Book Reviews

Earl (Knopf, $2.25). This deals with a dra­matic episode in the career of H.M.S. Amethyst in the Yangtse River between April and July, 1949. The second is entitled The Navy of Tomorrow; the Story of H.M.S. Il­lustrious (Werner Laurie, $2.50 estimated), by Frank H. Shay and deals with Britain’s 23,000-ton aircraft carrier. The third is Peter K. Kemp’s The Nine Vanguards (Hutchin­son, 18 shillings). By taking as his main theme the nine ships of the Royal Navy that have borne the name Vanguard, Commander Kemp has built up a well-documented ac­count of nearly four centuries of British naval history.

There are also several books that deal with various periods of naval history: Frank Charles Bowen’s Wooden Walls in Action (Staples Press, 21 shillings), an account of nearly 70 widely varied episodes in the fight- >ng history of wooden-walled ships; Du Quesne el la Marine royale de Richelieu a Col­bert (1610-1688), by Henri Carre (Sfelt, $2.40 estimated); Muslim Sea Power in the Eastern Mediterranean From the Seventh to the Tenth Century by Aly Mohamed Fahmy (Luzac, 20 shillings); Gerald S. Graham’s Empire of the North Atlantic by Gerald S. Graham (University of Toronto Press, $6.00), a study of the maritime struggle for North America, showing the influence of sea power upon history for the last four centuries; The Last Invasion of Britain, by E. H. S. Jones, RN (University of Wales Press, 35 shillings), the narrative of the abortive landing made from two French frigates on the Welsh coast on February 22, 1797; and Augustine Antoine Thomazi’s Napoleon el ses marins (Berger- Levrault, 390 francs).

Two reference works deserve mention: Theodore Fruchtman’s Illustrated Ship’s Dictionary; A Handy Compendium of the Most Commonly Used Terms (Reporter Pub­lications, $2.00) and the New Military and Naval Dictionary (Philosophical Library, $6.00).

For an authentic, convenient history of our own Navy, Theodore Roscoe’s This is Your Navy (U. S. Naval Institute, $3.00) is recommended. This is an informal history prepared under the supervision of the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

A number of books of special interest to navigators are: Ivan E. Allison’s Navigation and Astronomy for Students (British Book Centre, $5.75); The Principles of Air Naviga­tion, by E. W. Anderson (Methuen, 25/0); Edmund Gibson’s Basic Seamanship and Navigation (McGraw-Hill, $6.00); in J. B. Hewson’s A History of the Practice of Naviga­tion (Brown, Son & Ferguson, 30 shillings), all aspects of navigation and navigational usage are dealt with historically; two other books on the subject are Walter J. O’Hara’s Mariner’s Gyro-Navigation Manual (Cornell Maritime Press, $3.50) and Navigation Prob­lems and Solutions by Ramon O. Williams and George W. Mixter (Van Nostrand, $5.00).

The two great English naval annuals still maintain their high standards of excellence. However, the Naval Annual, founded by Sir Thomas Brassey in 1886, has changed its character somewhat and is now entitled Brassey’s Annual; The Armed Forces Year­book (Macmillan, $7.00). It is a handbook of information on the world’s armies, navies, and air forces. Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1951­1952, (McGraw-Hill $20.00) needs little in­troduction for it has changed its character scarcely at all since its first edition was brought out by its founder, Fred T. Jane, in 1898. It was and is still the best reference work on the warships of the world’s navies.

Four books, though not definitely pertain­ing to naval matters, should have an appeal to naval officers: Edward J. McShane’s Ex­terior Ballistics (University of Denver Press, $12.00); Harold S. Guetzkow’s Groups, Lead­ership and Men; Research in Human Rela­tions (Rutgers University Press, $5.00); Rachel L. Carson’s The Sea Around Us (Ox­ford University Press, $3.50), a fascinating account of the oceans of the world; and H. I. Chapelle’s American Small Sailing Craft (Norton, $6.00).

New and revised editions of three books of immense value to the naval profession have been published during the year: Thomas J. Kelly’s Damage Control (Van Nostrand, $4.00); Admiral Harley F. Cope’s Command at Sea (Norton, $3.75); and Admiral Arthur A. Ageton’s Naval Officer’s Guide (McGraw- Hill, $6.00).

An unusual number of novels with a Navy background have been published during the year: John Lodwick’s The Cradle of Neptune (Heineman, 15 shillings) deals with life at the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth; Nicho­las Monsarrat’s The Cruel Sea (Knopf, §4.00) is an heroic novel dealing with the Battle of the North Atlantic; Russell Thacher’s The Captain (Macmillan, $3.50) tells of life aboard an LST in World War II; Robert W. Travers’ 20th Meridian (Norton, $3.00) deals with life aboard a merchant ship in the At­lantic during the last war; Jan Wescott’s Captain Barney (Crown, $3.00) takes us back to the American Revolution and is based on the career and exploits of Captain Joshua Barney, privateer and later an officer in the Continental Navy; Keith Wheeler’s The Reef (Dutton, $3.00) describes the remorse of an officer of Marines who failed to ac­company his men on the reefs at Tarawa; Wirt Williams’ The Enemy (Houghton, $3.00) describes the life of 150 men, the crew of a four-stack destroyer, and the part they played in the Battle of the Atlantic in the last war; Herman Wouk’s The Caine Mutiny (Doubleday, $3.95) is a novel of life aboard a minesweeper in the South Pacific. This book has headed the best-seller lists for many weeks, and finally Donald R. Morris’ China Station (Farrar, Straus, $3.00), is the story of an officer on destroyer duty on the China Station. The author is a recent graduate of the Naval Academy.

ALEUTIANS, GILBERTS AND MAR­SHALLS, June 1942-April 1944. Volume VII of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. By Samuel Eliot Morison, with an introduction on Fast Carrier Operations, 1943-1945, by Commander James C. Shaw, U.S.N. Bos­ton: Atlantic-Little, Brown. 1951. 369 pages. $6.00.

Reviewed by Professor Richard S.

West, Jr., U. S. Naval Academy

Three separate operations are covered in Volume VII of Professor Morison’s heroic series on the United States Navy’s opera­tions in World War II, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls; yet fundamentally these disparate actions were sufficiently related to give the book a certain unity. The Aleutians Campaign, by wresting from Japan the islands of Kiska and Attu, cleared a possible route for supplies to Russia and denied to the enemy possible invasion stepping stones to Alaska. The campaign against the Gilbert Islands launched the frontal drive across the Central Pacific toward Japan’s inner de­fenses and paralleled the drive in the South­west Pacific through the Bismarcks’ Barrier. The Marshall Islands campaign, profiting by the tactical lessons of the Gilberts, placed the Navy in a highly strategic position within 700 miles of Truk and within a thousand miles of Saipan. From the three-fold story a reader may gather concrete impressions as to the nature of global war. Marine veterans of Guadalcanal saw action again at Tarawa; troops used at Kiska and Attu stormed ashore at Kwajalein. New types of landing craft that had proved their worth in the Mediterranean were supplied in significant numbers for the Marshalls campaign. Fast battleships and fast Esse^-type carriers, available in increasing numbers as the pres­ent campaigns progressed, kept the skies clear of enemy planes and guarded against a possible challenge by the Japanese fleet.

The campaign in the Aleutians, Morison thinks, might better not have been waged. “It would have been wiser in the long run to have left the Japanese in Kiska and Attu alone to get frostbite on the muskeg,” to have by-passed these positions and permitted them “to wither on the vine.” The difficulties of climate in an area where most of the time “clouds lay snug as a bedspread on the ocean” rendered both air and surface opera­tions hazardous.

The bright spot of the Aleutians’ picture was the Battle of the Komandorski Islands, in which Rear Admiral Charles H. McMorris with one heavy and one light cruisers and four destroyers flushed several Japanese sup­ply ships convoyed by Vice Admiral M. Hosogaya’s entire fleet, twice as strong as McMorris’s own, and managed to get away safely. For three and a half hours the Salt Lake City fenced and parried with Maya over an ocean duelling ground. Finally at the close of the duel the Salt Lake City received major damage to her steering gear, but the blow was unobserved by the retiring Japanese, and Swayback Maru, veteran of the Battle of Cape Esperance, continued to survive.

Professor Morison, now Rear Admiral re­tired, participated in the Gilbert Islands operations and writes with the assurance of an eyewitness as well as scholar. The high­lights of “Operation Galvanic” were the seizure of Makin by Rear Admiral R. K. Turner’s Northern Attack Force and the con­quest of Tarawa by Rear Admiral H. W. Hill’s Southern Attack Force. Operations against these first enemy-held islands in the Central Pacific were complicated by in­accurate charts, insufficient knowledge of tide conditions over the barrier reefs, and inexperience in dealing with the stubborn island defenses. Morison tells the story of the planning, preparation, and execution of these assaults with scholarly frankness and understanding. He does a particularly good job of showing now eagerly the Navy sought out the “lessons” of Makin and Tarawa and applied these later in the Marshalls. Al­though the battle for Tarawa cost the lives of 980 Marines and 29 sailors, and there were 2,101 wounded, the action was “well planned and bravely executed” and it be­came the “seed bed for victory in 1945.” “Of preventable blunders,” he assures us, “there were none of any consequence.”

In “Operation Flintlock,” the Marshalls campaign, there were three attack forces: the northern force attacking Roi-Namur in Kwajalein Atoll was under Rear Admiral R. L. Conolly; the southern force attacking Kwajalein Island was led by Rear Admiral R. K. Turner; and a third amphibious force under Rear Admiral H. W. Kill, after stand­ing by as a reserve off Kwajalein, plunged on westward to seize Eniwetok Atoll. For these later amphibious operations the Navy employed several new and improved types of landing craft that had not been available for Tarawa, LCI’s were armed to give close- in fire support to the landing force, and fighter planes armed with rockets strafed the beach defenses. Thrice the amount of naval bombardment ammunition was expended as in the earlier operations, and small islands adjacent to Roi-Namur and to Kwajalein were secured for landbased artillery, early in the game. For his close-range bombard­ment of Roi-Namur Rear Admiral R. L. Conolly earned his nickname, “Close-In” Conolly. Even “Howling Mad” Smith, who had been a bitter critic of earlier amphibious operations, as Professor Morison remarks, “loved the Navy after this assault—for a few days.”

A word of appreciation should go to Com­mander James C. Shaw, U. S. Navy, for his excellent introductory essay on “Fast Car­rier Operations, 1943-1945.” This fills out the general picture and complements the chapters devoted to carrier strikes, particu­larly “Operation Hailstone” against Truk, with which the book closes. Aleutians, Gil­berts and Marshalls, like others in the series, tells a story of which the country and the Navy can be proud.

RUSSIA, PAST AND PRESENT, by

Anatole G. Mazour. New York: D. Van

Nostrand Co., Inc., 1951. 785 pages. $9.00.

Reviewed by Vice Admiral L. C. Stevens, U. S. Navy (Retired)

The author of this important book on Rus­sia is Associate Professor of History at Stan­ford University. His method of handling history is not conventionally chronological. Dr. Mazour begins with the considerations of geography and the land, followed by an extraordinarily sensitive and perceptive dis­cussion of the nature of the Russian people, an excellent chapter on the problems in­volved in the orientation of Russian thought prior to the development of organized and systematic revolutionary philosophy, and two brilliant chapters on the nature and his­tory of the Russian Church.

It is only after this substantial introduc­tion that he begins with more conventional history, and then his treatment follows separately the two main threads of internal development of the state and external rela­tions, until the First World War. In addition, agriculture, industry, literature and the theatre, and art and music under the Tsars are each given special chapters. The Revolu­tionary tradition is then picked up from its beginnings until the end of the Civil Wars, after which the same broad topical pattern is used to bring the account up to today.

Dr. Mazour is very successful with this approach. His topical treatment permits a group of brilliant essays which yet remain inter-related and organically connected. Al­though the cultural aspects are intended to be presented only in so far as they have a bearing on the course of history, they are handled so well that they constitute in them­selves excellent historical summaries.

There are many fine qualities in Russia, Past and Present. Although the author came to the United States in 1923, he is a Russian, and he sees Russia through Russian eyes. This gives a sensitivity which is seldom if ever found in the writings of Westerners about Russia, which is perhaps most appar­ent in the thought-provoking chapter on the people. It also gives a difference in propor­tion. It is very instructive to note the sort of thing that Dr. Mazour defends, from the necessity of Russia to expand to what he calls its immaturity.

One of the many excellences of this book is the depth that is given it by a Russian’s con­ception of the importance of secondary per­sonalities. A host of characters on the Rus­sian scene whose very names are unfamiliar to most Americans comes to life, and their viewpoints and contributions are succinctly set forth. One can have only a smattering of Russia if one does not know Pobedonostsev as well as Alexander III, Ostrovsky as well as Chekhov, Hertzen and Goncharov as well as Pushkin and Tolstoy, Plekhanov and Bakunin as well as Marx and Lenin.

Another excellence is the aptness and in­terest of its quotations. It is a delight to find a history studded with such embellishments as Chancellor’s 17th century observations on the idolatry shown in Russian icons, Bis­marck’s maxim that “no one will ever be rich enough to buy his enemies by concessions,” or the New York Times’s comparison of Litvinov to litmus paper, since he flourishes with red when the Soviet government is in its alkaline mood but tends to disappear when it is acid. It is also salted with equally apt Russian proverbs, such as “Who wishes to catch the bird must first sing sweetly,” or “Close is the elbow, but you cannot bite it.”

There is hardly a dull page in the entire book, and it is profitable reading in many ways. Several little-known and obscure episodes are briefly discussed, such as the rise of the Mongolian problem, the disorders in the Russian navy in the earliest days of World War I, the incorporation of the Turk­men and Uzbek republics into the USSR, or the fate of the Crimean Tartars and the Chechen-Ingush, who collaborated with Ger­many in the last war. There is, moreover, an intriguing chronological table which is unique in listing many events which have seldom if ever been described in English publications. The endless complexities in­volved in the emancipation of the serfs are well set forth, and the account of the growth of industry under the Tsars contains infor­mation which is not readily available else­where.

Before Pearl Harbor, while the United States was still a non-belligerent, certain American newspapers took pride in what they considered their lack of bias by giving equal prominence to British and to German claims and communiques, although it was obvious at the time that the German govern­ment was less sincere in its statements than its opponent. In general, Dr. Mazour’s book is good history, but his effort to be unbiased is reminiscent of that part of the American press before Pearl Harbor. The author seems under the common illusion that the USSR is just another Great Power, and he does not pay as much attention as he might to the full implications of the identity of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet State. If he had ex­amined the consistencies and commitments of the Party as closely as he has those of Russia as a Great Power, and compared them with what he knows of the objectives and intentions of the United States, it is highly probable that he would be less inclined to­wards the attitude of “a plague on both your houses,” and would give less emphasis to the possible contributions of the West to Rus­sian fears and suspicions.

In spite of its length, this is a very con­densed and concentrated book. Space con­siderations alone must have eliminated much, but there are many omissions that seem important and disproportionate. Do not look to this book for any account of the issues that marked the rise of Lenin and the pre-revolutionary history of the Party, and which have stamped the Party ever since, or of Lenin’s distrust of Stalin, Stalin’s vow on Lenin’s death to remain faithful to the Third Internationale (known to every Soviet citi­zen today), the fate of Meyerhold, the Ca­nadian spy case, the coup in Czechoslovakia, the obligations of Party members with ref­erence to religion, the status of the “free Port” of Dairen and of Russian lend-lease, or the lessons which the Party, itself derives from its own history and which it drills into the Russian people today.

This book contains a good list of selected supplementary reading, but an inadequate index and too many slips in proofreading for its comparatively high price. Nevertheless, it is well worth its nine dollars to all who would take pleasure in knowing more than they do about Russia.

POLICY FOR THE WEST, by Barbara Ward. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York. 1951. 317 pages. §3.75.

Reviewed by Col. George C.

Reinhardt, U.S.A.

Miss Ward submits the clear, sound analy­sis to be expected of the author of the pioneering West at Bay (published in 1948). The bulk of her latest Volume is divided into three studies: Containment, Strength, and Unity. Quite accurately, her solution, Faith, is stated in a mere 13 pages. A policy so simply named, and defined, requires more detailed blueprinting than Miss West offers, however convincingly. It is too reminiscent of the hopeful, but scarcely practical, sug­gestions of her military countrymen who yearn for a return to “gentlemanly warfare.” Yet for all its lack of specific blueprints, Policy For The West does contain some ad­mirable sketches of a sturdy edifice. If de­tailed plans are regrettably missing who has submitted any a lay public can comprehend? Unquestionably, in the sections on Strength, calling for an active offensive on the ideologi­cal front both at home and abroad; on Unity, which assesses current “experiments” and urges a “balanced combination” of economic and military unification; Miss Ward has given the reader superb directions for finding his way through the wilderness at least as far as the site of the desired edifice.

Particularly noteworthy in today’s pleth­ora of muddled anti-communist literature is the author’s opening section; examining the “fact of soviet hostility”; its causes and challenge to the Free World. Few writers have stated the case as succinctly and calmly.

To the many readers who admire Miss Ward’s intellectual capacity as well as to all who yearn for a deeper entente between the two great English speaking nations, that dis­cussion is immensely encouraging. Gone is the intimation that Soviet hostility may be due in part, at least, to American selfishness; that wiser statesmanship and greater fore- bearance in the United States could have re­duced Russian enmity. Miss Ward evinces as ardent a conviction of the essential justice of the Western position as of the inevitability of Kremlin hatred toward every supporter of the free world.

Like her earlier work, Policy for the West reflects Miss Ward’s primary interest, eco­nomics. As strongly pro-Keynesian as ever, her indirect advocacy of British Labor poli­cies has been toned down, perhaps influenced by three years’ experience. Where she for­merly reproached this country for opposing nationalization of German industry and sup­ported European cartels (“Western Europe Steel cartel would still be smaller than U. S. Steel Corp.”) the sounder approach of the Schuman Plan, abhorrent though it is to British labor, may account for the change.

As ever, and rightly, Miss Ward avers, “the pivot of Atlantic Defense is the econ­omy of the United States.” As a disciple of Keynes she reminds us “a growing national debt over the last 100 years has been virtu­ally no obstacle to a steady increase in wealth and productivity of either Britain or the U.S.A.” Her budget for this country is “15­20% of its income to containment,” one-fifth for foreign aid, the balance for defense. “Other partners of the Western coalition should attempt the same percentage.”

Optimistically Miss Ward statistizes: the annual increase in productivity in America is 5%. If we can double that, a modest goal compared to war years, we can support the cost of containment “indefinitely.”

Recognizing, but not frightened by, the dangers of inflation she finds “the moral qualities of a people the best weapon against inflation” and, unpopularly no doubt, urges ts cuin “less necessary expenditures,” in­cluding even some socialistic pets, to main­tain defense spending.