The Admiral stepped to the deck of his flagship late that night. He found the Chief of Staff and several others of his assistants waiting for him. From the manner in which they accompanied him to his cabin, it was obvious that something serious had happened. While walking up the deck they told him that the long expected crisis had arrived, and dispatches were already coming in. The first half of the really important one had been decoded and it was apparent that the Admiral was to form a task force and get underway in a hurry—but not to the expected place.
At dawn they were on their way. Other units joined them until an imposing force of ships was headed for the objective. After breakfast the Admiral ordered a meeting of the staff. His cabin was in disorder; there were charts and books everywhere. It was manifest that he’d been up all night going over the situation, and it was equally clear that he had found it necessary to refer to dozens of reference works. Here was the navigation chart of the area; there an Air Force planning chart; a National Geographic map; and several volumes of Encyclopedia Britannica. There were intelligence reports and summaries; bulletins; and even a copy of Life open at an article on this area.
The material was available, little nuggets of it here and there, each of them important but none of them joined together in proper relation to the whole. They were scattered all about the cabin—and when the Admiral began discussing how the Task Force would enter the Straits and commence operations inside . . . the fun began. No one could remember the answers to such questions as: Would that harbor take a carrier? Was this beach satisfactory for an amphibious landing? Is this spot a bomber field or an emergency landing field? What section of that railroad offers the best target? Can we get those mountains on the radar as we pass through the Strait? These were all catchy but legitimate questions that needed to be answered as the conference rolled on, and the answers were right there in the cabin—but it took far too long to assemble them or even locate them. And once assembled, it was a difficult task to present a complete picture of the problem. The Admiral exclaimed a half dozen times, “Why can’t we put all these blasted facts together on one piece of paper?” What he wanted was a new kind of map.
Forty-four hundred miles away the General had been called back from his game of golf. His dispatches were coming in, too. His problem was a matter of strategic bombing and close work with the naval forces already underway for the target. But technical knowledge of the area was as hard to dig up as it had been for the Admiral. Of course he had the intelligence—it had been G-2’ed to the limit, but the essential material must be collected from a dozen different sources. To get an overall strategic picture of what it was about? No flux! The best that could be done for each command was to dig it out for himself and record it as clearly as possible on one of the few large maps at hand. Likely this map was already cluttered up with a lot of irrelevant information and the projection was distorted. . . . Well, it just didn’t suit the purpose at all.
Now let’s leave these hypothetical characters sweating it out as best they can and turn to meet the problem under consideration, the Strategic Map. What is it that these unhappy warriors require to help them make their important decisions? Is it possible to provide them with a really good strategic map? I think so.
What should this map contain? Right off, we should stress the difference between the needs of the strategist and the tactician. The strategic map should be one wherein are presented the broad facts of a strategic nature, plotted in their proper relations to each other. All non-essential details should be excluded. From the definition of strategy, this map should assist the commander in the science of concentrating an effective force at a given place and time, and should assist him in maneuvering on a broad scale the forces under his command.
Broadly speaking, strategic information may be placed under the headings of (a) topography, (b) hydrography, (c) meteorology, (d) communications, (e) economics, (f) political factors, (g) scientific factors, and (h) sociological factors. Obviously it would be impossible to display all these factors on a single map, but this information should be available in supplement so as to understand properly the strategic situation.
It might be argued that naval charts provide all the strategic or operational information needed for the seaman. This no longer is true. Operations today are sure to involve all three services—if not immediately, then eventually. Even the statesman is implicated.
Much of this information may be placed on a map without cluttering it, by wise use of symbols, map-size insert maps, written descriptions, and in certain cases, overlays. It is not just an intelligence map, nor an aviator’s map, nor a surface nor subsurface navigator’s chart; nor a railroad or automobile map, nor a terrain map for the infantryman or artilleryman, but a map for the commander, the statesman, and the student. It should also help to present the intelligence summary, with the current intelligence superimposed, if needed.
Here, then, is the information that should be found in this map:
(A) Geography: (on a relatively broad scale, naming important objects only)
(1) Coastlines.
(2) Significant rivers, lakes, waterways.
(3) Contours and altitudes.
(4) General character of terrain, such as marsh, desert, jungle, or cultivated areas, in order to display traflicability.
(5) Cities and towns.
(6) Land ice (permanent).
(7) Major political boundaries.
(B) Hydrography:
(1) Water depths, indicated by shading at 5, 10, 20, 100 and 500 fathoms (thus indicating suitable depths for amphibious, submarine, mining, and task force operations). Individual soundings for important controlling depths only.
(2) General ocean currents and exceptional tidal conditions.
(3) Limit of radar range from shore to seaward, to indicate where a ship, may use radar to fix a position and when it can be observed by radar from ashore.
(C) Maritime establishments:
(1) Bases, large, medium, and small, with controlling depth of water.
(2) Base facilities: repair, fuel, drydocking, and cargo handling.
(3) Anchorages, large or small, with controlling depth of water.
(D) Military establishments: (permanent only)
(1) Fort, camp, command post.
(2) Depot, dump, staging area.
(3) Fixed defenses, line or area.
(E) Aviation establishments:
(1) Airfields: heavy, medium, fighter or emergency, with capacity of field in type, and fixed facilities.
(2) Seaplane base: ramp, alighting area.
(3) Air depots.
F) Amphibious: (for operations of BLT or larger only)
(1) Suitable approach areas.
(2) Beaches: capacity to receive.
(3) Beach exits: trafficability and gradients.
(G) Transportation:
(1) Railroads: marshalling yards, tunnels, bridges, shops, and stations.
(2) Roads: bridges, tunnels, critical stretches
(3) Navigable inland waterways.
(4) Transportability of terrain.
(H) Major strategic targets: (beside those mentioned above)
(1) Power: vital generating plants.
(2) Fuel: refineries, wells, pipes, and tanks.
(3) Target systems as designated.
(4) Magazines: ammunition, chemical warfare, atomic bombs.
(5) Guided missile launching sites or areas.
(6) Radars: fixed and permanent.
(7) Shipyards and port facilities.
(I) Insert maps and tables:
(1) Meteorological data: (for main seasons)
(a) Gales, visibility, fog, cloud cover, temperature.
(b) Winds: direction and velocity.
(c) Waves and surf (for amphibious landings).
(d) Icing (for aviation).
(e) Sunrise and sunset tables (approximate only).
(2) Distances:
(a) To important places off the map, airline, ground and sea.
(b) Distances between important places on the map, with space for additional figures desired.
(3) Blow-ups of important bases or areas: (such as Norfolk area)
(a) When important to show details.
(b) When main map is too crowded.
(4) Shipping and air routes.
(5) Relation of subject area to surrounding areas, with surrounding map identifications, and index of more detailed and specialized maps for further reference purposes.
(6) Hydrographic: (supplemental)
(a) Water temperatures, summer and winter.
(b) Sound conditions (for ASW).
(c) Temperature gradients.
(d) Sea ice: limits and types, by seasons.
(7) Time zones.
It is again emphasized that only objects of interest to the modern strategist should be shown. Not every railroad is important, nor is every bridge or tunnel, hydroelectric dam, or power plant. If more detailed information is desired, let the navigator get out his charts and the intelligence officer his survey or encyclopedia. This is not the place for temporary dispositions such as portable radars, camps, troops, aircraft, or mobile artillery; however, space should be available to use it as a situation map if desired, by marking up the map, colored pins, overlays, etc. Not all the cities need be named, but densely populated areas should be indicated. The map must have on it proper definitions, interpretations, and legends, and on its reverse side sufficient data to describe the area more fully, such as one may find on the reverse of pilot charts of the ocean areas.
To give the best presentation of time and space, the Lambert conformal conic projection is recommended. Meridians and parallels should be indicated but not allowed to interfere with the main items. Compass roses should be used sparingly, if at all. The map should be carefully colored and shaded to give emphasis to prominent items, and yet maintain a clear overall picture.
The duties of the planners and the Fleet Commanders are vastly more complicated than ever before. They should be given every assistance in a difficult and important task. Let us devise for them a Strategic Map, as useful as the Hydrographic chart is to our navigators.