For two thousand years the area known to us as Germany has been the pressure center of Europe, from which endless armies of men and women have moved to Scandinavia, England, France, Italy, Russia, the Americas, and other countries. Anthropological studies indicate a far wider diffusion of Teutonic blood than at first glance appears credible. Even in Spain we find the blonde, blue-eyed remnant of the Goth and Visigoth invasion. These Teutonic people were ever cosmopolitan, world-citizens, and readily made themselves at home wherever their emigrations took them. From the time of the first contact of the Romans with the Cimbri and Teutons in the second century B.C. until the present day, the population of Germany has always been relatively dense, for it was, and is, a strong vital race sustained in an energy-building climate. The keenness of their struggle through the years has maintained a healthy race.
Recurrent pressures from without have also had their effect. Germany has been the battle ground of Europe and the resulting invasions have left their mark. Thus in the east we find a German with a strong admixture of Slavic blood, while in the south he has been mixed with Alpine and Mediterranean blood. The race has changed; the German has taken on other attributes, yet much of the original remains, not so much perhaps in percentage as in the dominance of the Teutonic strain. These people still have much in common with the dreaming, drinking, singing, impulsive Germans described by Tacitus, but new blood infusions and the molding influence of civilization have produced the modern progeny.
The Germans have always lacked unity. Their history is replete with internecine strife and war—of province allied against province. Real political union dates from 1870 when the provinces fought shoulder to shoulder against France. Inner union had, however, not been achieved, for the Germans remained provincial in thought and sentiment. This was in evidence even during World War I; moreover, the people were split into many political parties. The disastrous effect of that war with the unilateral dictates of the Treaty of Versailles and the continued oppression on the part of the victors served to weld these people into one, and union to the nth degree became a vital tenet of Hitler’s dogma. “Ein Reich; ein Volk; ein Fuehrer” (One state; one people; one leader) became the watchword.
The boundaries between the provinces disappeared in theory at least, and Germany stood united as never before. Union makes strength, and this went to their heads. They felt they had the strength and, given the will, they could do anything. A decree is signed and boundaries fall away; a proclamation is made and political parties are dissolved. The tendency was that whatever the Nazis wished they could make it so by proclamation. The thoughts, the hearts, the souls of men may perhaps be guided but never commanded.
While Hitler achieved strong political union, sharp inner divisions not only continued to exist but actually grew. Some dissenters were eliminated, more were thrown into concentration camps, but still the problem continued to plague them. Although Hitler had a very strong following and commanded a nationalist sentiment of close to 100%, the Nazi party and its practices caused sharp inner cleavages. This had a deleterious effect on the German war effort. It was not so apparent when German arms were going from success to success, but when the going got tough it was most difficult for those of divergent ideologies to march shoulder to shoulder with each other. There was bickering and friction all down the line. Even the top Nazis, as revealed in the course of the Nuremberg trials, broke up in violent dissension.
The German is highly impressionable and sensitive to new ideas in extraordinary degree. He swallows an idea uncritically; he is completely dominated by it; and then he may just as readily discard it. It indicates a psychological instability. He is inclined to go to extremes and frequently seems a bit unbalanced. The urge to union during the Nazi regime is an illustration of this. His attitude on propaganda is an even better one. Hardly had World War I broken out when the enemy unleashed a flood of propaganda against the Germans, but the latter scarcely deigned to answer. In post-war years, they realized their mistake and came to appreciate the efficacy of this weapon. So they said, “We must make propaganda,” and they went hard at it—unskillfully, even crudely.
The German is a character of extreme complexity, full of contradictions—a mixture of qualities which may combat and neutralize each other. Despite an open and frank disposition, he is inclined to be self-conscious and touchy; his vanity, unlike that of the Englishman which is sure and steady, is flighty. One finds it difficult to know just how to take him; thus he has become the despair of many a diplomat, and is so today. He is positive, direct-acting, and tenacious to the degree of stubbornness. Compromise is foreign to his nature, and if he is to be induced to compromise, this should be worked out for him. The third Lusitania note from the United States to Germany in 1915 paved the way for a compromise in the waging of the submarine war on commerce, but, if the Germans realized it, they did nothing to exploit it. He is dogged in high degree, and his patience reaches down to the very roots of his being.
On the surface he is apt to appear rough and crude, but essentially he is soft-hearted, good-natured, sentimental, and idealistic. It would appear therefore that his martial character is not inherent but thrust upon him by outside circumstances. Centuries of warfare, invasions, enemies round about, have given him this plus a great military ability.
Like all Nordics, the German has the habit of introspection, the tendency to self-analysis, a willingness to face facts no matter how disagreeable. His nervous and mental energies turn him to reflection and deliberation before action. Nordic self-assertion is not lacking in him, for he has will-power, initiative, enterprise and acquisitiveness; yet his docility to autocratic control is notable. He looks humbly to all those above his station.
A cartoon of long ago typifies the German as “Sleepy Michael”—a man arousing himself but still half-asleep. There is still much of truth in this picture, for the German naturally lapses within himself so that an outer impulse is necessary to arouse him. This does not mean that he is lazy and falls to sleep at his work; on the contrary he is industrious and lapses into singleminded concentration thereon, wherein he becomes unaware of influences or events around him. On the street one may even see how the German comes out of his inner self when a band strikes up.
The American probably exceeds the German in toughness of moral and physical fiber, but the latter is less highly strung, more phlegmatic, and therefore his endurance is greater. The German can stand longer, sit longer, eat longer, drink longer, and dream longer than any other people except the Orientals. He could perhaps also play longer than others, but his mood runs to work rather than play. He has drugged himself with work, and has found it his refuge in trying times.
The German does not naturally go in for sports and this may explain his lack of physical alertness, vivacity, and audacity, compared to other men. This lack has been partially counteracted by rigorous training in the armed forces. Subsequent to World War I when Germany was demilitarized, sports were promoted to aid physical development. These Berlin farmers, harrowing their field in the shadow of a German gun emplacement, represent the industrious man of the German people.
Like all branches of the Germanic tree, the German is gifted with the invaluable quality of individual initiative, which has perhaps done more than any other to give world dominance to this blood strain. Other racial stocks possess this attribute only in limited degree, for theirs is a tendency to herd instinct. However, the German has lost much of his individualism as a necessary surrender for organization and unity, and in a sense has become a cog in the state and industrial machine. Obedience has been instilled in him to such a high degree and to a far greater extent than the American that the German will obey the letter rather than the spirit of an order. Yet, experience in both World Wars shows that individual initiative is not a dead trait in the German character; moreover there are some inspiring examples of it, as for instance, General Francois’ move at the Battle of Tannenberg in 1914 which turned a German victory into a Russian rout, and General Rommel’s campaign in North Africa during the recent war.
The German stands in the forefront of scholars. He is surpassed by no other in his grasp of the sciences insofar as they concern the inanimate side of life; his achievements in archaeology, chemistry, and physics are conspicuous. He reasons well, but his power of imagination is great and the two frequently conflict. He is likely to pursue ideas tenaciously into the realm of phantasy and contrary to any possibilities. Grand Admiral Doenitz and others in authority had an idée fixe that the German submarine war on commerce would produce decisive effect in World War II, when cold and sober calculation should have indicated that the Allies were on the way to overcoming the menace in 1942 and that with the submarine reverses of the spring of 1943 decisive success could no longer be hoped for.
Germany occupies a median position as a producer of inventors and men of genius; her forte is rather the development, or improvement, of the known. An American invented the submarine but the Germans developed it to its highest point in World War I. Even though German development was arrested by her defeat in that war, they entered World War II with a small but very effective submarine arm. It distinguished itself with most important developments during the recent war, such as “snorkel” and a radically new drive to give the U-boat a high submerged speed.
Where, however, the German seeks to lead, govern or win other people, he shows a marked deficiency, for here he is face to face with men. His history in colonization and in adoption of foreign elements into the German family furnishes a series of examples which prove the issue, such as his miserable .failure in Southwest Africa where he aroused the enmity of the Hottentots and the Hereros, and the disappointing amalgamation of the people of Alsace-Lorraine following the war of 1870. He has persistently failed to win the allegiance, the loyalty, and the respectful regard of other people at home and abroad who came under his dominion. The Germans realized this weakness on their part and in World War II endeavored to profit by past lessons in governing Norway, Denmark, France, Holland, and other countries, but again they failed. It is just as impossible to make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear as it is to change fundamental racial characteristics.
The Prussian, in whom Nordic blood predominates, is the aggressive element amongst the German people. This is said advisedly even though the leader of Nazi Germany was an Austrian and certain South-Germans were notable pillars of support. Whether for good or ill, the Prussian has been the driving power. Perhaps most of the human relations friction is attributable to him rather than the amiable South-German. The former took to heart the advice of Prince Buelow, “If you cannot be loved, then you must be feared.” Where the wise man uses oil in his relations with his fellowmen, the Prussian uses sandpaper. In fact, tactlessness is a national trait of the German; Ribbentrop, the German Ambassador in London, giving the Nazi salute to the King of England, is one of the highlights of our time. The German tends to develop an exaggerated estimate of his own power and at the same time underestimates that of other peoples. Moreover there is a persistent incapacity of the German to understand another man’s point of view.
One is struck by the small amount of hate that the German engendered for his enemies in recent times and by the philosophical way in which he accepts defeat. The conditions of war are ingrained in his nature—someone wins and someone must lose—it is all part of the game. If one does not fight fair, and the Germans considered that the British propaganda campaign of World War I was not fair, then he will begin to hate. Thus, “perfidious Albion” came in for a share of it, while France, although Germany’s hereditary enemy, was respected as fighting a good fight. However, the German cannot hold a grudge for long; he tends to forget in a short while and will then make up. The post- World War I shift of German policy from enmity to conciliation with Great Britain would have been much more difficult were this not so.
The German shows a persistent tendency to seek personal leadership but competent leaders, particularly in diplomacy, have been lacking. In recent decades Bismarck is the only star in the firmament of their statesmanship. For a time it appeared that Hitler might be another, but his mistakes were so appalling that his earlier successes fade into insignificance. His policy led to ruin and no greater indictment can be made of a statesman.
Here then is Germany’s vital weakness; she can breed a competent people but cannot raise a few far above the general average. Napoleon’s precept, “It is the man who is wanted, and not men,” is particularly apt in this connection. The German mind and character tend toward narrowness through concentration on one line of endeavor, but fail to achieve broad knowledge and vision. Moreover the leader must be a master of men and the German’s aim has been to master the inanimate side of life. It is a race of technically educated men, and it is said that nine- tenths of such men work for those liberally educated. This is why the Jews were able to garner such a disproportionate share of German wealth between the two World Wars and this in turn contributed to the national resentment which we have witnessed in recent times. The British nobility has supplied competent leadership to its country but the German nobility, through pride of caste and birth, failed to avail itself of the quickening influence of new blood and generally produced men of sterile minds. Suppose the British had supplied Germany with just a few statesmen—what a power they might have been!
The acid test of fighting capacity is, of course, the conduct of war. In two World Wars the German armed forces showed superior ability, high morale, technical intelligence, and staying-power. They produced able organizers, excellent tacticians, and competent-to-outstanding military strategists. They were weak in the coordination of strategy on the top level and fatally deficient in the realm of policy.
Hitler’s last-ditch fight has left Germany in ruins. During the last war she lost several millions of men and women—casualties not only at the front but in the many cities laid waste. Her production facilities which survived the bombing are being dismantled, destroyed, or shipped away for reparations, leaving only small industry. The country has been partitioned and occupied. She will not be able to precipitate another World War within the foreseeable future.
Yet, we must not lose sight of the fact that there are over 65,000,000 ethnic Germans within central Europe. As a group they are split up and powerless, but as an individual the German remains just as competent a technician and fighting man. We may expect that they will go along with those who can and will help them on their feet economically and politically to rebuild their country. The urge to union is by no means dead; it will in fact be promoted by current conditions of adversity.
We are wont these days to speak of the atom bomb as the acme of modern power but here in the form of 65 million Germans we have an atom bomb of incomparable effect. How this force will exert itself remains to be seen. We know that the statesmen representing the great democratic and communist ideologies are not unmindful thereof. We know too that the German by nature will incline toward democracy and has so declared himself in the world today. Yet it will require our best effort and wise statesmanship to secure for the forces of democracy this potent weapon for peace or war.