a specialty is misleading. It implies that at a given point in his career one line officer becomes limited in his assignments to command only, whether it be ships, forces afloat or shore establish­ments, while another non-specialist officer of equal rank and ability can only occupy subordinate positions because he has not specialized in command. I do not think Lieutenant Rairden envisioned this situa­tion, but the implications are present. The commander is not a specialist, but a user or director of specialists. The best utilization of his subordinates requires an understanding of their duties and responsibilities, and this understanding is best gained by actual per­formance of those duties at some previous step in the commander’s career.

To establish a school of command would be to set a dangerous precedent. This would imply that only those selected for the school were fit to command ships or forces. It would be extremely difficult to determine the poten­tially best commanders from among officers of j unior rank and limited experience, and failure of selection for the school might dis­courage many fine young officers. Actually, we are all supposed to be in training for command constantly; by our performance of the various shipboard (or staff) duties, from “George” to Department head, we gain the knowledge and experience to fit us for higher responsibility. To relegate this training to a school would be to encourage a slackening of effort on the part of those officers attempting to work up the chain of command, and to substitute a certificate for ability and experi­ence as the prerequisite for command.

The article also recommends that at “stated intervals” commanding officers ad­vise the Chief of Naval Personnel of the names of those junior officers whom they believe to be particularly suited for com­mand. This method gives the C.O. no cri­terion for making his choice, and would lead to the unfair extremes of one Captain re­porting all his officers as well fitted and another, sterner C.O. reporting none. Our present fitness report system by using the category placement method, avoids the ex­tremes of personal opinion, and, in the long run, comes up with a true picture of the relative merit of the officer, including his ability to command.

However, I heartily agree with the author in his mention of the lack of inducements to command, and can elaborate on that score. While it is true that many junior officers attempt to avoid responsibility during their early careers, it is equally true that many others are eager to accept it. However, the officer with responsibility, no matter what his rank, must have the means of carrying it .out. In this respect the difficulties encoun­tered by the junior officer in command are highly discouraging to many.

Up until I came ashore recently, assign­ment of a junior officer to command was regarded among his fellow officers, with some seriousness, as a punishment, and he was someone to be pitied. This feeling was caused by many factors, some necessary, others unnecessary. Principally, they were:

The lack of personnel and funds as com­pared with the requirements for operation and pre-war standards of maintenance.

The lack of long, or even medium-range plans, with the resultant effect on morale. Personnel did not know where they would be from one day to the next.

The funneling of responsibility for ac­complishment of many directives down through the chain of command to the indi­vidual command without giving the com­manding officer the means of carrying them out properly.

The treatment of junior commanding of­ficers by many seniors acting on the theory that any junior officer is, by definition, in­competent and unworthy of consideration.

By no means do I suggest that rank be ignored when ships of various types are concerned. On the other hand, I propose that the greatest inducement to and desire for this responsibility would be created by re­storing to command the authority, the dig­nity, and the respect which is its due.