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SEVEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPED HISTORY. By Sumner Welles. Harper and Brothers, New York. 1951. 236 pages. $3.00.
Reviewed by Colonel George C.
Reinhardt, U. S. Army
Mr. Welles’ latest work does not carry the conviction and perception of his “Time for Decision.” Like so many “memoirs,” this volume grinds personal axes and makes too much capital out of “hindsight,” invariably correct but utterly useless unless pointing a future lesson.
The seven titular points are: (1) Welles’ abortive proposal, approved by the President, to celebrate Armistice Day, 1937, with an international assemblage convened to stop the drift toward war. (2) Recognition of, and maintaining relations with, the Vichy government. (3) An embargo against Japan to halt Far Eastern aggression. (4) The compromise with Argentina to achieve Western Hemispheric unity in 1942. (5) Postponement of territorial and political settlement with Russia until the war was won. (6) Support accorded Nationalist China and concessions to bring Russia into the war with Japan. (7) Creation of the United Nations before the war ended.
A major oversight in the author’s discussion of point one which remains in evidence throughout the book is the weakness of the
United States’ military position prior to late 1942. No consideration is given Hitler’s probable indifference to diplomatic intercession by this country with our then impotent army and navy.
Mr. Welles’ defense of decision two is probably the most convincing. The vociferous, if minority, opposition is explained by his “I so often wished in those years that national security permitted the public to be told the stark and uncensored truth.”
Under point three, Mr. Welles’ annoyance at Army and Navy opposition to an embargo against Japan expressed itself in: “even in the Armed Services the feeling prevailed that anything that might touch off a showdown should be postponed.” Nowhere is there comprehension that the undermanned and poorly equipped “Armed Services” had for years vainly reported their inability to support “tough diplomacy” anywhere except in Central America.
Anthony Eden’s realism was in sharp contrast. He refused to commit Britain unless the United States guaranteed military assistance in case British possessions in the Far East were attacked as a result of that embargo. Mr. Welles charges Eden with the plan’s failure, assuring us that President Roosevelt must refuse such a guarantee because “the country would not support him . . . right after attacking his quarantine speech.”
Yet there had been no official effort to prepare the public for such a stand, no steps to increase our military establishment. A foremost editor has commented: “the nation’s reaction was the natural response of an uninformed people.” Mr. Welles ignores the fact that there, at least, national security DID permit the country be told the stark truth, a truth that badly needed telling.
Point four was a sagely won triumph for Welles over his intransigent superior and customary opponent, Secretary Hull. The error of the fifth decision is placed at the door of “military leaders” who advised the President that Russia might make a separate peace with Germany if pressed. Similar blame is assessed for number six, the Yalta concessions to bring Russia into the war against Japan. The correctness of the seventh point is generally accepted as fully recounted by the author.
There might appear to be some confusion of politics with foreign policy. Mr. Welles bluntly attributes China’s 1937 economic collapse in her battle against Japan to our Silver Purchase Act which drew that metal from China to this country. Yet “due to the influence of the Silver States in the Congress” its repeal, “the one sure method of preventing increasing chaos in China was wholly impossible.”
Most disappointing of all is the failure to consider our military posture in connection with our foreign policy. As Herbert Feis (“Road to Pearl Harbor”) remarked: “We were trying to make a foreign policy out of morality and neutrality alone.”
From General Emery Upton (“Military Policy of the United States”) in 1881 to Mark S. Watson (Official History, “Office of the Chief of Staff”) in 1950, unsensational, factual studies of this country’s refusal to mesh military and foreign policies exist; however, few match the excellence of these two. That their concept is either unknown, or ignored, by a veteran diplomat of Mr. Welles’ stature may explain more persuasively than this volume some of the unpleasant aspects of the world situation today.
THE SOLDIER’S LOAD AND THE MOBILITY OF A NATION. By Col.
S. L. A. Marshall. Washington, D.C. The
Combat Forces Press, 1950. 122 pages.
$1.00.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel J. D.
Hittle, U. S. Marine Corps
With the publication of this book, Col. S. L. A. Marshall, military analyst of the Detroit News, makes what to date is his most valuable contribution to the crying cause of bettering U. S. military thought. Considering the high quality of Col. Marshall’s previous writings (Men Against Fire and others) it can quickly be seen that this is no run of the mine product. In fact, it is one of those books that cannot fail to stir up the military thinking of its readers. If anyone is so complacent as to believe that our present land-warfare thinking as it pertains to mobility is everything it should be, a perusal of only a few pages should serve to explode such naive faith in our current ways. This is because the basic theme of the book is that our land combat forces have lost and, if a change for the better is not made, will continue to lose mobility and fighting efficiency because the individual soldier is literally carrying too heavy a burden. This unnecessarily heavy back load is something that the author says must be lightened if we are to achieve better realization of the fighting potential of the U. S. infantryman.
As those who read Col. Marshall’s Men Against Fire so well know, he is a painstaking researcher who delves deeply into source material for the facts needed to substantiate his assertions. His reliance on facts and experiences, rather than lengthy theorizing, lends added value and readability. He begins with the recognition of the quite obvious fact that although “everybody is ready to give three cheers for mobility,” there is a failure to apply the principle at its most important point— the back of the soldier.”
Turning to the evidence of military history, the author shows how the overburdened soldier has been the rule rather than the exception ever since the Romans. The Roman legionary marched against the barbarians with a load of about eighty pounds on his back. There is certainly some food for thought in the author’s pointed
observation that “though it seems brutal, we should at least add the footnote that 2,000 years after the Legion, the American Army dropped men from Higgins boats and onto the rough deep sands of Normandy carrying more than eighty pounds.”
This indictment of the loads that the Army put on its fighting men in the last war is detailed and forceful, reflecting the deep study Col. Marshall devoted to his investigation of the problem. It’s certainly startling, but Col. Marshall states that men in the initial assault waves at Omaha Beach (Normandy landing) went ashore with four cartons of cigarettes in their packs. There were those, he says, who never made the shore because of the cigarettes. Falling into the water from a minor wound or just plain stumbling, “they soaked up so much water that they could not rise again.” The seriousness of the matter is pointed up by Col. Marshall’s conclusion, “We cannot afford any more spectacles like Omaha Beachhead where we prevailed only because of the superhuman valor of a relatively few men.”
The Normandy landing is not the only example used by the author. Everywhere he contends there was an overburdening of the individual soldier, with the resultant overburdening of the supply system.
Fortunately, Col. Marshall does not stop with the mere exposition of the problem, but presents a well thought out and detailed proposed solution. Refusing to deal in generalities, he figuratively opens up and repacks the soldier’s pack, discarding what he contends are unnecessary items, but retaining essentials. At least his solution will provoke thought and argument among those who have been confronted with the problem.
The second part of the book, “The Mobility of a Nation,” is built around the same basic theme of the unnecessarily heavy pack; in this case, it is the nation that carries too heavy a burden of military unessentials in war. Col. Marshall s view is that true morale in a fighting unit is not in direct ratio to the supply of coke, candy, and USO shows. “To coddle men is to make mollycoddles of them,” he contends. Wastage, coddling, and all that goes with it lead directly to the question, according to Col. Marshall, whether it might not bring our own destruction “on the day the United States must meet an equal opponent with a better sense of conservation.”
Marines will derive some satisfaction from Col. Marshall’s recognition of their efforts and success in sticking to the essential items of military supply. The author specifically states, “In Pacific operations throughout World War II, they [Marines] outstripped the Army in getting down to the bare essentials.”
This book is noteworthy not only because of its informative, thoughtful text, but also because of its price. The Combat Forces Journal deserves a pat on the back for making such an important military book available for the good old-fashioned price of just one dollar.
SEA SLANG OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By Wilfred Granville. 271 plus xiv pages. Philosophical Library, Inc., New York. 1950. $2.50.
Reviewed by Professor Louis H. Bolander, U. S. Naval Academy
In his foreword Mr. Granville states that the slang of seafaring men must ever be the despair of the glossographer, for new words and phrases are being coined almost daily by quick-witted seamen in the Royal Navy, the Merchant Navy, by yachtsmen, fishermen, the men of the lightships, and the crews of the barges and “narrow boats” that work the inland waterways of England. Sea language is particularly difficult to handle since the hardy men who coined the terms leave but few written records and many have passed on without leaving clues as to the origin of their colorful phrases.
The period covered by this book includes the five decades from 1900 to 1949, supplementing Admiral W. H. Smyth’s notable Sailor’s Word Book, which covered the sea slang of the nineteenth century and Frank C. Bowen’s Sea Slang, which preserved many last-century terms as well as many colorful salty modern phrases. The author, who was a cadet in the Royal Navy in the first World War and a Reserve officer in World War II, has recorded rather fully the slang of the Royal Navy for both these wars. Many of the terms discussed which origi-
nated in the ever-active brains and fertile imaginations of the Royal Navy’s enlisted seamen have a definitely humorous appeal. The “Tin Duck” was the cognomen applied to the veteran battleship Iron Duke, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe’s flagship in the Battle of Jutland; “Tirps” was the nickname given to the dignified Admiral von Tirpitz of the German Navy in World War I. The food furnished the men supplies an endless variety of epithets. A meat or fruit pie becomes a “covered wagon”; milk becomes “cow”; the term “red lead” refers to tinned (canned) herring in tomato sauce; and “three-sixty- five” refers to eggs and bacon, borrowed from the commercial traveller’s term—they used to (but not today) eat them 365 days in the year and would order them thus: “Call me at 7:30-365” (i.e. eggs and bacon for breakfast). A “repaint” refers to any naval officer called back to active duty in wartime. But in the first World War such an officer was called a “Dugout.” A “cow gun” means a naval gun of heavy caliber, cow suggesting clumsiness or unwieldiness. Definitely English in scope, this book will nevertheless have an appeal for American Navy men, officers and enlisted men alike.
The arrangement of the words and phrases discussed is strictly alphabetical, thus making the volume easy to consult. The author wrote the reviewer that since the book came out he has collected some 500 terms of addenda to be incorporated in a new edition. Over three thousand phrases are discussed in this handy little reference volume.
A SURVEY OF UNITED STATES
PORTS. By George Fox Mott, Ph.D.
Arco Publishing Co., Inc., New York. 228
pages. $7.50.
Reviewed by Commander John V.
Noel, Jr., U. S. Navy
Members of the Armed Services and others interested in logistics will appreciate Dr. Mott’s notable contribution to that highly important subject. His survey should be a useful reference and a source of data which are so essential to the logistic planning that must accompany our defense efforts. All who are concerned with the sea and its traffic will be interested in this unique treatise
on the major United States ports.
Dr. Mott has combined his studies of transportation, trade, and economics with his port inspection experience during World War II as Colonel Mott, U.S.A.R. This happy blend of scholarship and military background has produced an unusual book. There is much fascinating information about world trade and commerce and at the same time enough tables and statistics to make the volume useful as a reference.
Parts one and two are devoted to a general discussion of port economics, facilities, cargo handling, etc. The theory and practice of port operation are expounded in all their complexity together with a useful definition of Port Authority. Part three is an analysis of 30 major ports, giving their facilities, characteristics and potential for growth and development. For each port a chart is reproduced which adds a great deal to the value of this section. Part four contains a discussion of other means of transportation which are likened to the spokes of the port operation wheel. These are railroads, trucks, inland waterways and aircraft. It also contains a glossary of terms used in connection with port operation.
It is regretted that a work of such obvious labor should be marred by poor reproduction. It is not the rather unusual recourse to mimeography that is subject to criticism but rather the fact that it is not a good job of mimeographing. The typing is not first rate and the uneven appearance of various letters leads to the conclusion that inferior stencils were used. Some pages are definitely blurred. In addition, an appreciable number of errors in spelling and punctuation was noted. The glossary in part four is a useful addition but could have been made more useful by expansion. For example, the much used word hinterland is not defined.
These minor imperfections should not divert the reader from the value of the book. Dr. Mott has indeed made a contribution to our knowledge of United States ports which should be useful to military planners, American shippers, port and terminal operators, port authority officials, waterfront industrialists and students of water transportation generally.
A WORLD AIRLIFT. By Elvira K. Frad- kin. Funk & Wagnalls Company, New York. 1950. 216 pages. $2.85.
Reviewed by Captain Ben S. Custer,
U. S. Navy
The book is handsomely bound with a most attractive cover, calculated to whet the curiosity of nearly anyone who has an interest in aviation. Unfortunately, the promise of the cover died aborning. This is not a book that anyone would willingly read unless he were doing research on the scope of propaganda, pawned off on the American people by the Air Power League or if he were doing research on the psychology of American ■ Women’s Clubs and their leaders.
Mrs. Fradkin, the author, we are told on the book cover, is “at present a delegate for the Federation of Women Shareholders in American Industry at the United Nations” and she “represented the organized women of the United States in the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War at the First World Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 1932,” and “she was co-founder of the Women’s Action Committee for Victory and Lasting Peace, and the New Jersey Council on International Relations,” which explains her devotion to the peacemaking idea. Her book should really have been called a proposal for a United Nations Air Police Patrol although her lack of logic in outlining such proposals suggests a subtitle of “Alice at Lake Success.” Mrs. Fradkin is so naive and so full of the spirit of Pollyanna that it is hard for this reviewer to comprehend why Funk & Wagnalls ever printed this piffle.
In 155 pages the author uses the symbol UNAPP 478 times. This symbol, of course, is the modern “high level” officialese for United Nations Air Police Patrol and because Mrs. Fradkin wants peace she has decided that her UNAPP is a panacea for peace as well as a cure-all for most of the world’s ills. Through pages of padded prose, she begins nearly every paragraph with a question, questions which the reader soon knows how to answer. These questions are posed so that she may explain just how UNAPP will solve any stated situation.
The author alludes to the unwillingness of Russia and the United States to surrender sovereignty in order to achieve control over atomic energy, but she blithely assumes that because of the grave situation between Russia and the United States (as of the summer, 1950) that both countries will jump at the chance to pool their military air power in order that this United Nations Air Force may function as an air patrol around the world and later as a police patrol. Ignoring the history of secret German rearmament, particularly in the air, she naively predicts that such a patrol could immediately spot secret production of military aircraft which would, of course, be reported to the U. N. where one assumes some kind of joint resolution might be passed to condemn the maker of military aircraft. Mrs. Fradkin’s sponsors, who should have known more about aircraft and flying than she, ought to have briefed her as to the easy convertibility of large, fast transports to bombers; they ought, too, to have explained how great industrial plants can turn out pilotless missiles which could be used against or despite Mrs. Fradkin’s UNAPP. It seems that by repetition of her favorite symbol the author hoped to prove her thesis. A random paragraph is quoted below; there are many which are worse and more illogical.
“With UNAPP, this situation would be handled in a different manner. Reports and aerial photographs would present some of the facts needed. Then the delegate from the Union of South Africa would be so hard pressed at UN by this testimony that hurried cabled pleas for renewed instructions would force a moderation of an indefensible stand on the part of a member of UN. The dangers of permanent administrative union, which, for the sake of economy, consist of joint administration of nearby trusteeship and non-self-governing territories, can be minimized and watched by the regular stops of UNAPP. The constantly changing status of the different empires, nations, territories, colonies, and dependencies could, with UNAPP standing by, be achieved without the upheaval of war or revolution.”
The author, ignoring the League of Nations experience, also states, “The probability that this war aviation could slip international controls and be commandered for national interests would be counteracted by a united condemnation of the consequences which would resound around the world.” (Italics mine.)