Many able writers have discoursed at great length and with convincing logic on the necessity for a strong and balanced Navy to enable us to control the seas in time of war. Command of the seas is important in war; for a maritime nation like the United States it is vital. The employment of the myriad components of our naval power to obtain and maintain this crucial command of the seas after the outbreak of a major conflict has therefore been the subject of many articles, speeches, and essays. We have been told by learned and competent professional men how the preponderant power of the war-strength carrier task forces will be thrown against the enemy; how the numberless flotillas of amphibious ships and landing craft will swarm toward an enemy-occupied beachhead; how our anti-submarine team of air, surface, and undersea elements will swing into action to clear the lifeblood sea lanes of enemy U-boats. But few have explored the role of our Navy in “fringe” warfare.
Now “fringe” warfare can be just as dangerous and just as decisively disastrous as a large-scale all-out conflict. Someone has succinctly compared it to the death of a thousand cuts. Each cut is of itself relatively harmless. And yet the victim finds that bleeding to death from many dozens of tiny knife pricks is just as final as the single, quick, incisive blow of the executioner’s axe.
You won’t find a definition for “fringe” warfare in any dictionary. During the past few years, however, the pattern of this type of warfare as practiced by the forces of communism in the world today has become painfully clear. In many of its connotations the term “ ‘fringe’ warfare” goes far beyond the usually accepted meaning of “war.” It includes all of the methods and tactics used by the communists in promoting their program for world conquest. It includes not only the employment of armed force, but also the use of sabotage, subversion, propaganda, economic pressures, political maneuvering, and many other devices and techniques. It is marked by deception, doubledealing, hypocrisy. Geographically, it rages around the periphery of the communist heartland—in the lands and areas earmarked for early conquest. It is incipient in all of the non-communist world. In terms of the opponents involved, the expression is very apt because the hard central core of communism—Soviet Russia—is rarely committed to participate actively and openly in the struggle. The “fringe” communists—' the puppets and satellites, the party members in the democratic countries, and the fellow-travelers—are the front-line troops. As far as “fringe” warfare is concerned, only in a few instances has direct invasion of one country by the armed forces of another been used. North Korea’s deliberate invasion of the Republic of South Korea is such an instance. The invasion of Tibet by Red China is another. The use of Chinese Communist troops in North Korea to stave off impending defeat of the North Korean army might also be construed as an armed invasion. But, generally speaking, the communists have been able to make their gains without resorting to direct invasion. Let’s examine some of the characteristics of this type of warfare.
First of all we might note that “fringe” warfare is localized, yet global. In the northern mountain regions of Greece, the Greek communists are in rebellion against the legally constituted government. On the other side of the globe in Indo-China, the Vietnamese and the French are fighting for survival against the onslaughts of the communistic Viet Minh forces. In Burma, in Indonesia, in the Malay States revolt smolders. Already the Republic of the Philippines is defending its new-found freedom—against the internal cancer of the communist-led Huks. Even France and Italy in the few short years since World War II have found the threat of communism rising up within themselves and have been hard pressed to overcome that threat. Not an area or nation in the non-communist world today is safe from the insidious erosion. Here at home we have our Harry Golds and Judith Coplons.
On the face of it, each of these incidents is a local affair. The Huk revolt is an internal problem for the Philippine government, as far as the Greek farmer is concerned. By the same token, a communist-inspired general strike in Italy is of little interest to the Vietnamese trooper. His enemy is the Viet Minh soldier. And the American, whose closest contact with communism at home has been in the nature of a few atomic spies and some red agitators, finds it hard to become alarmed over these widespread yet seemingly isolated events abroad.
Each of these events is part of the fabric of “fringe” warfare. The same theme runs through them all. Each fits into the communist plan of world-wide aggression. Each adheres to the broad concept of communist global strategy. Each is consciously and deliberately carried out in consonance with the basic design and each contributes toward the ultimate goal of communism. So, although each of these battles is localized— fought in many different places by a variety of methods and by many different participants—they are all part of the same war. Geographically speaking, “fringe” warfare is localized; yet from the point of view of strategic direction, it is global.
This very characteristic is a decided advantage to communism and a definite disadvantage to the forces of freedom fighting for survival against communism. It is the modern equivalent of the “divide and conquer” technique.
A second characteristic of “fringe” warfare is that it consists primarily of a series of minor engagements for limited objectives. The plan calls for a large number of small successive advances, rather than for complete and final victory in one overwhelmingly decisive step. Thus, we find, for example, that communists are content for the present to undertake a campaign to dominate one or two unions, rather than to attempt the complete subjugation of all of the labor forces. They are willing to wait. They are willing to make their gains in small increments. This takes a long time. But communist strategy is predicated on the assumption that the campaign will last not for years, but for dozens of years.
Hence, the threat is minimized; the danger is hidden. In any one instance, the losses to the inroads of communism are relatively small. Resistance, therefore, is disorganized and often ineffective. After all, one doesn’t lose much blood from a little knife prick.
The third attribute of “fringe” warfare is found in the fact that these minor engagements are fought by relatively small forces. This applies whether the participants are military forces, such as guerillas or rebels, or whether on the other hand they are the cells which are formed to infiltrate our governmental organization, our universities and schools, our labor unions, etc. The communistic elements in each of these instances are only a small part of the whole. Even in Russia itself, the fountainhead of communism, the membership of the communist party is but a fraction of the total population. Though weak in numbers, the red forces which fight the skirmishes around the periphery of the communist heartland are far stronger than mere numbers indicate, because they are well-organized, ruthless, and fired with the zeal of communism. They depend on speed, surprise, and shrewd planning to win an initial and decisive advantage. They also gain in relative strength because they usually possess the initiative. Aggression, whether sanguinary or bloodless, is their forte. But, we must remember, this program of communist encroachment is no mass movement; it is genuinely supported and fostered by only a small proportion of the people—behind the Iron Curtain as well as in the regions of the world which are still free of communist domination. One quarter of the inhabited area of the world, and one third of the peoples of the world live under communist rule. Of the more than 750 million persons, few are masters. Most are slaves. The fighting on the frontiers—in the arenas where the battles of the “fringe” war are being waged—is carried on by small, well- disciplined, single-purposed groups.
The use of puppet or satellite groups as a smokescreen to hide the coordinated communist effort is a fourth trait of this mode of warfare. Although they are all communists, they masquerade behind many varied national identities. In the Philippines, the communistic Huks are viewed by most of the civilized world as Philippine nationals and not as outside invaders. In the channelized thinking of the 19th Century, where clear- cut nationalist lines could usually be drawn, this viewpoint is understandable. But today, in dozens of countries around the globe, citizens betray their native lands to give allegiance to the hammer and sickle. The Huks are subservient to the dictates of the Kremlin; they scorn the legally-constituted government in their own land and are dedicated to its overthrow.
The same charge may be leveled against the Greek reds, the Viet Minh rebels, the communists in Burma, Italy, Indonesia, the United States, and many other lands. They are ostensibly nationals of the countries in which they live; they are all shamefully branded with the mark of treason against their own country. Nevertheless, there exists a reluctance to recognize this truth. It is paradoxical but true that many people would view tolerantly such treasonable activity so long as the communists in Greece can maintain the myth that they are Greeks. Yet the very same people would rise up in righteous anger and cry “intervention” or “invasion” if these communist traitors were stripped of their camouflage.
This masquerade device is used to good advantage. It is well established that Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria have given substantial assistance to the Greek guerillas. Communist forces, when pressed by Greek government troops, were given protection within the borders of these countries. They were permitted to reorganize and train, were supplied with arms and other necessities, were allowed to cross the border into Greece again to continue their attempts to subjugate that country in accordance with the communist plan. Nevertheless, the rules of conduct among civilized nations prevented retaliation by the Greeks against the Iron Curtain countries on her northern border.
A similar situation exists in Asia, where the Chinese communists have given and continue to give material assistance to the local reds in Indo-China, Burma, and Korea. When the North Korean armed forces were all but crushed in the fall of 1950 by the United Nations troops, Red China opened the borders of Manchuria to the fleeing remnants to permit them to regroup and rearm in preparation for the later effort to drive the UN force out of Korea. Once again the aggressors had a safe source of supply and a haven in case of reverses. And untouchable behind all of that is the core of communism, the origin of the master strategy, and the source of much of the heavy arms—Soviet Russia itself. Nevertheless, this is one of the features of “fringe” warfare—the use of puppet or satellite forces to do the actual fighting.
A fifth characteristic is the variety of methods used in waging the conflict. It is important to note in this respect that much of the fighting is done by other means than force of arms. Some of the most productive communist successes have been accomplished without resort to open warfare. And some of the most effective countermeasures yet devised by the freedom-loving nations of the world have been in the political and economic realms. Regional arrangements, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Rio Pact, have political, sociological, and economic aspects as well as military implications. This merely adds emphasis to the fact that since the communists use many means to obtain their goals other than naked armed force, we of the noncommunist world must be alert to recognize and counter the varied non-military phases of “fringe” warfare. Just as importantly we must realize that we have the potentiality to capture the initiative and press the fight to defeat the communist program of world conquest by methods other than the employment of military pressure.
These, then, are the characteristics of “fringe” warfare: It is localized, yet global; it consists primarily of a series of minor engagements for limited objectives; it is carried out by relatively small forces; it utilizes puppet or satellite groups as a smokescreen to mask the single coordinated communist effort; it is waged in many different manners, both military and non-military.
This type of warfare has brought considerable success for the communists. They have travelled a good part of the road toward their ultimate goal—complete subjugation of the entire world to communist rule. This progress has been made without deliberate resort to a conventional large-scale all-out war. When war has been unavoidable, as in World War II, the communists have capitalized on the unexpected opportunities to nudge their way into the resistance movements which sprang up everywhere behind the advancing Axis armies. From the communist point of view a major world war, though not entirely unprofitable, is nevertheless much more costly than the slower, more calculating techniques of “fringe” warfare. Since they anticipate that their program for world conquest will extend over scores of years, and plan on that basis, it is reasonable to expect that they will continue to employ “fringe” warfare in the future in preference to precipitating an all-out major war, provided of course that the “fringe” warfare technique continues to pay off as it has in the past. Our problem is, therefore, twofold: We must be ever mindful that a third world war is possible, and consequently maintain a suitable state of readiness for it; we must also recognize that the communists are winning now in their “fringe” warfare campaign, and therefore we must counter that threat now.
Many people are aware of this twofold problem. Much has already been undertaken to neutralize and reverse the progress the communists are making in their “fringe” war. More is in the planning and build-up stages. Our actions range from the field of economics to the field of military power, from Marshall Plan aid and the Point Four program to the MDAP and the build-up of our own armed forces. It is certainly appropriate under these circumstances to develop in some detail just how sea power in general and the Navy in particular can assist in combatting the menace of communism under the conditions of “fringe” warfare.
A glance at the map of the world will show that the really critical areas in which “fringe” war now rages are around the periphery of the central land mass of Soviet Russia. The red menace is gradually spilling over to engulf all of the Eurasian land area. Except for islands like Formosa, Japan, and the Philippines, all of the immediately threatened areas are linked by land with Russia and satellite countries. Therefore, the lines of communication between the communist heartland and the battlegrounds of the “fringe” war are in the main not subject to interdiction by sea power. There are no sea lanes to sever. How, then, can our preponderance of sea power be of any advantage?
The same chart of the world also makes graphically clear the fact that the democratic nations are committed to exterior lines of communication to reach these battlegrounds, and that most of the exterior lines cross oceans at one place or another. This is true of all lines of communication from the United States to the peripheral areas which are threatened. While these oceans may be crossed by air transportation, an overwhelming proportion of transport is by sea. The sea lanes are the pulsating arteries by which support and sustenance are given to those who are resisting the onslaught of communism in those areas. They are the avenues over which supplies of critical raw materials flow to our own industrial plants. They are the ocean pathways by which the freedom-loving nations of the world strengthen ore another economically and militarily. They are the vital lifelines for the support of our own overseas military operations as part of the United Nations. Without command of the sea, and the potential to retain it if threatened, we could not do these things. We could not hazard them. We would lose skirmish after skirmish in the “fringe” war by default. This, then, is the contribution which sea power makes to our capacity to resist communist expansion. It is a key contribution. Without sea power, we would be condemned to wait submissively in isolation while the free nations of the world were gobbled up bit by bit, until finally our turn comes. Command of the sea is the core of sea power. And naval power is the means by which command of the sea is gained and kept.
Attaining and maintaining command of the sea is of course a function of naval power in major wars as well as under conditions of “fringe” warfare. However, since we have purposely restricted our discussion to the exploration of the role of the Navy in a “fringe” war, let’s be more specific.
We noted that “fringe” warfare is localized, yet global—the man in the street is concerned only about his own little red problem, but actually the menace of communism shadows the entire democratic world. The Navy is localized, yet global too. Its ships and men appear in ports around the globe—concrete, tangible evidence that the United States is interested in supporting the free nations in their resistance to communism. Although fleets of intercontinental bombers may be poised in Omaha to swarm into the air to his defense, the fearful citizen of Trieste, or Saigon, or Manila probably finds it hard to feel reassured. But the presence of an American cruiser in the harbor- even though its guns are trained in and not manned—Is real encouragement and the purposeful attitude of its crew is warming to his heart. Here is something that he understands as well as he understands the boxes of food and the shipments of arms and equipment from the United States. Since the Navy is mobile and self-supporting, a lot of territory can be covered by a relatively small number of ships. Almost every remaining non-communist country in the world that borders on salt water (and there are many of them) is visited periodically by ships of our Navy. This is down-to-earth, grass-roots contact. And the people are gradually becoming aware that they are not alone in their struggle against communism; we in the United States are fighting at their side. Thus, the Navy plays a very salutary and useful role in “fringe” warfare by helping to tie together the free nations in their determination to resist communism, by helping to neutralize the effectiveness of the modern communist “divide and conquer” technique.
The Navy is also helpful in counteracting the second characteristic of “fringe” warfare, namely, the fact that it consists primarily of a series of minor engagements for limited objectives. The Navy comes in small packages suitable for use in minor engagements. It can be safely used to quell minor disturbances without the repercussions which would arise from the use of components of an air force or elements of an army. Navies have been traditionally used in the past as police forces. Frequently a single ship may be sufficient to tip the balance against the communists. Often the presence of naval power, or the knowledge that it can be quickly applied, is enough to stabilize an otherwise volatile situation. The Navy is already deployed in the vicinity of critical areas, and it can be rapidly shifted to exert pressure where it is needed when it is needed. This serves further to delimit the list of possible objectives which the communists may attempt to gain. The risk is proportionately greater for the communists, as the possibility of effective counteraction by our versatile, on-the-scene naval forces increases. These same naval forces are also useful with respect to the third characteristic of “fringe” warfare.
We noted as a third feature that it was carried out by relatively small forces, which rely on speed, surprise, ruthlessness, a well- devised plan, and a well-knit organization to achieve their ends. When the communists strike, they have to be hit fast and they have to be hit hard. But, like fighting fires, the effort to quench the blaze when it is first flaring up is far less than that required after the flames have gained headway. Here again the Navy’s compactness and mobility are invaluable. Reaction is swift, and it is hard-hitting. For this purpose, naval power must include air and amphibious components. With these, it is complete in itself to take the necessary counteraction rapidly and effectively. Yet it is an outstanding example of “economy of force” which is a very important consideration when we remember that the “fringe” war may last for years.
The Navy can also be used effectively in helping to neutralize the advantage which the communists gain from the fourth characteristic of “fringe” warfare—the use of puppet or satellite groups as a smokescreen to mask the singular nature of the communist effort. Naval forces can be used without the diplomatic handicaps which accompany the use of air forces and armies. Naval forces can be deployed in the vicinity of danger areas in situations where the establishment of a land air base or the landing of an army would be impossible without precipitating open conflict. In some cases, the Navy can use its air, amphibious, and surface elements to isolate trouble spots, or it may be used to prevent the use of an adjacent “neutral” communist territory as a refuge and source of supply for local reds. And, as has been previously pointed out, by maintaining the lines of sea communications, naval power can in effect help to make our own country and other democratic nations the adjacent “neutral” territory from which those who are resisting communism may draw support, even though we may be separated from the battleground by miles of ocean.
With regard to the fifth attribute of “fringe” warfare, the Navy can also contribute much toward countering the variety of methods which the communists use. The applications of naval power in the military aspects of a “fringe” war are self-evident and need no further amplification. But the usefulness of the Navy in the furtherance of the non-military measures which we employ in combatting communism may be obscure. It may be difficult to see how the Navy contributes at all to the success of the Marshall Plan, for example. Much of the effectiveness of the Marshall Plan, however, is dependent on the ability of the member nations to carry on an unhindered and voluminous exchange of goods and services. Much of this trade goes by sea. The success of the Plan is jeopardized if this sea trade is threatened; the availability of adequate naval power for its protection if necessary is a prerequisite to the Plan’s success. Foreign trade among the non-communist nations of the world is essential for our collective economic health. The keystone of foreign trade is sea power, and a vital element of sea power is the Navy.
Our Navy also contributes to the efficacy of various other non-military measures by which we support the free countries of the world. A simple illustration may be found in the informal, goodwill visits which our ships make to many lands and peoples. These provide an opportunity for the exchange of ideas, for the demonstration by actual example of the democratic ideals for which we stand, and for the creation of a warmer and better mutual understanding.
Although this discussion is centered primarily on the usefulness and effectiveness of naval power in waging “fringe” war, we should not infer that naval power alone can do the job, or that naval power is the most appropriate and applicable force in every situation. Failure to develop more fully the capabilities of other techniques and measures which are also highly important in countering communist moves in the “fringe” areas is due to the desire to limit our discussion to the role of the Navy and is not due to a lack of appreciation of the importance of these other measures.
We have seen how our Navy can be well employed in the current patterns of “fringe” warfare. The naval forces, and their operational techniques are the same as or similar to the ones which would be required in the event that a major, all-out war should break out. Their numbers, and hence their capabilities are limited—in degree but not in variety. The surface, amphibious and air components of our present naval forces are as versatile now as expanded forces under full mobilization would be. Our present naval forces are an investment in security which will not have to be scrapped or rebuilt if fate swings us out of the “fringe” warfare phase into a third world war. On the other hand, because they can be so effectively used in waging “fringe” warfare, they are not in the luxury category of a weapon that can only be used under limited circumstances in a full-scale intercontinental war.