Along with speculation on discussions at the Key West Conference, a new, a fertile field for inter-Service wrangling opened. As a result, reams and reams of paper will be wasted by proponents of Naval Aviation, Marine Corps Aviation, or a single Service Air Force; yet few if any writers will mention, or even take into consideration the real—the down to earth—reason for aviation as a weapon. An honest appraisal of Marine Corps Aviation and its position in our future military establishment therefore becomes essential.
Talk as they will, the primary reason for the aviator’s existence—other than strategic bombing—is support of the infantry, “the Queen of Battles.” Since the day an air service was conceived in the womb of the Army Signal Corps, its basic raison d’être, has been ultimate support of the soldier fighting on land. Support of ships at sea followed as night follows the day. As a consequence America has developed the strongest single support weapon the world has seen since Hannibal introduced the elephant.
Before discussing any subject, a student must acquaint himself with the historical background thereof.
Marine Corps Aviation was born on May 22, 1912, when First Lieutenant Alfred Austell Cunningham reported for duty as a student at the Navy’s flight school in Annapolis. Throughout the next few years of its existence, Marine Air underwent growing pains, acquiring techniques, mechanical skills and “know-how” of flying as more and more Marines became interested in the antiquated planes of aviation’s early days. World War I gave added impetus to the flight program.
The period of the ’20’s and ’30’s marked the development of a mission which became, in World War II, a hallmark of Marine Corps Aviation. In October, 1919, Lieutenant Lawson H. M. Sanderson, attached to the Fourth Marine Air Squadron, then flying support missions for Marine ground units operating against Haitian bandits, conducted the first successful experiments in dive bombing under actual combat conditions. From that time until the day of Pearl Harbor, Marine Air Squadrons continued development of the doctrine of close air support, practicing it in Santo Domingo, China, Nicaragua, and in the islands of the Pacific.
Low budgets and disinterestedness obstructed maturation of Marine Air during the decades of peace. Congress, generally reluctant to invest in military preparedness, failed to provide funds for aeronautical expansion and research. Meanwhile, most American strategists, lacking an appreciation for the potentialities of the new weapon, relegated aviation to a position of relative unimportance. Thus any progress made by one or another of the air services was in the field of actual combat experience, and this advantage was attained by Marine Corps Aviation alone.
In 1931 units of the Marine air arm were assigned to duty with carriers of the Fleet, and for the three years following the flight decks of the Langley, Saratoga, and Lexington hummed with activity of Marines gaining experience at carrier landings and take-offs. By December 7, 1941, therefore, as far as combat experience was concerned, Marine Corps Aviation might have been more fully prepared for combat than any other American air service.
Official recognition and designation of Marine Corps Aviation’s wartime missions was made in 1935 when the Navy adopted the Marine Corps Schools’ Tentative Landing Operations Manual. This publication, and its 1938 replacement, FTP-167, spelled out the Marine air arm’s role to include, among other things, progressive relief of Naval aviation supporting a landing operation as well as attack in support of ground operations.
From this directive the Marine Corps drew the concept which became the basic function of its aviation branch in World War II, and which, to all intents and purposes, will be its assignment in any future struggle; that is, support of the Fleet Marine Force in amphibious operations. Although Marine pilots, having received their initial training in Naval flight schools, are designated Naval Aviators—fully trained to conduct a purely Naval mission as such—the primary mission of Marine Corps Aviation remains. To execute this assignment it is first necessary to clear the skies of enemy aircraft, then to conduct strafing and close-in bombing attacks when and where requested by Marines on the ground.
In carrying out this duty, Marine flyers frequently operate from aircraft carriers during the initial stages of a landing operation, for adequate shore facilities are not always available. By developing this specialty Marine Air duplicates an activity of Naval aviation, but it is a specialty that cannot be performed by the Air Forces, untrained in carrier landings and unappreciative of naval dispositions, formations, and tactics. On the other hand, Marine pilots are specialists in close-in air support, a tactic discovered and developed by them and later studied and adopted by the Army Air Corps whose Attack Aviation amply demonstrated its practicability. Although duplication of a function again appears to have resulted, close analysis will reveal that Marine aviators place emphasis on air-ground coordination, particularly during the critical ship-to-shore phase of a landing attack. Since the U. S. Air Force is not vitally interested in this type of operation—currently emphasizing training in air-to-air support and strategic bombing, instead—it therefore remains for Marine Corps Aviation to execute this important function. Furthermore, the specialist training of Marine pilots enables them to perfect the tactical relationship between naval components and Marine ground and air units.
Without bothering to look at the record hung up by Marine Corps Aviation during World War II—it speaks for itself—let us delve into the basis of close-in air support. Just what is it? What does it mean? What is expected of it? What can it do?
Close-in air support is a Marine Corps development. In its accepted military sense it implies immediate and specific assistance by aircraft to infantry units engaged in direct combat with the enemy. This activity is indicative of the objective team-work characteristic of Marines. In this sense, Marines consider aircraft as simply one weapon, along with tanks, artillery, and infantry, made available by the American people to military commanders for the execution of their missions. This concept indicates, moreover, the employment of aircraft in any manner which may be of direct assistance to ground forces, whether engaged in infantry combat ashore or approaching a beach in landing-craft.
As defined by Marine Corps Schools, close- in air support is the Attack by aircraft of hostile ground targets which are at such close range to friendly front lines as to require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of the ground forces in order to insure safety, prevent interference with other elements of the combined arms, and permit prompt exploitation of the shock, casualty, and neutralization effect of the air attack. This doctrine, of course, while it recognizes the necessity and significance of strategic bombing and interdictory attacks, by its very definition excludes all air missions performed outside the range of ground forces. In amplification it may be pointed out that close-in air support is the attack of ground objectives by aircraft employing any or all available agents—bombs, machine guns, smoke, rockets, etc.—within as little as 200 yards of front line troops.
Ground forces, faced with stubborn enemy resistance based on terrain unapproachable by tanks and immune from the effects of artillery or naval gunfire, call for close-in air support. An air attack conducted on such a target must necessarily be tactically integrated with the ground effort in order that the great shock effect of close-in bombing and strafing may be properly exploited. Without thorough training and a complete understanding of the tactics employed by the ground units, as well as perfect liaison between pilots and supported infantry unit commanders, accomplishment of this delicate task becomes well-nigh impossible. It is likewise essential for the ground units to appreciate the capabilities and limitations of their supporting arm. A perfect meeting of minds must exist. Only through continued training with one another, constantly observing each other’s tactics, and actual sympathy for each other’s problems may such coordination be achieved.
Marine pilots are trained for the support of landing operations in all its phases, from covering a convoy during its approach to the target to giving close-in support to Fleet Marine Force ground units engaged on the beach; it is in this latter phase that Marine air has become especially proficient. Pilots supporting Marines on the ground must be acquainted with Fleet Marine Force tactics, dispositions, and formations, must recognize Marine uniforms, equipment, and installations, and must be conversant with Marine lingo. Only close and continual association will attain this optimum.
An infantry officer, requesting air support, expects action immediately, not next week; he expects the target, not his command post, to be destroyed. He has neither the time nor the patience to brief his air support on factors it should already know. If the air unit has trained with the supported unit during periods of nominal peace, it will then need to know only the location and nature of its target. Other details will be worked out automatically by staffs of the respective air and ground unit commanders. Air-ground liaison, to include signals, directional markers, front-line panels, and the like, will have been perfected beforehand.
Marine Corps Aviation can neutralize targets immediately confronting front line troops. It has done it in the past as attested by the recent war; it can do it at the present time as attested by recent maneuvers; and it will do it in the future, if allowed to work along with and train with Marine infantry.
The Marine on the ground, interested in his own personal safety, to say nothing of the security of his nation, will insist on close-in air support by Marines for Marines. The Marine ground commander must have control of his air support if adequate protection is to be afforded his troops, and if his objectives are to be taken with a minimum of casualties. He cannot afford misunderstandings which may arise as a result of inter-Service differences; he must have close-in support exactly where he wants it and when he wants it. Unless he has Marines to support him, this ideal will in all likelihood be unobtainable.
If another war comes we must be completely prepared. Infantrymen who will be engaged in mortal combat desire the highly trained specialists of Marine Corps Aviation in the planes flying about overhead, prepared at any instant to render close-in air support.
With degrees from Franklin and Marshall College, Pennsylvania State College, and the University of Pennsylvania, Major Rentz was commissioned in the Marine Corps Reserve on January 30, 1942. Following his war service, he is presently attached to the Marine Corps Historical Division, U. S. Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington, D. C. He is the author of the Marine Corps monograph Bougainville and the Northern Solomons.