In order to maintain its reputation, the Navy today must insure that its personnel maintain a high order o{ discipline while on leave and liberty. It is commonly accepted that the best way to insure this high order of discipline is through adequate indoctrination and a continuous program designed to develop and maintain pride in self and in the Service. However there are always those few men who cannot control themselves when not under the more rigid discipline to be found aboard ship and on the shore station. And there are an even greater number of men who, celebrating the additional freedom afforded by liberty, become borderline cases susceptible to influences which lead them into situations which result in bad publicity for the Service and disciplinary action for the man. For these reasons, the Navy establishes Shore Patrols in areas where sailors are granted liberty.
But, are these Shore Patrols adequate? In most large liberty areas there is a permanent Shore Patrol formed of men and officers assigned for a period of approximately six months. In addition, each ship and shore station assigns personnel to Shore Patrol duty in numbers proportionate to the number of personnel authorized to go on liberty. Obviously, the men of the permanent details cannot be adequately trained to carry out police details. Yet these men are called upon to handle cases involving not only drunkenness and disorderly conduct, but felonies such as aggravated assault, rape, burglary, and even murder. In many cases civilians arc involved. All Shore Patrolmen are instructed to call in the civil police in cases involving civilians or in the more serious cases involving offenses committed within the jurisdiction of civil authorities. In any criminal case, however, the handling of the participants and witnesses during the 'first few minutes often determines whether or not the case can ever be successfully closed. Often the lack of immediate and adequate investigation imposes a hardship on the sailor involved in such a case. All too many commanding officers have investigated cases at Mast, finding that the hostility of civilian witnesses and occasionally the civil authorities precludes a fair and just handling of the case.
The problem only begins there. Even more important from the standpoint of public relations is the role of the Shore Patrol in creating a good impression upon the public. In a recent case, a Philadelphia jurist commended the Shore Patrol, in the person of the Shore Patrol Officer who appeared as a witness, for its efficiency, neatness, and courtesy. In general this has been the rule wherever the Navy has established Shore Patrols. But in spite of this general rule, all too often one sees Shore Patrolmen who are sloppily uniformed, inattentive, and impolite. Nothing will impress a citizen more than the quiet, efficient handling of a case by well trained, polite, and well uniformed personnel who take pride in their work. Nothing will make a bad impression more lasting than the inefficient handling of a case, sloppy appearance, or discourteous manner.
Most often these faults are due to lack of training and a lack of pride in the work. It is only in the past few years that civilian police organizations have come to realize that police work requires intensive training. It is realized that Shore Patrolmen should not be professional police officers, but even so elementary a subject as law of arrest (with which certainly every Shore Patrolman should be familiar) is a complicated subject. Then, many enlisted men and officers regard Shore Patrol duty as a necessary chore which is one of the less desirable aspects of the Service. Certainly it is a hard thing for the average sailor to be on patrol on a cold night when his friends are enjoying themselves in a local spot.
During the war, the Navy sought to forestall these shortcomings by bringing into the Service, as specialists, men who were policemen in civilian life. Although many of these Shore Patrolmen were outstanding, there were a few who created a lasting prejudice against a permanent Shore Patrol system. Some of the men rated as specialists had come from police duty in small municipalities where police training was of the most elementary sort. Many had no understanding of the problems of the sailor. The historian, Toynbee, might have called the wartime Shore Patrol specialists the “external proletariat” for they were “in but not of” the Navy.
The Army has long understood this problem and has made the Military Police a separate corps. These Military Police receive specialized training in Military Police Schools and carry a Military Police MOS number (equivalent to a Navy job code rating). Some men are given advanced training as investigators, and some are even assigned on temporary duty to the better municipal police forces for in-service training.
A consideration of this problem in relation to the Navy’s requirements leads to the formulation of a program for the improvement of the Shore Patrol as means of discipline enforcement, prevention of offenses against discipline, and improvement of public relations. Such a program might include the following:
(a) Establishment of a permanent Shore Patrol detail of fifty per cent of the strength of the largest expected total Shore Patrol in any large liberty area.
(b) Selection of rated personnel of high intelligence and good records for assignment to permanent Shore Patrol details for two year tours of duty. Insofar as possible, these men should have completed at least one tour of sea duty and should be volunteers or should show interest in the work.
(c) Establishment of a Shore Patrol School with a six month curriculum for personnel assigned to permanent details. Such schools as the Northwestern University Traffic Institute and the San Jose State College (California) could give invaluable aid in the formulation of such a curriculum. Graduates of the course should be assigned an appropriate Navy Job Code number.
(d) Selection of a limited number of officers for post-graduate training in police administration. These officers would then be available as a nucleus for an expanded Shore Patrol organization during mobilization.
(e) Maintenance of close liaison with Military Police and standardization of methods.
(f) Establishment of a cadre of trained officers and men ashore whenever a task force of any size is to be in a foreign port for more then one day. Day to day replacement of all personnel, including the Senior Shore Patrol officer, results in serious inefficiency.
(g) Establishment of a U.S. Armed Force crime report and statistical center to permit adequate study of offense trends in the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
(h) Modification of Uniform Regulations to establish such distinctive items in the Shore Patrol uniform as white gloves, leggings, and belts, in order to promote esprit de corps.
Such a program would do much towards providing the Navy with an alert, efficient Shore Patrol organization. It would provide a nucleus of well trained personnel, taking pride in their work and yet understanding, from their own experience, the problems of the sailor on liberty. It would assist in insuring fair and just treatment of Naval personnel alleged to have committed offenses. Finally, it would do much to prevent the lack of adequate investigation which so often hampers a commanding officer in taking action on a Shore Patrol report. The Navy could then boast of a Shore Patrol which in every way constituted an efficient police organization and yet was in and of the Navy.