Mutual Defense Insurance

Recently the Congress of the United States, acting as trustee for the bene- . fit of the American People, took out a new insurance policy with a first year’s premium of over a billion dollars. The expressed intent of the insurance is “to promote the foreign policy and to provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing military assistance to foreign nations.” This additional protection purchased by the Congress for America is known as the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (Public Law 329, 81st Congress, approved October 6, 1949).¹

In the words of Senator McMahon, one of its supporters, it is but “another in a series of logical steps in the unfolding foreign policy of the United States.” It is true that, taken by itself, our extra coverage represents a radical departure from America’s historic policy of non-involvement in European affairs. However, anyone who doubts the need for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program because it forsakes traditional American foreign policy closes his eyes to recent bitter lessons of history; to the fact that we have fought in two world wars and that before each one our cocoon-like reliance on twin policies of neutrality and isolation failed dismally to save us. Such a doubter also is blind to the realities of post-World War II developments and particularly to the fact that the United Nations is not working effectively to guarantee the peace of the world. As Senator Connally warned on the floor of the Senate during debate on the MDAP, “We have to recognize the facts as they exist.” We are in the situation, the old story familiar to lawyers, where the lawyer tells his client who consults him by phone “they can’t put you in jail for that,” and the client replies, “I’ve got news for you, counsellor. I’m calling you from the jail.”

A recent article in the Proceedings, “The Atlantic Alliance,” by Robert McCormick (August, 1949), traced the steps which led to the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, of which MDAP is but a logical implementation. Mr. McCormick voiced the belief that if the North Atlantic Pact were accomplished there would be a real hope of lasting peace for years to come. His article made clear some of the reasons why a defensive military alliance between the Atlantic community of nations had become a strategic “must” for our foreign policy and defense planners. Such an alliance actually became a binding treaty-contract when on July 21, 1949, the Senate voted 82-13 for ratification. The vote came only after the most soul- searching examination of a proposed treaty since the days when the Senate refused to ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations. Following the most extensive hearings in the history of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, during which ninety- seven witnesses were heard, the Treaty came to the floor for debate on June 30. For thirteen full legislative days thereafter (July 5-21, 1949) the Senate devoted almost exclusive attention to the problem of ratification, a decision which the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations predicted would have “a tremendous impact upon world events for generations.” Anyone who takes the time to read the full course of Senate debate will be amply repaid, for he will find unfolded there the full panorama of American history in the fields of diplomacy and international law and relations.

No textbook, however well written, could compare to the voice of the “greatest deliberative body in the world” as it struggled, through democratic process, to arrive at its momentous decision to ratify a foreign policy so far removed from the charted course of Washington and Jefferson. Indicative of the feelings aroused are the following brief Senatorial descriptions of the Treaty. Its proponents called it “the greatest discouragement to war which we have yet devised”—Vandenberg (Cong. Record July 6, p. 9066); “a living instrument for righteousness and peace”—Dulles (Cong. Record July 12, p. 9494); “a flaming ‘do not enter’ sign to any aggressor”—Connally (Cong. Record July 5, p. 8991). Yet its detractors, just as sincere and just as positive, classed it as “the essence of the same despotism that resulted in the American Revolution”;— Jenner (Cong. Record July 15, p. 9743); “a treaty which will do more to bring about a third World War than it ever will to maintain the peace of the world”—Taft (Cong. Record July 11, p. 9388). Finally, there were those who voted for ratification with such conscience-wrenching reservations as, “I am going to vote for it without any optimism and with great fear that it will be but a futile gesture”—Mundt (Cong. Record July 14, p. 9462), or “I shall vote for the Treaty, but I have never taken a dose of medicine in my life which was so bitter for me”—Gillette (Cong. Record July 11, p. 9378). Surely a document which could call forth such deep and obviously sincere statements from our chosen representatives is one the significance of which all Americans should understand.

Before considering the commitments of the Treaty and its vital corollary, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, it is essential to understand why we had to have them. At Dumbarton Oaks and at San Francisco, an instrument was forged, which, if followed with good faith, would have been a guarantee of lasting world peace. That instrument was the Charter of the United Nations. Unfortunately for the hopes of the world, breaches of faith on the part of one nation and the sin of 45 vetoes by that same nation, have rendered the Charter prostrate and helpless to realize its objectives. But the veto alone is not responsible for the frustration of the Charter’s purpose “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Soviet representatives in U.N. have consistently campaigned to obstruct and sabotage peaceful creative effort in the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Military Staff Committee and the Atomic Energy Commission. The United Nations has become for Russia a sounding board for Communist propaganda instead of, as the Charter envisaged, a holy crusade for collective security. Moreover, Soviet policy is as guilty of nonfeasance and non-cooperation in the activities of U.N. as it is of misfeasance and breach of good faith in the use of the veto. A recent address by Deputy Undersecretary Dean Rusk of the State Department clearly illustrates the trend:

“The impact of Soviet policy is felt not merely in its abuse of the veto in the Security Council— an abuse which is threatening to sap the prestige of that vital body. The more important veto is on the ground, in places like Greece and Korea, where settlement has been frustrated by a refusal to use the elementary processes of peace. Commissions established by the Security Council and by the General Assembly have been boycotted. Of the eleven specialized agencies, organized to carry out essential technical and economic work for the United Nations, the Soviet Union belongs to only two—The International Telecommunications Union and the Universal Postal Union, both of which predated the United Nations. Where the United Nations has sought to carry out a major humanitarian effort as in the International Refugee Organization, the program for Palestine Refugee Relief, or the International Children’s Emergency Fund, the contribution from Moscow has been zero.” (State Department Bulletin No. 539 of 31 October 1949.)

Is it any wonder that with such a record on the part of the Soviets our disillusioned statesmen sought a means, within the framework of the Charter, to improve the world’s chances for collective security without being subject to the paralysis of the veto? Some way had to be found to shore up the crumbling walls of the United Nations. Fortunately, a formula, based upon the Pan American system, existed within the provisions of the Charter. This formula found its way into the Charter only because our Latin American neighbors insisted that this hemisphere’s proven system of collective defense, as exemplified by the Act of Chapultepec, should not be sacrificed to the new and untried world security system. At the insistence of the Latin American nations and through the personal intervention of President Truman a deadlock on the relationship of the two systems was broken and Article 51 of the Charter eventuated. This article, which is not subject to the veto, and is the basis of the Rio Pact, the Brussels Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty, has now become for the democratic nations of the world the most important and hopeful provision of the Charter. Stymied by the unanimity principle (which also killed the League of Nations) of Article 27 and disappointed with the effectiveness of Article 39, which vests in the Security Council the determination of the “existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression,” believers in the United Nations could yet find hope in the wise provisions of Article 51, which guarantees the “inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs.” The full text of Article 51 reads as follows:

“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self- defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

President Truman’s commitment to the Latin American countries at San Francisco was fulfilled in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance formalized at Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947. This treaty provides in Article 3 that:

“An armed attack against any American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.”

The contractual obligations of the Rio Pact simply put the Monroe Doctrine and the Act of Chapultepec on a binding multilateral basis. The Monroe Doctrine had been in existence for over a hundred years. Consequently, the objections made by the Soviets to the conclusion of the Rio Pact never approached the fury of their attacks on subsequent regional defense systems organized under Article 51. When, six months after the Rio Pact was concluded, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (with sympathetic encouragement at least, from the United States) signed a similar collective Self Defense Treaty, Russian condemnation increased in tempo. The charge was made that the treaties violated the spirit of the Charter and that they were military alliances aimed at another United Nations member, namely Russia. In all fairness it must be admitted that there is a certain amount of specious plausibility to the charge, particularly with respect to the Brussels and North Atlantic Pacts. But consider for a moment whence came the pressure which made these treaties necessary. Consider the frustration of the peaceful objectives of U.N. by the complaining nation and then remember Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and the other nations of Europe which had been swallowed up and forced into defensive alliances with Russia. Was this not enough to give pause to the most hopeful nation?

Examine Article 51 again. Does not the “inherent right of collective self defense” carry with it the inherent right of preparation for defense? As Senator Graham phrased it in the debate on the North Atlantic Treaty:

“Nations that have been given storm warnings that they are in the possible path of the hurricane may exercise an inherent right in making an agreement and plans for collective self defense.” (Cong. Record July 20, 1949, p. 9993).

Another point to remember when considering the Soviet charges is that there are provisions in the Rio, Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties which reaffirm faith in the purposes and principles of the United Nations and encourage the peaceful settlement of international disputes under the Charter provisions. In net effect, the pacts never operate if the Security Council always operates. The contracts of mutual defense are simply anchors to windward, which in view of the record of the Security Council, prudent nations, like prudent sailors, have ready for sudden emergencies. There is ample evidence to prove to the satisfaction of the fair minded that the pacts in question are explicitly inter-woven into the legal fabric of the Charter provisions and that they are designed not for aggression but for defense against aggression.

The negotiation of the Atlantic Treaty was given impetus by the Senate of the United States through the unusual procedure of a Senate Resolution (S. Res. 239, 81st Congress, June 11, 1948) advising the President to explore the possibility of pursuing the “association of the United States by constitutional process with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self help and mutual aid and as affects its national security” and contribution “to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self defense under Article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.” Too often we think of treaties as being negotiated by the Executive Department without consultation with the Senate which is then asked, ex post facto, for its “advice and consent.” In the case of the North Atlantic Treaty we find the reverse and in the eyes of the legislators at least, the proper method for the “advice and consent” clause of the Constitution to operate.

Pursuant to the mandate of the Senate, the Secretary of State entered into conversations with six of the signatory States about the security of the North Atlantic Area. During the entire course of the negotiations Secretary Acheson sought and received further advice from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Finally, on April 4, 1949 at Washington, D. C., the Treaty (which runs for a minimum of twenty years but may be denounced after ten years with one year’s notice) was signed by representatives of the United States, Canada, Iceland, Portugal, Italy, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Norway.

The heart of the Treaty and at the same time its most controversial provisions may be found in Articles 3, 5, and 9. Article 3 reads as follows:

“In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”

The terms of this article commit the United States to an important obligation. The extent of this obligation cannot be measured, but as already noted the first year’s premium amounts to over a billion dollars. We have bound ourselves to the principle of self help and mutual aid and we have agreed to work together in building up the military capacities of all signatories to defend themselves and ourselves against attack. How much we contribute, and for how long, depends on a great many intangibles, difficult to translate into dollars and cents. During testimony on the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, which implements Article 3, Secretary of Defense Johnson estimated that the program of building up the European signatories’ defense establishments would extend over a period of 4 or 5 years and, he hoped, would cost less each year. When asked the ultimate over all cost of the program however, he replied “The man does not live who can make an over all guess on that.” (MAP Hearings on S. 2388 p. 55). On being asked a similar question, General Bradley, speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was even more non-committal. He stated:

“That is the way I view it, because the building up of the security of Europe is going to cost a lot of money, but we feel most of it has to be done by the nations of Europe themselves. That may take a great many years for them to do that themselves, depending upon their rate of economic recovery, and if at any time this country feels that that should be speeded up, to reduce the time when they arrive at that point of security, then you might want to sponsor a similar program, or more, or less. If through their recovery they have demonstrated their ability to build up their security within a reasonable time without undue risk of inviting aggression before they reach that ability to defend themselves, you might not want to give them anything. So it seems to me that it is so dependent on the future situation that I am unable to answer it.” (MAP Hearings on S. 2388 p. 107).

Senators who opposed the program were not so reticent about estimating its cost. Thus, Senator George, basing his figures on equipment needed to effectively arm the 35 to 50 divisions General Bradley testified would be necessary to hold an aggressor in check until reinforcements came, stated:

“it must involve the expenditure within the next five years—by 1954, I believe—of from $8,000,000,000 to $12,000,000,000.” (Cong. Record September 21, 1949, p. 13331).

To what does Article 5 commit us? It reads as follows:

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

“Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

Is “such action as we deem necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area” tantamount to an automatic involvement in war against any aggressor? The interpretation of this article concerned the Senators more than any other. The money commitment inherent in implementation of Article 3 by a program of military assistance was bothersome enough, but an article which seemed to bind us to war was an even more serious matter. Only Congress has the power to declare war and that power must be exercised jointly by the House of Representatives and the Senate, whereas only the Senate’s concurrence is needed to approve a treaty.

The answer to the extent of our commitment under Article 5 seems to lie in the interpretation of the phrase “including the use of armed force.” By normal construction, this phrase suggests other alternatives, for whatever comfort they may give. Everything would depend, of course, on the nature of the event. As Senator Vandenberg explained:

“A minor aggression might be stopped by a vigorous warning. An instant appeal to the Security Council might succeed and suffice. (His tongue must have been in his cheek here.) If the Security Council defaults, the so called pacific sanctions described in the Charter (Article 41) might be applied by the partners under the pact. . . But suppose the event is obviously of major and deliberate magnitude and clearly discloses a criminal aggressor deliberately on the march—as Hitler entered Poland or as the Kaiser entered Belgium. ... If it is, it threatens total war or total surrender, pact or no pact. If it is, our commitment is clear as crystal. It is to take whatever action we deem necessary to maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area, which vividly includes the security of the United States. If the only action adequate is war then it means war. . . If it does mean war I venture to say that we would be infinitely better off for having instant and competent Allies. But if it does mean war, only Congress itself, under the specific terms of the Pact (and our Constitution), can declare it.” (Cong. Record. July 6, 1949. p. 9068-9) .(Matter in parentheses added)

Opponents of the Treaty leveled their heaviest guns at Article 5, and certainly its commitments do spell out a radical departure from America’s historic policy of “splendid isolation.” For the first time in our life as a nation in peacetime we find ourselves bound by treaty to take steps which, if they don’t amount to war, are as close as one can come to it without saying the awful words. The Pact’s supporters, however, viewed Article 5 as an incalculable influence for peace and the converse, a powerful deterrent to war. They pointed out with a great deal of force that had Hitler and the Kaiser known that America’s great potential was committed instantly, upon aggression, to the cause of the Allies, World Wars I and II might never have happened. They hoped their hypotheses would work equally well with future aggressors.

To the military planner the import of Article 5 is immediately apparent. He no longer has to count on probable or possible allies in the event of war. He knows who they will be in advance and, moreover, can join his allies around a table and draw up combined plans in much greater detail than has ever before been possible. No one in or out of the military forces wants war, but it’s our business and duty to prepare defensive plans in case of attack. That job has now been made easier and less confused by hypotheses.

Article 9 goes hand in hand with Articles 3 and 5. The latter articles describe what we are committed to do while the former sets up the machinery for making recommendations on how it will be accomplished. Article 9 reads as follows:

“The Parties hereby establish a council on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of the Treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.”

The North Atlantic Council has already (Nov. 18,1949)² held two meetings and seems well organized to carry out its task of implementation. Its sole function is to consult, advise and recommend. Secretary of State Acheson serves as its first Chairman. The Defense Committee on which Secretary of Defense Johnson represents the United States and is Chairman for the first year, has been in effective operation for several months. The Council and the Defense and Military Committees have been engaged in accelerated action because of a provision the Congress of the United States inserted in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. The legislators, not wishing to appropriate money to implement unrelated national defense plans, specifically withheld nine tenths of the billion dollars authorized to be appropriated ($500,000,000 in cash and $500,- 000,000 in contract authority) until such time as the President had approved “recommendations for an integrated defense of the North Atlantic Area which may be made by the Council and the Defense Committee to be established under the North Atlantic Treaty.” The Military and Defense Committees have been working on the plan for several months and the meeting in Paris was for the purpose of formally approving the Committees’ detailed labors. The Council approved these commendations at the meeting held in Washington on January 6, 1950. Upon approval by the President on January 27, 1950 of the Council’s action with respect to the Defense Committee’s proposed plan, the $900,000,000 became available for use, subject only to the conclusion of conditioned bilateral agreements which were signed on the same date but which in certain instances require parliamentary approval.

The importance of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act should be obvious to every military man. They alter our whole strategic thinking and sooner or later in our careers every one of us will become involved in their implementation phase. One need only look at the daily orders of any service to see how many officers have already been ordered to duty in one of the subsidiary planning or advisory groups envisaged by Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty and Section 406 (b) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act which provides that “personnel of the armed forces may be assigned or detailed to non-combatant duty, including duty with any agency or nation, for the purpose of enabling the President to furnish assistance under this Act.”

The actual terms of our billion dollar insurance policy, earlier mentioned in this article, are to be found in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act itself.³ Like most insurance policies, it contains a lot of fine print but, to the service man, this print is as alive as the clauses of a real policy to an insurance agent. Officers specializing in plans, logistics and operations will certainly be called upon to make contributions in their particular fields. The collection, choice and shipment of equipment, the integration of that equipment into the Armed Forces of the several nations in accordance with each nation’s assigned tasks, and the technical operating advice needed to insure effective use all will require participation by experts from our Armed Forces.

Let us examine for a moment some of the basic objectives of the Mutual Defense Program. The primary aim is self-serving. Let there be no mistake about that. The idea is to insure our future security and protect our past, present and future investments in the economic recovery of the democratic nations of Europe. The European signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty, surrounded as they are on every hand by evidences of aggressive activities by the Soviet Union, need their sense of security restored. The first step in rebuilding their moral will to resist aggression was our promise, under Article 5 of the Treaty, to come to their assistance if attacked. The second step is this program which will restore their own ability to meet and hold any aggressive action in check until America’s might reaches their side.

Militarily, the political objectives of the Treaty and Program would be accomplished by putting existing defense forces, already in being but lacking in equipment, on a basis of efficiency, and gearing those forces into an integrated defense unit for the common cause. A secondary objective, both political and military, would be the bolstering of physical as well as moral resistance to internal upheaval.

In broad terms the program provides:

First: All United States military assistance projects including existing program for Greece, Turkey, Iran, Korea and the Philippines are to be brought together into a single over-all program.

Second: All assistance provided to Atlantic Treaty nations will be used to promote the integrated defense of the North Atlantic Area in accordance with plans developed by the Military and Defense Committees established under Article 9 of the Treaty.

Third: Assistance to western Europe will take three main forms. Arms and equipment will be furnished to meet deficiencies of the presently organized military forces. Military advisory groups will provide technical and training assistance in the reception, maintenance and employment of the American equipment involved. Finally, a small amount of direct aid, in the form of machine tools and raw materials will go to enable European countries to increase their military output. This assistance is intended to complete existing facilities and not to build complete factories.

Fourth: Safeguards are provided in the law to protect our own military stocks from depletion beyond the safety, point. Thus, a limit of $450,000,000 was placed on the amount of excess equipment which could be furnished, and no material can be provided out of normal (non-excess) military stocks without a finding by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense that such transfer would not be detrimental to the national interest of the United States. Our mobilization reserve must be kept at an adequate level.

Fifth: A series of bilateral agreements have been executed between the United States and the countries concerned prior to the furnishing of any aid to make as certain as any agreement can that the equipment provided is effectively used. Military advisers from our Armed Forces will have the duty of helping the armed forces of the' participating nations to make the most effective use of the equipment provided.

Sixth: Both the President and the Congress (the latter by Concurrent Resolution) have the power to terminate aid under the law. The President can do so whenever he determines that the aid being furnished is not being used in accordance with the policies and purposes of the Act or is not in harmony with our obligations under the United Nations Charter.

Let us examine some of the specific provisions of the Act. By Section 101 the President is authorized to furnish military assistance to North Atlantic Treaty Countries to promote their integrated defense. That word “integrated” is the keynote of the law. As the Conference Report on the bill stated:

“Contribution of military resources to an integrated defense of the North Atlantic is a prudent investment for the American people. Contribution of military resources to a congeries of national military establishments, each devoted to its own particular national interests, would be no investment but merely a futile expenditure.” (Cong. Record, Sept. 27th, 1949, p. 13549).

Our own troubles under the National Security Act with assignment of roles and missions, not to mention the dollar, should pale to insignificance alongside the tremendous problems (diplomatic as well as military) involved in integrating and articulating a unified plan involving many countries and defense establishments. Obviously, because of their location most of the early land fighting would fall upon the French, Benelux and other Continental countries. Testimony given in open Congressional hearings made this clear. The long-range naval and air power in large measure will have to be provided by this country and the United Kingdom. But where does that leave the French Navy? Already rumblings are beginning to sound from across the Atlantic. But if those countries and their defense establishments can bury their traditions and knuckle to the commonweal, the moral for our own Defense Establishment should be obvious.

The equipment, materials, and services authorized to be furnished under Section 101 are to go to those signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty who have heretofore requested assistance. Those countries (Title I Countries) are the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark and Italy. The three remaining Atlantic Pact countries (Portugal, Iceland and Canada) did not request assistance. However, under another provision of the law (Sec. 408) the President may sell military equipment to any nation which is now or hereafter joins with the United States in a collective defense and regional arrangement. This would include all members of the Rio Pact and of any possible future Pacts in the Pacific or Mediterranean. As a matter of fact, such an authorization has been long sought by the Executive for we have in the last few years suffered the intense embarrassment of not being able to sell or procure military equipment even for our good neighbor Canada. This provision will be a great boon to standardization of equipment and it should be noted that the authorization has no time limit.⁴

Sections 102 and 103 authorize for Title I Countries the appropriation (since appropriated by the Congress) of 500 million dollars each, in cash and contract authority respectively, to carry out the purposes of the Act.

The Act further provides in Section 402 that prior to the furnishing of assistance to any eligible nation, the President shall conclude bilateral agreements with such nation, which must contain certain mandatory provisions affecting the use, transfer of title and security, in order to protect the interests of the United States. Another important mandatory provision of these agreements is the so-called reciprocity clause. This underlines the mutuality of the program by giving the President the right to ask for reciprocal assistance to the United States or to other participants in the program. Presumably, this could include base or transit facilities for United States forces.

Under the terms of section 403 (b) not to exceed $450,000,000 worth (at original acquisition cost) of excess equipment and materials may be furnished under this Act. Actually only the cost of repair, rehabilitation or modification and shipping of such equipment will be charged against the Program. Thus, at a cost of approximately $77,000,000 (estimated by Secretary Johnson in the Senate hearings), the beneficiary countries may receive as much as $450,000,000 worth of equipment.

The Act also makes provision for continuance of aid to Greece and Turkey ($211,370,000) and allots some $27,000,000 to be split up between Korea, Iran and the Philippines.

Another unusual provision is an authorization for the President to spend $75,000,000 to carry out the policies and purposes declared in the Act in the general area of China. The President is not required to account for expenditures made nor does he need, necessarily, to expend them for military assistance. Of interest to naval officers is the following colloquy between Senator Connally and Senator Knowland with respect to the discretionary power of the President over the $75,000,000 fund,. and the strong influence of the testimony of Vice Admiral Badger, U.S.N. on the amount set aside for aid to China:

“MR. KNOWLAND. I believe the Senator from Texas is correct in that respect. I believe the bill contains ample safeguards not only in relation to China and the general area of China, but also in relation to other sections of the world. I also believe that such discretionary power rests in the President and that, at any time he feels that it is necessary to do so, he may curtail or restrict or eliminate the use of the funds.

“MR. CONNALLY. That is correct.

“MR. KNOWLAND. But I should like to point out that the amount of $75,000,000 was not picked entirely out of thin air. The amount arose from the testimony of Admiral Badger, who indicated that in his judgment the minimum amount that would be necessary in order to meet the situation in China and the general area of China—but his references were particularly directed to China—would be no less than $75,000,000.

“The amendment I had originally offered provided for a considerably larger sum, but I want the RECORD to show that the amount of $75,000,000 came largely as the result of Admiral Badger’s testimony.” (Cong. Record, September 19, 1949, p. 13270).

It is quite probable that the world has not seen its last regional defense pact under Article 51 of the Charter. It is of interest to note that the Congress in the “Findings and Declaration of Policy” of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act expressed itself as “favoring the creation by the free countries and the free peoples of the Far East of a joint organization, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to establish a program of self help and mutual cooperation designed to develop their economic and social well being, to safeguard basic rights and liberties and to protect their security and independence.” Whether this declaration of policy presages a “Pacific Pact” will depend, of course, on the reaction of the countries concerned. The extent of United States participation in such a venture will probably have to await the recommendations of Ambassador Philip Jessup, now touring the Far East in a special advisory capacity to advise and recommend to the Secretary of State a dynamic, consistent Far Eastern Policy. As noted above the President has $75,000,000 at his disposal to underwrite the beginning of a program of military assistance to implement a Pacific Pact if it is practicable and profitable to do so.⁵ Our policy of mutual defense insurance should be made worldwide if the tide of Communism is to be stemmed on all fronts. It is futile to bolster our moral and military defenses in one part of the world and neglect them in another, for Communism is like molten lava erupting into the crater of a volcano. One never knows at what point on the crater rim the lava will overflow. But, like Communism, lava always seeks the weakest spot, the course of least resistance. That is why we must be vigilant all around the mountainside until time, or the United Nations, finds a way to control the danger and secure lasting peace for the world.