Five years after the end of World War II hostilities finds U.S. military forces established at many overseas bases in virtually all oceans. Some of these bases are small island outposts where only military men are stationed; others are on larger land masses where service men have their dependents with them. In all cases, however, the major portion of the supplies comes from the United States. The aggregate of these supplies amounts to thousands of tons per month. The items required consist of virtually all commodities required in modern living, in addition to the strictly military supplies. In the cargo manifest of a Navy cargo transport one may find heavy construction equipment, lingerie, ammunition for cruisers, baby foods, automobiles, post exchange supplies, drugs, firearms, etc.
Prior to the fall of 1949, the Navy was in this cargo transportation business in a small way, but on August 2, 1949, the Secretary of Defense established the Military Sea Transportation Service, a unified sea transportation organization under the direction and control of the Navy Department. The purpose of this organization is stated in the basic directive as follows:
“The MSTS is established in order to provide, under one authority, control, operation, and administration of ocean transportation for personnel (including the transportation of sick and wounded), material (including petroleum products), mail and other cargoes for all agencies or departments of the National Military Establishment (excluding personnel and cargo transported by units of the fleet) and as authorized or directed for other government agencies or departments of the United States subject to established priorities.”
This means that the Navy is supervising the transportation of a great quantity of cargo. Some of this goes in commercial ships, some in chartered ships, and some in MSTS ships manned by civil service employees. A large quantity, however, is moving in commissioned Navy ships of the AKA class. It is with this latter class that this article deals primarily, although most of the factors considered obviously apply to any ship engaged in this type of operation.
Most of the material herein is based upon the author’s experience in command of an MSTS AKA for the past year. That rather than any attempt to inflate the ego, will account for the use of the first person in some instances, although there were times during which the ego was in dire need of inflation. The few instances cited of timely preventive measures being taken are not offered in the sense of boasting, but rather as enlightening examples. It is believed the author should be permitted this latitude to offset partially the impression that all lessons were learned by the mistakes which are also cited as enlightening examples.
Virtually all commanding officers taking over the MSTS AKA’s are new to the cargo transportation game. We keep our commands on the average of about 12 months. Few, if any, will be repeaters. In this lack of previous experience and in this short tour of duty, we are at a disadvantage when compared to the merchant marine skippers who keep the job for years and consequently accumulate a vast amount of first hand experience. It is suggested that we can overcome this handicap by compiling and studying the experiences of those who have gone before. It is unnecessarily expensive for each new commanding officer to learn by experience the many actions necessary to safeguard his cargo. Most of our manuals concerning combat operations have been compiled from years of accumulated experience. In what is probably the initial phase of extensive cargo transportation by Navy ships we should not delay the serious study of lessons learned by our predecessors, and of procedures successfully followed in the commercial shipping industry.
The MSTS is a large organization. With headquarters in the Navy Department it has deputy commanders based ashore at strategic points on U.S. coasts and overseas. It has port directors or appropriate representatives in many other ports. The organization utilizes thousands of employees, including civilians and service personnel. Regardless, however, of the size, scope, and complexity of this shore-based administrative organization the ultimate objective of transporting passengers and cargo from one port to another is accomplished by the ships. This brings the responsibility for the safe transportation of these passengers and the cargo directly to the shoulders of the commanding officers of the ships, and there it rests.
This responsibility is established by the following sentence in the basic directive of the Secretary of Defense:
“The responsibility of MSTS for cargo begins when the cargo is finally stowed on board and accepted by the commanding officer, and terminates when the cargo is accepted free on board ship at destination.”
Now it is obvious that, although the commanding officer’s legal responsibility does not begin until the cargo is stowed on board to his satisfaction, neither his professional nor personal popularity would be enhanced by his waiting until the cargo is loaded and then saying, “No, I won’t accept it.” While the commanding officer seldom has any voice in deciding what cargo he is to carry, he is vitally interested in its nature before loading begins. He wants to know whether it is heavy or light, inflammable, explosive, fragile, or pilferable. Such facts he will not usually know until he arrives at the loading port, but he must know them before he loads in order to protect the cargo properly while in his custody.
Because of the wide variety of cargo carried each load is a custom load, i.e., its stowage aboard ship must be designed for that particular cargo. Except for bulk cargo, such as petroleum and grain, there can be no such thing as a standard stowage plan. As the cargo accumulates for a particular ship, the port terminal authorities, together with an MSTS liaison officer if present, make up the loading plan, showing the proposed location of cargo by decks and holds. When the ship arrives a conference is held with the commanding officer, and the loading plan is submitted for his approval. In the basic directive MSTS is responsible for the approval of stowage plans and their proper implementation. The commanding officer is that approving authority. Note well, however, that the loading plans are made by port terminal authorities and the cargo is loaded aboard by stevedores. This procedure is both practical and logical, although neither of these activities is within the MSTS. This puts the commanding officer in somewhat the same position as he is relative to a pilot. The pilot may be conning the ship, but the commanding officer is not relieved of his responsibility for her safe handling. Likewise, despite any statements to the contrary, the commanding officer is responsible for the proper stowage of cargo aboard his ship. In justice to those concerned it should be stated here that terminal port authorities are, in general, capable, cooperative, and courteous. In the well established ports they have had wide experience, and their plans are usually well made. It is probable, however, that, with the expansion of MSTS, some cargo booking activities will be less experienced and thus fail to consider all pertinent factors when making up the loading plans. This is just an added reason for close study of those plans by the commanding officer.
What are the factors to be considered in the loading, stowage, and handling of cargo? Disregarding for the moment the optimum conditions for safeguarding cargo, the major factors to be considered in planning a load are stability, structural stresses, trim, and list. These are matters which affect the seakeeping qualities of the ship and must never be neglected. Proper consideration can be given to these factors only if the commanding officer knows the characteristics of his ship. Stability, of course, depends largely upon the metacentric height, which for a particular ship depends, in turn, upon the center of gravity of her load. Heavy cargo on deck or in the upper part of the holds, with light cargo in the lower holds, may reduce the metacentric height to a dangerously low point. On the other hand a very low center of gravity of a heavy load may result in a “stiff” ship with a snap to her roll and a resultant structural strain. Remember how closely the Bureau of Ships watches the addition to, or removal of, weight from combatant ships, and their effect upon the stability? In cargo ships several thousands of tons in the form of cargo are added or removed. Their effect upon the stability must be watched equally closely by the commanding officer.
A poor distribution of cargo may result in heavy structural strains even though stability is good. Longitudinal distribution of weight should be as uniform as practicable. For instance, a heavy load amidships and none on the ends, or vice versa, will set up heavy stresses, particularly in a seaway. Limitations in weight concentration in pounds per square foot of deck space are also specified for the various decks.
Trim is very important because of its effect upon the steaming and steering qualities of the ship. The loading activity that sent one ship out a foot and a half down by the head apparently disregarded the fact that marine propellers and rudders are designed to operate in water rather than air, and that their efficiency falls off rapidly when operating in the lighter medium. The AKA-55 class is designed for a four foot drag when loaded to the maximum allowed mean draft of 26 feet. It is seldom that this limiting draft is reached, but with a normal load the commanding officer cannot go far wrong if he provides for a drag of approximately 3½ feet. Most cargo ships have their engine room approximately amidships, which results in a propeller shaft almost half the length of the ship. If the drag is far different from the basic design, some trouble may be experienced with overheating of the shaft bearings, especially in warm waters or with a very heavy load.
Control of the list offers no particular problem. As the loading progresses, any list becomes readily apparent and can be corrected by appropriate cargo stowage in individual holds. It should be remembered, however, that the AKA’s have very limited facilities for correcting a list by the transfer of fuel and water.
Consideration of these factors of stability, list, and trim can not be restricted to the departure condition. Changes en route caused by fuel consumption and the discharge or addition of cargo at interim ports must also be considered. Theoretically, it is possible to calculate precisely the effect of the proposed load upon the stability and trim. Practically speaking, the commanding officer is wiser if he does not expect such perfection.
Protection of cargo against loss and damage is such a large subject that only a few points will be covered here. It is suggested that officers involved in cargo handling read some of the many excellent books upon the subject. It is reemphasized that while the commanding officer’s responsibility for the cargo begins only after the cargo is stowed on board and accepted by him, he can safely accept this responsibility only if his interest precedes the loading. All custodians of cargo must understand their legal responsibility and the exact time when that responsibility is transferred. Only in this way will the gaps in supervision be closed and the proper precautions taken. This knowledge is necessary not only to protect one’s own interests but to deliver the cargo safely to the consignee, which of course is the ultimate objective. This latter is accomplished efficiently only if adherence to one’s legal rights are tempered with understanding and cooperation with other activities.
Protection of cargo against physical loss means, primarily, protection against pilferage. Protection against damage means, primarily, proper handling and stowage. Both of these subjects are more involved than would at first appear.
Protection of cargo against pilferage is a compromise between absolute security, expeditious handling, and manpower limitations. The most vulnerable period is during loading and unloading. “But,” you say, “the commanding officer is not responsible for cargo during this period. He is responsible only during the time it is stowed on board.” Yes, that is true, but the times of stowage on board and removal from that stowage are the times when the responsibility shifts. It is theoretically possible to make this shift unequivocal by posting sentries in every cargo space during loading and unloading and checking every piece of cargo in and out. This theoretical solution is not practicable for two reasons. First, it would slow up cargo operations to an unacceptable degree; second, the manpower just isn’t available. For instance, to provide a watch-in-three on around-the-clock operations would require over half of the ship’s company. For these two reasons, then, we must accept something less than the optimum. The great majority of cargo consists of items not readily pilferable during loading or unloading. Pilferers reserve their talents for items more profitable than cement, iron pipe, heavy crates of nuts and bolts, etc. For cargo such as this the commanding officer can cooperate with the loading authorities by checking the cargo on the pier and thus not hold up operations. Most stevedoring companies are paid on a tonnage basis and naturally they object, and rightfully so, to any illogical interference with the quantity handled.
The decision as to the type of cargo to check as it moves to or from its place of stowage aboard, rather than on the pier, is one for the commanding officer to make. There is one type, however, which must be checked at its place of stowage on board, both in loading and unloading, and that is “special” or “receipted” cargo, if the commanding officer wants to avoid an inevitable dispute as to when some item of such cargo is lost. Receipted cargo is that which must be receipted for by signature each time its custody changes. It consists of such items as jewelry, liquor, firearms, narcotics, and other valuable and vulnerable items for which the hands of the thief have a particular affinity. Such cargo should be considered in the same status as a classified publication. If the time and conditions of custody transfer are not positive and clear-cut, trouble is bound to arise. For the protection of both the commanding officer and the port terminal authorities there is only one place where this transfer of custody should occur, that is as the cargo moves into its designated stowage space aboard when being loaded, and as it moves from its designated stowage space aboard when being unloaded.
There is something about shipments of cargo which, to many people, offers an overpowering temptation to that quality of human nature which desires something for nothing. Items will be taken from ocean cargo when the same thief would not think of taking them from the shelf of a store. Pilfering is limited to no particular class of people, and it is limited to no particular type of cargo, although some types of valuable cargo are more susceptible to pilferage than others. Firearms and liquor are particularly attractive. There has not yet been devised a positive solution, and I presume there never will be as long as human nature remains as it is. The first requirement is, of course, to recognize the danger as real and insidious. Then, knowing the exact times when responsibility for the cargo begins and ends, one must protect his own interests, which means protection of the cargo, and vice versa. This is best implemented by designation of a secure stowage space, by assignment of sentries, and by indoctrination of the ship’s company to be ever alert for pilferage and the tricks by which it is accomplished. A deliberately dropped and broken case of liquor can look most accidental; the lid of a box of pistols need not be pried open very far to slip some out; a small hole through a pasteboard container of gloves, socks, etc., will be hard to detect but sufficient to permit removal of the contents.
In accepting his responsibility for the protection of cargo against damage, the commanding officer should remember that his mission is to deliver the cargo in as good condition as it was received by him. For the protection of his own interests he should know the condition of the cargo as it comes aboard. Normally this can be rather easily and readily determined by his representatives who check the cargo as to quantity. Notations (exceptions) should be made of all damaged containers of crated cargo, or of damaged uncrated cargo such as automobiles, iron or soil pipes, etc. The loading authorities should be notified of these exceptions so that the record is clear as to the condition of the cargo when it is stowed on board. One may be assured that the unloading authorities will discover any damaged cargo. Unless the commanding officer notes that it was damaged when received by him, it will be rather difficult to prove that it was not damaged while in his custody.
The commanding officer must study loading plans carefully to detect an undesirable mixture of cargo, and then have his officers constantly observe the loading operations to insure that the plans are properly implemented. As an example, my cargo officer once noted that drums of cleaning fluid were being loaded in a hold with cookies, candy, etc., contrary to the loading plans. Over the strenuous objections of the loading authorities he made them unload the cleaning fluid. Sure enough, one of the containers was found to be leaking badly. Permeation of these foodstuffs by the fumes of the cleaning fluid during the ensuing voyage would not have added to their edibility.
Frequent inspections should be made to detect and prevent improper stowage procedures. The factors to be considered are so numerous that all will not be found in publications. Common sense is a good guide. Perishable items should not be stowed against the sweating skin of the ship; candy should not be stowed close to an engine room bulkhead; bags will be ruptured by sharp projections of the ship structure; heavy items should not be stowed on top of fragile cargo. On one occasion it was noted that uncrated castings with machine-beveled edges were being stowed in bulk. This is probably not covered in any book, but it was obvious that the machined edges very probably would have been damaged by the movement of the ship over a long voyage.
Most of the major shipping terminals in the United States are well organized, and
the loading authorities are very careful in the stowage of cargo and in the observance of safety precautions. At some of the overseas advanced bases the personnel involved are neither so plentiful nor so experienced. The preparation of surplus or “roll-up” material is usually done by field units who do not always use the requisite care. On one occasion a large quantity of clothing had been assembled on the pier for loading. The ship’s cargo officer inspected it and found it to be wet. The shippers were quite perturbed when the commanding officer refused to take it because of the danger of spontaneous combustion after a prospective long period of stowage in the ship’s hold. On another occasion many used vehicles were assembled for shipment back from overseas. Many of them were merely scrap. The ship’s officers were informed that they had been drained of gasoline in accordance with safety requirements. The cargo officer, rightfully stepping beyond his theoretical legal boundaries, inspected some and found a considerable amount of gasoline still in the tanks. The troops who were shipping them had a ready solution for quick removal. They began drilling holes in the bottom of the tanks so that the gasoline would drain out on the parking lot immediately adjacent to the pier. This procedure was rejected forthwith by the ship’s officers to prevent a dangerous contamination of the area, and to prevent the inevitable residual gasoline from draining out in the ship’s hold as the ship rolled. Some 700 gallons of gasoline was eventually removed from the vehicles.
There is a tendency to treat “roll-up” cargo lightly and as of little value. If not handled or stowed properly it can be just as hazardous as new equipment. Much of it is valuable even though its containers are in poor condition from long exposure to tropical elements and fall apart during handling and a long ocean voyage. Missing roll-up cargo can result in just as many explanatory letters as missing new cargo. The poor condition of many containers makes it especially vulnerable to pilferage. I speak from two personal experiences with pilferage of Marine Corps firearms from improper containers. If there is any doubt that the Marines watch their equipment closely, try losing one of their pistols or a pair of their shoes sometime.
Cargo must be stowed or secured to prevent shifting. Most crated cargo in the holds can be stowed without special lashings. Vehicles and most deck cargo must be lashed down with wire rope and turnbuckles. This securing is done by the loading authorities but should be inspected by ship’s officers before acceptance. On one occasion the ship’s officers found that about ten automobiles had been lashed down by passing bare wire rope over fenders, trunks, and other parts of the bodies. An ocean voyage with such lashings would have seriously damaged those bodies.
The ship’s cargo officer will be wise to keep a log of cargo handling operations. In it should go information as to the times the various hatches are being loaded and unloaded, the names of cargo checkers, security provided, notations of damaged cargo, and in general any data which might be of value for future reference. He should also keep on file all documents relating to the cargo carried. It is surprising how frequently letters of inquiry are received regarding cargo of past loads.
Holds containing cargo should be sounded frequently in port as well as at sea. On one occasion when my ship was loaded to its maximum draft a check valve in a submerged overboard drain line from one of the holds decided not to work. Coincidentally, the sounding watch who had last pumped out a few inches of water from the drain well had neglected to close a protecting stop valve. The result was that, during the short interval between routine soundings, enough water got into the hold to damage a sizeable quantity of cement therein. Early discovery prevented serious damage, but it still was an embarrassing report to have to make.
Existing data on the characteristics of a particular ship are not always accurate. It is suggested that appropriate ship’s officers be required to record and keep for future reference such items as the rates of handling cargo, tons per inch immersion at various drafts, the trim of the ship for various loads, etc. Theoretical calculations afford a good guide, but nothing can replace actual practical experience. Exact knowledge of items such as the above will be frequently of great assistance in planning. In some cases practical experience is the only source of information.
It is recognized that my concentration on the problems concerned may lead the reader to the false conclusion that command of an MSTS cargo ship is filled only with pitfalls and headaches. Such is far from the truth. The MSTS is a big organization, performing valuable services for all the armed forces. The sea lanes rather than the harbors are the normal habitat of the MSTS ships. In the one fiscal year of my command I steamed 50,000 miles, and touched ports on both coasts of the United States, West Indies, Panama, Japan, and several Pacific islands. All of this was independent steaming. Initiative and responsibility are very appropriately passed to the commanding officer. Interference with internal administration is kept at a minimum. The ship’s company is small for so large a ship, but that results in a hard working and contented crew. The officers are usually without previous experience in cargo handling, but they are conscientious and industrious. The time required to discharge and reload cargo normally permits sufficient opportunity for upkeep of the engineering plant and the accomplishment of urgent repairs by outside repair facilities. Precise routes and speeds of advance are normally left to the commanding officer, with only the dates of departure and arrival being specified. On most cruises time is available for independent training exercises, at the commanding officer’s discretion. These may include ship-handling, zig-zagging, CIC drills, automatic weapons firing, maneuvering board instructions, man-overboard drills, etc. Initiative and good planning will generate sufficient training so that the ship should be able to take her place in a transport formation and perform with credit.
The prospective commanding officer of an MSTS cargo ship should consider himself fortunate in this assignment, and may look forward to a pleasant, interesting, and instructive cruise.
Graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in the Class of 1929, Captain Ricketts has seen duty in battleships, cruisers, carriers, minelayers, and attack cargo transports, and in several types of aircraft squadrons as a naval aviator. During the last two years of World War II he served as operations officer on the staff of an amphibious group and force commander in the Pacific. After commanding the U.S.S. Alshain, which experience is the basis of his present article, he assumed his present duty as Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, on the staff of Commander Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet.