Will the “Cold War” become a hot one? Certainly not if we can help it. Is Russia going to turn on the hot tap, and if so is this likely to be sooner or later? Who can say? But if we think she intends to do this at all, it would be only prudence on our part to answer, “Sooner.” Would she open up with the atom bomb, and if so would her targets be more or less military ones, or would she start a war of obliteration? If the latter, she would have calculated that we were more vulnerable in this respect than she was. In making our own calculations, it would be well for us to take into account the probability of a Communist Dictator thinking little of throwing into the scales the lives of hundreds of thousands of his own women and children and other non-combatants if he thought that that would give him even the slightest advantage. When weighing up these various possibilities we have to keep before us the fact that the aggressor nation must inevitably be more ready than the non-aggressor at the commencement of hostilities and stronger generally at the points of impact. Her peace footing, unlike that of her adversaries, will have been practically her war footing for some considerable period. The “Iron Curtain” facilitates the utmost secrecy and, in addition to all this, we could expect, at the critical moment, considerable injury at the hands of highly organized and fanatical Fifth Columnists.
Well, should Russia attack us under these favorable conditions for herself, what then? So far we have asked ourselves a number of questions to which we have been able to give vague answers or no answers at all; but here we can reply very definitely. We have to defend ourselves. Would the reprisals in kind to atom bomb attack, which we would presumably take, cover our defensive requirements? There exist authorities who maintain that this indeed would be the case, granted of course that we possessed sufficient atom bombs and aircraft to carry them as well as such superiority in the air as was needed to beat down enemy resistance to our attacks. These people are sanguine enough in peace-time debates, but it is to be doubted that were they to find themselves the responsible advisors to Government when war was imminent, they would commit themselves to such a definite assurance. How could they, knowing how greatly superior Russian air power would be at the points of attack? Would they, moreover, be in a position to know how much damage Russia could stand? The factors would be so unknown that we could not afford to gamble on them.
We should therefore be committed to certain defensive measures which, as we shall see, would be very extensive ones. Now these are big matters presenting many aspects on which I cannot competently remark; and even if I could, space would not permit me to do so. In any case my only object here is to bring out certain points which I hope will show the great influence sea power must have on the strategy, whether defensive or offensive, of the belligerents in a war of this nature.
In the first place we have to consider the possibility of Russia being a very definite menace to the sea communications of the Atlantic Powers. As a sea power she has one important weakness, which is that she possesses no central fleet on which detachments can fall back for support when faced with strong concentrations of our forces, and so can scarcely hope to garner the full fruits of sea power—namely, to use the sea in all the far-reaching ways which sea power confers on him who possesses it. But, with her large number of submarines and her gigantic air force Russia might well cause us very heavy shipping losses and injury to our bases. These in turn would impose delays and generally have an adverse effect on all our operations, whether sea, air, or land.
I have heard it said that owing to the size of the navy now maintained by the United States, it is no longer necessary for Great Britain to have a fleet on the scale hitherto thought necessary. That, for more than one reason, is an ill-considered opinion. It is far from being universally recognized—and sometimes even responsible ministerial chiefs appear to be ignorant in this respect—that the basis of calculation of the forces necessary to safeguard sea communications is not merely the strength of the enemy forces but also the number of merchant ships to be protected and the length of routes on which the latter are open to attack. Now, when one considers the speed and radius of action of aircraft and submarines, it becomes evident that apart from a few remote areas, shipping must be prepared for attack anywhere in the world-wide network over which our trade must ply. But it is not the trading ships only which have to be defended. Seeing that the countries of the British Empire, of Western Europe, and of the United States are mostly separated by vast expanses of water, it is only by that element that the great bulk of their armies, and indeed much of their air forces, can be moved to the points of concentration which strategy necessitates and, when there, maintained. Of outstanding importance in this connection would be the transportation of American armies to Europe, and on their safe and rapid passage much—almost all, as far as the existence of the Western European countries is concerned—would depend. Adding to these vast sea routes commitments a great number of detached operations, offensive and defensive, we perceive that the combined strength of the two navies would be none too great.
The defense of bases, both ship and air, is as important as is the defense of the sea routes, for without secure bases sea power loses one of its essential parts. It is, therefore, of prime importance that those bases should be completely equipped in peacetime with the weapons and appliances which modern conditions impose. These things cannot be installed and organized at short notice, and we must take into account the possibility of surprise attack. Pearl Harbor and the damage sustained by British ports in the late war were bad enough, but with atom bombs in play the result of unreadiness would be far more disastrous. There will, of course, never be a weapon of defense 100 per cent effective, but unless something very near 100 per cent of atom bombs can be effectively dealt with we, especially Britain, will be in a bad way.
Not only must we possess numerous strategic bases along the sea routes, but we must, in war, destroy or mask those of the enemy. But there is something of vital importance bearing on this matter which must give us the greatest preoccupation now, that is the spread of Communism in the Far East. Whatever happens, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, Formosa and the East Indian islands must not become available to Russia. On our policy as regards the future of Japan much of momentous importance depends.
It is well to remind ourselves that warships are not the only instruments whereby the control of sea communications is brought about. It is true that modern fleets can more and more meet day-to-day air requirements in sea operations, but when the enemy sets in motion large air concentrations against shipping, warships, and bases, then the central air forces must be thrown into the battle. I would suggest that in a' defensive strategy, such as we are discussing, the main object of these central air forces is to fight to obtain command in the air over the area whence enemy air forces sally forth to prey on shipping, warships, and bases, and, in addition, to reinforce the sea forces when necessary. It cannot be repeated often enough that this air participation in the struggle for sea power must not be looked upon by airmen, as it frequently was in the late war, as being in the nature of a sideshow. The sea being a factor vitally affecting every part of our strategy, its demands must be accorded high priority in every quarter where contribution to meet those demands can be made. Armies, seeing that they have so much to do with the defense and capture of bases, are equally affected.
It is in the nature of Britons and Americans to accept a defensive policy unwillingly. They prefer to be guided by the maxim, “Offense is the best defense.” That slogan becomes a mere cliche when applied indiscriminately and under all circumstances. There are many occasions in war when a cool and calculated defensive interlude will not only not delay ultimate victory but will most certainly hasten it; and conversely, a hasty general offensive before flanks, rear, and lines of communications have been made secure, will result in defeats, loss of equipment, supplies, and territory. The time taken to make up these losses inevitably means a prolongation of the war. The late war has lessons of which we should take heed. We— that is, Great Britain—early in the hostilities started an air offensive against enemy towns and centers of production which at that period incommoded the enemy very little. We marched our tiny army, with hardly any air support, into Holland, thus allowing superior enemy armies, well covered in the air, to pass around our flanks and rear and force us into the sea at Dunkirk. Britain, her oversea bases, and her sea communications were inadequately defended. Had we not lost so much shipping, the invasion of France might have been accomplished a year earlier than it was. It is true enough that our armament had been pitifully reduced in the years of peace, but equally true that that should have dictated a policy of strict and integrated defense by all arms and strict adherence to the principle of Economy of Force until we had built up the resources of the Empire—and until the United States had joined us—to a pitch where we could stage an effective offensive strategy.
But the maxim that offense is the best defense does, after all, hold good when applied within the framework of an over-all defensive strategy. The old direction to “Seek out and destroy the enemy” threatening our shipping, or the invasion of our country, is as applicable today as it was in the past, and it now applies to air forces as much as to fleets. Britain was always most successful in her maritime wars when she first destroyed the fleets of her enemies and then mopped up the latters’ trade. Is not that principle equally correct for air forces? Seek out and destroy the enemy in the air and then (if the statesmen think this expedient) destroy his towns in comparative leisure. Mr. Churchill describes in his book The Second World War how serious the situation became in 1940 as day by day our ability to defend ourselves in the air was being weakened by German air attack on our fighter bases. Suddenly, however, Goering switched these attacks to London, and grim as the consequent damage and suffering to us must be, Churchill breathed again. This is what he noted down: “It was therefore with a sense of relief that Fighter Command felt the German attack turn to London. . . . Goering should certainly have persevered against the airfields, on whose organization and combination the whole fighting power of our Air Force at this moment depended. By departing from the classic principles of war, as well as from the hitherto accepted dictates of humanity, he made a foolish mistake.” (The italics are mine.)
It seems to be accepted as a matter of course that, should Russia drop atom bombs on our towns, we should do the same to hers—a slogging match with women and children getting most of the slogs. If that nature of counter action is indeed the only way by which we can defend ourselves, well and good; we must take it. But would it necessarily be the only way, and would it even stop this form of enemy attack? Would it give protection to our shipping and would it stop the enemy’s advance across Western Europe? Visualizing the conditions of a sudden and overwhelming attack, I would say most emphatically that this would not necessarily be the most advantageous course to pursue; that it would probably be one where we would be merely reacting in a way desired by the enemy, and that we should lose far more than we gained, both in the short as well as the long run. It seems to me as clear as daylight that by refusal necessarily to play according to the enemy’s gambit we should not only better assure our security but so spoil the enemy’s opening move that the. initiative would pass from him to ourselves much sooner than it otherwise would. By a cool and resolute adherence on our part, unshaken by the enemy’s blows, to a policy of first things first we would, in that very first clash of arms, lay for ourselves the foundations of ultimate victory. We must hold on to certain strategic areas and also defend them from shattering air attack, and we must hunt out and destroy the forces that threaten our shipping. What consolation would it be to us if we laid flat Leningrad and Moscow, the while British ports were blasted, our ships sunk, and Western Europe over-run? We have to fight with everything we have at hand, and complete concentration on the one object would be absolutely essential. That one object would be to hold fast until we got a respite. That respite would come mainly from the sea, with the ships bringing the men, weapons, and supplies from America, the Commonwealth, and other countries without which we could never deploy the forces necessary for a great offensive. So every missile we have must be used against the forces attacking us, whether in the air, on land, or at sea, and against their bases, lines of communication, and oil,
The strategic offensive, being a less controversial subject, calls for few words here. It must be generally agreed that modern navies have far greater offensive power than they had in former days, and can play a big part in a general offensive. The operations open to them need not be severally discussed, but one particular one calls for remark. The history of British continental wars abounds in incidents where sea power has enabled her to bring succor to resistance movements in nations occupied by her enemies. Such operations ranged from the landing of arms and supplies and minor coastal affairs to landings in force and ultimately to invasions. A classic example of this sort of operation was the Peninsular War, where a comparatively small British army with sea power behind it, acting in a disaffected country, played a major part in bringing about the defeat of Napoleon. That analogy must not be carried too far but the principle remains and could be successfully applied with the very different type of forces of today.
Disaffected countries! There would be Russia’s “Achilles heel.” Her rulers realize only too well the fires smouldering underground, fires that would leap up and roar if the slightest vent could be opened. That knowledge is probably more of a deterrent to her plunging the world into war than almost anything else. In war it would cause her the greatest preoccupation, compelling her to immobilize armies and air detachments in many areas. Here we see the flexibility of sea power; it can strike from so many different directions, and with air power it can strike hard. The possibility of effective action of this sort would appear to be great. Nations will not forever be kept down by foreign despots, but will rise when the chance is given them, and throw off the yoke. Russia, like aggressor nations before her, is working out her own destruction. One wonders if Stalin realizes this and, realizing, is afraid. He would be still more afraid if he realized (which he probably does not, Russians understanding little of what sea power means) that; other things being equal, the belligerent who holds command at sea is bound to win in the end. History has proved this and will prove it again; for less than ever can any country exist if all the seas are closed to her.