Perhaps the Reserve Fleet is a luxury we cannot afford.” This statement was made by a high ranking naval officer less than a year ago. Another high ranking and influential officer told the writer, “Why don’t you people sink or scrap a lot of your ships that are taking up valuable berthing space and using funds that should be going to the operating forces? You know as well as I do that we will never use many of those ships, such as the obsolete landing craft down in Green Cove Springs, for example.” Curiously enough, it was only a few months later that the outbreak in Korea occurred and the first urgent call was made upon the Reserve Fleets for amphibious vessels, including those same low priority “obsolete” landing craft.
At the time of this writing there are very few who question the value of the “Mothball Fleet,” but it is important to note that the statements of two responsible officers quoted above represented the attitude of many before the Korean fighting began—less than five years after the end of World War II.
This dangerous trend in thinking should be recorded and fixed in our minds, in order to prevent its recurrence in later years, when economy again becomes paramount to all other considerations of defense.
Since we have in a way passed through a cycle in our experience with the Reserve Fleet organization, it seems appropriate and timely to examine the entire Reserve Fleet concept. The past five years of experience can teach us many valuable lessons—-the limitations as well as the potential value of this reserve of seapower.
In order that our examination of the subject may be complete we must first know the history of the Reserve Fleet organization, the reason for its creation, and the evolution of the original concept over the short span of its life. Major problems which beset this young activity should be recognized and the manner of their solution studied in order to guide us in future decisions.
Secondly, the feasibility of the basic concept and policies must be tested. An analysis and discussion of experience gained in the trial run resulting from the Korean incident offers an excellent practical test of feasibility. Frank understanding of deficiencies and limitations as well as the potentialities of the program will open the way for better knowledge and constant improvement.
And, finally, in order to be of any value the outline of our discussion must include definite recommendations which may stimulate constructive thinking about this important and extremely valuable program.
The design, composition, and organization of the Reserve Fleets as they were established at the end of World War II constituted the logical results of the experience of the Navy with its reserve combat ships just prior to our entry into that war. That experience was not happy.
These reserve ships—mostly destroyers and submarines—had been divided into priority categories 1, 2, and 3, supposedly capable of being placed in active service within 30, 60, and 90 days, respectively. In practice it developed that these vitally needed ships actually required an average of many months for activation. Those who served in these vessels will attest to the grief which was encountered when they first went into commission.
These conditions came as a shock to the Navy and to the Administration. On May 25,1940, the Secretary of the Navy addressed a letter to all hands commenting on the delays experienced in re-commissioning ships in time of national emergency and on the deficiencies in policy and organization then in effect for insuring the readiness of inactive ships. He criticized the following deficiencies:
(1) the lack of appreciation of the importance of maintaining readiness of these ships;
(2) the inactivating of such ships without thorough overhaul;
(3) the lack of adequate funds for upkeep;
(4) and the inadequacy and infrequency of necessary inspections, with the resultant ignorance of true conditions by the Navy Department.
Four years later, on May 31, 1944, the President of the United States wrote—“Both in 1917 and in 1941 we found that vessels in reserve commission were not in as good condition as we expected them to be. The Navy ought not to get in that condition again.” The consequences of this memorandum and the experience to which it referred were then written into the Navy Regulations.
As might be expected, the policy and requirements which these new Regulations prescribed were based on ideas which today appear incredibly optimistic and unrealistic. Article 640 of the Navy Regulations, 1920, as corrected, provided that vessels and craft In Commission or In Service, In Reserve, should be maintained in a condition of readiness for service “such that additional personnel being provided within ten days they can be placed in active service within that time.” Those ships maintained Out of Commission or Out of Service, In Reserve, were to be in a condition of readiness, such that personnel being provided within ten days they could be placed in active status in reduced commission or reduced service within 30 days.
The Regulations also provided that ships in an inactive status should be organized into sub-divisions, and that at least one ship in each sub-division should be maintained In Commission or In Service, In Reserve. As actually organized, such subdivisions varied in the number of their components from one (in the case of battleships, carriers, and cruisers) to 18 in the case of PC’s. All large ships were kept In Commission, In Reserve. Thus, approximately 25% of the Reserve Fleet vessels were maintained with skeleton crews on board; many were steaming; and they constituted a substantial group of ten day ships in a high state of readiness for use in case of any emergency or mobilization.
Likewise, the governing policies of that time contained ambitious requirements and standards for maintaining a high degree of readiness of personnel and material conditions within the ships. The Chief of Naval Operations was directed to provide for the procurement, training, organization, and availability of additional personnel required to completely man the ships in the short times specified for complete readiness as indicated above. All ordnance, machinery, and equipment were to be maintained in operable condition, fully assembled, with certain few exceptions. Full allowances of equipage, spare parts, and consumable supplies were to be maintained on board. And, quoting from directives then in force, “Funds for the readiness, preservation, maintenance, and periodic overhaul of all vessels in inactive status retained in reserve for future active service shall be included in the annual budgets of the Bureaus concerned. They shall be set up separately by the Bureaus and allotted directly to the appropriate reserve fleet commander and shall be specifically restricted to his use in the same manner as is done with budgets to commanders of active fleets.” Remember, all of these policies were promulgated only about five years ago.
These early policies have been discussed at some length because the readiness concept expressed in them was quite well publicized at the time and the general public, as well as many in the Navy, believe that essentially the same readiness condition existed in 1950. This could easily have developed into a Maginot Line philosophy in regards to our reserve naval power.
It did not take long before realization began to spread that the Reserve Fleet concept was somewhat starry-eyed in many of its implications. This was first felt in the delays which marked the inactivation program. Construction of piers and their attendant facilities and services fell behind schedule because of strikes, other material procurement difficulties, and labor shortage. This in turn forced many more ships anchored in the stream to keep up steam and run boats instead of devoting full time to securing. Coincidentally with the delay in inactivation came a speed-up of demobilization of personnel and the consequent inability to inactivate with ships’ crews as planned. This was partly made up for by contracting for considerable inactivation at private industrial plants, but standards suffered in the process through lack of experience and inadequate inspection. Preparation of inventories, allowance deficiency requisitions, machinery histories, etc. suffered particularly for these reasons.
We have noted that in 1940 the Secretary of the Navy stressed the need of thorough overhaul of ships before their inactivation. When the Reserve Fleets began to form in 1945, such overhauls were prescribed and at first were carried out. This plan could not be followed for long due to the general insistence for fast demobilization of the ships’ crews and the inability of administrative and industrial activities to cope with this large and sudden work-load.
By the middle of 1947 the overhauls had been markedly reduced and ultimately, at the time of inactivation, only certain so- called voyage repairs, and repairs to machinery otherwise dis-assembled for preservation, were being undertaken. To compensate for the lack of inactivation overhaul, a program of quinquennial overhauls was begun in the summer of 1947, during which 20% of each type per Reserve Fleet Group was given an overhaul each year.
Again, the extent of these overhauls became more and more limited because of the stringency of funds and because the costs were constantly increasing. In August, 1949, the shipyard overhauls were discontinued completely. With the state of emergency existing as this is written it is quite certain that an overhaul program will be reinstituted in the near future. However, the backlog developed during more than a year’s holiday in overhauls has certainly retarded the material readiness of many reserve ships to an uncomfortable degree.
The drastic cuts in funds in late 1949 and early 1950 eliminated practically all industrial assistance by shipyards, except for necessary drydocking, and the maintenance load became increasingly heavier on the inadequate numbers of Reserve Fleet personnel. Priorities of tasks were established, and it became necessary to authorize deferment of many desirable and important tasks in order to concentrate on that work which would insure watertight and weathertight integrity, maintenance of dehumidification, and preservation. Prevention of deterioration required all the resources of the Reserve Fleet organization; improvement of readiness became practically an impossibility.
Serious consideration was given to concentrating effort on only the high priority ships, at the expense of those considered of lesser importance for the early days of possible mobilization. However logical this policy appears at first glance, it possesses one great difficulty and danger. That is the fact that considerable difference of opinion exists as to which types will be needed first. The relative priorities of ASW, amphibious operations, transport, mine operations; the value of certain World War II types in operations against high speed submarines, etc.—all of these factors affect the selection of the “high priority ships.” And the selection is further complicated by changing opinions as new developments alter the operating characteristics of our own and potential enemy units.
It was during this period that suggestions were being made to scrap “obsolete” types, or at least to concentrate all effort on a limited number and let the rest deteriorate. Fortunately, the idea of scrapping ships to cut expenditures was temporarily discouraged and the view prevailed that any ship was a potential asset, even though it may be quietly rusting away at a dock
From our review of Reserve Fleet history so far, it is obvious that most of the problems and difficulties result from peacetime economy of funds. Although, as naval officers, we appreciate the desirability of having these ships in reserve, we should also, in our capacity as citizens and taxpayers, examine the cost. Perhaps we may find, after all, that this is a luxury beyond the capacity of our budget and the national economy to afford.
Totaling up the original costs of the ships which were in the Reserve Fleets as of July 1, 1950, we find the amazing figure of over 13½ billion dollars. This represents actual cost at the time of building and does not include the value of supplies or fuel on board nor much of the equipment added during World War II.
With the inflationary increases in wages and material costs since these ships were built, it is conservatively estimated that their replacement cost today would exceed 30 billion dollars. This is certainly a very impressive sum of money. But more important, and of extremely vital importance in case it becomes our lot to fight another war, is the fact that the Reserve Fleets represent a reservoir of already fabricated ships, guns, and machinery.
At a time when our national economy would be taxed to capacity, when materials and manpower are dangerously critical, these ships represent a savings account of millions of tons of steel fabricated to final form. And they represent 1,380,000 man- years of skilled manpower stored up for a rainy day.
Having proven the value in those terms, let us compute the cost of maintaining these assets. As budgeted for fiscal 1951, the total amount planned for both Reserve Fleets was $13,600,000. This included everything for the maintenance and upkeep of the ships, all services such as power, steam, water, dredging, etc. It even included the maintenance and upkeep of those shore stations whose sole function is support of the Reserve Fleet Groups. Of course, this figure was later supplemented to provide for the Korean emergency, but it represents the amount that otherwise was planned for both Reserve Fleets for the entire fiscal year.
In addition to the funds specifically allotted in the budget, we may estimate the total cost of pay for personnel of both Reserve Fleets at approximately $45,000,000. Therefore, the total cost of maintaining in ready reserve about 70% of our naval tonnage amounts to approximately $58,600,000, as planned and budgeted for fiscal year 1951. This represents less than two-tenths of one per cent of the present replacement value of these ships.
If you could buy automobile insurance which covered storage, maintenance, fire protection, and servicing on a $2,000 car for $4.00 a year, you would consider it very reasonable—certainly not a luxury.
When you consider that the reserve of naval power stored in the Reserve Fleets is a powerful deterrent against possible aggression and a tremendous asset if war is forced upon us, an insurance rate of two-tenths of one per cent is definitely not in the luxury class.
When the North Korean Communists invaded the South Korean Republic and the UN forces were committed to stopping this aggression, there was an urgent and immediate need for amphibious transport and supporting ships. The Reserve Fleets were called upon to provide this augmentation of our meager operating forces.
The expansion of the Active Fleet provided a splendid opportunity to try out the readiness of the Reserve Fleets and to test the feasibility of their basic planning concepts.
In the Atlantic Reserve Fleet, with which the writer is more familiar, the Fleet commander determined on the policy of using this expansion of the Active Fleet as a test activation. Based on the premise that existing plans were complete and sound, and subordinate commands were properly indoctrinated, he ordered the Group Commanders to activate according to schedule, and then kept hands off. Only when special circumstances required were implementing directives issued. And, of course, this not being a mobilization, there were many special conditions which differed from those which would be encountered in an all-out mobilization. Basically, the Reserve Fleet concept of activation procedure, as evolved from the original ambitious 1945 scheme, provides for the Reserve Fleets to furnish the Active Fleet, at the earliest practicable date, with ships that are de-preserved, habitable, safely mobile at sea, and organized and trained to permit limited trials in the berthing area. Industrial assistance (other than normal necessary logistic support), modernization or advanced training is not planned for this activation phase. Essentially, the Reserve Fleet Commander is required to turn over ships operable to the degree in which he received them, or “1945” ships.
The Active Fleet Commander, through his cognizant Type Commander, is then responsible for further training of the crew, operational training, modernization, shake- down, and any post-activation shipyard availability required.
Although there have been many heated arguments on the subject of the degree of operability and training desirable at the time of turn-over, it is firmly believed that the existing policy is sound and results in the earliest date of overall operational readiness. The Active Fleet Commander is in the best position to know his own operational needs— how urgently he needs the ships, what alterations are required for their planned employment, and how best to fit them into the shipyard schedules for Active Fleet ships.
Activation of Reserve Fleet ships is accomplished in the berthing area by the ships’ company,—assisted, supervised, and instructed by Activation—Instruction teams. These A/I teams, as they are commonly called, are composed of Reserve Fleet Group personnel augmented by specially trained Naval Reservists. Experience has shown that these teams, if properly qualified and trained, are one of the most important keys to the success of the entire program.
The crews of the activating ships are Naval Reservists, with a small core of Regular Navy personnel.
As stated earlier, the activations under this expansion due to the Korean incident were not under mobilization conditions and therefore presented many special circumstances. For example, the necessity for depending chiefly on volunteers from the Naval Reserve resulted in the slow arrival of crews for early wave ships. The Reserve Fleet Group personnel, accepting the situation, proceeded with great zeal and enthusiasm to carry on the activation themselves, without waiting for crews.
In their enthusiasm to reduce the overall delay caused by the late arrival of crews for these early ships, the Group Commanders in many cases proceeded with items of work which normally would be performed by the Active Fleet Commander during the second phase of readiness. This deviation from planned procedure, made necessary by peculiar circumstances existing in the first months of the program, proved to be of value as a practical test of several theories. The results of the test convinced Commander Atlantic Reserve Fleet of the soundness of the basic concept contained in Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief Atlantic directives. The attempt to accomplish alterations and modernization during the activation phase is believed to have caused delay in the date when a ship was finally ready to take her place with the Active Fleet as a combat unit.
When alterations were conducted concurrently with activation, it caused interference with an orderly activation procedure and delays in that phase of work. In some types there were alterations which required extensive work in certain living spaces, and many members of the ship’s company could not move aboard until long after reporting. This was particularly undesirable with the inexperienced crews because it slowed up their organization into a closely integrated team.
The advantage of an early turn-over to the Active Fleet became obvious in other ways as a result of this early experience. As was to be expected with green crews assembled hurriedly, there were many cases of key billets filled by unqualified personnel. Under the Reserve Fleet Commander, with no source of experienced personnel to draw from, it was difficult or impossible to correct these situations. With an early turn-over to the Type Commander, that officer has the means under his own command to adjust quickly and correct such deficiencies to his own satisfaction and that of the ship’s Commanding Officer.
In addition to the advantages for personnel adjustments, an early turn-over to the Type Commander permits that officer complete freedom in accomplishing all matters to his satisfaction, without divided authority or responsibility or differing interests. After all, the Type Commander is the one who will use the ship, and he should get it under his complete control as early as possible. Recognizing this fact, Commander Atlantic Reserve Fleet, with the concurrence of Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, directed the return to planned procedure for activation and turn-over as soon as personnel arrivals began to fit into the phased schedule.
Many other lessons were learned which will be of extreme value for the future. As was anticipated, the vital importance of proper inactivation and inactivation overhaul was emphatically proven. Those ships which had been properly inactivated and overhauled prior to going into reserve status were soon materially ready to resume their place in the operating forces. Those ships which were not overhauled, and which were carelessly inactivated by crews impatiently watching demobilization points, caused many delays and headaches for all concerned. Unavoidable deterioration due to poor initial preservation of machinery added greatly to the time, manpower, and funds necessary to place them in operating condition. Likewise, the importance of complete records prepared prior to, and during, inactivation was pointed up by those cases where inactivating crews had failed to prepare them properly.
One phase of activation which had always caused concern to the Reserve Fleets was the supply of deficiency materials, activation consumables, and spare parts. Planning since the inception of the fleets had provided for a continuing flow of these materials during peace time to bring the ships up to allowance. Unfortunately, lack of funds made it impossible to carry out these plans. The current activation program provided a thorough testing of the procedures for obtaining these materials from the supply system. There were some shortages of essential materials and a number of delays in activation caused by depletion of stocks, or procedural difficulties. In general, however, one may say that the results of the test were satisfactory, in that the lessons learned will be of the greatest value in revising stock levels and procedures for any future activations. The most desirable solution, of course, would be to bring all ships, or at least those of high priority, up to full allowance prior to any activation or mobilization.
The paper work problem, always with us, reared its ugly head and demonstrated the need for further coordinated action. The timely supply of up-to-date charts, registered publications, effective directives, and manuals for a large number of activating ships has been a matter of concern in all mobilization planning. Although under continuing study, no satisfactory solution had been reached when the present activation program began. Much improvising was necessary to equip many ships with essential charts and publications. The experience gained indicates that a concerted effort is needed to solve this important problem.
Summing up the lessons learned in connection with the material condition of inactive ships and the supply of the material needs, we find on the whole that most of the difficulties or deficiencies can be corrected in the future by intelligent planning based on the valuable experience gained in these past few months. However, a ship in perfect material condition and fully equipped is of little value without a well trained and qualified crew in her. The problem of personnel to man the newly activated ships will always be one which warrants the most concentrated study.
In this connection one develops a greater appreciation of the vital importance of the Naval Reserve training program. The personnel who are the product of that program form the major source of crews to man Reserve Fleet ships upon activation. Crews not fully qualified in rate and in shipboard operations will tend to negate all efforts toward a high state of material readiness; ships which are materially ready will be needlessly delayed in taking their place in the battle line.
The importance of the Naval Reserve training program becomes steadily greater as time goes on. The further we leave World War II behind us, the lower the general standard of qualification sinks. The number of those trained at sea in the last war is constantly decreasing and the number of inexperienced non-veterans is increasing. The recall to duty of a large percentage of Organized Reservists during the last half of 1950 has further depleted the numbers of trained personnel available for manning Reserve Fleet ships and accentuates the importance of the Naval Reserve training program.
Examination of the results in test activations to date emphasizes the many ramifications of the Reserve Fleet program. It is not merely a matter of material upkeep to prevent the ships from rusting away. That is important, of course, but there are many other facets of the problem involving personnel, supplies, equipment, facilities, and modernization of the vessels. The feasibility of the overall program depends on a firmly coordinated approach to the solution of each of these individual and related problems.
The success of the activations to date indicates that the Reserve Fleet organization had recognized the many ramifications of their problem sufficiently to insure the feasibility of the program as a whole.
Having examined the evolution of the original concept and having observed a practical test of its feasibility, we should project these observations into the future. The lessons learned can serve to guide us, not only in the near future, but also in our long-range planning. Some day, when the forces of aggression have been beaten, we may again be placing some of our naval power in reserve. Then the experience gained in the past five years will stand us in good stead.
Therefore, looking to the immediate as well as the more distant future, the following recommendations are submitted:
I. It is recommended that the present Reserve Fleet organization and command structure be continued.
Although frequent and determined efforts have been made at various times to place the Reserve Fleets under the Shore Establishment or the Active Fleets, careful study of these suggestions has always resulted in the decision to continue the organization as now established. With the Reserve Fleet a part of the Operating Forces and the Reserve Fleet Commander directly responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations, the “Mothball Fleet,” always has a champion to guard its interests. With the readiness of these ships as his primary responsibility, the Reserve Fleet Commander can concentrate his attention on them without diversion. If the responsibility were transferred to the Shore Establishment or the Active Fleet, this concentrated attention could not be given because of competing interests and demands. Dead ships do not particularly appeal to Navy men, and the natural reaction in times of stringent funds or personnel shortages would be to drastically reduce their upkeep, rather than curtail some of the functions of competing interests which are more active and vocal. To re-phrase the words of the President in 1944, “The Navy would again find its Reserve ships not in good condition.”
II. In any future lay-up of active ships it is recommended that a thorough inactivation, including overhaul, be made a matter of strictly enforced policy.
The importance of thorough inactivation and overhaul for future planning cannot be over-emphasized, even though it be at the temporary expense of operating forces or activities. It is axiomatic that economy in the armed forces becomes increasingly drastic as the end of a war recedes further into history. A ship properly “laid-up” can be much more economically maintained and will remain as an asset for many more years than one improperly preserved.
III. Upon activation, it is recommended that ships be turned over to the Active Fleet Commander at the earliest practicable date, with the responsibilities of the Reserve Fleet Commander being restricted essentially to de-preservation, habitability, and operability to the degree that will insure safe mobility at sea.
Personnel of the Reserve Fleet Groups have trained and specialized in all phases of preservation and de-preservation. They are best qualified to perform these functions. Repairs and alterations which delay this activation procedure should not be attempted normally while the ships are under the custody of the Reserve Fleet Commander.
One World War II Fleet Commander once remarked that there were occasions when he desperately needed ships—any kind, even floating wheel barrows—just so they were ships. Other situations require ships with special equipment or specially trained crews. Only the Active Fleet Commander, who is to employ the ships, can know what is required for the situation existing at a particular time. It follows logically that newly re-activated vessels should be turned over to this operational commander at the earliest practicable date after de-preservation has been accomplished. The degree of modernization, the adjustment and training of personnel and special measures dictated by planned employment can then be executed by direct decision of the responsible operator.
IV. It is recommended that immediate concerted effort be made to allocate to the various printing agencies the task of reproducing all essential manuals and publications for ships scheduled for activation.
In order to provide an up-to-date supply of such material and to avoid duplication of effort, this printing work-load should be definitely allocated and equitably distributed. Maintenance of up-to-date master copies for quick reproduction would require additional funds and personnel in the several printing centers, but the results would justify the expenditure.
V. It is recommended that a larger percentage of the ship's company for each activating ship come from experienced personnel of the Active Fleet.
Experienced personnel coming from operating ships would greatly reduce the time necessary to make effective combat units of newly activated ships. Compensating numbers of recalled Naval Reservists, now scheduled for manning Reserve Fleet ships, could furnish the necessary replacements in the active ships. Their training in operating vessels would in turn enhance the value of these Naval Reservists in much shorter time.
This discussion has necessarily been limited to the points which are considered fundamentally important. Many of the opinions and recommendations submitted are matters of frequent argument among those concerned directly or indirectly with the activities of this organization. In fact, controversial policies and concepts were purposely selected for presentation in the hope that more widespread, intelligent, and constructive discussion might result. Only in that way can we extend our knowledge and appreciation of that extremely valuable asset to our national defense—the “Mothball Fleet.”