On the 11th of November, 1914, the British Admiralty jubilantly announced that H.M.A.S. Sydney had engaged and sunk the German cruiser S.M.S. Emden off the Cocos Keeling Islands. Kapitan zur See von Muller had raided back and forth across the Indian Ocean in his 3500 ton ship for eleven weeks, sinking 16 British and Allied ships totalling 66,143 tons, but H.M.A.S. Sydney of the fledgling Royal Australian Navy had finally run him down.
Twenty-seven years later another H.M.A.S. Sydney was in the news. On December 2, 1941, the British Admiralty announced—
“Information has been received from the (Australian) Naval Board that H.M.A.S. Sydney has been in action with a heavily armed merchant raider which she sank by gunfire.
“No subsequent communication has been received from H.M.A.S. Sydney and it must be presumed that she is lost.” The armed merchant raider that engaged this second H.M.A.S. Sydney was the German Kormoran, Schiff 41.
The story behind this brief communique begins in the spring of 1940 when Schiff 41, then the North German Lloyd cargo- liner Stiermark, was taken in hand for conversion to an auxiliary cruiser. An 18-knot diesel-driven ship of 8736 tons, generally similar to the other German raiders, she carried an armament of six 5.9" guns and a dozen smaller anti-aircraft guns. In addition, she was fitted with six torpedo tubes and carried two seaplanes and three hundred and sixty mines. She was commissioned on October 9,1940, and, after trials in the Baltic, finally sailed from Gotenhaven on December 3, 1940.
Schiff 41 left German waters under the command of Fregatten-Kapitan A.G.T. Detmers on 4 December 1940. Moving out through the Skagerrak and up the Norwegian coast to Stavangar, she turned westwards and headed out to sea. Two days after leaving Stavangar, Schiff 41 adopted her first disguise. Schiff 41, now alias the Russian motorship Viacheslav Molotov, steamed northwestward to the edge of the pack ice off Jan Mayen Island, and then under cover of fog passed down through the Denmark Straits and into the North Atlantic without being sighted by any British patrol vessel.
In accordance with the German Naval Staff’s policy of employing their surface raiders to divert enemy strength from the main zone of submarine operations, Fregatten-Kapitan Detmers spent little time in the North Atlantic. Instead, he steamed directly south until he reached the latitude of the Cape Verdes. Here, where the Capetown- England and the LaPlate-England shipping lanes converged, he began his raiding operations. Before doing so, however, he discarded his ship’s alias, since a Russian ship in the South Atlantic would hardly have passed without questioning.
Moving slowly southwards, cruising back and forth across the shipping lanes, Detmers conducted daily air searches, but not until January 6,1941, did he make his first contact, the Greek freighter, Antonis (3729 tons), bound from Cardiff, Wales, to Rosario, Argentina with coal. Detmers sighted her early in the morning, quickly overtook her, and ordered her to stop. She did so and the Germans boarded her, condemned her cargo as contraband, and, after taking off the crew, sank her with scuttling charges and a torpedo.
The German Naval Staff issued orders for Schiff 41 to return to the north between the Cape Verdes and the Canaries so as not to interfere with the pocket-battleship Admiral Scheer then operating north and northwest of Ascension. Therefore Detmers moved north again and quickly found this a profitable hunting-ground. About 660 miles west-southwest of the Canaries, on 18 January, he sank the tanker British Union (6989 tons) in ballast from London to Aruba. Moving southward again, he met the blockade runner Spreewald on the afternoon of 28 January, and, while in company, shelled and sank the British motorship Afric Star (11,900 tons). Bound from Buenos Aires to London with a cargo of frozen meat, she was sunk to the northeast of St. Paul Rocks just after midnight on the 29th.
Later that same day, another vessel was sighted, overtaken, and attacked. This time, however, the Germans had a fight on their hands, for the master used his radio to send out an RRRR (“attacked by enemy raider”) warning, attempted to escape, and didn’t give up until his ship was afire and sinking from Schiff 41's gunfire. Detmers picked up forty-three survivors and learned that he had sunk the British freighter Eurylochus (5723 tons), enroute from Liverpool to Takoradi, Gold Coast, with fighter planes to' be assembled there and flown across Africa to Egypt. After sinking Eurylochus, Detmers transferred eighty-five of his prisoners to Spreewald and sent her on her way.
A meeting in the South Atlantic “waiting area” (22 S.-27 S., 12 W—20 W.) had been arranged by the Naval Staff for 7 February. Schiff 41 turned southwest again and met the fleet tanker Nordmark and the freighter Duquesa, a prize of Admiral Scheer. The ships remained in company for two days, while Schiff 41 refuelled from the tanker and transferred 170 prisoners to the freighter. Then the raider moved in toward the South African coast.
Detmers intended to use the picket boat, which Schiff 41 carried, to lay five or ten mines off Walvis Bay, but the weather was bad and he had to abandon his plan. Then having received further orders from the Naval Staff, he returned to the “waiting area” to cover the refueling of the raider Penguin (Schiff 33) and the fourteen whaling ships that she had captured in the Antarctic during “Operation Weddelmer.” This refueling took place on 25-26 February, having been delayed for a day by the sighting of a steamer, which had been allowed to pass unmolested because an attack might have compromised the rendezvous.
Afterwards, Schiff 41 moved back into the Natal Channel and on 15 March met U-1Z4, which had been sent out with essential spare parts for Admiral Scheer’s radar. The pocket-battleship, returning to Germany after operating in the South Atlantic and Indian oceans, arrived just after midnight, received the spare parts from the U-boat, and departed immediately. The U-boat, however, refueled from Schiff 41 and remained in company for three days before departing to operate off Freetown.
This series of meetings show the tight control, tactical as well as strategic, that the Naval Staff maintained over raider operations, control that was exercised with a minimum of radio traffic. The Naval Staff would broadcast several plans, each designated by a code letter. The raider then would select the desired one and answer with just the code letter of that plan. Thus radio traffic was kept to a minimum.
Covering and refueling obligations completed, Detmers could at last return to raiding operations. On March 22, just to the northeast of St. Paul Rocks, he sank the British tanker Agnita (3561 tons),bound from Freetown to Carapito, Venezuela, in ballast. Three days later, about 350 miles to the northwest, he captured another British tanker, the Canadolite, (11,309 tons), also in ballast from Freetown to Carapito. The Canadolite, surprised and unable to put up a fight, although she carried one 4.7-inch and two 3-inch guns, was too valuable to sink, so Detmers put a 16-man prize crew aboard her and escorted her to a previously arranged rendezvous with Nordmark. At the rendezvous Canadolite was refueled and then sent to Bordeaux where she arrived on the 13th of April.
Off and on from the 28th of March to the 6th of April Schiff 41 was in company with the tankers Nordmark and Rudolph Albrecht and the submarines U-105, U-106. After covering refueling operations, Schiff 41 moved back into the center of the Natal Channel to operate against merchant shipping.
Fregatten-Kapitan Detmers and his crew were glad to be able to return ta raiding. Although they realized the importance of refueling and covering operations, they still preferred to watch the columns of smoke and clouds of spray made by a sinking Allied merchant ship. They didn’t have to wait long. On the 9th of April the British freighter Craftsman (8022 tons) was sunk. Bound from Rosyth to Capetown, her only cargo was an anti-submarine net for Capetown Harbor. Three days later, another ship was sighted, overtaken, and sunk. This was the Greek freighter Nicolaos D.L. bound from Vancouver to Durban via the Panama Canal. Detmers had to use two torpedoes in addition to scuttling charges to sink this ship as she was laden with Oregon pine.
After these sinkings, Detmers moved southward for further refueling operations. From the 19th to the 22nd of April Detmers met the raider Atlantis (Schiff 16) and the supply ship Alsterufer in the “waiting area.” He transferred 77 prisoners to the supply ship and then refueled and replenished his ammunition supply from Nordmark, which arrived at the rendezvous point on the 20th.
Schiff 41 left the “waiting area,” steamed southwestward, rounded the Cape of Good Hope during the first two weeks in May, and moved into the Indian Ocean. Here on the 13th he altered his ship’s identity to that of the Japanese freighter Sakita Maru, and then, to the southeast of Saya de Malha Bank met the supply ship Alstertor. Detmers had 125 mines aboard and, except for the abortive attempt off Walvis Bay, had had no opportunity to sow them. A set of plans for mining ports in the Bay of Bengal had been drawn up by Kapitan zur See Ernst Kruder before his death in the sinking of the raider Pinguin; Detmers decided to carry them into effect during the period of the new moon late in June. Prior to the minelaying, however, he intended to conduct raiding operations.
After parting company with Alslertor on the 19th of May, Schiff 41 moved northeastward and cruised in the area south of Ceylon. On the 5th of June Detmers altered his ship’s disguise again. Schiff 41’s new alias was Kinka Marti, but this disguise brought the Germans no luck either, for they sighted nothing but a lighted American freighter.
Finally, just before dawn on the 15th of June, when Schiff 41 was to the southwest of Dondra Head, Ceylon, Detmers sighted a ship dead ahead. In the gathering light she was seen to be a small British India Company passenger liner. An armed merchant cruiser! An attack or even a successful defense was out of the question. Long before Schiff 41 could have steamed out of range or been covered by darkness, she would have been hunted down by planes and ships from Colombo, barely 200 miles away.
Detmers steamed ahead and the armed merchant cruiser, believed to have been HMS Shenking, turned to starboard and passed astern. By 0830 she was out of sight —no alarm! Everyone from the captain to the youngest apprentice seaman breathed a sigh of relief.
The moon was now in its last quarter and the time for mining operations was drawing near. Madras had been selected as the first target. Schiff 41 turned and headed out across the Bay of Bengal on a deceptive course. On the 19th of June she reached the Singapore-Calcutta track, turned, and headed in towards Madras. Mining position would be reached shortly before midnight on the 24th of June. Five more days to go, then three more, then two, finally early on the afternoon of the 24th of June another British India Company liner hove in sight. An armed merchant cruiser! She was HMS Canton.
At first the British ship followed Schiff 41, then speeded up and passed her. Probably only the unsettled condition of Anglo- Japanese relations saved Schiff 41, alias Kinka Maru, from being challenged right there. The armed merchant cruiser was heard using her radio. Probably she was checking on whether Kinka Maru or any of her sisters were expected at Madras, and, when the cruiser found that they were not, she would wait off Madras.
With mining operations out of the question, at least for the near future, Detmers turned and headed back along the Singapore-Calcutta route. Just after midnight on the 26th of June he sighted the Yugoslav freighter Velebit (4153 tons), bound from Split to Moulmein in ballast. Fired on and stopped, she was burned and left sinking. Hardly had the Yugoslav freighter been sunk, when another target was sighted. Detmers shadowed, attacked and sank her just after dusk, although not before she had sent out an RRRR signal. The British India Company freighter Mareeba (3472 tons), she was carrying a cargo of raw sugar from Batavia to Colombo.
Schiff 41 had been at sea for almost seven months and her engines needed overhauling, so Detmers headed off the steamer lanes into the central part of the Indian Ocean. Only one engine was overhauled at a time so that the raider would always have at least two thirds of her speed available; therefore it was not until the 17th of July that she was again ready for active operations. At the same time Schiff 41’s identity was altered for the fourth and last time. The general deterioration of Anglo-Japanese relations, combined with the fact that the Japanese were using steamers rather than motorships on their Indian Ocean routes, made a Japanese alias less and less effective. Schiff 41’s new alias was the Dutch motorship Straat Malaaka, to which she bore a marked resemblance.
At last Detmers could start raiding operations again. During the last week in July and the first two weeks in August he moved down the coast of Sumatra and Java and into the waters off Northwest Cape, Australia. Lady Luck was being fickle, however, for the only sighting was on the 13th of August. His “victim,” a fast modern 6000-ton motor ship, sighted him against the setting sun at a range of 20,000 yards, too great for the raider’s guns. Her suspicions aroused by something, the “victim” sent out a QQQQ (‘sighted disguised raider’) signal that was picked up and repeated by the Singapore station. Detmers tried to close the enemy, but contact was lost at darkness and never regained.
During the next two weeks Schiff 41 cruised back along her previous track, back and forth across the Australian-India and Sunda Straits routes. Then Detmers turned westward and headed towards Ceylon. It was just to the south of Ceylon that his next sighting was made. Just before noon on the 1st of September he sighted a fast moving motorship of the Wairangi type. She passed out of sight, reappearing again that afternoon, but never came within range and her 17-18 knot speed made a chase impossible.
Detmers cruised back into the center of the Indian Ocean, passed to the south of the Chagos Archipelago, and moved northward into the Arabian Sea to search the Cape- town-Bombay and Capetown-Karachi lanes. His planes sighted a ship on the 19th of September, but the raider never made contact. Late in the evening four days later, however, he sighted, closed, and captured the Greek freighter Stamatios G. Embericos (3941 tons), bound from Mombasa to Colombo in ballast. Twelve of her crew were picked up that night, the other eighteen were found the following morning. When finally mustered, the captured crew were found to be a polyglot group indeed. There were:
12 Greeks
4 Egyptians
1 Turk
1 Rumanian
1 Croatian
1 Bessarabian
2 Swedes
2 Norwegians
1 Portuguese
1 Lett
1 Brazilian
2 Filipinos
1 Madagascan native
Detmers’ only comment was: “Who gave orders to whom, and in what language?”
Schiff 41 had not refueled for over four months. After many difficulties a rendezvous was arranged with supply ship Kulmerland by the Naval Staff and the German Naval Attaché in Tokyo. Detmers headed southeastward into the southern part of the Indian Ocean until he was about 600 miles due west of the Australian coast. Here on the 16th of October he met Kulmerland, which was one of the German raider supply ships that had been operating out of Japanese ports since the fall of 1940.
Schiff 41 received 4000 tons of diesel oil and provisions for six months from the supply ship. In return she transferred the crew of the Stamatios G. Embericos to the Kulmerland. On the 24th of October the two ships parted company. The supply ship was to return to Japan, while Schiff 41 continued her raiding operations.
From the 24th of October to the 19th of November Schiff 41 cruised off the northwestern Australian coast. His mine laying attempts in the Bay of Bengal having failed, Detmers was planning to repeat raider Penguin’s highly successful mining of southern and eastern Australian ports. After laying Schiff 41’s three hundred and sixty mines, Detmers was supposed to pass south of Australia and operate in the Pacific. Final plans called for Schiff 41 to round Cape Horn, operate in the South Atlantic, and return to German-occupied France at the end of March 1942.
On the 19th of November, 1941, 200 miles off the west coast of Australia, the paths of the German raider Kormoran (Schiff 41) and H.M.A.S. Sydney crossed. As the two contestants unknowingly entered the ring, Schiff 41 had been at sea for nine and a half months. She had operated in the North Atlantic, South Atlantic, and Indian Oceans. She had sunk 10 ships totalling 56,976 tons and captured an 11,309-ton tanker for a total of 11 ships of 68,285 tons. Kormoran’s bag of 11 ships in nine and a half months is hardly impressive when compared to sinkings of' a dozen or more ships in a single cruise by some of the top U-boats. The mere presence of the German raiders on the distant trade lanes of the Pacific and Indian Oceans diverted British strength from the main area of U-boat operations in the North Atlantic and made it necessary for the British to guard every trade route in the world with cruisers and armed merchant cruisers. By the end of 1940 the British were employing over a hundred of their liners as armed merchant cruisers— liners that could otherwise have been used as troop transports or auxiliaries.
Schiff 41’s opponent, H.M.A.S. Sydney, had operated with the British Mediterranean fleet from the outbreak of war with Italy until the spring of 1941. She had taken part in the Battles of Calabria and Mattapan and had helped to sink the Italian cruiser Bartolomeo Colleoni and two Italian destroyers. In the summer of 1941 she had been called home for refit and repair and since then had been engaged in escort operations.
On the 11th of November Sydney left Freemantle escorting a Singapore-bound troopship. She turned the troopship over to another cruiser off Sunda Straits on the 17th of November and was expected back at Freemantle on the 20th of November. No word was received from her despite radio calls and air searches, until finally on the 24th of November the tanker Trocas reported that she had picked up 25 Germans, survivors of the crew of an enemy raider. In all, 241 German survivors were picked up or came ashore in lifeboats. Of H.M.A.S. Sydney there has never been any further sign nor word except for a few lifebelts and a charred life- raft! Fregatten-Kapitan A.G.T. Detmers relates that at 1600 on the 19th of November the raider Kormoran (Schiff 41) was 200 miles west of the Australian coast, steaming north at 10 knots, when he sighted a ship on his starboard bow. Identifying her as a light cruiser, Detmers quickly altered course into the setting sun and worked up to full speed.
Sydney, for it was she, turned, and at high speed came up on the Kormoran's starboard quarter. She approached for half an hour and then signalled in international code, “Make your signal letters.”
Meanwhile, Detmers, not knowing the meaning of the cruiser’s first signal, made no reply. Instead, he sent out an RRRR signal, giving his position and the name Straat Malaaka, Kormoran’s alias. When the Sydney signalled in international code, Detmers hoisted Straat Malaaka’s international code letters, PKQT, but on a stay between the funnel and the foremast, where they could not be seen clearly.
Sydney, with guns and torpedo tube trained out, came up and repeated her request. Then she hoisted the signal flags “IK,” the first and third letters of Straat Malaaka’s secret call, which Detmers obviously couldn’t understand.
At this time the two ships were steaming westward at 15 knots on a parallel course between 900 and 1200 yards apart. Why the cruiser closed to this range is unknown, and even Detmers could offer no solution. One possibility is that the Australian Captain believed Kormoran to be a blockade-runner or supply ship and hoped to board her before she could scuttle herself.
As there was no hope of further evasion, at about 1635 Detmers ordered the screens concealing Kormoran's guns dropped, and opened fire. The range was so short that the Germans could see the men on the deck of the enemy cruiser. Four 5.9" guns crashed and two torpedoes splashed, into the water. The raider’s first salvo hit Sydney’s bridge.
Sydney’s answering salvo went over, but her second salvo hit Kormoran in the fuel tanks amidships. At almost the same instant one of the raider’s torpedoes hit the cruiser under the bridge, putting the two forward turrets out of action. A further salvo hit Sydney amidships, wrecking plane, catapults, and boats. After about five minutes Sydney turned to port and passed so close astern of Kormoran that the Germans thought that she would ram them. At 1650 Sydney fired four torpedoes which missed, and the raider replied, but also missed.
Aboard Kormoran all guns were still in action, while the cruiser’s after turrets were still firing. Both ships were on fire and Sydney was down six feet by the bows. Thirty minutes from the time Kormoran opened fire the action was virtually over. The raider was lying stopped with an uncontrollable fire raging in her engine rooms, while the cruiser, her superstructure smashed and her boats destroyed, was steaming slowly southwestward under a dense cloud of smoke.
At 2200 that night Detmers ordered Kormoran abandoned and at midnight she blew up and sank. Some time before H.M.A S. Sydney had disappeared, disappeared forever, into the night.