We hear a great deal these days of morale in the armed services. The subject appears frequently in the press and on the radio, particularly in connection with matters such as the recent pay bill and the Congressional hearings on unification. An enlightened public knows that high morale in an organization for which it is paying the expenses is an excellent indication of efficiency. The greatly increased cost of national defense and the uncertainty of a lasting peace have both stimulated the interest of the people in the morale of their Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Of the many components of military morale, discipline is perhaps the most important. In the original and scholarly meaning of the word, discipline is the treatment suited to a disciple or a learner; it does not necessarily mean punishment. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the major psychological aspects of discipline and to present in simple language some of the reasons behind the rules for human behavior.
For an officer whose military education preceded his understanding of the science of behavior, it is interesting to note that little in the teaching of modern psychology and sociology contradicts the lessons in leadership taught in the armed services. A good division officer or executive officer exemplifies daily the complex principles of human relations whose terminology he might find unfamiliar. But it is considered important for officers today to understand why many of the standards of good military leadership are so well accepted. In such understanding a leader can increase his abilities to command: from, knowledge, sea power.
Since motivation determines behavior, either disciplined or undisciplined, we may group the terms together and examine men’s behavior and the resultant level of discipline in terms of their motivation. Discipline is based on a variety of factors both physical and psychological. The physical factors will only be mentioned in passing, since they are readily understood. Certainly a military unit must be well equipped, well fed, and must be afforded good medical attention if possible. It is axiomatic that the leader must provide for his men all the available necessities and comforts. But the importance of these material factors is much exaggerated in the popular mind. The defenders of Stalingrad or Carlson’s Raiders on Guadalcanal had few of the necessities and none of the comforts of life; yet they displayed a quality of discipline of the highest order. The one basic requirement for discipline in terms of physical factors is that their scarcity or nonexistence must be understood and accepted by all hands. This necessity cannot be too strongly emphasized. For example, if your destroyer, delayed in returning to port, is eating dehydrated potatoes while the ship alongside in the nest has fresh ones, it might be wise to pass the word around informally that it was a matter of first come, first served, instead of mere indifference. The principle concerning the acceptance of their environment by military men brings us to the first of the psychological factors behind effective discipline: keeping men informed.
First Basic Factor—Information
At first glance it may seem too obvious to warrant discussion to maintain that all military personnel should be well indoctrinated. It is obvious that everyone feels more at ease and can work more efficiently when he knows the structure of his organization and the rules to be followed in living and working within that organization. It is the exceptional military unit, however, that implements this principle completely. Most commanders believe in and even advocate a a policy of thorough dissemination of information, but few ever follow up and determine how thoroughly the word is trickling down to the lowest echelons. It is not enough to post a Plan of the Day and to instruct the division officers daily at quarters to inform their men of a few facts. Keeping the men informed must be an organized, methodical, continuous part of their training and instruction. Two major purposes are served by such a program. The men gain a full understanding of their jobs, thereby increasing their interest, initiative, imagination, and performance. Secondly, the men develop favorable attitudes toward serving in the Navy and toward performing their assigned tasks. The method used in informing personnel depends on the size of the command and the ingenuity of its leaders. Frequent group conferences at each level, down to conferences with the men led by a petty officer or junior officer, are probably the most effective method. Others are: unit newspapers, bulletin boards, public address broadcasts, and printed circulars.
Information concerning their own organization is of primary interest to the men. All officers and men, for example, should be familiar with the organization book of their ship; the lines of responsibility and the division of labor delineated therein are of slight value, if not widely understood. Articles for the Government of the Navy, Navy Regulations, and Ship’s Orders should also be understood by everyone and not just read at Quarters. Careful dissemination of pertinent extracts from regulations and orders is of basic importance in the maintenance of discipline. Many military offenses are the result either of ignorance of the law or, more often, of a fundamental lack of appreciation of the seriousness of an offense. For example, a single glass of beer on a hot day can result in a court martial and a severe sentence for a new man who does not realize that any kind of drinking while on shore patrol duty is a crime. Other matters of importance to the men are promotion policies and procedures, educational and recreational opportunities, welfare and religious activities, and evidence of progress in attaining objectives, such as the ship’s standing in its competition with other vessels. By means of interviews, observation, reports, and even suggestion boxes, the leaders must keep their ears to the ground and give their men the information they want.
Another class of information might be termed external; it originates outside of the ship. News of the world and local affairs and information concerning future operations and ship movements are major examples. Only the second, future operations and unit movements, are related to discipline in that ignorance of such matters tends to create sentiments of uncertainty and insecurity. This brings us to the second psychological factor concerned with military discipline: a sense of individual security.
Second Basic Factor—Security
There is no more important nor fundamental necessity in a person’s relationships with others than a feeling of security-—not just physical security, but rather an assurance that he will be well treated and fairly judged by his superiors. Among industrial workers, attitude surveys invariably place “fair treatment by superiors” toward the top of the list of factors influencing job satisfaction. It is security in this sense that is a basic requirement for discipline. The outstanding characteristic of the relationship between subordinates and superiors is the dependence upon the superior for the satisfaction of subordinates’ needs. In a fundamental and pervasive sense, the subordinate is dependent upon his superior for his job, for promotion, and for many other rewards and gratifications. For the subordinate to feel secure he must live and work in an atmosphere of approval. This atmosphere is revealed not only by what the superior does, but by the manner in which he does it and by his basic underlying attitude towards his men. This atmosphere of approval is the backbone of good discipline.
Atmosphere of Approval
As an illustration, let us accompany a new commanding officer on his first Saturday morning personnel inspection. The crew has fallen in at quarters with the normal misgivings of men whose lives for the next year or so will be intimately concerned with the character and nature of their new leader. By creating a positive (good) or a negative (uncertain) atmosphere in the performance of his first duty, the Captain can establish the basis for good discipline or he can foster a feeling of insecurity. As he inspects the crew he notes a few outstanding men and a few who are not presentable. The general appearance of the ship’s company is fair, but not quite up to his standards. The Captain can place a few of the sloppiest men on report, call his officers together after inspection and exhort them to show definite improvement by the following week. This method would have some results, but many of the men and officers would wonder how tough this regime was going to be and would be inclined to be uncooperative. The new commanding officer, however, prefers a positive approach. As he inspects each division he has his yeoman note the names of those men whose appearance is really outstanding. After inspection he tells his officers, assembled in the wardroom over a pot of coffee, that their men looked good, but he thinks that some improvement can be made. He observes that the division officers, being able and experienced, know which of their men needed attention without his (the Captain’s) pointing them out. He also instructs the executive officer to grant the men whose names he had taken an extra liberty. In this manner, the new commanding officer established an atmosphere of approval.
It is even more important for the division officers and junior and petty officers to establish an atmosphere of approval. While it is desirable for the commander to set an example, it is the men’s immediate superiors who really establish the atmosphere in which the men live. A word of praise when merited, the liberal use of men’s names, and a friendly and confident bearing are all attributes of good leaders who know the importance of an aura of approval.
Another major aspect of individual security previously mentioned in connection with keeping men informed is that of forewarning men of changes that will affect them. Plans for movements of the ship or squadron are rarely secret in peacetime and should be as quickly and thoroughly passed down the line as circumstances permit. Time of return to port, whether or not there will be an inspection this weekend, and time liberty will commence are all items of considerable importance to every man and are often not promulgated. In disseminating this information the petty officers should be informed first so that their authority and prestige can be enhanced and the men encouraged to come to them for information rather than be forced to listen to ill-founded rumors emanating from such unofficial founts of gossip as executive office yeoman.
Third Basic Factor—Level of Aspiration
A third basic factor on which discipline is founded is the establishment of attainable goals and objectives. Men lose their desire to cooperate and work together if they feel that they are just going through the motions. To coordinate as a group, men must have an objective in sight. This objective cannot be defined in the same terms for all levels. A fighter pilot who is a section leader may want to have the smoothest, most skillful, and best shooting section in the squadron while one of his gunners mates may simply aim to keep all machine guns operating without casualties. A peacetime military organization, particularly the Fleet, substitutes competition for the incentive of combat. Almost all units compete in their class in all phases of operations. The competition, however, furnishes goals and objectives only insofar as these are understood and accepted by the men. If the lowest levels are shown how their efforts are contributing to the performance of their ship, they understand what their work means and take pride in doing it well. It is not sufficient to outline major objectives. Most men perform better with sub-goals in sight—jobs they can complete in a day or a week. Industrial workers respond to such sub-goals as rest periods and smaller production units with decreased fatigue and boredom and increased output. Similar results can be expected in any comparable military situation.
Fourth Basic Factor—Individual Worth
A fourth basic factor affecting discipline is the recognition of every man’s dignity and individual worth. Psychologists are not in complete accord on the primary social needs or drives of the worker. The consensus is, however, that as working concepts we can recognize two needs as fundamental: the need for self approval and the need for the approval of others.
In any situation we want to be recognized as contributors to the common good. This human need explains many disciplinary cases. The unrated men who are at everyone’s beck and call and who do all the unskilled labor often find their unrecognized and lowly role untenable. They are subconsciously seeking approval although their anti-social behavior may be expressed by insubordination, malingering, quarelling, and lateness in returning to duty. Their behavior is understandable to students of human behavior who recognize in the subordinate-superior relationships similarities to the earlier relationship between a child and his parents. Just as a child often misbehaves to attract attention, so may a poorly adjusted seaman fail to wear the proper uniform for the same purpose. In recognizing the man and his contribution the leader must pay more than lip service to this principle of human relations. Good wages and even promotions are not enough; every man must be made to feel that he is important and a necessary part of the organization. It is admittedly more laborious in many cases to treat all enlisted men as individuals, but success in doing so is a measure of success as an officer. The major idea is for the leader to recognize the self-respect of his men and to appeal to it to control their behavior.
Fifth Basic Factor—Social Status
In discussing the second of man’s two basic needs or drives, the need for social approval, the approval of others, we arrive at the fifth fundamental component of military discipline. This factor is the social status of the individual, his place in the complex social organization that is the naval vessel, squadron, or station. In all organizations there are two structures or frameworks in which the individual works and operates. One is the formal organization as laid down in the Ship’s Organization Book. The effectiveness and efficiency of this formal structure often determined the size and composition of the second, the informal organization. The latter exists, however, in some form in the most efficient units. It is a deterrent to discipline only when it circumvents the official organization. In most cases the informal organizations in military units are extremely important in that they furnish individuals at the lowest levels with a social status and a strong sense of identification with the group. Most naval personnel are familiar with the unofficial groups found aboard ships; the bridge gang, for example, is a sort of club. Less easily recognized are groups of non-rated men who gather in their part of the ship over a coffee pot, if possible, and give their members a sense of belonging. These groups should be closely observed by all officers; their behavior and composition is often an excellent indicator of the state of discipline and morale existing in the command. Naval officers who are interested in this relatively undeveloped phase of leadership will be interested in F. J. Roethlisberger’s Management and Morale (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1944), which gives a non-technical account of elaborate studies made by a group of psychologists on the attitudes and organization of workers in the Western Electric Company’s Hawthorne Plant.
Military Drill
In addition to the five basic components of positive discipline outlined above, there are two more aspects of the subject that should be considered: military drill and punishment. There are two types of drills: emergency drill and formal drills. Examples of the former are: General Quarters, Air Raid Drill, Fire Drill, and Collision Drill. Their positive effect on discipline is sometimes nullified if they are inflicted too frequently upon the unit and if high standards of proficiency are not demanded. Most men understand the logic of preparing for a possible emergency and become disheartened only when they do not understand the need for frequent and tedious exercises. Properly administered, they enhance the man’s feeling of security against attack, surprise, or disaster.
The second type of drill—the formal, military one, is useful to some extent in all military organizations as a means of indoctrinating recruits into military life and as a basis for the necessary military ceremony and procedure. However, it is no longer in itself the major pursuit of military life; few modern leaders subscribe to the traditional axiom that “close order drill also brings about habitual obedience to orders.” Obedience to commands, yes; but where in actual practice are these drill commands needed? Obedience to orders today implies an understanding and, in some cases, even an evaluation on the part of the subordinate as he complies. Blind obedience to commands may be fostered by close order drill, but its practice in modern times is often very costly. As the psychologists express it, there is little transfer of learning from the acquisition of one pattern of behavior (military drill) to another (obedience) unless these patterns are fairly closely related.
Punishment
The final aspect of discipline which remains to be discussed is punishment. As stated in the first part of the chapter, punishment is the end of the disciplinary road—a confession that positive discipline has not been successful. Within reasonable limits there is no such thing as a good crew or a bad crew; there are only good leaders and bad leaders. Father Flanagan maintained that there were no really bad boys, and his Boys Town in Nebraska is a monument to that conviction. Nearly every case of punishment occurs after some sort of failure at the top. There is no more certain index of a unit’s morale than its incidence of offenses meriting punishment. The intelligent and able leaders look for the real cause behind the minor infractions that plague, in some degree, even the best administered unit. The first and basic principle involved is that the offender’s immediate superiors, his petty officer and division officer, must feel responsible for their subordinate’s offense. Only then will a real sense of leadership responsibility be developed in all echelons and will attempts be made to uncover the real reasons for the infractions. The result of putting this principle into effect is sometimes downright magical. A small naval vessel had during the last war ten to fifteen mast cases a week during a regime in which inexperienced officers were permitted to report men for petty offenses as an easy solution for their disciplinary problems. As soon, however, as the officers and petty officers were themselves questioned at length on the details of each case and made to realize that the infraction was a reflection on their professional efficiency, the number of mast cases dropped to four or five a month.
Summary
In analyzing military discipline in its broadest sense in terms of motivation and in breaking down the concept into its components, there have been discussed in this paper the following five factors: keeping the men informed, giving them a sense of individual security, providing attainable goals or levels of aspiration, recognizing every man’s personal dignity and individual worth, and, lastly, providing satisfactory social status and approval. Meeting these requirements assures good discipline in any military unit. Drill and punishment have also been evaluated.
It only remains to touch upon the traditional and legal framework of discipline in the United States Navy. As Admiral Holloway, U.S.N., Superintendent of the U. S. Naval Academy, reminded the First Class Midshipmen in his Open Letter of 14 October 1947: “The cornerstone and very bedrock of a military society is respect for and obedience to law, regulation, and order.” Enacted by the Congress and deeply rooted in the Federal Statutes are the Articles for the Government of the Navy. They express in timeless fashion the moral and inspirational principles which have been the real strength of the American Navy.