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Rear Admiral Lucius W. Johnson, M.C., U. S. Navy.—Here is a supplementary note on the history of the Battenburg Cup which was mentioned in the April Proceedings.
On September 17, 1909, at Hampton Roads, elimination races were held to select the race-boat crew which would represent the United States in an international race, as a feature of the Hudson-Fulton celebration. The crew from the U.S.S. Minnesota won, and the Louisiana was second. The race was held on September 29th on the North River, New York harbor. The crew °f the Minnesota won the international championship. On October 2nd, the Minnesota's crew rowed against the Louisiana’s, and a crew representing the British Navy, for the Battenberg Cup. The Minnesota won. Her crew was trained and captained by R. M. Kocher, Chief Master -at-arms.
On March 5, the following year at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the Georgia defeated the Minnesota and won the Battenberg Cup.
Commander C. C. Farmer, U. S. Navy (Retired).—In a Fleet Race for the Battenberg Cup in April or May, 1907, I believe the British cruiser Argyle won the cup. I was a member of the Barge Crew of the Missouri at that time.
The last paragraph on page 424 states that whaleboats were used, but the fact is that regulation race boats were used. I am lot sure, but I believe the Argyle used the Indiana’s race boat in this race, which was held during the Jamestown Exposition.
Let me hear from some other old-timers °n the subject.
Wireless in Warfare, 1885-1914
(See page 117, February, 1951, Proceedings)
Mr. Kenneth H. Condit.—One of my good Navy friends has called my attention to the first paragraph of Mr. Bigelow’s article in the Proceedings for February 1951. He suggested that I ought to tell you about an earlier experiment in sending wire* less messages, and I am taking this means of doing so.
It is a well documented fact that in 1842, Joseph Henry, the famous scientist, who was on the Princeton Faculty at that time and later went to the Smithsonian Institution, set up just the same kind of pair of parallel wires which Sir William Preece used and transmitted an impulse from one to the other. This was done from the front to the back campus of the College of New Jersey, as Princeton was called at that time. To Professor Henry this demonstration was simply an interesting scientific experiment and he apparently never visualized its practical application. Your readers may be interested in the fact that Professor Henry preceded Sir William Preece by more than forty years in this particular experiment.
Mr. Arthur H. Morse.—Interesting as it is, Mr. Robert P. Bigelow’s “Wireless in Warfare, 1885-1914,” in your February issue, calls for the following comments:
Admiral H. B. Jackson, the father of radio in the British Navy, and Ferdinand Braun, who shared a 1909 Nobel Prize with Marconi (and died unhonored in Brooklyn in 1918), are not mentioned; and no mention is made of the Poulsen Arc, on which we and our allies substantially depended for overseas communication during the first World War.
Preece’s given name was William, not Thomas.
Mr. Bigelow intimates that such early success as Marconi had was due to his use of “the earth as one of his poles and an antenna as the other,” an arrangement which was proposed by Edison in 1885. But, in the specification of his first patent, Marconi deprecated such an arrangement for transmitting “electrical effects to the greatest possible distance,” and it was years later that he acquired Edison’s U. S. patent (465,971) on the earthed aerial.
Referring to Marconi’s alleged spanning of the Atlantic in December 1901, Mr. Bigelow might have mentioned that no skilled telegrapher was present and that the alleged feat has never been repeated with comparable apparatus. Also, in referring to British naval use of wireless in the Boer War of 1899-1902, Mr. Bigelow might have added that, al-, though every facility was given him for the purpose, Marconi was unable to provide any wireless service to the British land forces in that war.
Mr. Bigelow did a further injustice to the Poulsen Arc in stating that “as late as 1914 the equipment in use emitted a signal many kilocycles wide.” That statement, however, could be accepted as a fair commentary on the cancellation of Marconi’s 1912 contract to provide the British Government with an “Imperial Chain.”
Mr. Bigelow has obviously done a good job of research, but, unfortunately, disinterested sources of wireless history are rare, and, alas, even more so . are persons with first-hand knowledge of the subject.
The Use of Scientific Manpower by The Department of Defense
Mr. Joel H. Hildebrand.—The impulse to write upon this topic was given by a timely article entitled, “Must We Always Be Gadgeteers,” by Philip M. Morse, published in the December, 1950, issue of Physics Today. In it he asks the question, “Is the only contribution of physics, to the year-by-year needs of this country, to be more and fancier gadgets?” And he answers in the negative, saying “I believe it is possible for physicists, as physicists, to contribute to the better use of the tools and weapons they have helped to make.” (Italics mine.) This elicited a fervent amen on my part, because my experience in both wars had to do mainly with use rather than development, and I saw many instances of the faulty use of weapons, and of “gadgets” that had been designed by persons competent enough as scientists but ignorant of the limitations imposed by combat conditions. I mentioned a few cases in an article entitled “The Scientist and the War,” published in Chemical and Engineering News, December, 1945.
No informed person today questions the fact that our survival as free people requires a continual flow of scientific knowledge into our defense effort as well as into our civilian economy. The interchange between scientists and the armed forces was very slight at the beginning of World War I, but it increased by necessity in the face of such menaces as the submarine and war gases. It became an active partnership during World War II, although there were, naturally, gaps and failures. It can become even stronger, and it should be developed to the utmost.
It is easy to cite instances of scientific ignorance on the part of men whose only contact with science has been in such instruction as it has been possible to give in the military and naval academies, but I have seen fully as much waste and misdirected effort resulting from the ignorance of scientists regarding military operations. In World War I, we of the Experimental Eield of the Chemical Warfare Service in France were forced for days to divert all our energies to prepare for General Pershing’s observation a stationary flame-thrower that would have been a sitting duck for a few soldiers with hand grenades. This should have been evident to the persons in Washington who insisted upon the demonstration. Again, we received from Washington a “Field Gas Testing Set,” designed by some scientist who evidently was under the delusion that a field gas officer would have a “red-cap” to carry it about the battlefield for him so that he could open it up and sit calmly on a camp stool in the midst of battle, as if he were merely milking a cow, manipulate his bottles, and find out what his nose had already told him, because he would have taken the course in the A.E.F. Gas School under my command.
I shall not draw upon World War II for further illustrations, because I do not wish to make anyone’s face red, either from embarrassment or anger. My moral is simply this. Every effort should be made now to acquaint a number' of our ablest young scientists, personally and directly, with members of the military establishments and with military materiel under operational conditions. I suggest, therefore, that such men be sought out and brought into contact
not employment, except, perhaps, as contractors or consultants—with the laboratories and proving grounds of the several branches of the armed forces, and, particularly, with materiel under operational conditions. Let them ride in bombers and fighters, m submarines, in destroyers, in tanks. Let them attend maneuvers. Only so can they be properly prepared for much needed operational research. Friendships will be formed under these conditions leading to the selection of able and informed scientists when particular problems or emergencies arise. Furthermore, a scientist can sometimes discover a problem or see a new possibility where a non-scientist can not. We cannot depend only upon non-scientists to discover and formulate problems for scientists in distant laboratories to solve.
Such interchange has been easier in England than here, by reason of the size of that country and the role of London as the scientific and cultural, as well as the political and military center of the nation. A comparable mterchange here between scientific and military men will be attained only by extraordinary effort. I urge that it be made. There are keen-minded young men in university laboratories eager to aid in the defense effort while continuing at least part of their usual, basic researches. These constitute a Pool of manpower which should be drawn upon. It is but natural for the Army, Navy and Airforce to turn to those who helped in fhe late war, but they should not stop there, but should tap this new, unused pool of scientific manpower.
Hoisting Propellers
(See page 539, May, 1951, Proceedings)
Rear Admiral A. Farenholt, U. S. Navy (Retired).—In the recent May issue of Proceedings there appears under “Discussions and Comments” a note by Mr. John Good describing a method by which the propeller of the Confederate States Ship Alabama was hoisted clear of the water, thus eliminating its drag through the water and permitting added speed. He also asks if any Federal ships had a similar rig?
Yes, they did; the plan was installed in several vessels of the United States Navy shortly before the Civil War. The large steam sailing 40-gun frigate Wabash, built at Philadelphia in 1855, and stationed as a receiving ship at Boston during the 1880’s, was fitted with such a propeller hoisting installation, and as a young boy I well remember looking down the large, square propeller- well located at the after end of the poop overhang.
There were many types of propellers tried out and in use during the early days of steam navigation and it was expected that the hoisting type would be very successful, but in this case it was not so. The difficulty of detaching and the subsequent coupling-up of the screw, with the danger of losing it completely, the great noise of the swoosh of water in the large well as the ship squatted down in a sea way, the vibration imparted to the whole vessel, and the small amount of increased.speed attained soon resulted in the abandonment of the plan. However all six ships of the Wabash class—regarded as the finest models afloat in their day—the Merri- mac, Minnesota, Colorado, Roanoke and Niagara and several smaller vessels were so equipped.
How Does Your Correspondence Read?
(See page 141, February, 1951, Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Henry Williams, U. S. Navy.—Chief Dewey’s article should be required reading, not only for every member of the Navy’s personnel, but also for everyone in the Government having to do with preparing letters and publications. Were every one of these to take to heart his well expressed ideas, what a saving in paper, printing and typewriting there would be! What improved administration would result from readable, understandable correspondence, instructions, and information!
“Gobble-gook” as he calls it,—sometimes known as “gobble-dy-gook,” one of the chief products of official Washington,— keeps going many typewriters in offices and many printing presses in the Government Printing Office. The expression should be defined and used more often!
President Theodore Roosevelt had a famous expression—“weasel-words.” As I remember, he said that these were words taking the life and meaning from sentences, just as a weasel sucks the life-blood from its victim.
Mr. Dewey evidently has had and profited by a course of instruction in creative writing which teaches one how to express ideas in simple, appropriate words, a course which all naval officers should have.
There should be a slogan in every office where written or spoken words are put together into sentences. It should read: Take time to be brief. Its explanation lies in the famous quotation from the French philosopher and mathematician Blaise Pascal who wrote in 1656, “I have made this letter long, only because I have not had time to make it short.”
Since then, through the centuries those persons most successful in influencing the thought and opinions of men have done so, principally through the use of simple, understandable language'. In our time, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill are outstanding instances of this power.
A British Flag Anomaly
Commander Hilary P. Mead, Royal Navy.—On land there is no restriction as to the use of the Union Flag (vulgarly called the Union Jack) and it can be seen flying over royal castles and fortresses, above government buildings, churches and factories and even the homes of ordinary citizens. Afloat, however, the prohibition is strict, the Merchant Shipping Act providing that a fine of 500 pounds can be inflicted on the owner pf a vessel that flies unauthorized colors, which broadly means anything except the Red Ensign. This prohibition of the British Union Flag on board British merchant ships has in recent times been the subject of several bitter agitations, but the fact remains that it is not allowed.
Internationally there is an unwritten custom of paying a compliment to a foreign country by flying, generally at the fore masthead, the national flag of the country in whose waters the vessel is a visitor. In the case of the United States, France, and some other countries there is no difficulty or doubt since the national flag is the same as that used by the navy of the state and its mercantile marine. In the case of Great Britain, however, the numerous different flags are hard to follow or understand, and there may be some excuse for a foreigner to believe that the Union Flag rather than the Red Ensign is the national colors of Great Britain. It is true that the complimentary flag has nearly always been the Red Ensign, evidently owing to its mercantile nautical associations. Now it is being said that foreign vessels visiting an English port have been contemplating the use of the Union Flag in this connection, and cases have occurred of ship-chandlers offering the Union Flag to ignorant ship-masters for the required purpose.
In the event of a foreigner flying the British Union Flag in an English harbor, it will be interesting to watch the reactions of the authorities. It seems that they have no jurisdiction whatever in this matter over the doings of foreign ships, and the anomaly will follow that foreign merchant ships can do with impunity what is forbidden to British ships themselves.
What Risk Does a Submarine Run?
Mr. Warren S. Howard.—What were a submarine’s chances of sinking an enemy ship in World War II and getting away with it? Available information is too incomplete to give a final answer, but the published record shows a surprisingly small number of submarines which were destroyed while sinking someone.
In the course of the war, 49 British, 16 American, and 61 major Japanese warships, destroyers and larger (excluding subs), were sunk by enemy submarines. These ships, especially the dozen battleships and fleet carriers lost, normally were escorted; yet all three battleships and nine fleet carriers went down without their attackers being destroyed in the escorts’ counterattack. Figures for cruisers and destroyers are equally impressive; not one of 23 cruisers sunk in those three navies was avenged, while only eight of 83 destroyers were. Escort carriers did best, two out of eight being avenged.
This does not take into account subs detected while making an approach, unsuccessful, or only damaging attack and sunk; the first submarine sent down in the war, U-39, was sunk in an unsuccessful attack on Ark Royal. I don’t have any figures for the total number of attacks that Axis subs made; fint it is significant that in the far more ■ than 4,000 attacks by U. S. submarines on all types of Japanese shipping, the percentage of loss was only a fraction of one per
cent.
Figures for merchant shipping are less complete than for warships. However, the Admiralty has published a list of British nierchant shipping losses, and an analysis has been made of sinkings in 1944-45, when the convoy system was general. Ninety-two British merchantmen were sunk and 16 damaged by submarines during this period; yet, on a comparison of dates and locations °f sinkings, there are only four instances where submarines were sunk after making those attacks. The U-boats altogether destroyed about 2,500 Allied and neutral Merchant ships during the war, and lost 250 subs to surface craft, numbers of these to hunter-killer groups. Aircraft made the main group of U-boat kills. This fits in with U. S. experiences, for most of our subs that were lost were not sunk in convoy battles, but by being surprised by Jap ships, or planes.
These figures, incomplete and misleading as they are—they do not begin to measure fhe real value of escorts as a deterrent to attack—nonetheless point up the tremendous tactical advantage an attacking sub has, and indicate too well the shortcomings of a defensive attitude against submarines. Aggressive patrolling aimed at surprising the submarine itself is the only solution to this problem of beating the sub at sea.
Piers, Wharves, and Docks
(See page 320, March, 1951, Proceedings)
Rear Admiral A. D. Alexis, U. S. Navy.-—Referring to the inquiry of Mr. A. L. Durlacher, Maracaibo, Venezuela, on the difference between (a) a pier, (b) a wharf and (c) a dock, and your reply, may I summarize your explanation into definitions as accepted and used by the Civil Engineering profession:
Wharves
Wharves are landing places or platforms built out, into or on to the water for the berthing of vessels.
Quay Walls or Bulkheads
Wharves built in to the water, parallel to the shore, are generally known as quays or bulkheads.
Piers
Wharves built out to and into the water perpendicular or oblique to the shore are generally known as piers.
Wet and Dry Docks
Docks may be divided into two general classes—harbor docks and repair docks.
Harbor Docks, known as Wet Docks, are enclosed or partially enclosed basins, sheltered for the receiving of shipping. When there exists a considerable range of tide, an enclosed basin, provided with locks and entrance gates, similar to canal locks, is used, so arranged that the water in the dock may be kept at more or less constant level to facilitate the loading and unloading of cargo. Where tide is not abnormal, the dock consists of the open or solid piers; the quay wall or bulkhead, and the water in the area with an open entrance.
Repair Docks may be marine railways, lift docks, graving docks or floating docks.