Most persons who have given it any thought regard a strong Merchant Marine to be indispensable to the security of the United States. This premise has been fundamental to American naval strategy ever since Mahan first enunciated his concept of sea power near the end of the last century. Every year we spend millions of dollars in support of an ocean-going merchant fleet. Our ships do not pay their way in competition with foreigners, but in the past we have justified the granting of subsidy to private ship owners on the ground that a vigorous Merchant Marine is essential to economic prosperity and the national defense.
Is this still a good assumption? Is a large fleet of merchant shipping in fact a necessary or desirable means of preserving our world maritime position? There can be no satisfactory answer to this question that does not take notice of new strategic and economic influences which have been at work since the end of World War II. These influences are so revolutionary in character as to justify—if they do not also force—a revision in our traditional concept of sea power.
We are today slowly mobilizing the resources of this Nation behind the North Atlantic Pact. We seek to create in western Europe a defensive alliance that will deter the aggressor from further encroachments in our direction. We anticipate that if a war is forced upon us the free nations which rim the eastern Atlantic will be strong enough to hold the line in Europe until we can join them in a decisive effort against the common enemy.
This far-reaching program has introduced a set of values not heretofore applied in relation to the Merchant Marine. It seems appropriate, therefore, to reexamine our policy toward the Merchant Marine in the light of world conditions as they have developed since the end of the last War. It would be unwise and wasteful to cling to a policy which may now be outmoded by changes in strategic and economic values unforeseen at the time of its adoption.
The attempt will be made in this discussion to review briefly the historical relation of merchant shipping to national strategy. Against such a background the situation which now confronts the United States may be viewed in its proper perspective. By this process it should be possible to suggest for the Merchant Marine a policy consistent with the larger national policy of which it forms a part.
Continental and Maritime Powers
The nations of the world have been broadly classified as continental and maritime powers. Many military historians agree that the character of a nation from this standpoint dictates the form of strategy that is best suited to it. The British, for example, are a maritime people, and they have, with success, pursued a maritime strategy. The Germans, on the other hand, are a continental power, and their important military successes have been made on land. This is not to say that a single nation may not combine in itself certain elements of both sea and land power. Many nations have done so, notably France and Spain. It is simply that such influences as geography, natural resources, population, and so forth, serve to direct the interests of a people primarily toward the land or toward the sea. If these forces are recognized and understood, it is possible, in my opinion, to measure the dependence of a state upon the sea, and thus to determine a strategy best suited to preserve or increase its national power.
Indeed, the dependence of a state upon maritime operations is the proper yardstick by which its merchant marine policy should be measured. A state which derives its economic nourishment from maritime activity must preserve its merchant shipping as a means to economic health, or else it will languish and die. Conversely, a state which draws from the land the major portion of its strength is not vitally dependent on the fruits of shipping for its economic sustenance.
If the nations of Europe and Asia be examined and arranged according to their historical pattern as continental or maritime powers, one significant difference will be observed between the two groups. All the maritime powers—save Great Britain— seem at some time in their history to have risen to world leadership as sea powers and then to have passed into decline, never to recover sea power once it has been lost. Whether Great Britain is now moving toward the fringes of that pattern, it is as yet too soon to say. Not so the continental powers. The great land powers—Russia, France, Germany—have lost and have regained the dominant position in Europe on numerous occasions. Even during periods of decline they have maintained their political significance, as opposed to the almost complete loss of influence in world affairs suffered by the small nations that border on the sea. Spain and Portugal are today good examples of Powers that have passed from world preeminence. The one still commands important notice in world affairs; the other is of little or no significance.
The reason for this political phenomenon is, I believe, that continental powers retain the essential attributes of territory, material resources, and manpower, which cannot be taken from them; whereas, a true maritime power can compensate itself for the lack of these advantages only by way of the sea.
Small states which have acquired world importance through circumstances of geography and trade have not held their relative positions when profitable access to the sea has been denied to them. Their military and economic potential has depended on the maintenance of favorable maritime surroundings. When these have disappeared, maritime states have invariably passed into decline.
The Mediterranean and Maritime Character
The Mediterranean basin is a fruitful area for study of the relation of merchant shipping to the rise and fall of maritime states. It is the scene of the emergence of a succession of maritime powers throughout the span of recorded history. Moreover, the course of warfare in Europe has been inseparably identified with the employment of sea power in the Mediterranean. Naval strength has been exerted in these narrow waters almost invariably in either of two forms: in the protection of maritime commerce or in the employment of naval and merchant ship types for the support of land armies. It is significant that the changes in weapons and methods of warfare which have taken place since many centuries before the birth of Christ have failed to alter the fundamental strategic factors that determine military success or failure in this critical area of the world. The advantages of interior lines, mobility, and freedom of action enjoyed by the ancient powers which were able to control and use the sea lanes of the Mediterranean persist until this day.
In 525 B.C., Cambyses, the King of Persia, was unable to extend his conquest of Egypt to include Carthage. He lacked shipping for the support of his movement across Libya; as a result, his army perished in the desert. Yet, in 1940, the British, under General Wavell, in a truly remarkable campaign, moved across that same stretch of North African coast to destroy an Italian army of more than 200,000 men. But the British right flank rested firmly on the free use of sea communications for the support of Wavell’s tank columns and tactical air.
The outcome of land campaigns has usually been decided in the Mediterranean by the availability of shipping to one adversary or the other. Alexander the Great recognized the hopelessness of conquering Egypt until he had made secure his communications across the eastern Mediterranean. So, as a first step, he carried out a successful campaign against Tyre, the principal Phoenician city, in order to obtain the cargo shipping he needed to move against Egypt. Napoleon, on the other hand, failed to see that by the defeat of the French Fleet at the Battle of the Nile his land armies were cut off from effective naval support. He was turned back in Syria by an inferior Turkish force assisted from seaward by a small squadron of British ships.
In each of these instances, and in others, the military issue was decided in favor of the belligerent who was able to move men and supplies over water to the support of armies fighting on land. Frequently, small states have been drawn into the conflict. When these states have owned transport shipping, they have played a role out of proportion to their size and economic importance. Allied with stronger powers, they have tipped the balance in favor of one major adversary or the other.
In the ancient world and during the Middle Ages, the principal states which held maritime power in the Mediterranean were Crete, Phoenicia, Carthage, the Greek States, Rome, Genoa, Venice, and Pisa. These States all possessed certain properties in common. Taken as a whole, such properties may be said to identify true maritime character. The early maritime powers were invariably small in geographic extent. They lacked natural resources and arable land. They bordered on difficult or impassable terrain, such as mountains or deserts, or else on the territory of unfriendly peoples. The inhabitants of the maritime states were usually traders and craftsmen, who did not engage extensively in farming or the raising of livestock. They depended on the importation by sea of the food and raw materials they were unable to produce at home. And, what is most germane to this discussion, they derived a large part of their national income from hauling the waterborne commerce of peoples not inclined toward the sea.
The earlier maritime powers of the Atlantic shared these same characteristics. Portugal, Holland, and the Hanseatic Cities of the Baltic are good examples. Great Britain falls into a somewhat separate category, but only because of her insularity, which underlines both her dependence on the sea and the natural protection it affords her. France and Spain must be excluded from such a grouping, despite their extensive maritime history, because they are primarily continental in character. But it would be proper to add to this list the New England seaboard of the United States, as it existed from the beginning of the Nineteenth Century until the Civil War, since this region exhibited so many of the identifying features of maritime character.
It is not possible to ascribe the decline of the earlier sea powers to any common cause. In the history of nations that have risen to maritime greatness and have lost it, there are deep and slowly moving influences which do not concern us here. There is, however, one circumstance that has always attended the decay of sea power: When small states have been unable to make a profit from maritime operations, national power has slipped from their grasp.
It seems fair to say, then, that if the independent nations of the world which are truly maritime in character are forced away from the sea—whether by economic competition they cannot meet or by political or military means—their influence in world affairs and, correspondingly, their capacity to defend their independence will be markedly reduced. This is the situation confronting the smaller maritime powers today.
A Changing Concept of Sea Power
It was a primary thesis of Mahan that for a nation to be a great sea power it must conform to three requirements: First, such a nation must have the means of production, and thus be stimulated to the exchange of products. Second, it must have shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on. And, third, it must own colonies, which facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping. Parenthetically, our own lack of colonies led Mahan to question whether the United States could ever become truly great at sea.
Prior to World War II, this concept of sea- power was well supported in the history of maritime nations. It will be observed, however, that it is a concept which grew out of the colonial system and the doctrine of Mercantilism. In the half-century prior to the First World War—during which Mahan wrote—the maritime powers were in constant struggle for individual advancement. Colonies were their greatest source of wealth and power.
The doctrine of Mercantilism requires a nation to seek the materials needed to support its economy from within its own orbit and to export its production to others at a profit. Hence, each of the maritime states required its own fleet of merchant shipping, since none could depend upon its rivals to provide bottoms at a time when not to provide them would weaken the relative position of the other.
Taken as the whole, this theory of sea power was probably justified by world conditions prevailing until World War II. But, as a result of that war, there have been profound changes in political and economic relations between the nations which, in my opinion, demand a revision in our traditional concept of the meaning of sea power.
Today, the colonial system is at an end; and the doctrine of Mercantilism, as such, is as dead as the dodo. In their stead, there is gradually taking form a system of mutual support between the free nations of the western world. Events of the last decade and a half show all too plainly that nations on the prowl can be successfully resisted only by the collective action of the states which are ranged against them. We recognized this when we extended economic aid to our Allies in the form of lend-lease during World War II. We are now, by means of the Economic Cooperation Administration, endeavoring to restore and sustain the economic structure of the free nations of Europe. We believe these nations must enjoy a reasonable degree of prosperity if they are to be strong enough to withstand penetration by forces dangerous to ourselves. In order to do this, we are expending—and we are committed to expend—a vast portion of our national substance. We have centered our entire foreign policy on this program. It is a policy of calculated risk. Through this policy, we hope to avoid war; should it fail, failure may indeed make war inevitable.
This is a philosophy of world politics to which we as a nation have not heretofore subscribed. And it imposes upon us the necessity to review some of the assumptions which have been fundamental to our national thinking in the past. One of these is the assumption that we must own and operate a large ocean-going merchant marine to safeguard our military and economic self-sufficiency. Standing alone, this assumption is good; but it fails to take into account other, more compelling, influences which determine the national welfare. As I see it, the question to be decided is whether continued support of an expanded U. S. merchant fleet is in agreement with our larger policy of aid to Europe. If not, then we must find a policy for the Merchant Marine which tends to advance the program we are embarked upon in Europe at such great cost, and risk, to ourselves.
It so happens that most of the nations to which we are extending assistance are maritime powers—Great Britain, Norway, The Netherlands, for example. Or else they have extensive maritime interests—such as France and Italy. The transportation of ocean commerce is one of the principal services these nations sell to others. They must have the income they derive from this service if they are to maintain economic stability. It affords their peoples a means of livelihood and provides them with foreign exchange to buy the food and raw materials they cannot produce at home.
On the other hand, the hauling of ocean commerce has not been vital to the economy of the United States since the “clipper-ship” era. The maritime nations of Europe practically monopolized the world’s carrying trade —if Japan be excluded—until the Second World War. Although U.S. shipping in foreign trade experienced a brief revival largely as a result of World War I, the maritime states soon recovered when world conditions settled down to normal. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 again stimulated U.S. shipping, but World War II did not permit the effects of that legislation to be fully determined. Since the war, the United States has maintained a relatively large fleet of dry cargo ships in foreign trade. Most of this tonnage could not operate profitably without financial assistance from the Government. That tonnage is now in direct competition with ships of the Atlantic Pact States, which are also recipients of Marshall Plan aid. As post-war conditions adjust themselves still further, it will become more difficult for our ships to compete with foreigners under the present rates of subsidy. Conversely, unless the maritime states recapture from us the carrying trade upon which they depend, their economic revival will not be assured.
Thus, in our present policy toward the Merchant Marine, we find ourselves in the anomalous position of supporting American shipping on the one hand while we underwrite the economy of the nations with which it is in competition on the other. The two objectives are in opposition. It is obvious we cannot accept ECA as a permanent arrangement. It would seem reasonable, therefore, for us to take all necessary steps to make ECA a success as soon as possible, and put an end to the drain which is so seriously depleting our own resources.
Maritime Economics and the National Defense
The problem, then, is to reconcile our maritime operations with our overriding foreign policy, with which they are seemingly in conflict. The solution that immediately suggests itself is to curtail government support of overseas shipping. By this means, the maritime states of Europe would be restored to a competitive position in the word trades.
The arguments against such a course of action are more widely appreciated than those in favor of it. In brief, they reduce themselves to these: (1) A cutting-down in the number of U.S. owned vessels engaged in foreign trade would be harmful to our economy. (2) National defense requires the maintenance of a substantial fleet of active overseas shipping in case of war.
In support of the first of these arguments, most advocates of continued subsidy point to the flow of commerce and the employment of labor which are dependent on a sizable and active U.S. Merchant Marine. Admittedly, the labor and commerce of the United States involved in maritime and related pursuits form a small part of the national whole. Therefore, if these offshoots of labor and commerce are in fact dependent on a supported Merchant Marine, it would still be correct to say their interests are submerged in the deeper considerations of national policy which have been set forth above.
The statement that commerce would suffer by a reduction in our ocean-going merchant tonnage is part of a persistent propaganda which holds that U.S. foreign trade will not flourish unless a substantial amount—usually 50 per cent—is transported in our own bottoms. The transparency of this argument should be evident. The greatest relative expansion of our foreign trade took place between the Civil War and the First World War, during most of which time U.S. tonnage engaged in foreign trade was comparatively minor. Shippers found it to their advantage to move their goods in foreign bottoms because the service was cheaper and more efficient. The United States never developed a first- class merchant marine during this period. The return from shipping was too small to interest investment capital. Labor and other costs were too high for profitable competition with foreigners. But our foreign trade developed enormously, nevertheless.
What the proponents of continued support to privately owned shipping tend to overlook is that foreign trade is a two-way business. Other nations cannot buy if they are unable to sell. And the surest way to render a maritime state unable to buy is to take from it the means of earning a livelihood at sea.
Foreign trade plays an important part in our economy, but the effect of its disappearance would be small compared to the effect the Marshall Plan is having upon our economic resources. The exchange of products with other nations is favorable to our domestic prosperity, but it is by no means essential. And we must not forget that so long as we have goods that are needed by others, they will, when necessary, send their own ships to get them. Shipping follows trade, and not vice-versa.
What the United States does need, however, is an assured source for each of the vital raw materials which are not in adequate supply at home. These materials we can afford to buy. We would be justified, if necessary, in giving full financial support to the tonnage required to haul such cargoes; since, in the main, these ships would be bulk carriers moving a pay load in one direction. As such, they would rarely compete with foreign carriers in the more diversified trades. The support of such shipping would be a proper and legitimate use of subsidy.
When Mahan stated that a nation’s power depends in part upon overseas commerce, he had reference, of course, to nations that are geographically confined mainly to trade by sea. Where the exchange of products can be carried out over land routes, as between continental states, it is obvious this dictum does not apply.
The United States is a vast continental region, more nearly self-sufficient industrially and agriculturally than any other nation in the world. In comparison with the economic structure of Europe, the United States could fairly be regarded as comprising many countries, each of which might quite logically be viewed apart from its surroundings. The internal commerce within this great area is, in fact, the trade Mahan recognized as vital to the prosperity of maritime states.
In recent years, most of our domestic trade has been carried on by means of land transportation and over the inland waterways. Coastal shipping has fallen into disuse chiefly because of excessive labor costs. Somehow, coastwise, intercoastal, and noncontiguous shipping—i.e., with Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico—have never been considered to merit government support, although the arguments for assistance to this class of shipping are equally cogent as those for shipping in the so-called “essential” overseas trades. The reinvigoration of domestic shipping could probably be accomplished at no greater cost than the present cost of subsidy to shipping on foreign trade routes. Maritime labor and the shipbuilding industry both need the expanded market for their services a revival of domestic shipping would provide. Moreover, the increased use of inherently cheaper water transportation would result in an over-all advantage to the economy of the Nation.
The arguments which favor retention of a large and active Merchant Marine as a precaution in the event of a future war usually revolve about two points. First, it would be unsafe to depend upon allies and friendly neutrals to supply the tonnage we would need to fight an overseas war. Second, we were faced with this situation twice before, and each time we still had to build tremendous tonnages to help Allies who were supposed to have helped us.
Both these arguments are superficial. Of the first, it is needless to argue that we would—or could—fight an overseas war without allies. Even though the territories of the Atlantic Pact Nations might be overrun, it does not follow that their merchant marines would fall into the hands of the enemy. This did not happen in the First World War; neither did it happen in the Second. In each of these Wars, it was the shipping of our Allies that enabled us to project our military might overseas until such time as our own bottoms were being produced in quantity. In World War I, we did not get into quantity production until after the Armistice was signed; in World War II, it was a year and a half before our shipyards really got rolling.
As to the argument that we have twice had to produce emergency fleets on short notice, the United States will always be confronted with this situation. The shipping available to all the nations of the world during peace is never enough to satisfy the demands of war—not even if we own it! Therefore, at the outbreak of a war, maritime allies will always need more tonnage; and there will never be enough. Those nations among maritime allies who possess the productive capacity to provide shipping in great quantity will have to get to work and produce it, regardless of the extent of their original contribution to the common fund. For, after all, the objective is to win the war; and in war, nations contribute according to their means, not according to their numbers. Thus, no matter how large a Merchant Marine with which the United States may commence a war, it will be faced with the obligation to devote its enormous shipbuilding resources to the production of still more tonnage.
These considerations should set at rest the widespread misconception that it is feasible for this country to maintain in active employment during peace a merchant fleet that can exert a deciding influence upon the outcome of war.
Conclusion
It is time we made a realistic appraisal of our needs for ocean-going shipping against the background of our commitments to European recovery. The resources of the United States are not unlimited. If they are not to be dissipated beyond the danger point through our efforts to stabilize the economic situation in Europe, then we must strive to get for our money a fair dollar’s worth for every dollar spent. We can succeed in this only if we insist that the ECA Nations direct their energies along lines that will make them self-supporting in the shortest possible time. If this is to be our policy, however—and if we are to be consistent in it—then we must modify our system of support to private ship owners, with which it does not agree.
But more important to the long-range interests of this Nation is the necessity to bolster the political and military structure of the maritime powers which have joined us in the Atlantic Pact. We share with Great Britain leadership in a world complex of sea power that rings the Eurasian continent like a girdle. This alignment of maritime strength provides individual states in the maritime community with what is probably their most valuable single means to withstand domination by land power. No strategy for this Nation can be successful which does not take account of the interdependence of maritime states brought about as a result of the last War. No policy for the Merchant Marine will advance that strategy if it compromises the wider interests of the many for the narrow interests of the few