Recently American newspapers have carried pictures of the U.S.S. Missouri—“The Mighty Mo”—off the coast of Korea, throwing the support of its tremendous broadsides into the action ashore where outnumbered U. S. soldiers and Marines were holding on to tenuous footholds against the attacks of swarms of North Korean and Chinese Communists. Only a year ago, the same Missouri was also in the headlines, but in an entirely different manner. For on the morning of January 17, 1950, while bound out from Norfolk to the sea, the Missouri had grounded hard and fast on a sand bar just off Old Point Comfort.
At once the Navy found itself faced with two problems: (1) fixing the responsibility for the human error that had resulted in the grounding; and (2) getting the ship off the bar and back into service again as speedily as possible.
The first problem the Navy took care of in its usual probing and investigation and disciplinary procedure. Unfortunately, owing to human nature being just such, the public interest of the newspapers and average citizens was centered mainly in this first human interest story. The tremendous problem relating to the ship itself, a problem immediately recognized by all engineers and seamen, was lost on all but the most analytical of the reading public.
Hence this article is written in the hope of enlightening the readers of the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings on the second, and little known, part of the Navy’s problem.
In plain language the job that confronted the Navy was just about the equivalent of moving the main RCA building at Rockefeller Center a distance of half a mile. The RCA building is 850 feet high; the Missouri is 888 feet long. And the Missouri’s 57,000 tons approach the weight of the RCA building.
These comparisons simply indicate the magnitude of the Navy’s problem. No one, as it happens, wants to move the RCA building, but freeing the Missouri and getting her back afloat and ready for service was distinctly imperative.
The Problem
It was common knowledge that the Missouri had grounded while running a special range to the left of the main ship channel. She had moved across the sand for approximately half a mile from the point where her bow first touched, and this had occurred at a time of unusually high tide. The difference between the normal draft of the ship and the depth of water around the ship after grounding was approximately seven feet. Thus at low tide she pressed down on her sandy bed with some 18,000 tons weight. From this preliminary information it became immediately apparent to the Navy that the salvage of the Missouri was a major operation and would require time. The decision was at once arrived at for Commander Cruiser Force, Atlantic, to move aboard the grounded ship with part of his staff and commence salvage operations.
An attempted pull-off had already been scheduled for that very afternoon, and it took place unsuccessfully at 1900. Tide tables had shown that a fairly high tide would not again occur until January 20, but that thereafter the nearest approach to the tidal conditions existing at the time of grounding would not be until February 2.
Divers reported that the ship was resting on fine to medium coarse sand, and that this sand had been packed by the ship’s weight to the consistency of a poor grade of cement. In the course of later dredging and tunneling operations, it was further disclosed that large boulders of the size of footballs and larger were embedded in this sand. However, there had been no damage to propellers or rudders, although a gash in the hull had opened three fuel tanks to the sea.
On the basis of this information a preliminary plan was organized in five parts, certain of which could be carried on concurrently:
1. Remove fuel oil by 2400, January 18.
2. Remove ammunition, boats, boat skids, anchors and chains, and stores as soon as possible.
3. Dredge close aboard along both sides.
4. Obtain beach gear and two submarine- rescue vessels.
5. Attempt to pull off with all tugs at evening tide on January 18 and at morning high tides on January 19 and 20.
Subsequently the pull-off attempts preprepared for January 18 and 19 were abandoned as being too time-consuming and unlikely of success. It was well established that any such attempt prior to removal of maximum weights had little chance of success. But the pull-off attempt proposed for the 20th could be accommodated without loss of time in the longer range plans; and in the event of an extra high tide, and even though the Missouri would still be some 4,000 tons heavy, the attempt on the 20th had a remote chance of succeeding. As expected, however, the attempt did not succeed, for the tide was not above that predicted.
The General Plan
Meanwhile, long-range plans were being formulated. The next high tide would occur on February 2. With this in view, and considering a most important factor which influenced plans and operations throughout the entire period, that of public relations, it became apparent that an immediate decision and public statement as to the target date of ultimate pull-off effort was necessary. Some unfavorable press notices had already appeared and these gave indications of increasing in volume and pointedness. It is not considered good practice to commit one’s self when so many variable factors are involved, but in this case some definite statement was needed. After considering all elements of the operation, it seemed feasible to complete the many salvage tasks planned by February 2, and accordingly this date was selected and published as that toward which all efforts were pointed. This was done with full recognition of the probability that if the Missouri was not afloat on or by February 2, higher authority would be forced to take some other and more drastic action.
After making an estimate of the situation, including the means available, the -basic plan was written.
To refloat the Missouri to deep water:
(a) By increasing her buoyancy and decreasing her displacement
(1) By removal of the maximum fluids, ammunition, stores, personnel, etc.
(2) By lifting her stern with pontoons.
(3) By tearing away the sand from under her and letting her settle further
(b) By pulling off
(1) With nine beach-gear rigs.
(2) With two especially powered salvage lifting vessels.
(3) With tugs equipped for towing.
(4) By using tugs as surging and twisting arm.
(c) By dredging an exit channel.
Major aspects of the operation were then outlined and drawn up, and daily schedules derived therefrom. These daily schedules were arrived at in Commander Cruiser Force Staff conferences held each day at 1100 and 1700, where hour by hour tasks were decided upon and promulgated for the succeeding day’s operations. These daily conferences, in addition to the details which were discussed, were a most important phase of all operations. It was through the medium of these conferences that Commander Cruiser Force, Atlantic, was able to create the necessary mutual understanding and thus impose upon his organization the need for utmost effort in every undertaking.
In planning the daily tasks it was necessary to consider carefully the space alongside the ship and the type of operations being conducted. These had to be integrated to prevent interference of the many tasks assigned which required space alongside the Missouri by various ships. Thus all dredging and major off-loading had to be completed prior to laying beach gear. To protect the divers, diving operations had to be conducted in areas at least two hundred feet from any dredging. The rigging of pontoons interfered to some extent with the rigging of beach gear, and so forth. The time space factors alongside the ship were developed into a diagram for clarity.
The plans provided that all tasks supporting the basic plan were to be completed by dark on 30 January, that a coordinating team rehearsal would be held at high tide on the morning of January 31, and that full pull-off efforts be scheduled on each morning high tide daily thereafter through the 4th of February.
Once the general plan had been outlined, it was never deviated from in any major aspect.
Major Aspects
The major aspects of the operation were derived from the general plan and are outlined and scheduled in brief below:
(a) Fuel. Off-load all fuel possible within the capacity of the pumps on January 18, 19, and 20.
(b) Dredging. Use the U. S. Army dredge Comber to dredge a trench on both sides of the Missouri forty feet deep and of sufficient width to allow that depth to be attained, and to dredge an exit channel one hundred and fifty feet wide and forty feet deep from the stern of the ship to the main channel. Obtain a hydraulic dredge and dredge to forty foot depth along the sides of the Missouri as close aboard as possible, port and starboard, and close astern. Divers wash out under the rudders, skegs, and counter, and tunnel under the hull along the sides aft.
(c) Beach Gear. Lay out nine sets of beach gear to be completed before ammunition was removed. Position two salvage lifting vessels, the Windlass and the Salvager, to utilize their own beach gear for maximum horizontal pull.
(d) Pontoons. Position three sets of submarine- salvage pontoons in vicinity of the skegs and rudders.
(e) Ammunition. Remove all ammunition from magazines by January 30.
(f) Stores. Remove all fresh and dry provisions and other stores in excess of one week’s supply, to be completed prior to January 28.
(g) Personnel. Be prepared to transfer about one thousand men ashore or to ships alongside any time after January 30.
(h) Special operations:
(1) Receive about two thousand tons of fuel aft of amidships on January 25 to provide crushing effect to induce some settling of the ship to gain buoyancy.
(2) Discharge all fuel oil, diesel oil, feed water and potable water, retaining only sufficient supply to last until 0600 February 2, to be completed by 0600, January 31.
(3) Remove the fluids in the three breached tanks by air pressure and shoring adjacent compartments.
(4) Make preparations to give the ship an explosive shock on January 29 and prior to removing the extra weight aft. This was in conjunction with (1) above.
(5) Provide for destroyers to make wash at high speeds.
To implement the tasks required of these major aspects, dredges, ships, equipment, and personnel experienced in salvage were obtained through cognizant authorities with the maximum of dispatch.
Summary of Operations
To summarize the operation, the following was accomplished during the period January 17 to 30.
(a) A net total of 12,023 tons of weight was removed from the Missouri.
(b) A total of 266,845 cubic yards of sand was dredged alongside and in the exit channel.
(c) A total of 651.4 man hours of diving operations were conducted. Divers were assigned to the work of tunneling under the hull, inspections, and rigging pontoons. It is estimated that a total of 1500 cubic yards of sand was removed from under the hull in the tunneling operations of divers.
(d) Nine sets of beach gear were rigged with winches and pulling gear on the Missouri. In addition, two salvage lifting vessels were rigged for maximum horizontal pull using their own anchor windlasses and pulling winches. Two preventer hawsers were placed on the bow of the Missouri to hold the ship in place in case of bad weather, and were rigged for quick release.
(e) A total of four pairs of pontoons were rigged, one pair at the bow (rigged after the pull-off attempt of January 31), two pairs under the skegs aft, and one pair rigged athwart the rudders. Due to difficulties in rigging, the latter pair was not effective during any pull-off attempt.
To coordinate planned pull-off attempts, an operation order was drawn up and promulgated. This order set up task groups with assigned tasks and group commanders. It provided for several contingencies which might arise during any pull-off attempt. It provided a plan to recover all gear once the ship was pulled free. It provided two detailed plans in the form of a sequence of events to occur during pull-off attempts. Plan One covered the period from minus two hours to minus one hour and was designed to develop maximum twisting effect. Zero Hour, the time of high tide, was promulgated the night before by dispatch.
Prior to dark on January 30 all the major tasks were completed with the exception of the pontoons. The after pair, those secured abreast the rudders, broke loose during a test run of the destroyers in preparation for their possible use to create waves. This pair of pontoons was never effectively re-rigged. In order to obtain a more even trim fore and aft, both anchors and all cable had been replaced and the forward peak tanks flooded, making a total addition of about 600 tons in the bow.
On the morning of January 31 the weather was calm and operations were begun during darkness and in a heavy fog. A flood tide of about one knot was running. Its direction was from about 10° on the starboard bow of the Missouri. Beach gear was set taut at 0515 and tugs began working up to speed shortly thereafter. All tugs were pulling at full speed by 0600. In the meantime, because of reduced visibility and the effects of the current, the towing unit had drifted to the northward, that is, clockwise with respect to the fore and aft axis of the Missouri. This drift to the northward resulted in one of the assisting harbor tugs of the towing unit getting across the double wire hawser used by the northern salvage lifting vessel. As a consequence, this vessel (one of the two most powerful units) had to slack off on her lines, and her full effectiveness was never realized. The twisting unit of the harbor tugs on the bow of the Missouri on this occasion was never fully effective because of the wash from the screws of the bow unit. The harbor tugs were not sufficiently powerful for the task assigned. Consequently, a full and effective twisting effort was never obtained on this occasion. One of the pulling tugs snapped her heavy towing wire. The remaining beach gear and tugs functioned as was expected. The effort obtained, therefore, on the morning of January 31 turned out to be exactly as it was named; that is, a coordination rehearsal. The Missouri remained hard aground.
Immediately following the unsuccessful attempt outlined above, the anchors and anchor chain were again removed. The peak tanks were emptied and the fourth pair of pontoons were rigged in place on the bow. Tugs were rearranged in accordance with the diagram on page 193.
On the morning of February 1 the weather was clear, but a southeast wind of, about 12 knots had developed during the night. At 0530, Plan One was executed. The twisting unit of three fleet tugs took its first pull on the starboard bow and began working up to full power at 0545. The port quarter beach gear was set taut at the same time. The ship started swinging to the right almost immediately, and within fifteen minutes was 10° to the right of her initial resting position. The twisting unit was then shifted to -the port bow. The port quarter beach gear was slacked and the starboard quarter beach gear set taut. Within a very short time the ship began swinging rapidly to port, and almost immediately report was received that the draft astern had increased some five feet.
At 0630, Plan Two was successfully executed. During this period only two untoward incidents occurred. The harbor tug attempting to pull the northern salvage lifting vessel (the Windlass) clear snapped her towing hawser, and it was only due to the splendid ship-handling efforts of the commanding officer of the Windlass that a serious casualty was prevented. Actually, the salvage vessel outboard of the port bow unit brushed the Windlass, but no serious damage was sustained. The second incident related to the pontoons. The after set broke loose when the ship started to come free and one of the pair sank. It was located in the main ship channel on February 10 by the AMCU-11, a specially equipped sonar ship of the Mine Force requested for the occasion. After locating the pontoon, the divers of the submarine rescue vessel Kittiwake recovered it.
The Recover Plan was executed by dispatch as soon as the Missouri was in deep water, and all gear except the one pontoon mentioned above was recovered and delivered to cognizant authorities by February 7.
Evaluation
In evaluating an operation such as this it is important to consider the conditions under which the salvage was conducted. The Missouri went aground in a protected harbor. Salvage operations, therefore, were never confronted with the problem of the open sea. The Missouri went aground on sandy bottom. The ship was not hung up on rocks. The Missouri was undamaged. Except for three compartments of 456 double bottoms, there was no flooding to contend with. Once afloat, there was no problem of stability. The 57,000 tons of the Missouri; her position of a half mile from deep water; the hard- packed sand, a good part of which had the consistency of light concrete; the heavy cumbersome salvage gear; the great number of officers and personnel to organize; the mutual understanding to be created together with the short time factor (that date of February 2): these were the primary considerations.
Another broad point in evaluation is the fact that the Navy does not have an operating salvage unit as such. It is recognized that maintenance of such a unit would be inefficient unless collateral duties were imposed upon it or unless it could be integrated into and used by a fleet or type commander in the normal execution of his duties. From the results obtained in this operation it would seem that such a unit could be organized and exist in fact, that it could be trained as a team for special duties of salvage and so disposed that its employment in salvage operations could be quickly obtained, and that it could operate from an organization, plans, and instructions already formulated and effective.
One of the most outstanding aspects of the entire operation was the quick and ready support and assistance which was supplied by all commands ashore and afloat throughout the entire Atlantic area. The mutual understanding between commands, the vast and diversified facilities, skills, and equipment which were available, the ingenuity, devotion to duty, and loyalty portrayed by individuals and groups, all go to prove that the Navy’s basic concepts of organization and training are sound and effective.
In the matter of training, it is considered that this operation bore to the salvage units involved the same relation that actual war bears to the Navy as a whole. It was more than training. It was a test of capabilities developed in training. With that in view, Commander Cruiser Force, Atlantic, obtained and employed ships, equipment, and personnel in excess of that actually required. Thus, students from the school of salvage at Bayonne, New Jersey, were asked for and did participate. The benefits derived by all hands in actual participation were much greater than could have been obtained in an artificially devised salvage exercise.
One of the most unusual features of the operation was the fact that not one single personnel casualty occurred. The dangers inherent in handling the heavy beach gear, pontoons and towing wires, in diving operations and off loading ammunition, and in the heavy strains involved, all were recognized. In addition, there was the ever-present hazard of fire in the Missouri, particularly considering her reduced fire-fighting capabilities under the circumstances. With the foregoing in view, a comprehensive program of security measures was instituted; and while it is recognized that luck looked on with favor, these measures are considered to have contributed greatly to the results.