When our Navy entered the Mediterranean, in the Fall of 1942, and when our Army landed on the North African coast, they were not on unfamiliar territory. In fact, the United States had maintained a naval squadron in those waters from 1801 to 1818, and some naval forces up to the outbreak of the Civil War. The reason for this early show of force in these far-away regions was, of course, the predatoriness of the Barbary Corsairs, those piratical rovers of the North African States. The exploits of the American Navy in the campaigns against them, the deeds of Preble and Decatur, the long years of hard and often heartbreaking work, and the final victory are well known chapters in American naval history. But they are also some of the very few points of light in an otherwise quite gloomy record, in which the Christian nations, and above all the Great Powers of Europe, do not appear at all to their advantage.
The Barbary Corsairs represent, indeed, a strange phenomenon in the history of Europe and a strong indictment of the so-called civilized nations. It seems incredible today that such a state of things could have been permitted to exist; that for more than three centuries the Christian nations should have allowed their Mediterranean commerce to be carried on at the mercy of common pirates, letting themselves be humiliated and blackmailed, permitting their men and women to be carried into slavery, and paying tribute in money and naval equipment to a few bloodthirsty and arrogant bandits. The Venetians, Genoese, and Pisans in earlier days, the Spanish, Portuguese, English, French, Dutch, Danish, Swedish, Austrians, Germans, Russians, and Americans in more recent times had to buy security from piratical attack, although their combined sea power was infinitely stronger than the small fleet of comparatively light craft at the command of the corsairs. For nearly 300 years the civilized nations stood in fear of a menace which the determined action of any one of them might have wiped out practically in no time.
Speaking of the ruler of Tunisia, William Eaton, U.S. Consul at Tunis around 1800, succinctly expressed the situation in this remark: “Can any man believe that this elevated brute has seven kings of Europe, two Republics, and a continent tributary to him, when his whole naval force is not equal to two line-of-battle ships?”
The reason for this cowardly and dishonorable attitude on the part of the Christian nations was the lack of unity among them, their political and commercial rivalries, their endless quarrels and mutual hatreds. It suited France to see the coasts of a hostile Spain raided by the corsairs; it pleased England and Holland to have the pirates prey on the maritime commerce of the lesser states and thus eliminate unwanted competition. These powers were ever ready to ally themselves with the Barbary States, even at the expense of humiliation, tribute, and loss to their own subjects. Under such conditions neither energetic action by one of the major maritime powers, nor any effective concerted procedure by all nations concerned was feasible.
Despite several half-hearted measures, it was not until after the beginning of the nineteenth century, after the United States had pointed the way to the proper way of dealing with the Barbary pirates, and after the Napoleonic Wars had evolved a greater readiness for international cooperation, that steps were taken for the definite elimination of this “Scourge of Christendom.”
During the Middle Ages relations between the Christian nations and the Barbary States had, on the whole, been friendly. But even as early as 1390 Barbary corsairs began to trouble the seas, and at the urgent request of the Genoese, a force consisting of a “great number of lords, knights, and gentlemen of France and England” set out from Genoa to chastise them. After the expulsion of the Moors from Granada in Spain, in 1492, the situation at once became much more dangerous. Poor living conditions in North Africa combined with a desire for revenge in driving the expatriates to piratical enterprise. Their scattered efforts were soon welded into a more menacing pattern by the brothers Horuk and Khair-ed-din Barbarossa, who made themselves and the Turkish sea power the virtual masters of the Mediterranean. In 1541 they even succeeded in dealing a disastrous defeat to a great armada led by Charles V of Spain. But even after the Battle of Lepanto, which spelled the decline of Turkish sea power, the Barbary corsairs continued to roam the middle sea at will. Finding little effective opposition, they extended their activity into the Atlantic and along the coast of Europe as far as England and the North Sea, ravaging the shores, carrying off the inhabitants, and disrupting maritime commerce. The main centers of the corsairs were Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco.
The Christian nations did not, indeed, remain entirely inactive, and numerous attempts were made against these strongholds. But usually these expeditions were not carried far enough, and in any event they benefited only one nation, and that for a short time only. The others continued to suffer or pay tribute. Between 1609 and 1616, for instance, the Algerines, with about one hundred ships at their command, captured 466 British ships, all the crews of which were reduced to slavery. When James I of England finally made up his mind to put a stop to this state of things, the belief in the invincible strength of the Algerines was still so strong that his admiral was of the opinion that it could not be done by one fleet, or in a single campaign, but that it was likely to be the work of years. He also suggested that all the maritime powers of Europe should contribute toward the expense of the operation, and participate in the gains by selling the captured Moors and Turks as slaves!
James, however, decided to carry out the expedition by himself and in 1620 sent against Algiers a fleet which, incidentally, was the first English naval force to enter the Mediterranean—at least since the Crusades. Another expedition was sent in 1637 against Sallee in Morocco, and in 1655 Cromwell again despatched a fleet under Blake, which chastised Algiers and Tunis. Other punitive raids were made in later years, but the pirates quickly broke the treaties made and England continued to lose about a hundred ships to them each year. In 1661 the Dutch Admiral de Ruyter succeeded in releasing several hundred captives, but in 1712 the Hollanders still paid Algiers a tribute of guns and naval supplies, which enabled the pirates to strengthen their fleet, continue their depredations, and break the treaty within three years’ time, so that the Dutch had to pay even more for the next truce. Between 1682 and 1687 the French bombarded Algiers three times, yet because the corsairs also hurt his rivals, King Louis XIV is said to have remarked that if there were no Algiers, he would have to make one. The same remark is also attributed to the Dutch and the English; it is evident that the attitude expressed by it was not conducive to energetic measures of suppression. Thus, despite all these expeditions, the corsairs grew in boldness and arrogance, and in 1660 the Algerines even demanded—and were temporarily granted—the liberty to search British vessels and to take out all foreigners and their goods!
If the great Sea Powers suffered such losses and indignities, the smaller ones naturally fared even worse. The Italian States were left entirely helpless and had to purchase an unstable security by constant payments in money, goods, and lives. As late as 1798 an expedition from Tunis landed on an island off the coast of Sardinia and kidnapped nearly a thousand people, mostly women and children. Austria was reduced to the humiliation of placing her seaborne commerce under the protection of her archenemy, the Turks. Prussia and the Hanseatic cities suffered from the depredations of the Mediterranean sea rovers and felt powerless to stop them as long as England gave them at least her tacit approval. When the expected tribute did not arrive on time, the Bey of Algiers would put the consuls of the offending countries in chains and set them to work with the other slaves, as happened to the Danish and Dutch consuls. Treaties stipulating regular payments in return for security from attack were, however, made only with a few of the stronger nations, since the pirates were not anxious to reduce the number of ships they could prey upon.
An incident of the eighteenth century may serve to illustrate the cowardly submission into which nations of Europe had fallen with regard to the Barbary Corsairs. Emperor Charles VI, having added the Spanish Netherlands to his Austrian domain, and realizing the need for maritime trade, founded the India Company of Ostend and began to organize an imperial navy. But England, France, and Holland, disturbed by the rise of another competitor, forgot their own quarrels long enough to unite in opposition to the new venture. Intimidating sailors who would take service under the imperial flag with death at the stake, putting every conceivable obstacle in the way of running the ships of the new company, and even threatening the emperor with war, they forced him to abandon his plans. With the commercial company his new navy also collapsed, leaving the developing Mediterranean commerce of Austria entirely unprotected. When in 1764 Algiers declared war on Austria, without any other reason than to make Austrian vessels their “legitimate” booty, the imperial government was unable to stop their attacks. It was finally decided to build two frigates, but until these were ready, two armed merchant vessels were to cruise against the pirates. The history of their “campaign” is a sad irony. It was felt unsafe to equip these two ships with metal guns, as that might incite the greed of the pirates. The report of their cruise made to the Imperial Council states: “that the ships had the good fortune not to meet up with the corsairs, since ships, crews, and ammunitions certainly would have been lost if they had.” When the two frigates were finally completed, Trieste, the imperial port city, objected to the cost of maintaining them and they had to be sold. In 1784 Austria was forced to sue for a treaty with Algiers and continued to pay an annual tribute.
No serious attempt to subdue the Barbary States was made until 1775, when Spain sent a naval and military force against Algiers. Owing to mismanagement and disagreement among the commanders, however, the expedition ended in disaster. It is noteworthy for us chiefly because one of the participants was Joshua Barney, later Commodore and hero of both the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. In 1784 a combined fleet of Spain, Portugal, Naples, and Malta again attacked Algiers and fought a naval battle in the bay, without, however, engaging the batteries on shore, thus leaving the pirates’ stronghold unimpaired.
The consequence of these failures, halfhearted attacks, and positive encouragement naturally was an unbelievable insolence of the Pashas, Deys, Beys, and Sherifs of the Barbary States, from which the large powers suffered almost as much as the weaker ones. Every fresh instance of submission only whetted their appetites and ran up the price of peace and immunity. No nation escaped the insolence of these tyrannical rulers, and even the representatives of England and France had to submit to unimaginable indignities. In order to force them to bow low to the Bey, they were obliged to creep into his presence under a wooden bar; not one of them seems to have had the courage or presence of mind ascribed to the Dutch envoy to China under similar circumstances, in entering the Emperor’s chamber rear first. It was the energetic action of the young United States which finally showed up the inner weakness of the Barbary States and pointed the way to a fairer settlement with them.
But during its first few years of existence the new Republic also had to pay tribute to these lawless bandits. As soon as they had learned to recognize the new flag as that of a new and as yet weak nation, the Barbary corsairs quickly began to prey upon its unprotected ships. From 1783 on American ships were lost to them in increasing numbers, to the detriment of the developing American maritime trade. Treaties of peace were concluded with—or rather bought from —Morocco in 1786, Algiers in 1795, Tripoli in 1796, and Tunis in 1797, for, as the Tripolitan ambassador in London expressed it: “Turkey, Tripoli, Algiers, and Morocco are the sovereigns of the Mediterranean; and no nation can navigate that sea without a treaty of peace with them.”
Yet this buying of goodwill proved to be an expensive affair, costing about half a million dollars annually, including ransom paid for the liberation of American nationals and the delivery of warships and naval stores.
Among the American leaders of that time there were, of course, different schools of thought concerning the problem. John Adams, then minister to England, was in favor of making the required payments in order to insure the peaceful and profitable trade of the United States. In a letter dated December 15, 1784, to John Jay, who was secretary for foreign affairs during that period, he says: “Some are of opinion that our trade in the Mediterranean is not worth the expense of the presents we must make the piratical states to obtain treaties with them. Others think it humiliating to treat with such enemies of the human race, and that it would be more manly to fight them. The first, I think, have not calculated the value of our Mediterranean trade. . . . The last have more spirit than prudence. As long as France, England, Holland, the Emperor, etc., will submit to be tributaries to these robbers, and even encourage them, to what purpose should we make war upon them? The resolution might be heroic, but would not be wise. The contest would be unequal. They can injure us very sensibly, but we cannot hurt them in the smallest degree. . . . Unless it were possible, then, to persuade the great maritime powers of Europe to unite in the suppression of these piracies, it would be very imprudent for us to entertain any thoughts of contending with them, and will only lay a foundation, by irritating their passions and increasing their insolence and their demands, for long and severe repentance.”
Adams continued to urge a policy of peace and tribute, as expressed in another letter to Jay, of February 22, 1786: “If it is not done, this war (started by Tripoli in order to enforce tribute payments) will cost us more millions of sterling money in a short time, besides the miserable depression of the reputation of the United States, the cruel embarrassment of all our commerce, and the intolerable burthen of insurance, added to the cries of our countrymen in captivity. . . . If a perpetual peace were made with these states, the character of the United States would instantly rise all over the world. Our commerce, navigation, and fisheries would extend into the Mediterranean .... The additional profits would richly repay the interest and our credit would be adequate to all our wants.”
On the other hand, Thomas Jefferson, then minister to France, considered war the only permanent solution of the vexing problem. On August 20, 1785, he wrote to John Page: “You will probably find the tribute to all these powers make such a proportion of the federal taxes as that every man will feel them sensibly when he pays those taxes. The question is, whether their peace or war will be cheapest? But it is a question which should be addressed to our honor as well as our avarice. Nor does it respect us as to these pirates only, but as to the nations of Europe. If we wish our commerce to be free and uninsulted, we must let these nations see that we have an energy which at present they disbelieve. The low opinion they entertain of our power cannot fail to involve us soon in a naval war.”
These two statements contain the basic arguments for and against a policy of appeasement. History eventually proved Jefferson right and Adams wrong. In fairness to Adams it must be stated, however, that he was not opposed in principle to strong measures against the Barbary corsairs, but only in consideration of the weakness of Congress under the Articles of Confederation and of the poverty of the young nation, which made effective naval preparations impracticable at that time.
Jefferson, too, was mistaken in his assumption that he could interest the various European nations in a joint action against the pirates. In his autobiography he makes the following statement: “I was very unwilling that we should acquiesce in the European humiliation of paying tribute to those lawless pirates, and endeavored to form an association of the powers subject to habitual depredations from them. I accordingly prepared and proposed to their ministers at Paris, for consultation with their governments, articles of a special confederation. . . . Portugal, Naples, the Two Sicilies, Venice, Malta, Denmark, and Sweden were favorably disposed to such an association . . . and nothing was now wanting to bring it into direct and formal consideration but the assent of our Government and their authority to make a formal proposition. . . . But they were in no position to make any such engagement. ...”
What Jefferson had in mind was a perpetual blockade of the Barbary States by an international fleet, since bombardments had proved to have only a transitory effect. It was, however, not only the inability of the American Government to implement this farsighted plan which kept it from being executed. As long as England still considered these states valuable allies, nothing could be achieved by the weaker nations. The attitude of a large section of British opinion toward the problem is, perhaps, best expressed in the following excerpt from a pamphlet published by Lord Sheffield in 1783, and aimed against a bill introduced by Pitt, providing for free trade between the United States and Britain: “It is not probable the American States will have a very free trade in the Mediterranean; it will not be to the interest of any of the great maritime powers to protect them from the Barbary States. If they know their interests, they will not encourage the Americans to be carriers—that the Barbary States are advantageous to the maritime powers is obvious. If they were suppressed, the little States of Italy, etc., would have much more of the carrying trade. . . . The Americans cannot protect themselves from the latter (Barbary States); they cannot pretend to a navy.”
Actually, the rovers were privately encouraged by the English, who gave information to them of the sailing of American ships and are even said to have used their influence to bring about a truce between Portugal and Algiers, in 1793, for the express purpose of enabling the Algerines to prey upon American ships in the Atlantic. The seriousness of the problem can be seen from the fact that in that year eleven American ships were captured by the pirates. After renewed treaties and tribute payments, the American Mediterranean trade revived again to the extent that in the Spring of 1799 alone eighty American vessels entered that sea.
But in the meantime the Constitution had been adopted and a strengthened American Government could prepare itself for more energetic action against the corsairs, as well as any one else who tried to interfere with the legitimate interests of the country. The building of several frigates and other war vessels was finally agreed upon in 1794, and a few years later the United States was ready to send a naval force to the Mediterranean to ensure fair and equitable treatment of its merchant ships. The history of the ensuing campaigns with Tripoli and Algiers is well known and need not be reviewed here.
The beneficial results of these actions proved the efficacy of forceful measures in dealing with the Barbary pirates; it also showed what a comparatively weak force could achieve against them. For the United States this success spelled the end of perennial tribute and a very noticeable increase in prestige abroad, a result which certainly would not have accrued from any meek continuation of cringing, begging, and paying, or any other form of appeasement.
The question of Christian slavery was raised at the Congress of Vienna, and it was becoming plain that the European nations were not going to tolerate it much longer. Realizing that the main reason for protecting the corsairs had now vanished, Great Britain finally got ready to put an end to this perpetual irritant. Consequently, a British naval force, joined by a Dutch squadron, was dispatched to the Mediterranean, under the command of Lord Exmouth, in 1816. After a heavy bombardment of Algiers, the destruction of its fortifications and its entire navy, the Dey was forced to sign a new treaty stipulating the total abolishment of Christian slavery. The other Barbary States followed in quick succession in signing similar pledges.
But even this severe lesson was not enough to stop the corsairs. The fortifications of Algiers were soon repaired and new cruisers were sent to prey on the ships of the weaker nations. The problem came up again at the inter-European Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, held in 1818, when many of the nations represented urged vigorous steps to end the menace once for all, either by a British force or an international naval fleet. But nothing came of it, because Great Britain was not troubled by the pirates any more, while she did not wish to invite Russian and other warships into the Mediterranean. Thus, the Two Sicilies, Portugal, Toscana, Sardinia, Sweden and Denmark, Hanover, and Bremen continued to pay tribute for another decade or two. Even Great Britain had to repeat her admonitions by sending a naval force to Algiers, in 1824, under Sir Harry Neale, an event which is of interest chiefly because it witnessed the first appearance of a war steamer, which, by the way, had her funnel shot away during the action.
Algiers was not subdued finally and definitely until 1830, when France, irked by the repeated insults of the Dey, and anxious to expand her influence, sent an expeditionary force there, consisting of a naval squadron under Admiral Duperre, and a military force of 37,000 men. Defeating the Dey’s forces, capturing and occupying the town, the French took possession of the entire territory and incorporated it into their colonial system. After that the piratical exploits of Tunis and Tripoli also came to an end, although Tunis was not occupied by the French until 1881, while Tripoli was taken by the Italians, after their war with Turkey, in 1912.
Morocco, too, experienced a change of heart and promised the abolition of slavery and piracy in 1816. But mistreatment of white visitors and piratical acts continued, and several demonstrations against that state became necessary before real peace was established. Thus, for instance, the Austrian vessel Veloce was captured in 1828, near Cadiz, by the Moroccan corsair Rabia-el-Gheir. It was taken to Rabat-Sallee, where the crew was kept prisoner. When the news reached Vienna, it was decided to send a naval force consisting of two corvettes and two smaller vessels to Morocco to free them. Fortunately, the preceding Wars of the Greek Liberation had induced Austria to reestablish at least a small navy. The Austrian squadron, under the command of the Venetian, Baron Bandiera, finally reached its destination early in 1829. As long as the captured crew was not freed, Bandiera could not resort to force against the pirates. After long negotiations the Austrian commander eventually achieved his first goal, but the release of the Veloce was refused. In retaliation Bandiera decided to take or destroy two of the pirate ships anchored in a river near Larache. Landing his small force, he marched up to where they were located, but was attacked by greatly superior Moroccan forces. He defended himself as best he could by means of the rocket guns in use at that time. Since he did not succeed immediately in setting the pirate ships on fire, two volunteers swam to the nearest one, which had been deserted by its crew, and ignited it. The second vessel had in the meantime been sunk by the rocket guns. Their mission thus concluded, the Austrian force returned to their ships, having lost 22 dead and 14 wounded. But although the Moroccans had suffered much heavier losses, the Moroccan Emperor was still unwilling to give in, and the towns of Arsilia and Tetuan also had to be bombarded before full satisfaction was obtained. Again, even a small force had succeeded where treaties and peaceful embassies had failed for centuries.
But the Moroccans were not finished yet. In 1844 and 1851 France was forced to bombard Sallee and other Moroccan cities again, and in 1856 a Prussian vessel was taken by Moroccan corsairs. This capture called forth the first war-like act on the part of the newly created Prussian navy. The Prussian flagship, the corvette Danzig, was dispatched there under the command of Prince Adalbert, the first admiral of the Prussian navy. In the skirmish that developed near Cape Tres-Forcas with Moroccan forces, the prince- admiral was wounded, while seven German sailors were killed. Morocco was not completely pacified until the end of the nineteenth century. It was finally divided between France and Spain in 1912.
These colonial penetrations by European powers ended the menace of the Barbary States, although the introduction of steamships and the general impatience with all interference with the free flow of traffic, characteristic of the nineteenth century, had helped to check it even before that. We are not concerned here with the ethics of colonization, nor with the treatment the conquerors accorded their new possessions; but if ever the conquest of other countries was justified, it seems to be in the case of the Barbary States, which for centuries had defied civilization and caused untold suffering, and which had a record of broken treaties and pledges which probably surpasses anything else of that kind ever known in the world’s history.
It also seems that no better example of the uselessness and danger of appeasement can be found than the story of the Barbary corsairs, who for such a long time were allowed to intimidate Europe, when concerted action by the injured nations could have stopped them within the shortest time. But, as has become apparent from the preceding pages, it was the greed and selfishness of these nations which prevented both united procedure and effective action by any single member. They would rather suffer themselves than get together or share their advantages' with their competitors. As long as such a shortsighted attitude is maintained, the Barbary States of the world will continue to prosper and plague humanity.