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UNITED STATES James Forrestal
N. Y. Herald Tribune, May 23 Editorial.— The tragedy which has ended the career of James Forrestal, former Secretary of Defense, and one of the ablest and most selfless administrators whom this country has ever enlisted in its service, was the result of overwork, over-conscientiousness, the overstrain which our times have put on every able man with a deep sense of duty, and the almost juvenile savagery with which such men are too often treated by the partisans and sensation-mongers of our public life.
As the President said yesterday, Mr. Forrestal was in a true sense a “casualty of the war”—of that war which made as enormous demands upon the top administrators, carrying their terrible responsibility for the adequate equipment and proper employment of the millions relying on them, as it did on the individual foxhole soldier or combat pilot who lived or died according to the energy and skill of their administrative supporters. Working fourteen hours a day, seven days a week and without vacation, Mr. Forrestal drove to completion the ships and landing craft, the vast organization and mountains of supplies which were the tools of victory and survival; but a strain of that kind can leave wounds which are incurable.
Yet it was not only the war. The strain was unrelieved as the gigantic tasks of peacetime military reorganization were pressed upon him; and it had to be borne in a new atmosphere of petty jealousies, rivalries, political bickering and back-biting, factional and journalistic snipings. There are many public men who seem to thrive on partisan battle and on the grist of insult and misrepresentation which is the normal reward of eminence in American public life; but such men are not always, by any means, the ablest administrators or the finest or most conscientious minds in the public service.
Mr. Forrestal had the grim jaw, the tense self-discipline, of the fighter; but he was a fighter for what principle and duty demanded, not for himself. Fie was doing to the best of his great capacities an extraordinarily difficult job of reorganization, administrative planning, the reconciliation of violent opposites; he was doing it with inadequate powers and inadequate public understanding and support, and was without sufficient defenses, against either the exhaustion to which his own labor had reduced him or the meannesses of the keyhole world of Washington. It is possible to put a breaking strain upon the strongest, and Mr. Forrestal broke. But the loss is the nation’s; and the question it leaves behind it—as to whether as a nation we can always afford the cruel luxury of the treatment we so often mete out to our most devoted public servants—is not easily to be evaded.
Marines Land in Helicopters
N. Y. Herald Tribune, May 11.—Quantico Marine Base.—Marines used helicopters instead of boats Monday in demonstrating a new technique to get troops ashore in a beachhead assault.
With a simulated flight deck for take-off and a realistic battlefield for landing, they demonstrated to about sixty members of Congress Monday that the trick was both feasible and practicable.
Congress has been hearing suggestions lately that perhaps Marine troops should be turned over to the Army and Marine aviation to the Navy. The Marine Corps invited the Senators and Representatives, most of whom were former Marines, to come down to this big base to see the demonstration. It was a rehearsal for forthcoming amphibious exercises off the Carolina coast when the helicopter troop transports will be flown off the 14,500-ton carrier Palau.
In offering this new scheme for getting the first assault forces ashore in enemy territory without subjecting them to murderous fire from fixed positions along the beach, the Marine Corps has two major points in mind:
1. Reducing the hazard of an enemy atomic bomb attack on the close formations of transport vessels necessary in conventional amphibious landings.
2. Putting troops down at any point desired, whatever the terrain, with the consequent advantages of surprise.
Navy Rocket Hits 2,250 Miles Speed
N. Y. Herald Tribune, May 4.—The Navy’s new experimental rocket, a forty-
five-foot-long Viking, reached a speed of 2,250 miles an hour and an altitude of fifty- one and a half miles today on its first launching.
The rocket was launched thirty miles north of the southern boundary of the White Sands, N. M., proving grounds, and landed ten miles to the northwest five minutes later, a Navy announcement said.
The altitude was far short of the 114-mile height reached by a German V-2 in Army tests, and the 250-mile record set by a two- stage V-2, combined with a “WAC Corporal” rocket.
The Viking, similar to the V-2, was developed by the Navy to carry scientific instruments beyond the earth’s atmosphere for research in cosmic rays, atmospheric composition, radio propagation and photography.
Missiles Range in Caribbean
Manchester Guardian, May 4.—Washington. The State Department announced today that Britain and the United States are negotiating for a joint guided-missiles range in the Caribbean area. “Good progress is being made,” a spokesman said.
The project, designed to track the flight of missiles, involved setting up launching sites in Florida and constructing radar tracking stations in the Bahamas, he added.
Yesterday the United States Senate approved legislation to set up a 3,000-mile testing range to cost £50,000,000.
A Navy is Vital
N. Y. Times, May 6.—The interdependence of the armed services and particularly airpower’s reliance on the Navy for advanced bases from which to wage an offensive war were stressed last night by Rear Admiral W. S. DeLany in an address here. Admiral DeLany, Commandant of the Third Naval District, spoke to a rally of the state Navy Mother Clubs at the New Yorker Hotel.
Admiral DeLany asserted that security against attack can be achieved only by denying potential enemies the base areas from which attacks could be launched.
“Atomic weapons, guided missiles, pushbutton contraptions in no way weaken that principle,” he said. “The increased range and deadliness of such weapons merely accentuates the necessity for plans and over-all Navy strength, adequate for immediate advancement of our forward lines of resistance and offense.”
Calling the United States essentially a maritime nation, Admiral DeLany said that “seapower, therefore, plays the most .important part in its security.” Seapower, he asserted, can control 70 per cent of the earth’s surface. He added:
“Regardless of the development of air, even if the day comes when commerce is transported by air, there will be ships upon the surface of the sea to supply such air bases and to serve them.”
Admiral DeLany declared that “if we accept a defensive concept for the Navy, and our national security, we admit failure and admit that we have elected to fight any future wars on our own soil.”
GREAT BRITAIN Staff Sea Warfare Exercise
London Times, April 21.—The First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Fraser, yesterday received representatives of the Press at Greenwich and expounded to them the nature and purpose of the comprehensive “Exercise Trident,” which is being conducted there during next week.
The purpose of the exercise is to examine all aspects of warfare at sea—past, present, and future—with a view to emphasizing the continued vital importance to this country of maintaining sea communications in war and of intimate collaboration between the different services, as well as the impact of these matters on other departments of Government. It is being attended not only by many naval officers of high rank holding important appointments—many of the commanders-in- chief of the Navy’s foreign stations are at home in order to take part—but also by Ministers of the Crown, senior Civil servants, prominent men of science, officers of the Royal Naval Reserve, American officers and others.
Lord Fraser, in welcoming the Press representatives to the scene of the exercise, ex-
plained that since much of it would be concerned with matters that are secret, it was not possible for them to be admitted to the exercise itself; but that two specimens of its procedure would be shown to them as illustrating the whole. The exercise was of a purely “staff” character, not involving the actual movement or participation of ships. It was in no sense aggressive, very much the reverse: it was rather a matter of examining possible dangers and taking precautions against them.
Starting with lessons learnt during the late war, the programme was designed to direct attention on to the conduct of analogous operations in the immediate future—if such need should arise—and lead on to scientific development to be expected in the future, eventually touching on the effects of atomic development on war at sea.
£, Each item would be staged as a lecture, demonstration, or conference, and would be followed by a discussion of the issues raised or illustrated. Among the subjects to be studied would be the strategic effects of the world distribution of raw materials, including fuel; shipping and its defence, both in the last war and against the air and submarine attacks to be expected in the future; the tactical application of new weapons, such as guided missiles, jet aircraft, and rockets. Various devices would be used to display the desired subjects—cinema films, models, and the like.
Rising Costs
Lord Fraser spoke on the subject which exercises many minds, the re-equipment of the services, and the slow progress that is seemingly being made in that task, so vital to security. Besides the rapid developments that are now in progress, which dictate care
not to expend resources on new equipment that would be obsolete by the time it is provided, there is the heavy increase in all manufacturing costs, which equally dictate a husbanding of resources.
The armament of a destroyer of to-day, for instance, costs 10 times that of her predecessor of 1938; the electrical installation of a modern cruiser is five times as elaborate as that of her predecessor of the same date, and correspondingly more costly.
The demonstrations which followed took place in “Trident Hall,” specially fitted up in a war-wrecked garage just outside the gates of the Royal Naval College. The first demonstration took the form of a lecture on the course of the war in the Mediterranean during 1941 and 1942, specially designed to illustrate the interdependence—on both sides, Axis as well as British—of the sea, land, and air arms. The possibility of using Malta as an operational base, for instance, was shown to depend upon the number of fighter aircraft provided for its defence against the attacks of the Luftwaffe; when its defence was effective enough for cruisers and destroyers to operate there, the proportion of Rommel’s supplies that got through to Africa dropped sharply, and he was unable to advance or to hold advanced positions.
The second item was a demonstration of the tasks involved in the passage of an east- bound Atlantic convoy in 1943, as a prelude to the similar problems of the immediate future when shipping may have to withstand the attacks of high-speed submarines as well as the improved aircraft of to-day.
The audience was shown the convoy disposition by model ships on the floor of the arena, by which they saw how the formation of the ships forming it left a clear space in the middle for the escort aircraft-carrier to manoeuvre.
Home Fleet Summer Program
London Times, May 4.—The Admiralty yesterday issued an outline of the summer programme of the Home Fleet—which seems to have shrunk slightly since its cruise to the West Indies last autumn.
The Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, has shifted his flag to the aircraft-carrier Implacable while his late flagship, the battleship Duke of York, is being refitted. Only one carrier of the 3rd Aircraft Carrier Squadron, Rear-Admiral Man- sergh’s flagship, the Theseus, is to take part. As before, there will be three cruisers of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, in command of which Rear-Admiral Slayter has relieved Vice- . Admiral Russell. Twelve destroyers, all of the new “Battle” and “Weapon” classes, will take part.
The whole fleet—as thus summarized—is to spend a month based on Invergordon, for exercises; ships will then visit various foreign ports before the end of June, when exercises with ships of war from other nations of the Western Union are to take place. Before and after those exercises visits will be paid by different ships to various ports and seaside resorts in the British Isles.
Arethusa as Atomic Target
London Times, April 29.—The cruiser Arethusa was moored off the Sussex coast today about four miles east of the Nab Tower, Isle of Wight, where she will be used as a target .to test the effect of atomic (gamma) rays on her hull in a series of experiments which begin next week. The rays will be directed upon the Arethusa from pontoons, and their effect on the ship will be recorded by instruments installed in her. There will be no men and no live animals in the ship.
The area near the cruiser has been notified as a danger area to all shipping, and private vessels will not be allowed within half a mile of her. The Arethusa was built at Chatham in 1935.
Scrap Ajax
London Times, April 7.—It was announced in the House of Commons to-day that it has been decided not to sell H.M.S. Ajax to any foreign country.
Mr. Dugdale, Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, said that the Government had given the matter careful consideration. They were conscious of the very cordial relations which had existed between the British and Chilean navies over a long period, but, nevertheless, had decided that this ship, which had played such a historic role in British naval history, should not be sold to any foreign Power. (Loud cheers.) As the
| Active | Training | Reserve |
Type | Fleet | Experimental Etc. | Fleet |
Battleships.................. | Duke of York Vanguard | Anson King George V Howe |
|
Carriers..................... | .... Implacable | Victorious | Indefatigable |
(All types) | Ocean | Illustrious | Formidable |
Triumph | Warrior | Indomitable | |
| Vengeance Theseus | Glory | Campania |
Cruisers...................... | 15 | 2 | 12 |
Destroyers.................. | 33 | 20 | 65 31 |
Submarines................ | 30 | 4 |
Navy had no further use for her she would, of course, have to be scrapped.
Mr. J. P. L. Thomas (Hereford, C.).—Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware how gratified the country will be at the decision that this historic ship should not be sold to a country at the moment in possession of British territory?
Vice-Admiral Taylor (Paddington, S. C.). —Instead of scrapping this ship which carried out such illustrious service would it not be possible to turn her over to one of the Dominions?
Mr. Dugdale.—That is a question which should be addressed to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.
Amethyst Unprotected
The Aeroplane, April 29.—On April 20, H.M.S. “Amethyst," a 1,490-ton frigate of the Far East Fleet, was fired on and hit by shells from a shore battery of the Chinese Communist forces on the North bank of the Yangtse River. Casualties on the “Amethyst” were 17 killed and 23 wounded; she was driven ashore but later was refloated and anchored upstream.
At the time of the shelling, H.M.S. “Amethyst” was going up the Yangtse from Shanghai to Nanking to relieve the destroyer H.M.S. “Consort." The latter went to her relief’s rescue and was also hit by shells, suffering some casualties, before returning to Shanghai.
On April 21, the cruiser H.M.S. “London,” accompanied by the frigate H.M.S. “Black Swan,” made an unsuccessful attempt to rescue “Amethyst”; other ships were also fired on and severely damaged.
Later in the day an R.A.F. Sunderland dropped supplies and subsequently put a
party of four, including two doctors, aboard the beleaguered ship. Subsequent attempts to alight alongside were driven off.
We record the affair, not because of the publicity which has already been given it but because someone in authority already seems to have forgotten that to-day ships without air power to shield and protect them are a waste of public money. Once again many lives have been lost and a costly ship endangered because the lesson has been forgotten.
(Editor’s Note: An indignant letter to the London Times claimed that sufficient bombing to cover these ships would have started outright warfare.)
Comments on British Navy
N. Y. Times, May 8.—By Hanson W. Baldwin.—The British Navy estimates for 1949-50 indicate that the trend toward increased readiness that started with the war scares last year will continue, but “vigorous” research and development will be pushed. The navy, alone of the three British fighting services, will be increased very slightly in man-power in the next fiscal year. The approximate present and planned manpower of the three British armed services are:
April 1, Mar. 31, 1949. 1950.
Navy............................... 145,000 146,000
Army.............................. 416,000 391,000
Air Force........................ 232,000 213,000
Total....................................... 793,000 750,000
The official naval estimates show that Britain now has a sizable fleet in active operation, including two battleships (compared to our one) and five carriers. The following table gives the status of the principal vessels of the British Fleet:
Under
Construct’n
10 3
3
Thus, the British navy, which was reduced immediately after the war to perhaps its lowest ebb in more than a century, has now become once again a formidable factor in world power.
On Politicians and Admirals
Exactly what part it will play in the future is dependent not alone upon the politicians but upon the admirals who control its destinies.
Anthony Martienssen, author of “Hitler and His Admirals,” has some interesting comments to make on this subject in a letter to this writer. Mr. Martienssen writes that some critics who have read his book have argued that if Grand Adm. Erich Raeder had “played a bigger part in the Nazi political . . . set-up he would have been able to obtain better facilities and larger appropriations for the Navy. ...”
“Most of the admirals in the Royal Navy (N. B.—also in the United States Navy) have played at politics at some time or other,” Mr. Martienssen comments, “and it is true that by their influence on politicians in the past they have managed to keep the Royal Navy up to scratch. The recent appointment of Admiral Lord Fraser as First Sea Lord is directly in line with this policy. He is a man whose political sense is acutely developed and whose personality is finely tuned to the need to influence Labor MP’s of the importance of sea power.
“But in my heart of hearts, I’m not sure that this is right,” Mr. Martienssen writes. “The navy, like the other services, must be the instrument of policy and not the director. If the admirals get too big a say in politics, they are liable to twist policy to fit the navy rather than vice versa. On the other hand, in England now, as in America and as it was in Germany before the war, few politicians have any real idea of what sea power is and why it should be maintained. If the admirals don’t get on their hind legs and shout, who will? It’s a perplexing problem ”
FRANCE
Ship Trials
La Revue Maritime, March 1949.—The permanent commission for trials of ships of the fleet, recently reorganized and presided over by Rear Admiral Graziani, has been active during the past 3 months, supervising the trials of the battleship Jean-Bart, the Chdteaurenault, the Jurien-de-la-Graviere,the Lorrain, and the Alsacien.
Following her performances of the preceding month, the Jean-Bart carried out, on February 7th and 8th, trials in speed, fuel consumption, and gunnery. At the base of Glenans, despite strong wind and rough seas, she made a speed trial under full steam, during which she exceeded 32 knots at 175,000 H.P. She then returned to Brest for routine checking.
Surplus Sales Pay For Indo-China Campaign
Chicago Tribune, May 20.—Paris, France. — I he vast terrain used for army maneuvers will be rented to farmers for crops and the wide fortified belt of the Maginot line will be leased to hunters to shoot rabbits, boars, and partridges in a desperate effort to raise funds for French military operations in Indo-China.
Thousands of tons of antiquated and obsolete military equipment which has been accumulating in barracks, forts, and army warehouses since Napoleon’s time will be auctioned, and scores of properties scattered over the country sold to raise funds and reduce personnel.
Paul Ramadier, minister of national defense, expects to raise 20 billion francs ($65,000,000) by the economy campaign and thus defray the costs of sending reenforcements of 10,000 troops to fight the Viet Nam.
I he sportsmen will pay $30 for hunting licenses to shoot gtime in the hundreds of thousands of acres now embraced in the fortified zones and the peasants will pay $20 a year per acre to cultivate fields and plains.
Ramadier will move the artillery proving grounds to North Africa and rent the fields previously used for that purpose to farmers. He will also demilitarize certain army airports and place military aviation on the commercial air fields.
French authorities expect the projected American military lend-lease as an adjunct to the North Atlantic pact will supply them
>
with brand new equipment free to replace material they plan to junk.
The supplies include millions of World War I tin hats, hundreds of thousands of pairs of rotting shoes, hundreds of thousands of moth eaten uniforms, scores of batteries of rusted field kitchens, saddles and harnesses of former cavalry units, including the flashy equipment of the Hussars and Dragoons, and thousands of decrepit old trucks, wagons, vans, and other vehicles, and huge supplies of worthless apparatus from the engineer corps.
U.S.S.R.
May Day Show Presents Jets
N. Y. Times, May 1.—Moscow.—A spectacular display of Soviet jet aircraft, including a new MIG that Radio Moscow described as “the fastest plane in the world,” marked impressive May Day ceremonies in Red Square.
Generalissimo Stalin and members of the Politburo watched the air show, which was under the command of Maj. Gen. Vassily Stalin, the Generalissimo’s son. Premier Stalin, in a gray uniform, looked vigorous and fit.
The Red Square demonstration brought the first glimpse of the improved MIG type jet plane. Radio Moscow said this was Soviet Union’s newest model and that its speed was superior to any other aircraft.
Three types of jets were included in the review. The first two previously had been seen at the Soviet Aviation Day show last summer. The final flight of thirty jet planes, however, was the improved MIG model, with the same silhouette as the earlier version but appearing to have a higher tail and more slender fuselage.
Foreign air attaches ■said that, assuming Soviet jet motors equal their design, they were undoubtedly supersonic. Radio Moscow’s assertion that the plane was the world’s fastest would mean supersonic speed since United States and British jet planes have exceeded the speed of sound.
The Soviet jets flew over the reviewing stand well throttled down to maintain tight flight formation. Foreign air attaches estimated the speed, as the planes passed the reviewing stand, at around 450 miles-per-hour, explaining that it was virtually impossible to engage in close formation flying at higher speeds.
United States air experts expressed the view that the Soviet Air Force was making considerable progress in the jet field. The new Soviet jets were noticeably faster than the older models. The air display included ten four-engined plane medium bombers.
Huge Parade Reviewed
The display of military units started promptly at 10 a.m. and lasted about an hour. It was followed by a procession of hundreds of thousands of Moscow workers and sports club members, bearing the traditional red banners as well as the blue flags of the sports groups.
Defense Minister Marshal A. M. Vassilev- sky issued the order of the day and took the salute of the parade, which was commanded by Marshal Kyril Meretzkov.
AVIATION
Fighter Designers to Challenge B-36
N. Y. Times, May 17.—There are at least four Air Force fighter planes and an equal number under development for the Navy that may be able to meet demands for something to intercept the B-36 bomber at altitudes over 40,000 feet, it was declared here yesterday.
So confident are builders of Navy aircraft in this area that their craft can “take” the B-36 that they will press the Air Force at the conference, called to discuss the problem on Thursday in the Pentagon Building in Washington, to let them try interception at such altitudes with the new Vought Corsair of United Aircraft, the Grumman F8F and its jet sister, the Panther, the McDonnell Banshee and several other types not now in mass production.
Most manufacturers agree that the altitude now accepted for long-range bombers— on the assumption that any enemy bomber that can reach the United States will use the same altitude—is well above the tactical requirements on which current fighter types were conceived.
Improvement in the performance of jets in proportion to altitude was a part of those con-
ceptions. Now it has been found that from
35,0 feet up, they lose surprisingly in efficiency and the propeller-driving, reciprocating engine makes comparable gains.
“Sonic Wall” Loses Menace
Likewise, all the fighters in service were designed before the “sonic wall” had been breached. With the results of flights “hundreds of miles faster than the speed of sound” already announced by W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force, designers have learned either that there is no sonic wall or that they know how to pierce it without damage to their aircraft.
It is along these lines that production of new planes will be proposed. Both Lockheed and Republic have versions of the Shooting
Star and the Thunderjet with swept-back wings. They are known as the F-90 and a new model of the F-84.
In addition to the sweep-back of the wings, probably sharper than present practice, noses will be tapered to needlepoint and air-intake ducts will be flush with the fuselage.
North American, whose F-86 with swept- back wings already holds the world’s speed record at 670-plus miles an hour, is proposing a refinement with flush air-intakes and a needle nose to be known as the F-93.
New Fighter Designs Needed
Aviation Week, May 16.—U. S. Air Force fighter development is lagging from three to five years behind current bomber performance.
This has dropped a critical problem in the lap of the aircraft industry:
To close the gap between fighter and bomber performance before foreign bomber development matches present U. S. standards.
Design Race.—U. S. Air Force has called a conference of all major airframe manufacturers to meet May 20 at the Pentagon, which will begin a concerted attack on this problem. From the design competitions originated at this conference will come a new breed of fighters that will eventually get the bulk of USAF fighter procurement funds.
Key factor in the new emphasis on USAF fighter development is performance of the latest models of the Convair B-36 bomber {Aviation Week, Mar. 14) that boosted the air war above 40,000 ft. about three years sooner than USAF strategists anticipated.
Requirements Boosted.—Until recently USAF fighter requirements were aimed at maximum performance around 35,000 ft. Although the present operational crop of USAF jet fighters (F-80 and F-S4) can meet that requirement, the urgent need now is for a fighter that can reach its peak performance between 40,000 and 50,000 ft.
USAF fighter experts believe that the problems of defensive operations between
35.0 and 45,000 ft. will be tougher to solve than the entire previous climb from sea level to 35,000 ft.
Basic Problems.—The job of producing a
50.0 ft. fighter involves four basic problems:
Improvement of airframe design to permit transonic combat performance.
Redesign of turbojet engines to produce greater efficiency above 40,000 ft.
Design and production of an entire series of new accessories aimed at making navigation, control, and gunnery accurate and simple at the speeds and altitudes required.
Planning and organizing a new type of ground fighter control system based on the tremendous increase in airspace cubage brought about by the extension of air operations to the 50,000 ft. level and transonic speeds.
Basic design limitation on present type jet fighters above 40,000 ft. evolves from the high wing loading of current fighters. Fighters that can take up to 7G stresses at 20,000 ft. will pull off their wings in 2|G turns in the thin atmosphere above 40,000 ft. USAF planners say that considerable basic research is required on the relations of wing loadings and power loadings above 40,000 ft. before much practical progress can be made on this problem.
RAF Tests.—Royal Air Force tests were made above 40,000 ft. with two Vampire jet fighters, one flying straight and level while the other tried to make passes at it. The attacking Vampire stalled and spun out every time a turn or even moderate bank was attempted.
This is basically the same difficulty encountered by highly wing-loaded fighters attempting to maneuver above 40,000 ft. against a lower wing loaded bomber flying straight and level. In an altitude record climb to 59,000 ft. by another RAF Vampire it was necessary to add six feet to the wing length to decrease the wing loading so that the plane would fly as high as its power would take it.
Need Research.—Lacking the basic research on aircraft performance and general conditions above 40,000 ft. USAF is proceeding cautiously into this new area. No really new fighter prototype contracts have been let since 1946.
Exploration of radical design change is proceeding through use of special research aircraft of which Convair Model 7002 (aimed at exploring the delta wing) and Republic XF-91 (aimed at getting data on the inversely tapered wing) are typical. Other flight research is being conducted by the Bell X-l and Douglas D-558-I and II. Until sufficient data are gathered from these and other high speed research planes now flying, the fighter design trend will continue to be evolutionary and represent moderate rather than substantial progress.
Design Trends.—Among design trends in the evolutionary progress of existing fighter prototypes: ,
Elimination of the open air-intake nose and substitution of a sharp-pointed nose.
Substitution of flush air inlets for jet engines replacing nose and wing-root ducts now in use.
Increased sweepback of wings from the current 35-45 degrees to as much as 60 de-
grees merging into delta wing configurations.
Principal powerplant problem is licking for the turbojet the same basic problem encountered in getting satisfactory performance at altitude from piston engines—ramming enough thin air into the engine to support combustion and provide cooling.
Power Drop.—The best of current U. S. jet engines experience a power loss of up to 80 per cent above 40,000 ft. USAF is pinning its hopes for solving this problem on a high density flow jet engine now under development.
Aircraft equipment and ground control problems are best illustrated by the experience of USAF fighter pilots, all with considerable World War II combat experience, who recently attempted interception of a B-36 at
43,0 ft. over Muroc AFB. They were flying F-86As, probably the highest performing production fighter turned out by a U. S. manufacturer, yet it did not make effective attacks on the B-36 at that altitude except from the tail zone.
Canopies Frost.—First the cockpit canopies frosted at 40,000 ft., cutting off visibility. That problem has since been solved. Another minor irritation was that when pilots twisted their heads sharply to keep the bomber in sight during maneuvers, their oxygen masks twisted loose, causing them to suffer severe blackouts.
The F-86A has a sufficiently fast rate of climb to get above the B-36 well within the limits imposed by present early warning radar. However, without detailed ground control, pilots were unable to plot accurate interception courses during climb despite perfect visibility conditions and clearly defined bomber contrails.
Wide Turns.—-When making anything but tail passes the F-86As were restricted to shallow turns of 6 to 8 mi. radius. This meant that pilots had to line up for their passes on the B-36 at from 15 to 20 miles away. They were unable to judge course and speeds properly at that distance. Consequently the fighter attacks were wide of the bomber.
USAF planners believe that these critical interception problems will mean an increasingly important role for ground controllers who will be electronically equipped to make these computations for the pilot and accurately direct fighter planes in the air. It also means a revolution in aircraft armament and sighting equipment.
Air Groups Barely Sufficient
N. Y. Times, May 2.—Indianapolis.— Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, said tonight that a forty-eight-group air armada could do no more than guarantee “prevention of an early defeat” and bring hope of “eventual” victory.
In a speech at the American Legion’s thirteenth National Aerial Roundup Banquet, he said that military officials “hope and trust this will be a sufficient deterrent to prevent a conflict.”
President Truman’s military budget for fiscal 1950 provides for only forty-eight air groups. Under orders for economy, the Air Force has been cutting back from the fifty- nine groups it had on Jan. 1 to get down to forty-eight groups by about July 1.
General Vandenberg revealed that Air Force plans called for fourteen of the forty- eight groups to be strategic bomber outfits, including four equipped with B-36’s—the world’s largest bombers. But he denied belief that a large fleet of long-range strategic bombers like the B-36, carrying atomic bombs, could win a war unassisted.
American strategic air power is “primarily a deterrent to war and a means of quick retaliation against aggressors,” he said.
“If conflict were forced upon us our strategic [bomber] force would pass from the role of deterrent to that of heavy retaliation. Our insurance against defeat and our hope of future victory would depend in large measure upon the effectiveness of this attack.”
Congress may give the Air Force more money than President Truman asked for it. The House has approved an increase to provide for fifty-seven air groups, but the bill has not been acted on in the Senate. Defense Secretary Louis Johnson has not yet made a clear statement on what size air force he favors.
Before Mr. Truman ordered a cut, the Air Force goal was seventy groups. Air Force leaders said that was the bare minimum needed for national security at present.
Despite the planned cutback, B-36 groups
are being increased from two to four, with thirty planes in each. Two strategic reconnaissance groups of RB-36’s are being added to four groups equipped with RB-29’s.
Other strategic bomber groups will have World War II Superfortresses and the improved versions, the B-50’s, until jet bombers are developed to replace them.
General Vandenberg said that the controversial B-36 is a “capable performer,” but he did not make the sweeping claims for it that others have in recent months.
“It is by no means the solution to all our security problems,” he said. “The Air Force has never held that this airplane is a suitable basket for all our eggs.”
He said that some day all airplanes like the B-36 might be outmoded by pilotless, guided missiles. But long before then, he went on, the B-36 will be replaced by better strategic bombers. He said that the first replacement for the B-36 already was being designed but would not be produced for “several years.”
The Supermarine 510
The Aeroplane, April 29.—First pictures of the swept-wing Supermarine 510 show that this is the first British aircraft with swept main and tail surfaces. Based on the Attacker Naval interceptor, the Supermarine 510 is powered by a Rolls-Royce Nene jet engine of which the new variants give 5,500 lb. S.T. The span is 31 ft. 85 ins. and the length 38 ft.
The maker’s announcement states that the aircraft is to be used for high subsonic and supersonic research. Experience has shown that the best altitude for conventional jet aircraft to conduct supersonic flights is at a starting altitude of about 40,000 ft. and pulling out not lower than 30,000 ft. Speeds of 700 m.p.h. reached at say 35,000 ft. exceed the local speed of sound, but we do not know what the performance of the 510 at this height may be, or what the angle of dive necessary to reach Mach 1.0 will be.
The Supermarine 510 has already flown in the hands of the Company’s test pilot, Mr. Michael J. Lithgow. It seems probable that the unusually good flying controls of the Attacker will also be retained on the 510. The Attacker was quickly developed after the War by using many Spiteful parts—the main planes and undercarriage were substantially the same. The 510, although far removed from the Spiteful, also embodies experience gained with the Attacker. This includes such assemblies as cockpit design,- fuel-tank arrangement, plenum chamber layout and cabin pressure equipment.
The 510 has a mainplane sweepback of about 45 degrees and the tail surfaces are swept more. The intake has not, externally, been changed much and the engine compartment is likely also to be the same as the Attacker. The Attacker F.l is in production for the Royal Navy and is an airframe which is particularly suitable for the French, as it would lend itself to installation of their His- pano-Suiza Nenes. The 510 is a logical development of the Attacker and holds promise of being a very fast fighter which could have a creditable range and endurance with drop tanks.
Meteors for Belgium
The Aeroplane, April 29.—Quantity delivery of Gloster Meteor 4 and Meteor 7 trainers is to begin immediately, following successful negotiations for the supply of Meteors to the Belgian Air Force.
This, therefore, is another step in standardizing, among Western Union countries, air defence equipment, and the two designs which form the basis of the European effort are the Meteor and Vampire. The Belgians are expected to build Derwent 5 turbines under licence and these power units will be used in Fokker-built Meteor airframes (which may be sold to Belgium) and will be a source of engine spares for the British-made aircraft which their country is now to get.
These two famous British fighter designs appear to be ageless, but in fact they are continually being refined as experience, operating them under all conditions, grows. In its latest form, Gloster have used a long-nosed single-seat version and it seems possible that the Mk.8—latest variant of the basic design —represents a line drawn across the latest equipment modifications.
The Belgians will receive the most up-to- date Mk.4s, but it seems probable that the Dutch will build an aircraft which will anticipate changes in the Meteor now being developed at Gloster’s.
MERCHANT MARINE
Superliner Completion Date Advanced
N. Y. Times, May 16.—An accelerated construction program cutting four months from the building time of the new superliner for the United States Lines will enable the ship to go into service in time for the 1952 summer tourist season, an official of the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, the builder, disclosed today!
At the request of John M. Franklin, president of the line, the shipyard revised its timetables to permit delivery of the proposed challenger for the Atlantic “blue ribbon” on April 3, 1952, instead of Aug. 7 of that year, the date specified in the yard’s contract signed last week.
The keel of the $70,000,000 vessel will be laid on or about Feb. 6, 1950, according to the builder’s spokesman. April 5, 1951, has been set as the launching date.
Thus, construction time for the 48,000-ton vessel would be only twenty-seven months— remarkably short, according to shipping men considering that the 26,454-ton America required the same period. The America, largest passenger liner previously built in this country but half the tonnage of the new ship, also was a product of the Newport News Company.
The construction time for other superliners such as the Normandie and Queen Elizabeth was as much as twice as long, it was noted.
The new liner, which may be named the United States, is known to her builders simply as Hull 488. She will be the first quadruple- screw passenger liner built in this country and the first potential American speed queen since the Nineteenth Century.
S.S. La Guardia
N. Y. Times, May 16.—Mobile, Ala., May 9.—Ready for her new service between New York and Mediterranean ports, the refurnished liner La Guardia sailed early this afternoon from the yard of the Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company.
Gleaming in a new paint job and completely outfitted to carry more than 600 passengers, the 18,000-ton liner will be the largest American-flag ship to enter the run to
Italy. She will be operated by the American Export Lines under charter from the Maritime Commission.
A large group of Government officials, company men and guests went aboard the ship this morning for the four-day run to New York. The run will be in the nature of a shakedown trip.
The La Guardia is due in her home port Friday and the traditional welcome to a new ship is expected there. She is the largest addition to the American passenger fleet since the America came out in 1940.
Formerly the Richardson
The La Guardia, renamed in honor of the late Mayor of New York, was formerly the Gen. W. P. Richardson. She was a Maritime Commission design, of the P-2 class, virtually identical to the ships of the General Meigs class.
For more than a year she has been undergoing reconstruction at the Pascagoula, Miss., plant of the Ingalls Shipbuilding Company, and she was brought to Mobile a week ago for finishing touches in the Alabama yard. Officials of American Export Lines and the Maritime Commission have been here during the week supervising last-minute details. Complete inspection of the ship has not yet been made, and the operating officials have not said what they think of the job.
The La Guardia is to carry 157 passengers in first class and 452 in tourist. For the warm weather route to Naples and Genoa she has been equipped with spacious new public rooms in both classes, forced ventilation throughout and some of the most modern and comfortable crew quarters ever offered to American seamen.
She is to run with the American Export Line’s trim new Four Aces, and later the company will place two new 20,000-ton liners in the route. These ships, the Independence and Constitution, are now under construction.
MISCELLANEOUS Reflection on a U. S. General Staff
Marine Corps Gazette, May 1949.—-By Col. Robert Alan, USAF (Command pilot, West Point ’31, presently on Joint Strategic Plans Group, Joint Staff).—Ah, the pity of
it all! Never, one is led to believe, has the high command of a nation been in such a sorry state. Observe: “The President has no military staff directly responsible to him and independent of the services.” “The Joint Chiefs of Staff, being the executive heads of the'Army, Navy and Air Force as well as the chief military advisers of the Commander- in-Chief, are sadly handicapped as regards to time and number of duties.” “May be the Joint Chiefs of Staff could get more done if somebody cracked their heads together.” “The Hoover Commission was reported weighing plans to propose a civilian chairman over the Joint ^Chiefs of Staff to cool off interservice rivalries.” “The committee system of command tends to delay, indecision, weak compromises or inaction. This might result in disastrous delay or indecision should the interests of the services diverge during a critical military situation.” “The services seem to be about as happy in their unification as a batch of tomcats tied together by their tails and tossed over a clothesline.” “The frictions between the Navy and the Air Force are as sharp as before, and they bring about duplication and instances of empirebuilding that contribute virtually nothing to our military strength and are unduly hard on the taxpayer.” “We may have a government by colonels.” “The statutory authority of the Secretary of Defense should be materially strengthened.” And, someone has caustically observed, we may even come to the sorry time when Mr. Eberstadt, one of the primary architects of the National Security Act who has recently reviewed his handiwork and found it good, is unavailable for further review of the National Military Establishment.
All these things and more are feared, alleged; or stated as fixed opinion—some by responsible men of adequate background and objective view, some by men whose only qualification is access to print or microphone.
There is nothing wrong in all this. It is merely the custom in our country, our way of doing things. No better way has yet been devised to insure the greatest good of the greatest number.
With this conglomeration of choice adjectives, fine invective, derisive citizens and experienced organizers, it appears that anyone may get into the act. Congress itself will soon be giving close scrutiny to the Hoover Commission’s recommendations for the reorganization of the national security organization, and doubtless the question of a United States General Staff will again be raising its perennial head. Before it does, let us give the general staff problem the objective scrutiny it deserves. A wrong decision in this matter by Congress could be disastrous.
By United States General Staff is meant all that the term has traditionally implied— a huge planning, directing, operating, administrating staff complete in every detail. It would provide the authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control necessary for the integration of the services into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces. Among others, its fields of endeavor would encompass strategy, certain phases of administration, logistics in its fullest sense, preparation of the budget, determination of roles, missions and requirements, all types of mobilization planning, the elimination of unnecessary duplication or overlapping and the coordination of military education and training. The General Staff would absorb the functions of the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, and the Personnel Policies Board.
The staff would be headed by a Chief of the United States General Staff who would also be Chief of Staff to the President. He would be senior to all other officers in the Armed Services. He would have the power of decision, subject only to the higher authority of the Secretary of Defense and of the President. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be abolished, as would the executive departments and Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The unmerged Army, Navy, and Air Force would then be placed in a single Department of Defense under a Secretary who had broad, clear power to manage and direct.
The officers of the United States General Staff would be drawn from the three services in equal numbers. They would form a General Staff Corps permanently separate from the officer corps of the services. In addition to manning the General Staff, they would provide the commanders and staffs of all
unified commands and joint task forces. They would wear a separate uniform and be on a separate promotion list. To insure constant touch with reality, they would serve tours of duty with the Services at frequent intervals.
Let us now examine the pros and cons of such an organization. Might it be a Frankenstein? •
Before proceeding further, it should be mentioned that the staff just described is the extreme proposal for a United States General Staff. From it many recoil in horror who merely pose mild objections to the several diluted versions that have been suggested through the years. And so to the problem.
In favor of the General Staff the following arguments have been variously presented:
First, it would provide a completely objective viewpoint at the top where it is badly needed. The country deserves something better than plans based on the desires of all the services. A staff, completely divorced forever from service traditions, vested interests, rivalries and fears would produce the required product.
Second, it would eliminate the delay, compromise and frustrations which even under the urgency of war and the presence of as great and objective a personality as General Marshall, were evident on a number of occasions.
Third, in connection with the emphasis we are placing on economy and the necessity for husbanding our national resources, such a staff would be in a perfect position to effect economies. It would recognize padding quite readily, and quickly sort out the essential from the non-essential.
Fourth, it would raise those who think in terms of the over-all defense of the country to what would clearly be a separate and distinguished position in our armed forces.
Against the General Staff are these arguments:
First, it would place too much power in the hands of too few. The United States General Staff might, as did the Prussian General Staff, gradually assume control of the higher political activity of the country. ‘The Man on Horseback” might arise. In this connection it will be recalled that many times recently the military has been accused of exercising undue influence in the political realm, with Gen. Marshall as Secretary of State, Gen. Clay making policy in Europe, and Gen. MacArthur formulating it in the Far East.
Furthermore, it is said that the Chief of the General Staff would tend to become the Commander-in-Chief in his own right, that despite the Secretary of Defense and the President, his influence might become decisive and even pave the way to dictatorship. Once again the finger is pointed to the Prussian General Staff of 1860-1918, and particularly to Gen. Ludendorff who, in World War I, ran rough-shod over Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and Kaiser Wilhelm in the formulation of both military and foreign policy.
Second, it is alleged that the mere creation of the General Staff would not of itself assure efficiency. The task of directing all the joint activities of the three services is too tremendous for one staff and for one man, it is said. Moreover, although the Chief of Staff might act decisively, he might not do so wisely. He, too, even as the Joint Chiefs, must consider and weigh; and in this day of preference for even a bad decision over no decision at all, he might be so terribly wrong as to invite disaster.
Third, it is said that without denuding the three Services, there are not enough jointly trained and highly-skilled officers to form a great joint staff. Whereas its members should be officers of the highest intellectual attainment, superior schooling, and widest experience, the bulk of them would perforce be even as you and I—ordinary officers who might command neither the respect nor the confidence of the services.
No decision about the proposed United States General Staff can be properly made without first understanding the German General Staff. Every discussion of a United States General Staff seems to bring forth reference to the German General Staff, the mere mention of which makes the spines of most Americans tingle with fright. This reaction appears to stem partly from attendance at movies in which the Prussian officer has been represented as a monocled aristocrat of unbearable arrogance, implacable
menace and sadistic cruelty rivalled only by Dr. Fu Manchu. Surprisingly enough, history reveals that these qualities are in truth representative, and it is of them that many Americans think when they refer to the dangers of the German General Staff. What other Americans fear will be brought out later.
The German General Staff itself had much to recommend it. The living heart of it was the General Staff Corps, consisting in 1914 of about 240 highly skilled, intensively trained officers who had dedicated themselves to acquisition of the highest degree of high-level military skill. Here was no vegetating, no dullness, no stagnating; they studied the past only to learn and apply its lessons. Their view was towards the future, towards the study of the newest weapons and techniques, towards the handling of huge masses of men and their movement and supply. The greatest stress was placed upon initiative, originality and adaptability to circumstance. It is possible that no other military staff ever achieved the high standard of professional excellence attained by these officers of the General Staff Corps. Shortly before the war of 1870 the French Ambassador to Prussia wrote: “The composition of the Prussian Staff will, in the next war, constitute the most formidable element of superiority in favor of the Prussian army.”
The effectiveness of German arms in the period 1860 to 1918 is attributed in no small measure to the superior mastery of the art of war by the General Staff Corps. They are represented as having acquired a tremendous capacity for work, the faculty of concentrated effort over protracted periods, and the ability to deal swiftly and effectively with multitudinous problems. Upon these characteristics of the General Staff Corps rested the magnificent efficiency of the German General Staff of which the Corps, distinguished by the broad purple stripes on its uniform, was the driving force.
No one would object to these professional attainments in an American General Staff Corps. What one would object to is any growth in American officers of the arrogant attitude of Prussian officers, and their almost universal tendency to despise civilians.
Equally objectionable and far more dangerous, however, was the fact that the German General Staff became the guiding spirit and controlling force of its country’s foreign policy. It was able to do so as much because of its own excellence, as because of the weakness of Chancellors and Emperors. The last Kaiser, particularly, failed to dominate the General Staff during the first World War. Admittedly it is difficult for any Chancellor or ruler to go contrary to the advice of the General Staff when it claims that only by following its advice can security be assured. But be that as it may, in the First World War Gen. Ludendorff was able to dominate German foreign policy, and to lead Germany on to ruinous defeat and revolution which, historians point out, could have been avoided had less militaristic counsels prevailed.
It is clear then, that these two dangers: the arrogant character of the officers, and the decisive influence, of the General Staff on foreign policy, are the ones feared by critics of the German General Staff. Both are real dangers, and it is not surprising that we see them frequently pointed out to American law makers. Note the testimony on the National Security Act of 1947 given before the House of Representatives Committee on Expenditures by Adm. Zacharias: “The Joint Staff should be a secretariat, stated in the law, if we are to avoid a very dangerous situation. Unless so specified, the Joint Staff becomes in fact a national General Staff capable of incorporating all the evils of the German system.” Fletcher Pratt: “The German General Staff, instead of remaining an organ of the Government, became the government itself for all effective purposes, dragging Germany into war after war. There is a good chance it would set us on the first step towards military dictatorship and becoming an aggressor nation. Maybe it would be different in our case; but that is what all the others have said.” Adm. Radford “finds no virtue in a military organization such as the German.” He would “limit the Joint Chiefs of Staff to a 40 man secretariat without executive power, without authority to function as a military staff, and prohibited from functioning as a National General Staff or engaging in work of
an administrative nature that pertains to the armed services.”
So much for the German General Staff of the Army. It should not be confused with Hitler’s Armed Forces General Staff (OKW) which was the top staff in Germany during World War II, and a joint staff. The General Staff of the Army regarded the OKW as “amateurs serving an amateur.” It is interesting to note that Hitler detested the General Staff of the Army and its General Staff Corps. He abused them with such phrases as “a club of intellectuals representing defeatism wrapped up in intellectual- ism,” “professional obstructionists,” “burdened by the weight of the military knowledge.”
At this point, having briefly set forth the arguments for and against a United States General Staff, and having endeavored to make clear the character of the Gdrman General Staff, we are almost in position to evaluate and decide.
However, we should first glance objectively at the present National Security Organization. No one denies it has faults. Committee action in that critical focal point of the security structure, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is deplored and belittled daily. Many of the operations of the military establishment flow from the Chiefs’ decisions, and the work of the civilian agencies of the National Security Organization is closely affected by them. For instance, the National Security Resources Board, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board can not lay out their plans effectively without guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Even the President, the Congress and the National Security Council need the Chiefs’ strategic advice. The plans they make affect all the functions of Government, yet it has been pointed out that in the Joint Chiefs of Staff there is inacceptable delay, weak compromise, strong service bias and remoteness from other vital agencies.
'Phe Joint Chiefs, however, stand not alone before the critical onslaught; they are merely the most publicized. As Mr. Eberstadt has made clear, “the Munitions Board has not succeeded in establishing a pattern for achieving prompt decision”; “the National Security Council has failed to produce firm top-level national policy”; “the Secretary of Defense, lacking clearly defined authority and adequate staff assistance has been unable to keep the whole involved process in order.” These, then, are some of the over-all faults of the present organization for national security.
All these faults, it is alleged, would be corrected by the United States General Staff. I here would he little delay, no indecision. Strategy would be closely meshed with the national economy since the Munitions Board’s functions would be assumed by the General Staff. There would be no lack of intimate association between the Research and Development Board and those responsible for strategy, because its functions too would be shouldered by the General Staff. With clear authority in the military realm, the Chief of the General Staff would soon have things running in tip-top shape.
Before rendering decision as to the advisability of such a General Staff there remains only to set forth the virtues of the present system. *
First, the system provides a theoretically sound framework within which political, economic and military planning can be effectively interwoven. Second, it keeps too great power out of the hands of any one man short of the President. Third, it provides for unified, one-man command in the field. Fourth, it is working fairly well. When one considers that the Army and Navy have been operating unilaterally for a century and a half, one scarcely expects a great deal in a year and a half. Fifth, praise and extenuation for it as well as criticism of it have been offered. With respect to the Joint Chiefs of Staff it has been said that: “They are a splendid engine of military skill and thinking.” “Under the guidance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, substantial strides have been taken.” “Individually, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been too heavily burdened with departmental obligations to give to their important duties as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the time and thought that those duties demand.” “During the war the Joint Chiefs of Staff justified itself as an excellent mechanism for strategic planning and for carrying strategic plans into effect.” “The responsibilities assigned to the Joint
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ONE RESULT OF HITLER’S GENERAL STAFF
The U. S. Navy takes over control of Bremen. Both Germany and Japan used the General Staff system in World War II, despite the fatal defects shown by this Prussian system in World War I.
Chiefs of Staff are extraordinarily difficult and complex, even more so in peace than in war. The criteria upon which to form their plans and judgments have been vague and uncertain, the conflicting pressures upon them are heavy.” “The Joint Chiefs of Staff has proved its worth and should be continued.”
With reference to the other vital organizations of the National Security Establishment equally enheartening statements could be quoted but, for brevity’s sake, will be omitted.
Thus are arrived at the points of evaluation.
Returning now to consideration of the arguments advanced for the United States General Staff—objectivity, quick decision, economy, efficiency, distinction—it must be admitted that all are sound. One may be forgiven, however, for wondering whether no decision at all is not better than a hasty decision. At the highest level, is not the essence of judgment a thorough consideration of every view, a patient, thorough appraisal of every facet and possibility, rather than a quick answer? The need for speed in basic matters at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level is not apparent, although the need for rapid decision in the field is admitted by all and has been provided for by the Unified Commands. If we are to fly in the face of experience, to deny that “many heads are better than one,” and to prove once again that “all anybody learns from history is that nobody learns from history,” then let us continue to press for quick decision in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ■
The possibility of ill-considered decision in a General Staff pales into insignificance, however, alongside the danger of abuse of power. Here is the tremendous, overwhelming argument against the General Staff. Despite the President, the Secretary, and the Congress, its potential for evil in the hands of the wrong man would be unlimited. With the entire armed might of the nation at his disposal, he might easily effect a coup d'etat, and there would be no substantial counterforce to oppose him. Now, at least, we have no one military man with all the military forces at his command. Any Service commander with foul designs would have two other Services to reckon with. A Secretary of Defense bent on dictatorship would have to suborn all three Services. As long as man’s nature lends itself to the lust for and abuse of power, we would be wise to keep the greatest military force in the world out of the hands of those who might—it is remote but it is possible—abuse it to our own undoing.
If we could be sure that the Chief of Staff and the General Staff would always be high- minded, public spirited men of infinite wisdom, resource and tolerance, with no other concern than the good of the nation and an unerring ability to determine exactly of what that good consisted, then the United States General Staff would be the answer to our problem. Since we are assured by the research and development people that such men are not to be expected in the foreseeable future, it would be well to oppose formatipn of a General Staff.
Is there hope without a United States General Staff? Mr. Eberstadt, who appears to be as qualified as anyone and better qualified than most, thinks the existing machinery, with a few minor adjustments, will soon shake down to a smooth-running engine of national security. Yet even if there were little hope of improvement, it appears far wiser that the National Military Establishment proceed in its so-called “inefficient and blundering way of hammering things out by a long process of argument, compromise and inter-service struggle” than to ever commit itself to a United States General Staff of the type outlined herein.