(Editor’s Note: This article was condensed by the translator from a chapter in the author’s book Deutsche Schicksalsjalire recently published by Brockhaus in Germany.)
The German High Command did not embark on the Norwegian campaign in order to improve the military position of Germany by aggressive action, but rather it sought to forestall an occupation of Norway by the enemy. It was in fact nip and tuck as to who would get there first, as subsequent developments revealed. Until the publication of Winston Churchill’s memoirs, very few were even aware that there had been a “race for Norway.” That both opponents did indeed seek to occupy one and the same objective at about the same time, yes, even at almost the same hour, gives this operation a particularly interesting character.
The Norwegian question was broached to Adolf Hitler for the first time on October 10, 1939, by the Commander-in-Chief Navy, Grand Admiral Raeder. According to the War Diary of the Naval Staff and personal notes which the Grand Admiral made available to the author in January, 1944, the former emphasized the great danger for the military position of Germany in the event of an occupation of Norway by Great Britain, as the result of various intelligence indicating British designs on Norway. Secondly, Raeder called attention to the advantages which would accrue for Germany’s own conduct of the war as a result of gaining Norwegian bases. Hitler approved a deliberation of the Norwegian question: there was as yet no mention of a German action against Norway.
Subsequently, further intelligence indicated that the British were considering plans to lay hands on Norway and that there were detailed and carefully disguised preparations being made. The thoughts of the Naval Staff now concentrated on the threatening effects for Germany’s own conduct of the war, especially in the Baltic Sea area, which would ensue as a result of such a move on the part of Great Britain. The Commander-in-Chief Navy was of the opinion that the loss of Norway to the British, which would also bring Sweden completely under the enemy influence, was synonymous with the loss of the war, particularly since the German war economy was dependent upon the supply of Swedish ore. The Fuehrer held the same view, terming the resulting situation as “untenable,” and agreed with the Commander-in-Chief Navy that such an eventuality must be anticipated by all means.
Moreover, the question whether and how long Great Britain would respect the territorial waters of Norway—even without undertaking an occupation of Norway—was of first importance. How long would they permit the vital and extensive ore transport which moved constantly from Narvik within the protection of such waters to German ports? The Naval Staff took the stand in this regard that such transport was more secure, as long as Great Britain respected Norwegian sovereignty, than it would be if the extensive Norwegian coast line became a war area after a possible German occupation of Norway and the German Wehrmacht then had to assume the protection of such traffic.
The Naval Staff concluded from these considerations that it was preferable to let the Norwegian question rest until the danger of a British occupation should become acute, or until the British should appear unwilling to respect Norwegian territorial waters. It was considered out of the question that Norway could successfully contest with her own force any British occupation of whatever nature. Moreover, in view of the strong sympathy in Norway for England, it appeared doubtful whether the Norwegians would have the will to resist.
The situation was aggravated by the Russian-Finnish war. The danger appeared very great indeed that the British might get a foothold in Norway as a result of a request on the part of Finland for assistance. On the other hand, the contact with the former Minister of War of Norway, Quisling, which had been begun in December, 1939, offered some prospect that Norway might be secured by peaceful means against an occupation by Great Britain. Under these circumstances, the Fuehrer approved of the proposal of Commander-in-Chief Navy on December 12 that plans should be made with Quisling for the occupation of Norway by “(a) peaceful means—i.e. the German Wehrmacht* would l>e called in by Norway—-or (b) force.”1 Thereupon the Armed Forces High Command undertook the preparation of “Study North” by a working staff composed of representatives of the three services. “Study North” later received the code name “Weseruebung.” The participation of the German Wehrmacht would be necessary in any case if Norway were drawn into the German sphere of power, since it was not at all likely that Great Britain would take such action lying down and since Norway was not able to parry the expected British counterblow with her own force.
The Commander-in-Chief Navy was quite aware that the occupation of Norway by Germany would be accompanied with extremely great risk for the Navy in view of the heavy superiority of British sea power. Consequently, he too continued to hold that the maintenance of Norway’s neutrality was the best solution. However, he emphasized to Hitler once again on December 30, 1939, that under no circumstances must Norway fall into British hands. There was also the danger that British volunteers might accomplish a “cold” occupation of Norway in a disguised form. Serious resistance was not to be expected in Norway, probably also not in Sweden.2
At the beginning of January the foreign press generally confirmed that active British assistance for Finland was impending: strong British support was necessary, since a defeat of Finland would be dangerous for the Western Powers and Northern Norway must on no account fall into Russian-German hands.
Even though the Commander-in-Chief, Navy, and his officers in the Naval Staff were in entire agreement that the best solution would be the maintenance of the status quo, nevertheless at that time—i.e. in January, 1940—their mutual views as to the probability and the dangers of British intervention in Norway were not in complete accord. The following extract is taken from the War Diary of the Naval Staff of January 13: “The Chief, Naval Staff,3 is still firmly convinced that Great Britain intends to occupy Norway in the near future in order to cut off completely all exports from the Norwegian-Swedish area to Germany, and to paralyze German warfare on the high seas and in the North Sea; in so doing she will be able to count on Norway’s tacit consent or at least that of the Government and large parts of the population because of the Norwegians’ anti-German attitude. This opinion is confirmed by special intelligence, which has reached the Chief, Naval Staff. . . .
“In partial disagreement with the opinion of the Chief, Naval Staff, the Operations Division of Naval Staff does not believe that an early occupation of Norway by Great Britain is probable. Apart from the fact that it is in any case doubtful whether Great Britain is at present capable of mounting the necessary force, the Operations Division, Naval Staff, is of the opinion that such an operation would involve very great risk and prodigious difficulties for Great Britain. The occupation of Norway would bring Great Britain into strong and extremely undesirable opposition to Russia; furthermore, it would immediately call forth powerful counter-measures on the part of Germany. The establishment of British forces in Norwegian bases would directly result in the immediate extension of German operational bases to Denmark and, if necessary, to Sweden; German naval and air forces would thus constitute a highly effective threat to any British activities in the south Norwegian area.
“Any British military pressure exerted on Sweden through Norway could be rendered ineffective by immediate German action against Sweden, since German warfare could achieve substantially greater effect, and much more quickly, than would be the case with British operations undertaken from the Norwegian area.
“In the opinion of the Operations Division, Naval Staff, it is very improbable that Great Britain could release such strong forces at home as would be necessary for the occupation of Norway, in order to counter effectively the strong threat by Germany. . .
We will revert to this very significant strategic estimate of the Naval Staff later on.
On February 16 the Naval Staff was alarmed by the British surprise attack on the German tanker Altmark in Joessing Fjord. Even though the ship was under the protection of Norwegian torpedo-boats, the British destroyer Cossack went alongside and forced her to hand over some 300 prisoners. This case was a clear warning that henceforth Norwegian territorial waters would not afford sure protection for German shipping. On the other hand, the weak attitude which the Norwegian government showed relative to the violation of her sovereignty by Great Britain indicated that Norway would also do no more than enter a formal protest in the event of a German action.
No decision to execute the planned undertaking was made at the conference of Adolf Hitler with the Commander-in-Chief Navy on February 20. During the first days of March signs pointed increasingly to an imminent British action against Norway. Intelligence recently reported from the latter country that the government had indeed the will to defend its neutrality with all the means at its disposal but that a defense against British military measures by Norway was practically impossible. The armed forces were said to have received orders not to fire on superior forces without permission. Under certain circumstances the Western Powers might be accorded the right of passage by reason of Article XVI of the League of Nations covenant.
It is clearly apparent from the War Diary that concern for the imminent danger now also gained the upper hand in the Operations Division of the Naval Staff over the cool reserve with which it had formerly contemplated the Norwegian question. The same attitude prevailed in the Armed Forces High Command. Any further reserve was dispelled on March 4 when the Fuehrer sent out an urgent order, transmitted verbally to the Naval Staff, to make all preparations for “Weseruebung” with such great dispatch that subsequent to March 10 the Fuehrer could direct the execution of the operation on four days’ notice. Intelligence pointed increasingly to an impending supporting operation of the Western Powers for Finland, invoking the above-mentioned rite of passage. The British radio announced that the Western Powers were determined to give Finland all assistance, if the latter should request them to do so.
Meanwhile peace negotiations between Finland and Russia had gotten under way. It was indicated in a declaration of the Finnish Foreign Minister that, if the Russian demands should be too high, the Finnish government would request the immediate assistance of the Western Powers. The Finns had been definitely assured of this assistance regardless of the fact that it would necessarily extend the theater of war to the northern area. This was confirmed on March 10 by the official declaration of the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain.
The Russian-Finnish treaty of peace of March 12 temporarily eased the situation. If Great Britain should now take action notwithstanding, then it could not be in the guise of support for Finland. Under these circumstances, the Naval Staff believed for the moment that intervention of the British was no longer imminent. It assumed that the British government would await a more favorable time.
However, the situation was not relieved for very long. The Naval Staff gained the definite impression from all the intelligence, which it had latterly received from the most varied sources, that the Western Powers were determined to lay hands on Norway under all circumstances, secondly also on Sweden, for which purpose support for Finland would have been a welcome pretext. This was confirmed by further reliable information which advised that the Western Powers had done all possible to prevent the signing of the peace so that they would not be robbed of this pretext. However, the Naval Staff had no doubt that Great Britain would act even without it if she considered that the time therefore was ripe. This same view prevailed in Fuehrer headquarters.
Subsequently, the Naval Staff was disturbed by the numerous cases in which German merchant ships had been molested within Norwegian territorial waters by British naval and air forces. The Norwegian government endeavored to oppose the British encroachments. As a result of earnest German representations, it made very sharp protest in London on March 23 and directed its forces to open fire on any foreign warship or airplane which should again be guilty of such conduct contrary to international law.
The Commander-in-Chief Navy addressed the Fuehrer in this vein on March 26. Even though he explained that in his opinion the danger of a British landing in Norway was not acute at the moment, nevertheless, Germany was faced with the problem of executing “Weseruebung” sooner or later. He took the stand that it should be done soon— if possible, utilizing the new moon period (new moon, April 7). As a result of the presentation of Commander-in-Chief Navy, Adolf Hitler directed on the same day that the operation be accomplished. D-day was not yet set; on April 2 it was ordered for April 9 with the time for landing (Weserzeil) at 5:15 a.m.
The fears of the Naval Staff that strong British measures were about to be taken to interrupt German merchant shipping in Norwegian territorial waters were further substantiated by a report from Oslo that the Norwegian Naval Staff was of the opinion the British government would take all measures which it considered necessary in the near future to officially “take over itself the protection of Norwegian territorial waters.” It was said that the Norwegian government did not yet know what course it should take relative to such action. Semi-official press statements from London did not dispute the fact that Great Britain intended to interrupt German merchant shipping in Norwegian waters. However, this would not be accomplished with force but by means of political pressure on Norway. This served to strengthen the view of the Naval Staff that “in reality just such a British action against Scandinavia is imminent. . . . ‘Weseruebung’ is beginning to develop into a race between Great Britain and Germany!”4
With regard to the date set for Germany’s own operation (April 9), the Naval Staff noted in its Diary of April 6: “Our estimate of the enemy’s intentions is that he is just about to take action in Norwegian waters or on Norwegian territory. . . . The Naval Staff is of the opinion that greatest haste is necessary for the execution of ‘Weseruebung.’ April 9 appears to be the latest date. It would be desirable to advance this date, but that is no longer possible.”—Two days later events substantiated the German Naval Staff’s estimate of the enemy situation of April 6.
On April 8 the British government surprised public opinion with the declaration that British mines had been laid during the past night in three places in Norwegian territorial waters, at Stadtlandet, at Bud and in Vest Fjord,* 6 in order to prevent “ships carrying contraband from making use of the protection of neutral waters.” The political effect of the British minelaying was adjudged favorably by the Germans. It was expected that the impending German action would appear justified to neutral countries after this act of the opponent contrary to international law. However, in a military respect, the situation appeared to have become considerably more difficult; it now seemed quite certain that in executing our own operation, action would ensue with enemy naval forces standing near the mine fields.
II
The British mine-laying was the second flagrant violation of international law, after the surprise attack on Altmark, which the British had permitted themselves in Norwegian territorial waters. Were these isolated actions or were they links in the chain of further designs which the British government had in mind relative to Norway?
When the German High Command decided to undertake the Norwegian operations, it knew only that which has been presented above. However, in the course of the campaign, and a little later on after the occupation of Paris in June, 1940, it obtained some very revealing records and other documents, which added up to give the following picture.
On the basis of plans which had been prepared in the Allied military discussions of January 31, and February 1, 1940, the Allied Supreme Council in its session of February 5 in Paris had determined to prepare French-British forces in Great Britain for transport to Norway. On February 6 the British Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, informed the Norwegian Ambassador in London that England wished to have certain bases on the Norwegian coast “in order to interrupt the German ore transport from Narvik.” However, in actual fact, the British intentions went beyond this objective. Acting under British influence, the majority of the Supreme Council had expressed the opinion in the above-mentioned session that Operation Scandinavia should also be extended to the Swedish ore mines of Gael- livare. In this conference the view was also accepted that the action should not be dependent on an appeal by Finland for aid, but, independently thereof, it should be executed as a surprise operation in order “to save Finland or at least to seize the Swedish ore and the northern ports.”6 The operation was to be conducted under British command. In mid-February British and French General Staff officers inspected landing places with the consent of Norwegian authorities. The preparation of the British-French expeditionary troops was completed by the beginning of March.
The final decision to undertake the landing operation and to establish bases in Norway was made on March 28. The fact that peace had meanwhile been concluded between Russia and Finland on March 12 had no effect on this decision. The departure date of the first transports was set for April 5.
It was of decisive significance for the course of events in Norway that this date was postponed at the last minute. On April 5 the British High Command informed the Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy, that the first British convoy could not sail before April 8, evidently because the British transport preparations had not yet been completed.
In The Gathering Storm, Churchill substantiated the picture gleaned from the captured documents. He wrote that it had been decided, in the Paris session of the Supreme Council of February 5, to land, in conjunction with the aid-to-Finland project, “in Narvik and/or other Norwegian ports.” It was their intention, as he said, to “kill two birds with one stone (i.e., help Finland and cut off the iron ore).” The agreement, and if possible the “cooperation,” of Norway and Sweden was to be obtained. Then followed this rather remarkable sentence: “The issue of what to do if Norway and Sweden refused, as seemed probable, was never faced.”— That this was not a matter of concern can only mean that they were sure that either the Scandinavian States would cause them no difficulty despite formal protest of the action, or that they were determined right from the start to break any possible resistance with force. Since the troops detailed for the expedition were equipped for only an “unopposed landing,” the first named alternative was probably the appropriate one.
According to Churchill, the British Cabinet decided on March 12 “to revive the plans for military landings at Narvik and Trondheim, to be followed at Stavanger and Bergen. . . .” The date of execution was set for March 20, but on the same day (March 12) the Russian-Finnish peace was concluded. Thereupon the execution was postponed.
On March 28 the new French Prime Minister Reynaud attended the session of the Supreme War Council in London, in which it was decided to lay mines in Norwegian territorial waters on April 5. However, on April 3 the British Cabinet postponed the operation to April 8.7 Churchill wrote in this connection: “As our mining of Norwegian waters might provoke a German retort, it was also agreed that a British brigade and a French contingent should be sent to Narvik to clear the port and to advance to the Swedish frontier. Other forces should be dispatched to Stavanger, Bergen, and Trondheim, in order to deny these bases to the enemy.”
According to another British source, the troops were not to land until the Germans had violated Norwegian sovereignty or “if it seemed certain that they intended to do so." The similarity to the German attitude is noteworthy.
Meanwhile, on April 3 the British War Cabinet had received certain intelligence that strong German military forces had been concentrated in Mecklenburg and that over 200,000 tons of shipping had been collected in Stettin and Swinemuende. They concluded therefrom that Germany had taken these measures “to deliver a counterstroke against a possible attack by us upon Narvik or other Norwegian ports.”
As a matter of fact, the British High Command had lost the “race for Norway” when it postponed the date of execution from April 5 to the 8th. German naval forces were then underway for all those places which the Allies had selected for their landings.
III
The German-Norwegian operation embraced two independent phases: (a) the surprise assault and occupation, and (b) the supply of troop and material reinforcements to extend the positions gained.
The following landing places were selected for the blitz occupation: Oslo, Arendal, Kristiansand, Egersund, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik. The landings had to be accomplished simultaneously at all places and if possible by surprise. The Germans did not reckon with a unified and determined resistance by the Norwegians—-on the condition, to be sure, that the moment of surprise would be utilized by bringing full weight to bear on the day of occupation. Thus the approach was to be made in the fjords during the night, the landings at morning twilight. It was decided that the necessary troop formations were to be transported in warships or—within the range and capacity of the Air Force—by airplanes. In view of British naval supremacy, the landing units had to be transported by the fastest and surest means and, in order to ensure that the landings were made simultaneously, they had to arrive exactly on time. In the event that the Norwegians should offer resistance, the support of the warships was required not only for the entrance into the fjords but also at the landing of the troops. However, since the loading capacity of the warships was very limited, the heavy weapons, equipment, and ammunition had to be loaded in transports scheduled to arrive simultaneously at the ports of destination. Since the steamers were slower than the warships, it was necessary to sail them ahead of the latter. They had to be disguised as peaceful merchantmen, and if need be they were to be scuttled in time so that the real purpose would not be revealed prematurely in case of Norwegian control measures or British interception.
In Grand Admiral Raeder’s presentation to Hitler on March 9, he emphasized once again the great risk which the Navy had to accept in this action in view of British naval superiority. “Nevertheless, given complete surprise, I believe that our troops can and will be successfully transported to Norway," he continued. “On many occasions in the history of war those very operations have been successful which went against all the rules of warfare, provided they were carried out by surprise.” The Grand Admiral considered that the most difficult part of the operation for the ships would be the return voyage which would entail breaking through the alerted British naval forces. This had to be accomplished as quickly as possible and with all available support by the Air Force, particularly for the ships dispatched to the distant northern ports. This requirement ran counter to the interest of the Army, since the landed troops naturally laid great store in holding as long as possible the effective support which the warships offered. Hitler determined that the troops at Narvik would have to do without the continued support of naval forces, while two torpedo- boats were to remain at Trondheim.
Adolf Hitler decided that Denmark should also be drawn into the German sphere of power in order to safeguard the lines of supply. This was essentially a task for the Army; its first move in this connection was the occupation of Jutland. Copenhagen, the important bridge over the Little Belt at Mid- delfart, and the ferry facilities between Korsor and Nyborg were to be taken by naval operations. The Air Force was to seize the landing fields.
In the interest of the whole operation, plans were made for a simultaneous advance of the two battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau into the Arctic Ocean and the disposition of 28 U-boats along the Norwegian coast and in the area of the Shetland and Orkney Islands.
The Navy had organized the following task groups for the landing:
(a) Group 1. (Narvik); battleships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and 10 destroyers, the latter with 2000 landing troops.
(b) Group 2. (Trondheim); cruiser II ip per and 4 destroyers with 1700 landing troops.
(c) Group 3. (Bergen); cruisers Koeln, Koenigs- berg, Bremse, 2 torpedoboats and Torpedo Motorboat Flotilla I, with 1900 landing troops.
(d) Group 4. (Kristiansand); cruiser Karlsruhe, 3 torpedoboats and Torpedo Motorboat Flotilla II with 1100 landing troops.
(e) Group 5. (Oslo); cruisers Bluccher, Luelzoiv, Emden, and 3 torpedoboats with 2000 landing troops.
(f) Group 6. (Egersund); 4 minesweepers with ISO landing troops.
In addition there were Groups 7 to 9: battleship Schleswig-Holstein with a number of auxiliary ships and craft carrying a total of 3,400 landing troops for the tasks in Denmark. The occupation of Denmark was accomplished without friction and without resistance, apart from minor incidents, and led to a peaceful understanding with the Danish government.
All preparations for the extremely daring operation had to be most carefully disguised since the factor of surprise was considered of decisive importance. This was relatively easy for the warship groups but very much more difficult in the assemblage and outfitting of the transport groups composed of merchant ships and in the loading of the mass of army troops and their equipment.
The following were prepared for these tasks:
(a) The so-called “Transport Group,” comprising 7 steamers of 48,692 tons from Hamburg for Narvik, Trondheim and Stavanger.
(b) 3 “Naval Transport Squadrons,” with a total of 38 steamers of 198,999 tons.
The steamers of the “Transport Group” carried the weapons, equipment, etc., for ' the landing troops embarked in the warships- They were to steam disguised as ordinary merchant ships and were to arrive in the ports of occupation even before the warships- A foolish myth—unfortunately also repeated by Churchill in his memoirs—has it that the Germans had secretly sent arms and supplies to Narvik, hidden in ore ships even before the occupation. There is not a word of truth in this story.
The arrival date for Naval Transport Squadron I, whose ports of destination were Copenhagen, Oslo, Kristiansand, Stavanger, and Bergen, was the landing day (April 9), for Naval Transport Squadrons II and III, destined for Oslo, the 2nd and 6th days respectively after the landing. About 18,000 men and their equipment were embarked in these three squadrons. A further reinforcement of about 40,000 men was to be transported later on in a shuttle service with the steamers of Squadrons II and III.
Since the naval forces assigned to Narvik and Trondheim would have to refuel there in order to make a fast turnaround, the Naval Staff dispatched the tankers Kattegat and Skagerrak from Wilhelmshaven to Narvik and Trondheim respectively and the tanker Jan Wellern from Base North8 * to Narvik. The Armed Forces High Command had issued strict orders to all participating ships that they must not depart from the staging bases earlier than 6 days before the time of landing. This restriction was also effective for the above-mentioned naval tankers. It will be seen later on that this order allowed the steamers too little time for the voyage and had serious consequences.
Since the Norwegian undertaking was the first combined operation of all three services, for which there were available no lessons of the past, the Armed Forces High Command made very careful preparations for the command organization. General von Falken- horst was designated as the “Chief of the Working and Operations Staff ‘Weseruebung’”; simultaneously he was designated to be later the Commander-in-Chief Army, Norway. Air Force General Geisler with his reinforced Air Corps X was assigned to the command of the air arm. “Corps Area Command XXXII,” under Air Force General Kaupisch, was formed for the occupation of Denmark.
The Navy was assigned command afloat for the duration of the operation. The Naval Staff assigned the Naval Group Command East, Admiral Carls, to the command of the operation in the Baltic Sea area, inclusive of the Kattegat and Skagerrak, and the Naval Group Command West, Admiral Saal- waechter, to the command in the North Sea.
The conduct of the landing and the command ashore at the individual landing places was to be assumed by the senior army officer. The command of the air transport was in the hands of the Air Force until the execution of the landing. A local “Armed Forces Commander”—Army or Navy—was to be appointed after the landing at the individual places. The Commander-in-Chief Army, Norway, General von Falkenhorst, was assigned over-all command as “Armed Forces Commander, Norway,” for the further course of the Norwegian campaign.
Shortly before midnight, April 6, Groups 1 and 2 (Narvik, Trondheim) under the command of the Deputy Fleet Commander,9 Vice Admiral Luetjens, left their North Sea ports immediately after embarking their troops and joined forces outside of the river mouths at 3:00 a.m. for the joint advance to the north. Prior thereto—on April 3 and 5 respectively—the 7 steamers of the Transport Group and part of Naval Transport Squadron I had departed from their fitting- out ports, Hamburg and Stettin; the rest of the latter followed on April 7. The Ger- man-Norwegian operation had started.
At 9:48 a.m.,10 April 7, the force was first reported, even though only in part, by British air reconnaissance in 55°30' N, 6°37' E. The British plane reported one cruiser, six destroyers and eight planes. The report was also read by the Germans. At 2:25 p.m. British air reconnaissance reported a large ship, possibly Scharnhorsl class, two cruisers and ten destroyers in 56°48' N, 6°10' E. At this time the German force was unsuccessfully attacked by British Wellington bombers; 12 planes were counted. The greater part of the bombers sent out by the Royal Air Force evidently did not make contact. Subsequent to noon visibility conditions had become worse, which was very welcome to the Germans. To be sure, as a result of the change in weather, German air reconnaissance also had to be discontinued on about the line Stavanger-Peterhead.
The British High Command had recognized from the air reconnaissance reports that a German naval operation to the northward was in progress; they could not as yet deduce the purpose and objective of the undertaking from these reports. The Admiralty had, however, received an intelligence report from Copenhagen—evidently occasioned by the lively ship traffic to the northward in the Baltic Sea entrances in connection with the operation—that a German expedition of ten ships carrying one division of troops was underway to make a landing at Narvik. In passing on the report to the British Fleet Commander, Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, on April 7, the Admiralty had described it as “doubtful.”
The news that the German fleet was at sea caused the Admiralty to make certain important decisions. Britain’s own landing operation was abandoned, the troops then on board were disembarked, the forces which had departed to lay mines at Stadtlandet were recalled, and all measures were geared to the interception of the German force. On the evening of the 7th Admiral Forbes put to sea with the main forces of the British Home Fleet; the cruiser force departed on the following day from the Forth.
At 8:20 a.m., April 8, the first action between German and British naval forces took place north of the line Bergen-Shetland Islands. The sea had meanwhile become quite heavy; the destroyers steaming at high speed were pounding hard and the soldiers embarked in them found it particularly unpleasant. The British destroyer Glowworm, which had lost contact with her force—the battlecruiser Renown—ran into the destroyer Bernd V. Arnim of the German screen. The German cruiser Hipper presently took a hand in the destroyer action which had ensued and sank Glowworm with gunfire; 38 survivors were rescued despite the heavy sea. About noon, Group 2, which had been steaming in formation with Group 1 under the command of the Fleet Commander, was released to execute its task at Trondheim.
April 8 in the North Sea was a day of incidents, which so often play a decisive role in naval warfare. Their effect for the German operation were in part unfavorable, but predominantly favorable.
At 2:20 p.m. the former Polish submarine Orzel sank the transport Rio De Janeiro of Naval Transport Squadron I, bound for Bergen, when east of Kristiansand. The results of this torpedoing were fatal. The landings of the survivors and the dead in German army uniform necessarily revealed the German intentions and warned the Norwegians, thus precluding surprise. The British news agency, Reuters, reported at 8:30 that night from Oslo: “German troop transport Rio De Janeiro with 300 men on board torpedoed near Kristiansand.”
Group 2 arrived off Trondheim Fjord in the early afternoon of the 8th. Since it was too early to enter, they maneuvered at sea on various courses. At 3:00 p.m., just as they happened to be on westerly course, they were sighted by an enemy plane and reported as one battlecruiser, two cruisers and two destroyers on course west. The intelligence that the German force was steering on course west brought serious confusion into the previously fairly-clear estimate of the situation on the part of the enemy. Admiral Whitworth, who had been given the task of guarding the Vest Fjord leading to Narvik, now decided to operate so that he would block the route of the reported opponent in case the latter should make an advance into the Arctic Ocean. He ordered his force to form a scouting line from Skomvaer to the westward for the night, and thus left the entrance to Narvik unguarded. At 9:00 p.m. the German Fleet Commander detached the ten destroyers for the assigned task at Narvik. They entered Vest Vjord without making contact with the enemy.
The operations of the British Fleet Commander were also influenced unfavorably by the plane report. When it was received he was steaming on a northeasterly course about 120 miles west of Trondheim. The report caused him to change course to 0° (north), later to 340°, which took him farther and farther away from the scene of action.
During April 8 the German attack groups assigned to the southern Norwegian harbors, whose distances were shorter than those of Group 1 and 2, also commenced their advance. Whereas stormy winds had cleared the air in the northern North Sea, it was very foggy in the south in the forenoon of the 8th, which was very favorable for the German movements since they were withdrawn from enemy observation. Group 3 destined for Bergen found itself in an extremely dangerous situation at about 5:00 p.m. A far superior British force of two modern cruisers and 15 destroyers was only 60 miles away, and between the former and its objective. But— and this was the third fortune of war, this time particularly favorable for the Germans —heavy fog had set in since early afternoon and this prevented any scouting by the enemy. The German force was able to gain the entrance of Bergen without being seen, and then, when the danger was over, the weather cleared up so that the passage into the fjord could be made without navigational difficulties.
After the detachment of the Narvik destroyers, the German Fleet Commander undertook the projected advance into the Arctic Ocean. As dawn was beginning to break on the 9th, he ran into the Renown group of Admiral Whitworth, 50 miles west of Skomvaer. A brief but spirited action ensued; Gneisenau sustained considerable damage from a hit in the foremast, while Renown suffered no major damage despite two hits. Contact was finally lost due to reduced visibility and increasing range. The Germans continued the advance into the Arctic Ocean, and then returned unmolested to Wilhelmshaven on the evening of April 12.
Meanwhile, significant events had taken place in the early morning hours of April 9 in the designated Norwegian ports.
The ten Narvik destroyers encountered no interference until near their destination; then the Norwegian armored coastal ships Eidsvold and Norge engaged them at short range until both were sunk by torpedo fire. The commander of the landing troops, Major General Dietl, took over the town without resistance from the Norwegian Colonel Sundlo. Only one tanker, Jan Wellem, arrived on schedule; the other one was engaged by a Norwegian warship and was scuttled by her own crew. Refueling of the destroyers was thus delayed and the departure had to be postponed. Moreover, none of the three steamers of the “Transport Group” reached Narvik; two were lost en route, due to enemy action, and the third had to be diverted to Bergen.
Group 2 was fired on ineffectually by a land battery while forcing Trondheim Fjord and reached its destination without further incident. The debarkation of the Trondheim troops was accomplished without resistance. The tanker and two steamers of the “Transport Group” for Trondheim were lost at sea; the other transport finally reached that port after three days’ delay on April 12. The departure of Hipper was postponed to the evening of the 10th. Two of the destroyers followed a few days later after 800 tons of oil had been scared up in the city; the remaining two destroyers stayed at Trondheim.
The Bergen Group was also fired on by Norwegian coastal batteries while entering; Koenigsberg received three hits, Bremse one. The debarkation of troops was accomplished without interference, only minor resistance being offered in the city. The ships of Naval Transport Squadron I arrived in Bergen on schedule. Koeln and the torpedoboats undertook the return voyage on the evening of the 9th as planned. Koenigsberg and Bremse, which were not fully ready for sea, were left behind as support for the troops. Shortly before leaving and while standing out, the Koeln force was attacked by British planes; no hits were scored on the ships. During the forenoon of the 10th, British planes attacked Koenigsberg at Bergen and scored two direct hits. The ship burned out and capsized.
The initial attempts of Group 4 to force the entrance to Kristiansand failed due to fire from a shore battery and intermittent fog. When the visibility had cleared at 11:00 a.m., the force advanced to the attack again, this time leading off with the torpedoboats and torpedo motorboats carrying the troops for the landing; no more shots were fired by the Norwegian batteries. The debarkation of troops was accomplished by 3:00 p.m. with only minor resistance. In the course of the afternoon three steamers of Naval Transport Squadron I arrived in port with troops and equipment. Meanwhile Arendal and the cable station Egersund were occupied, as planned, without resistance. Karlsruhe and the torpedoboats were able to depart on their return voyage at 7:00 p.m. After clearing the entrance and while steaming at 21 knots on zig-zag courses, an enemy submarine scored a torpedo hit on Karlsruhe. So much water entered the ship that the cruiser could not be salvaged. The Captain transferred the crew to the torpedo boats and then sank the cruiser. The torpedo boats with the crew of Karlsruhe reached Kiel without further incident.
In the morning of April 9 Stavanger was occupied by airborne troops as directed. During the occupation the steamer Roda of Naval Transport Squadron I was sunk in the harbor by the Norwegian torpedo boat Sleipner. Thereafter, German bombers dealt with the latter in like manner.
For the seizure of the Norwegian capital, Group 5 stood off the strongly fortified Dro-back narrows at the entrance to Oslo Fjord at 4:40 a.m. April 9. When the van ship, the heavy cruiser Bluecher, was only 550 yards away, the coastal batteries opened fire. Within a few moments the cruiser received two 11-inch and at least twenty 5.9-inch hits, which caused heavy damage. Shortly thereafter two heavy explosions rocked the ship; she had been hit by two torpedoes of the torpedo battery Kaholm. Fires within the ship touched off a magazine explosion; she capsized and sank in deep water.
Luetzow, steaming astern of Bluecher, also received three hits in the action but the fighting effectiveness of the ship was only temporarily reduced. The attempt to force the narrows was then abandoned; instead the troops were landed outside of it and the capitulation of the fortifications was accomplished in the course of the afternoon by a combined land, sea, and air attack. The German naval force entered Oslo in the forenoon of April 10.
Meanwhile the situation in the Norwegian capital had developed as follows. The first German planes appeared over the city at 8:00 a.m., April 9. The Norwegian antiaircraft batteries opened fire on them but could not prevent the seizure of the Oslo- Fornebo airfield by the Germans. At noon 6 companies of airborne troops landed here and occupied the most important points of the city. The political situation was not at all clear. Quisling attempted to form a new government with German support. However, it struck no spark of sympathy amongst the people. The former government leaders did not resign but fled into the interior. A conference of the German Ambassador with the King proved fruitless. The latter sharply rejected the suggestion that Quisling take over the government and could not be moved to give in. The German Naval Attaché in Oslo, who knew the country very well, reported11 that no German action had been expected in Oslo up to the time of the torpedoing of the steamer Rio De Janeiro. It was not until the night of April 8-9 that the pregnant decisions were made which unleashed Norwegian resistance.
Since the military situation on April 10 was not yet so well in hand that all the German naval forces which had entered Oslo could be withdrawn, only Luetzow departed for the return voyage in the afternoon of the 10th, since she had to be released for other tasks. It was not accomplished without incident. When the cruiser was northeast of Skagen in the night of 10-11, she received a torpedo hit in the after-body at 1:29 a.m. from the British submarine Spearfish; it put propellers and rudder out of commission and much water entered the ship. It was only with difficulty that the unmaneuverable ship could be kept afloat and that tugs could bring her into Kiel in the evening of the 13th.
While these events were taking place on April 9 in the landing ports, the British naval forces off the Norwegian west coast were attacked by the German Air Force. German Air Squadrons 26 and 30 with Ju 88 and He 111 were employed in these attacks. Even though the deterrent effect which the German Air Force exercised on the British fleet was great, nevertheless the damage inflicted on this day did not fully come up to German expectations, nor did it agree with the observations made by the airplanes. The latter claimed a great number of hits on battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, and also on a troop transport. The results actually obtained were the sinking of the destroyer Gurkha, a hit on the battleship Rodney, and light damage to the cruisers Southampton and Glasgow due to near misses. The British oberved numerous other near misses but they inflicted no damage.
The further course of the campaign was largely influenced by the Allied reaction. The latter began in the early morning of April 10 with the first British attack on Narvik.
About 5:30 a.m. the Germans were taken completely by surprise when numerous heavy explosions rocked the harbor of Narvik. Five British destroyers had attacked with guns and torpedoes and scored a tactical success. It had its strategic effect too, in that it thwarted the German plan to depart homeward during the night April 10-11. What was left of the German naval force at Narvik was finished off on the 13th when the British made a renewed attack with the battleship Warspite and nine destroyers. The loss of the ten destroyers was a heavy blow for the Germans, but the addition of about 2500 men of their crews was a most welcome accretion to General Dietl’s defenses.
The Allies utilizing troops and transports earmarked for their own landing plans moved swiftly to retake Trondheim and Narvik by pincer attacks before the Germans could consolidate their position in central and northern Norway. Late in April the Trondheim forces had to be evacuated before they reached their goal, due to the threatening advance of German Army Group XXI from Oslo. On May 28 the Allies captured Narvik, but did not hold it long. Early in June the Allied troops were evacuated due to more pressing requirements for troops in the west. On June 8, General Dietl reported that Narvik was again in his hands. On the day following the Norwegian forces also ceased hostilities.
A naval action concluded the Norwegian campaign, in which the German Fleet Commander, Admiral Marschall, scored a notable victory. In an attempt to relieve the situation at Narvik, the Naval Staff had dispatched a strong German squadron, including the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, to the scene of action. The operation resulted in the sinking of the British aircraft carrier Glorious (22,500 tons), the auxiliary cruiser Orama (19,840 tons) and the tanker Oil Pioneer (5,666 tons), while Scharnhorst took a torpedo hit from a British destroyer. It proved to be a final thrust at the withdrawing foe.
V
The German armed forces can be very proud of the way in which they accomplished the Norwegian campaign—the first great combined operation of all three service branches in the history of war. The success gained was decisive and well deserved. However, the victory was gained at a price—the toll paid to British naval supremacy. The German Navy never recovered from the losses which it had suffered in this campaign.
The British-French counterblow was ill- starred from the beginning because it was undertaken with inadequate forces and underestimation of the German operational possibilities in point of numbers as well as equipment. The counterattack could have had prospects of success only if the communications with Germany had been promptly cut after the first German landings in Norway. To be sure, enemy submarines did attack the main stream of reinforcements and supplies on the waters from Germany to Oslo; they did indeed harass but could not disrupt the supply. Only large means could avail in this situation, i.e. the extension of British naval supremacy into the Skagerrak and Kattegat.
Was the Norwegian operation a real necessity from the German point of view, or is there perhaps occasion to see things in a somewhat different light as we look back over the general conduct of the war? In this connection the author requests the reader to review the War Diary entry of the Naval Staff, Operations Division, of January 13, 1940.12 Pursuing the thought of this estimate of the situation, it follows that the British would have committed a strategic mistake had they moved into Norway ahead of the Germans because they could not have held Norway for good. The Germans would have had control of the long arm of the lever since German counteraction via Denmark and southern Sweden was to be expected as a matter of course. There would have developed for the Allies an exhausting new theater of war of first order which would have been extremely difficult to supply in view of German air superiority. Moreover, had the Allies gone into Norway of their own initiative, it would have been a matter of national prestige to hold their ground there.
Unfortunately, the brilliantly conducted military campaign into Norway was a complete political failure for the Germans. The association with the former Minister of Whir Quisling proved to be a fatal error in the occupation. The choice of Terboven as the Reich Commissioner for Norway was also most unfortunate. It is little known that Adolf Hitler took leave of Reich Commissioner Terboven before the latter assumed his office in Oslo with these words: “Herr Reichskommissar, you can do me no greater favor than if you make these people our friends. ...” It would have been very difficult to find a personality less suited for this task than Herr Terboven! His ruthless and sharp pressure measures, plus the usually presumptuous and tactless procedure of the German civil administrators, nipped in the bud any small sympathy for Germany amongst the Norwegian people.
After many years of active duty, Vice Admiral Kurt Assmann was appointed Head of the Historical Section of the German Naval High Command in 1933. In addition to editing the official history of German Naval Warfare in World War I, he was lecturer on naval strategy at the German Naval Academy. His official duty gave him access to the official documents, and he had close personal contact with the Germans in high command, especially Grand Admiral Raeder.
Captain Krause, as Assistant U. S. Naval At- tach6 at Berlin, became acquainted with Vice Admiral Assmann in 1938. He served in North African, Italian, and Pacific campaigns during World War II, later had duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Munitions Board, O’Hare International Airport, Park Ridge, Illinois, and at the U. S. Naval Base, Charleston, South Carolina. Now retired, Captain Krause is currently in Europe.
1 Personal records of Grand Admiral Raeder, Vol. I.
2 Personal records of Grand Admiral Raeder, Vol. II.
3 The Commander-in-Chief Navy was also Chief of Naval Stall.
4 War Diary of Naval Staff, April 4, 1940.
5 Actually, they had been laid only in Vest Fjord.
6 Note of General Gamelin of March 10, 1940 (also Prime Minister Daladier to the French Ambassador in London, M. Corbin, of February 21, 1940).
7 The final determination of the date was made in Paris on April 5.
8 Polyarny, the base in Kola Bay which the Russians had made available to the Germans.
9 The Fleet Commander, Admiral Marschall, was ill.
10 All times are German time (Greenwich time plus one hour).
11 War Diary of the Naval Attache, Commander Schreiber.
12 See page 402.