On December 9, 1941, any question as to the extent of Japanese-Nazi cooperation was abruptly and forcefully answered, for the Pearl Harbor attack had been followed on December 9 by Germany’s (and Italy’s) declaration of war against the United States. Even before this date most Americans had had little doubt that the two major Axis powers were sinisterly operating “hand-in-hand.” After the beginning of hostilities in December the average American’s feeling was that the Germans and Japanese were each fully cognizant of the intended operations, military potentialities, and economic strength of the other; it would seem the two partners were already collaborating in a way similar to that which the United States and Great Britain would begin to display shortly after Pearl Harbor.
Seldom during World War II were there even faint indications that all was not rosy between the two major Axis partners. Was the reputed Japanese-German honeymoon always as cordial as the American people, at least, presumed it to be? An interesting and significant glimpse of this relationship is obtained by an examination of certain German naval documents seized about the time of V-E day; the examiner develops a genuine feeling that the Japanese frequently irritated their partners-in-conquest by failing to “cooperate” as the Nazis wished. Throughout the following article the reader should keep in mind that this account is based on German confidential documents which were prepared for only the highest German officials. These seized documents were translated and released by the Office of United States Naval Intelligence shortly after World War II. They are generally referred to as the Fuehrer's Conferences.
With the beginning of the war in 1939, the Germans presumed that Japan would keep her secret promises to allow German ships the use of Japanese ports and facilities. Apparently there was little, if any, reason to cause the Nazis to presume otherwise throughout the war. During the opening weeks of the war, however, the Nazis felt obliged to request an assurance from the Japanese that no contraband goods would be carried by Japanese ships. A similar request was made of the Russians, Italians, and Spanish.
The war was only two months old when the Commander-in-Chief, German Navy sought and obtained Hitler’s permission to request of Japan permission to have Nazi auxiliary cruisers and submarines put into Japanese bases and to be treated as ships of an ally. Furthermore, the Germans, already feeling the loss of submarines, sought to persuade Japan to cede to Germany several submarines for warfare against Great Britain in the Eastern Asia area. There is no indication that the Oriental partner acted favorably on the latter request, or, as a matter of fact, that German warships were ever in a position to use Japanese bases.
At the end of 1939, the watchful Germans, recognizing the fact that the Japanese were trading with the enemies of the Fatherland, considered applying intensified submarine warfare against Japanese merchant ships. Of course, the Nazis proposed to make it appear that their partner’s ships were the victims of mines, thus preventing “unfavorable political repercussions.”
The German naval documents for 1940 are mainly devoted to operations against Norway and to “Operation Sealoewe,” the planned invasion of Britain. Early in 1941, however, the Nazi naval strategists, perceiving the possibility of an early break with the United States or war between the United States and Japan, prepared a confidential memorandum of some length on the question of Japan and the Tripartite Pact (the agreement that set up the Axis).
The memorandum, intended for German use only, is significant, among other respects, for the way in which it reveals Germany’s analysis of the Far Eastern situation, her uneasiness about Japanese strategy, as well as her naive concepts as to how she would persuade her Oriental partner to refrain from pursuing “purely selfish aims,” aims which “must for the present be subordinated to . . . [the] . . . common aim,” aims which “can be fulfilled by means of the peace treaty after final victory.”
Touching the topic of naval forces with simply a statement as to the number of ships and cruising ranges of each type, the memorandum launched into the question of who had what and who wanted what in the Far East. In brief, the Nazis visualized the Japanese as aiming to encircle China, to secure a foothold on Borneo, and at the same time to eliminate the Philippines and Singapore and to obtain space for settlement on New Guinea and Australia itself. Obviously, all of these aims could not be achieved without the elimination of “American as well as British pressure on the Japanese sphere of interest.”
Turning to British interests in the Far East, the Nazis expressed the belief that “Britain is supporting China in order to counterbalance Japan.” The real key to the British power in the Far East was the great base at Singapore, a base which the British would strive to hold at all odds, for a glance at the Far Eastern situation revealed that without Singapore the whole British position “is untenable.” One basic raw material which was causing severe complications between the Japanese and the British was oil— Borneo oil and Burmese oil, oil which was enabling the British to have large supplies for themselves and at the same time ensure a shortage in Japan.
The Germans maintained that the “apparent independence of Australia and surrounding possessions” was an illusion, for those areas were closely linked through manpower and economics to “the high standard of living in Britain.” Finally, to maintain the British position as outlined would require the maintenance of sea communications in the Indian, Malayan, and Pacific areas.
As for the United States, what were its interests in the Far East? The Nazi memorandum was far from specific and simply referred to America’s “very strong commercial and political interest in East Asia.” To maintain and improve its position the United States “engages in power politics,” the geopolitical basis of which “lies in the triangle Hawaii-Upolu-Guam, with the point lengthened to Manila.” Alaska, the Aleutians, and Hawaii were recognized as the advance American bases aimed against the Japanese sphere of interest.
The German memorandum then dealt with the very crux of its objective: what would be the situation if (a) Japan remained neutral, or (b) Japan entered the war against America and Britain? By way of introduction to these themes, Nazi strategists expressed their viewpoints on the unique strategical and tactical factors involved in a Pacific war. They perceived that large fleet formations or attacks on enemy bases would be almost out of the question due to the great distances within the Pacific area. But the very vastness of that battlefield, they reasoned, would simplify the war against merchant shipping, and war waged by small task forces operating independently with their own supply lines. With a vivid background of the drawbacks of the “cramped- for-space” North Atlantic area, the Nazis expressed the idea that the Pacific area with its great distance would certainly provide ideal conditions for the operation of swift carriers and seaplane tenders both for reconnaissance and for attacks on enemy installations of all types.
If Japan remained neutral, could she be of any real assistance to the German war effort? Selecting the Americans for a model, the Germans maintained that with Japan remaining a neutral she would have to be persuaded to give—“What-is-it-the-Americans call-it—all aid short of war.” But the Japanese assistance would, of course, have to be both gradual and as unobtrusive as possible so as to prevent the intensification of the Americas’ anti-Axis attitude. Again drawing on the American bag of tactics, the Germans proposed that the Japanese declare a neutral zone around their home islands and insular possessions so as to facilitate the assistance measures to the Nazis.
What was to be the treatment of intelligence coordination? Japan should, it was felt, “place her entire intelligence system at the service of the German naval war effort.” Pointing to the American procedure in the Atlantic, the Nazi naval leaders proposed that even a direct exchange of intelligence could be profitably arranged between Japanese and German warships. All types of intelligence would be sought—ship movements, mine situations, enemy installations, and the supply situation at enemy bases—the last item being of importance in the prediction of enemy strategy.
One unique recommendation proposed by the Germans was that Japan should supply Italian East Africa with fuel, food, and war material. Japanese warships might well escort her own supply vessels with little fear of “energetic countermeasures” by the British, due to the latter’s “weak position in the Indian Ocean.”
Finally, in contemplating how a neutral Japan could support the German war effort, the Nazis planned that their partner should “exert strategic pressure on the enemies of the Axis,” by, among other aids, concentrating surface task forces in specially selected operational areas such as the weak South China Sea, the region south of the Aleutians, the Philippine area, the vicinity of the Marshalls, etc. Japanese submarines should appear in distant operational areas such as off the Australian coast, in Sunda Strait, in the Macassar Strait area, around the Samoan Islands, and as far away as the Gulf of Panama. Finally, the Germans planned for the Japanese to release certain pieces of false intelligence regarding the equipping and training of large forces of invasion troops for landings on islands or for operations against Indo-China, Burma, Siam, as well as other areas.
To return to the more basic question of the memorandum—if Japan were to enter the war as an ally of Germany and if the United States were to enter the war on the side of “the enemy,” what would be the effect on the European war and on the outcome of the war as a whole? The answer would be found of course, by an examination of the United States’ attitude; in other words, what steps would provoke the war? If America’s entry were provoked by steps taken by Japan, the United States could be expected not to commit the major portion of its fleet to the European theater, for the Americans would undoubtedly be forced to keep their power concentrated in the Pacific “as protection against the danger from Japan, which she considers great.” And then the Germans passed judgment on their partner’s war potential as well as on American political psychology:
Even though this danger [from Japan] is slight from the purely strategic and operational aspect, still it plays a large role in the thinking of the American people and also of their leaders. Any attack, even if it were small, by Japanese forces anywhere along the Pacific Coast of America from Alaska to Balboa or against American possessions in the Pacific would expose the American leaders to the strongest criticism if the fleet happened to be somewhere else at the time, for instance, in the Atlantic. For the same reason it seems highly improbable that strong American forces would be sent to defend Singapore, since there are no purely American interests to protect there, and ... in view of the Japanese forces, a very large number of units would be necessary.
Thus, the Nazis concluded, an America- at-war would probably not result in any considerable strengthening of “the enemy coalition in the European area of naval warfare.” Pacific threats would, it was assumed, so tie up the American Naval forces that little attention could be given to the Atlantic war. Then came what was perhaps the Nazis’ greatest display of wishful thinking. After stating that the American navy would be tied up in the Pacific, they say:
The same applies to the army and air force, which in all probability would be employed mainly for the defense of the numerous bases and the protection of the Pacific coast.
Again the Germans displayed a lack of information regarding their Oriental partners when they referred to the “unknown factor of the actual Japanese war potential.” Linking with this unknown factor the attitude of Russia and the possibility of a cessation of the Chinese war, the Germans noted that the amount and kind of European theater aid renderable by Japan would depend on Japanese initiative and activity. Assuming the very best possible success to Japanese operations, the Germans visualized their Axis partner as being able to tie down American forces, damage vital Anglo-American sea communication and, the most optimistic vision of all, to bring sea, land, and air relief to the Axis powers in Europe by removing “ . . . British forces from the home area or from the Mediterranean.”
A determined war effort by Japan would be one thing, but suppose Japan were to “pursue a hesitant and inactive war,” or should find “herself greatly hampered by lack of oil and raw materials” or even “by political obligations to Russia or China—?” What then? Most certainly the positive efforts of her entry into the war would diminish very soon. A lack of assuredness is detected in the Nazi statement that
It remains an open question whether . . . the focal point of the American war effort would shift to the European theater, so that the disadvantages of America’s participation in the war would outweigh the advantages of Japan’s entry.
None the less, the memorandum goes on to say that “in view of America’s increasing unilateral support for Britain it may be advantageous for the German war effort if the United States enters the war under the following conditions:
a. If Japan . . . enters the war on our side immediately after the U.S.A. commences hostilities, i.e., without hesitation.
b. If Japan has created the essential basic conditions for carrying out a war in the Pacific and in Malayan waters by immediately putting into effect a suitable supply policy and by limiting her aims in China.
c. If after entering the war Japan does not pursue purely selfish aims [!] which are not directly connected with the total war effort, but rather regards herself as part of the Axis front against the Anglo-American powers, and if she is capable of waging war with the greatest energy and the necessary tenacity.
d. It follows from what has been stated that it is in our interest to encourage Japan to take any initiative she considers within her power in the Far Eastern area, as this would be most likely to keep American forces from the European theater in addition to weakening and tying down British forces.
We can accept the risk that such action by Japan might bring about America’s entry into the war on the side of Britain, since, so far as naval warfare is concerned, the total advantages outweigh the total disadvantages.
Finally the German memorandum came to the point of “Japanese tasks,” and, as before, the Nazis dwelt at length on Japan’s temporary subordination of “selfish interest,” interests which “can be fulfilled by means of the peace treaty after final victory.”
Continuing in its position that partners should tell all (at least Japan should tell all), the memorandum stated, “Before Japan can be instructed as to her war aims it is of prime importance to have an exact knowledge of her war potential,” and “This foundation for rational cooperation must be created now in a spirit of mutual trust.”
As they had earlier in the memorandum, the Germans again expressed an understanding of Japan’s “several strictly limited National aims in her sphere” but were quick to reiterate that regardless of these aims, the partner must be made to realize that the primary war aim is to combat the supply lines of the Anglo-American powers. That “will be the task of the Japanese Navy in the Pacific and in the Dutch East Indies area.”
Japan was to be persuaded that under no consideration should primary importance be accorded to landings on or to seizure of areas which would involve tying down essential parts of the Japanese fleet permanently, unless, of course, the execution of such projects were essential to the main task.
What was to be Japan’s task if America made use of British Empire bases, such as Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, etc.? The Germans planned that Japanese submarines and task forces would go into action in this event but expressed the viewpoint:
Even though annihilating blows can hardly be struck at American surface forces, and in any case are not the main task of the Japanese surface forces, the latter must strive to tie down the largest portion of the U.S.A. fleet in the Pacific and wear it down by keeping it constantly on the move. This diversitory activity would have a decisive influence on warfare in European waters.
The Japanese must not plunge headlong into enemy base occupation tactics unless such action would be necessary to protect the rear. Perhaps Guam and the Philippines could be the scene of such operation but, as the memorandum stated,
It is impossible to judge whether these measures are feasible and can be recommended to the Japanese until their actual strength is known.
The point on which the Japanese forces were to concentrate was Singapore, where “ . . . the present weakness of Britain invites ... an attack ...”
The final German recommendation provided that, if Japan entered the war, a combined staff would be necessary to ensure strict coordination and to avoid “ . . . the error of two allies .conducting warfare independently of one another, as was the case when Italy entered the war.” The headquarters of this “Supreme War Council” would be in Berlin, with Japan represented by a plenipotentiary from the Japanese Naval Staff.
The memorandum concludes with a warning reference to bitter experience with the third Axis member:
Only in this way [Supreme War Council] can the war be carried on in a unified manner and the enemy be prevented from proceeding according to the principle “divide and conquer,” as he did in the case of Italy.
There is little indication that the desired coordination between Germany and Japan ever came about, for despite some exchange of intelligence, the spirit of mutual trust never flourished.
Frequently were the Japanese inquiring about the impending German super-invasion of Britain on the grounds that Japan wished to act simultaneously in the Far East; repeatedly Japan requested the proposed date of operation, but the Nazi timetable had been so completely disrupted that no definite answer could be given. Undoubtedly this apparent unwillingness to exchange information did not enhance Japanese estimates of German good will.
In March, 1941, the Nazis received a report from a “reliable agent of the [Nazi] Air Attache” in Tokyo which led them to suspect that perhaps Japan was even passing on valuable intelligence “to the United States and Britain in order to gain other advantages.” “There are many pro-British and pro-American Japanese,” said a confidential memorandum in the spring of 1941; “Not every Japanese is a friend of the Axis.”
In all of the remaining naval conference documents for 1941 there are few references to Japan and absolutely no references which would indicate the Nazis were aware of Tojo’s plans for the first week in December.
What valid impressions can be derived from a study of this German 1941 memorandum on Japan? The most obvious impression is simply that Germany had the ambition to call the plays in a world-wide contest and that Japan’s role, albeit important, was to be determined by Germany. Furthermore, one gets the impression that the Nazis were both half-suspicious of, and generally uninformed about, Japan. Also it was obvious that the Nazis were weighing well the significance of an America at war, for with the contemplated invasion of Russia, Hitler knew how helpful it would be to have American naval strength out of the Atlantic and in the process of being worn down by the Japanese.
The most significant impression derived from this inside view of German Naval psychology is that had the two major Axis powers been able to cooperate in the manner which the Nazis had envisioned, the early phases of America’s beligerency might have been even more trying than they actually were. And finally, the ghosts of the Axis can undoubtedly learn much from a thorough examination of wartime coordination—the Anglo-American way.