At about the midpoint of the Navy Yard overhaul of the U.S.S. Princeton in December, 1951, I made a survey of the deck watch experience and qualifications of the officers available for standing watches underway. Realizing, in a general way, that detachments had cut us down, I became much concerned when the survey showed only one officer remaining on board who was fully qualified to handle the ship in fast carrier task force maneuvers. I didn’t know then that he would be detached just as we began our most intensive operations. Two other officers remained who had served as J.O.O.D.’s, and we had an ex-watch stander from C.I.C. who looked like a good possibility. It was hard to believe that in this large Essex-class carrier, with considerably over a hundred officers in the regularly assigned complement, that only four officers of the proper rank would be even remotely qualified to stand deck watches underway. I next turned to the more senior officers. The “Exec.” had qualified aboard the New York as an Ensign, some help here; the Operations Officer had started his naval career as an aviation cadet and had specialized in large seaplanes, no previous shipboard experience, but an ambitious and an excellent officer; the Navigator had started his naval career as an ensign on a battleship and then went to Pensacola, specializing in large aircraft—and so it went.
We were suffering from the necessarily narrow officer specialization inherent in wartime training and expansion, with the resultant lack of opportunity for, or emphasis on, watch standing qualifications for all line officers. The great majority of our officers were ex-reserves who had been selected for and accepted commissions after the war. For the most part too, they were ambitious, the Navy was their career, and they appreciated the necessity of broadening the horizon of their naval experience.
Basically, the Navy is ships—and a great many of our officers knew little of ships— particularly the aviators and the aviation specialists. That was why, of course, many of them had been ordered to the ship, to gain experience and to qualify for command. But the problem still remained, how were O.O.D.’s to be qualified quickly? What senior officers were qualified to stand a supervisory watch on the bridge when one was needed?
The answer was obvious of course—training. But did we have enough material with which to work? Was there enough time? It would have to be a sort of a “boot-strap” operation in any case. The Navigator gave lectures; supervised reading courses were selected and pursued with diligence; we took full advantage of the Fleet Training Command facilities at San Diego, but there was still a wide gap between theoretical training and experience. To make matters worse, our one fully qualified and experienced watch stander received his orders to shore duty and was soon to be followed by the next two in order of experience. The picture wasn’t all bad, however; first, our officers were eager to learn. Underway Training, carried out and supervised by an excellent team, was very effective even though our period of training was cut in half. The Operational Readiness Inspection and Battle Problem conducted by Commander Fleet Air Hawaii at Pearl Harbor on our way to the Western Pacific added to our experience. Also, a number of the officers assigned deck duties had shown up well in emergencies; and believe me, we had plenty of emergencies.
One of these officers, a two-striper who had reported from the Naval Air Training Command, was particularly thorough and capable; he also had a flare for instructing others. During our Navy Yard period, he had drawn up and supervised an Instrument Flying Training course for the ship’s Naval Aviators which had been very successful and had resulted in instrument flying qualifications for every naval aviator attached to the ship. Here was an idea—why not pattern an Officer-of-the-Deck training after the aviator’s instrument training program? It would include a study course on applicable registered publications, current fleet orders, regulations, and applicable fleet and force instructions combined with lectures by qualified officers, familiarization tours and practical demonstrations of equipment and machinery, and, most important of all, watch standing. The program would not be limited either to those officers who conceivably would stand bridge watches. Our commanders and lieutenant commanders, many of whom had never stood a bridge watch in their lives, would be included.
By the time our ship had joined the Fast Carrier Task Force in the Sea of Japan, and after one “tour on the line” had been completed, the “specialists” had become fairly proficient in their individual jobs and had some extra time available for additional study and training. Here was the ideal setup to get that O.O.D. Training Program rolling: long periods at sea, continual maneuvering underway, replenishment operations at sea every few days, and no shore side distractions—we would be at sea a month at a time.
Our instructor designed his Deck Watch Officers Training course under the following general headings:
a. Study program of all applicable publications, regulations, and fleet letters, to be prosecuted concurrently with lectures and practical work.
b. Maneuvering Board.
c. Communications, with emphasis on use of tactical circuits.
d. Radar—capabilities and application.
e. Engineering Plant—capabilities and limitations.
f. Familiarization tours and instruction on the navigation bridge.
g. Emergency Bills.
h. Steering gear—including a complete tour of the system and practical instruction at the helm.
i. Air Operations as related to the O.O.D’s duties.
j. Replenishment Operations at sea.
k. Responsibilities and relationship among C.O., X.O., Conning Officer, O.O.D., Navigator, etc.
l. Writing the log.
m. Administration of the watch and ship’s routine.
The response to the training program was most gratifying; stimulating professional discussions became the rule about the ship; “visitors” on the bridge were frequent in addition to the regularly scheduled “makey-learns” on watch; commanders and lieutenant commanders took their turn under instruction as J.O.O.D. and J.O.O.W. in addition to standing 0.0.D. watches. The opportunity to maneuver the ship on replenishment day and in maintaining station alongside the replenishment ships was greatly prized, and there were always many critical observers. It was not unusual to find the Chief Quartermaster patiently instructing a three-striper aviator at the helm. The Navigator and his assistant were carrying out frequently conducted tours of the bridge and installed equipment—a sort of “cockpit” check out. Moreover the enlisted personnel assigned ship-control duties about the ship viewed their watchstanding jobs through new eyes—their assigned duties were important, and their performance was being noted. The standard of watch standing improved noticeably throughout the ship, and at all levels a general atmosphere of confidence and smartness developed.
We gradually drew ahead of the Bureau of Naval Personnel’s detaching orders and developed a back log of qualified watch standers who could be “put on ice” and rotated into other departments and watchstanding duties. The designation “Qualified as 0.0.D. underway on a CV-9 class carrier” became a prized and sought-after reward.