Have you ever experienced the frustrating moment, while traveling toward a vacation paradise, of suddenly realizing that you have forgotten something? Perhaps you forgot to bring a hunting knife, flashlight, camera, or almost anything else which might have been useful on the trip. When this happens you can blame faulty logistics planning, for while you were treating yourself to the luxury of contemplating the forthcoming holiday, the dull and complicated work of planning material requirements was obviously neglected.
Like the water that is never missed until the well runs dry, supply is taken for granted until it fails to deliver. And although there is no glamor in the act of delivering supplies, except where contact with an enemy is involved, few people realize what extensive planning lies behind the delivery of a can of beans to the man in a forward area.
Taken as a whole, supply planning, while it alone will not win a war, can have significant effects upon the outcome of a military situation. Yet the actual planning process is not basically an intricate matter. On the contrary, the pattern for developing a military outfitting plan is amazingly simple and similar to the manner in which one normally plans a vacation trip.
A holiday planner determines first what he wants to do. He may choose fishing, hunting, or just plain loafing; but whatever it is, it will have some effect upon where he chooses to go. His second consideration is the choice of a good holiday spot. This includes an examination of what the possible choices offer in weather, terrain, and resources.
Then comes the determination of tangible needs such as fishing gear, tennis equipment, and so forth. The fourth problem is that of deciding how and where everything is to be packed. Rough clothing, boots, heavy socks, tobacco, and such items may go in one bag; shaving sundries, toiletries, underwear, and handkerchiefs may go in another; and sports equipment may take up yet another gear box.
After that comes the matter of figuring out how everything will be loaded in the car. And finally some thought is usually given to insuring the safety of valuables like binoculars, cameras, and other similar items.
These processes of thinking, although accomplished quickly, constitute a preliminary plan. Essentially the thought pattern employed here is practically identical in substance to that by which military staging plans are developed.
The staging officer reduces these six basic considerations to technical terms which express the same general ideas. First is the unit’s mission. Next is the target area and its characteristics. Third is material requirements. Then, following in normal sequence, are packing and identification problems, transport plans, and security measures.
The actual operation of a military staging program is vastly different from the act of getting started on a vacation, for the former involves many more people, a great deal more equipment, a longer operating period, and a wider scope of activities, but the main difference in basic planning seems to exist in terminology.
Any operation involving the use of tools, whether it be a grand-scale naval operation, the transfer of a Seabee unit, or a holiday outing, may be planned through the same basic thought pattern. However, the universality of this pattern renders difficult a demonstration of its applicability to all levels at once. Hence it seems appropriate to confine our attention to a description of the problems which confront lower command echelons where plans and operations are most closely related.
The Navy’s wartime advanced base construction program provides a fertile field from which to draw illustrations as to the relationship between supply plans and operations. In addition to having the widest possible variety of materials, equipment, and supplies, construction units had the somewhat singular task of operating on land while remaining as mobile and self-contained as a ship at sea. Thus, for illustrative purposes, the comments to follow will be based primarily upon the process of planning a Seabee outfitting program.
Mission
Actual determination of what the unit is to do is largely the function of the type commander, who in turn receives his directive from the top naval commander. The supply officer’s function is to analyze the mission and note any specific implications it has concerning materials required to accomplish the stated purpose.
As will be demonstrated later, the mission may be so specialized as to require special equipment which, without a detailed study of what the unit is to accomplish, might otherwise be overlooked. For example, some battalions may construct waterfront installations while others build airfields and roads. These dissimilar functions require quite different types of equipment and materials. Hence it is essential that outfitting plans be predicated upon a thorough understanding of what operational end is to be achieved. At the operating level the supply officer concerns himself with the problem of his own immediate outfit. On the top echelon, the logistics officer views the problem broadly for a whole force. The thinking processes in both instances are practically identical.
The supply officer’s incentive to action appears in the form of a directive indicating that his unit is to perform a function. When he understands the substance of that function he then turns his attention to the locality of the intended scene of operations.
Target
The decision as to where the unit is going is the function of the top naval commanders. In many ways this is comparable to vacation planning. At the outset it is usually the wife who suddenly and summarily announces where the family will spend its vacation. One simply makes the best of the situation by considering what the chosen area offers in the way of amusement and diversion.
With the supply officer, announcement of the target area is his signal to study all maps, contour charts, reconnaissance photographs, and intelligence information pertaining to the target. His later planning steps require that he know whether the region is tropical, temperate, or cold, and whether it is flat, hilly, or mountainous. One should determine what the territory provides in usable natural resources such as lumber, coral, minerals, fuel, and water. Consideration should also be given to climatic range, topography, and other physical aspects. Enemy-inspired obstacles to the successful completion of a logistics plan must also be reckoned with.
An over-all picture should be developed and recorded for future guidance. A good balance between judgment and imagination is essential here, for the notes recorded at this stage will be brought into use again before the target is hit.
On the basis of analyses of the two considerations thus far discussed, the supply officer is ready to turn his effort to the problem of the tools needed to do the job assigned.
Material Requirements
Supply officers among the lower echelons have much of the material determination work done for them in the form of allowance lists. However, even the operating officer has an opportunity to exercise individual judgment in this connection. As previously indicated, the mission may be so specialized as to require items not provided on a standard outfitting list. On the other hand, certain items may be listed which are not required for the forthcoming operation.
Under ideal conditions, of course, special allowance lists might be developed for each special mission. However, since time and material do not permit this, the next alter-native is to make outfitting lists sufficiently broad to cover practically every type of function, and they should be flexible enough to permit choices based upon individual needs.
Thus it is advisable for the operating officer to give independent thought to the needs of his unit without depending solely upon a prescribed list. Certainly an outfitting list is an important index of the needs of any operating unit, and it is an indication of what is allowed and available. But since the list is compiled largely through the processes herein described, the operating officer should avail himself of the opportunity to use the same thought pattern in determining his unit’s specialized requirements. Even though he is not normally acquainted with the shortage and allocation problems that plague high-level staff personnel, he should at least be among the first to recognize field needs.
Therefore in contemplating the material needs of his unit, the supply officer should make lists of his own on the basis of his knowledge of (1) the mission of his unit, and (2) the target area. Thus, for example, if the mission is to build waterfront facilities at Formosa, and the destination is characterized by rocky waterfronts, outfitting plans should be developed accordingly.
When standard lists have been analyzed and supplemented by any additional items deemed necessary, priority numbers should be assigned to each article. A priority system is appropriate for two reasons. In the first place, not all items are of equal relative importance. The enthusiast who first gathered a lot of spare parts for a particular make of truck, only to receive a different make of truck later on, learned this the hard way. He wasted time getting parts which turned out to be useless to him, and he wasted more time turning them back in.
Important items should receive first attention in requisitioning and follow-up. It is not realistic to order supplies for a large-scale operation with no form of priority coordination.
In the second place, shipping spaces are not always sufficient to permit shipment of everything at once. If time is short and space limited, there is little justification for spending time on less essential materials.
One must therefore discriminate between what is essential, important, desirable, and unnecessary, in that order. For example, motion picture equipment obviously does not compare in importance with surveying and engineering gear, in the accomplishment of a construction project.
In developing a priority system, heed should be paid to the voice of experience. Technical experience on the one hand, and advanced base or combat experience on the other, must be considered. But a balance between these two types of experience is also highly important. A commissary officer with considerable stateside experience, who has definite ideas concerning the proper type of equipment for an efficient galley, may change his viewpoint somewhat when he becomes exposed to the difficulties of advanced base galley management. Hence, to spare himself the trouble of learning by bitter experience, it is always well to draw upon the experience of others.
This applies equally to all technical specialists, whether they are civil engineers, construction engineers, businessmen, stevedores, or architects. The determination of materials required for an overseas construction project requires a combination of technical and overseas experience.
Technical considerations, for example, may lead to the conclusion that certain equipments and materials are very desirable for the building of bridges. On the other hand, advanced base experience may indicate that such items are too elaborate for the purpose to be served. In other words, technicalities and rationalities must be tempered with the practicalities of extraordinary circumstances. Life at advanced bases presents many uncommon situations which must be anticipated either by imaginative thinking or by consultation with those who have been exposed to unusual conditions.
When priority categories are determined, each classification should constitute a separate list, with individual items broken down further into functional groups such as construction equipment, building materials, and others. Working with these lists, then, one can prepare material requests with a minimum of trouble and delay. Supplies may be requisitioned and filled under a priority plan which permits an orderly and even flow of material into the receiving storehouses.
No matter how well planned an outfitting program may be, the quantities of supplies to be handled cannot be altered. It is a big job for any unit regardless of size. When requisitions are submitted, the receivers may stand by for an avalanche!
Packing and Identification
When this point is reached in the operational phase of an outfitting program, the twenty-four-hour-a-day job is about to begin. It can be very embarrassing for the receiving activity if plans are not laid well in advance, for this phase of the operation can be likened to Fibber McGee’s closet. Submitting long requisitions for initial supplies is like opening the door to a gigantic closet chock full of tools, gear, rags, boxes, odds and ends of all sorts. A mountainous wave of material suddenly rushes forth. There is no stopping the flow, and there is no escaping the torrent.
Therefore, with an eye to the operational difficulties to be encountered, the supply officer must plan his receiving operation well in advance. The task of receiving, inventorying, stocking, packing, and marking supplies is an enormous one. Without previous organization it is overwhelming.
In a Seabee staging program, one must plan for the establishment of a well-situated accumulation area, commonly called a “dump.” Covered space should be provided to handle perishable items such as food, paper, office equipment, and clothing.
Reshipment containers may be constructed beforehand, but this must be done with due regard for what is going into them. Although it is well to have boxes sufficiently small to be capable of manual handling, it is useless to have lots of little boxes unless there will be lots of little things to pack. On the other hand, huge boxes serve little purpose if they must be packed with a conglomeration of miscellaneous supplies.
Thus the whole packing operation, from the building of boxes to the final marking of manifests, must be carefully planned and well organized. A disorganized mob of men and officers during this operation can cause untold miseries at the target area. At the outset of the packing process, a single authority should be established and a definite system determined. This assignment of authority must be a part of the pre-operational planning process.
One particularly complicated re-outfitting operation exemplifies the complexity of factors which must be taken into account, and why single authority is essential. The supply officer of one outfit had conducted the preliminary work of developing an outfitting priority plan with the advice of other department heads, had devised a packing and handling system, and had tentatively organized the crew for the all-hands job. His plans were approved by the executive officer and he proceeded with confidence that everything was in order.
He had a “team” system laid out on a production line basis. Crane operators, riggers, forklift operators, warehouse tractor operators, handlers, packers, inventorymen, carpenters, and painters were organized as teams with a supervising chief petty officer as captain of each team. An around-the-clock schedule was established and the mammoth task was about to begin.
Definite spaces within the accumulation yard were allocated to certain types of gear. For example, survey equipment went in one spot, office furniture and supplies went to another, housing materials and tents went elsewhere, and so forth. Each chief had a master list of identification numbers for assignment to finished boxes, and the inventory men on each team were charged with certain types of materials.
Over each shift was a warrant officer who supervised the over-all yard operation. The general plan was to unload incoming trucks, distribute materials immediately to the appropriate spaces, take inventories, pack or crate the items, and assign serial numbers to each box and its corresponding inventory sheet simultaneously. Thus within the course of each eight-hour shift the majority of materials received could be processed, counted, marked, packed, and ready for shipment. Each new shift would take over with each man carrying on practically without break from where his predecessor left off.
However, before operations commenced, someone realized that the other department heads might wish to inspect their materials and suggest special methods of handling and packing intricate instruments. On the basis of this thought the timetable was altered accordingly, and the department heads were worked into the plan to handle the inspection phase.
This system had all the earmarks of being a successful plan. Each superintending warrant officer was indoctrinated as to his specific responsibilities, each chief was given a written set of instructions, and each man in turn was assigned certain definite duties. With everything ready to go, the signal to start the trucks rolling was given.
As the first items began to arrive, things went according to schedule. As matters progressed, however, some of the inspecting department heads began regrouping supplies and thus diverting men from a systematic operation to a series of small special tasks. This caused confusion throughout the system, for while at one end supplies were ordered to one location, at the other end the same items were diverted elsewhere. Even this was not too serious, but when individual officers began assigning their own identification numbers, the operation practically fell apart.
The warrant officers of the watch received orders from several sources, the chiefs became confused as to what was wanted, and in time the whole operation was plunged to the very nadir of chaos. And the supplies continued to pour in by the truckload!
The weight of the commanding officer’s authority was eventually brought to bear in temporarily halting operations, but the situation had already become acute. High-priority equipment had become buried beneath lower-priority items which were following. It was not long before everyone began inquiring whether this item or that item had been ordered and received. No inventory sheet could be considered accurate, nor any number properly assigned. As a matter of fact, many boxes emerged with identical numbers on them, and nobody was sure where anything was.
Fortunately the outfit did not have an early sailing date, hence there was yet time to rectify the situation by unpacking most of the boxes and identifying the true contents of each.
This was an isolated and rare case. But it illustrates the need for a good plan backed by strong authority. No matter how well planned any operation is, the absence of centralized authority to coordinate all phases will doom it to failure. In the instance cited, it was clear that coordination control was lacking, and this lack stemmed from inadequate vested authority. When this is understood by all participants, it is then appropriate to develop an identification plan.
It might be assumed that when a box is packed, all that is necessary to assure identification of its contents is to paint a brief, general description of the items on the outside of the container. This would be acceptable were it not for two important factors in Seabee logistics. First of all, many boxes are necessarily packed with a variety of articles which, collectively, defy generalized description. More important, however, is the fact that plain language identification on boxes containing desirable pieces of equipment is equivalent to an open invitation for anyone to “borrow” the contents.
Consequently, in order to narrow the margin of risk, it is generally advisable to identify each box by a code designator as, for example, letter “A” for “automotive spare parts.” By assigning numbers in sequence under each general code designator, the organization can develop a master inventory list which states clearly what each box contains. Thus, box number “A-12” may contain “Automotive Spares, Jeep engine parts.”
Normally, two master lists are maintained. The first has all boxes listed in numerical order under each code designator, showing a complete inventory of the contents of each box. The other is an alphabetical list of items with an index to the box in which each item may be found.
The numerical list may be used when it is desirable to regroup boxes or separate certain supplies from others. The alphabetical list is consulted when one wants to find a specific item. Thus the former is normally used at the staging area as the outfit is preparing to ship out to a forward area, while the latter is extremely valuable at the target area when sudden demands require immediate location of a given article.
When mountains of boxes and crates must be handled, it becomes extremely important to have a ready reference to the contents of each box, but at the same time security demands that code numbers be assigned.
Identification numbers, therefore, cannot be assigned by several authorities without coordination between them, for the only outcome of uncoordinated box marking is utter confusion at the target area. The story is told of one outfit whose men used to place bets on what each box contained before it was unpacked. While this provides some measure of fun and diversion for the men, it is not recommended as a real morale-booster, for no matter who wins the money, everybody loses in time and effort.
The whole idea is to know what the outfit has and where each item is. In the absence of specific instructions, one young inventory enthusiast watched a box being packed with laundry soap, rags, mops, brooms, brushes, and toilet tissue. When the box was sealed, he assigned a code designator and number to the box, and opposite that number on his manifest he wrote “cleaning gear.” While perhaps technically correct, his generality hardly gave hint to the variety of items to be found in that box. In taking inventory such generalizations should be avoided. When all boxes are packed, marked, and segregated according to type and in priority groups, the next problem is the loading plan.
Loading and Distribution Plan
Thus far the thesis has been that “first things come first.” In shiploading this does not hold true. Whatever is wanted first at the destination must be loaded aboard ship last. Even under the most favorable conditions ships cannot be unloaded in a day, hence the priority list must be brought into use again to determine how the materials will be loaded.
At this point in the planning process the supply officer frequently finds himself caught between two divergent requirements. The Commanding Officer, basing his orders on his knowledge of what will be needed first at the target area, will request that certain items be loaded so as to be immediately available upon arrival.
The stevedoring specialists, on the other hand, must load the ship in the safest and most economical manner possible. The two views are not always agreeable in terms of actual loading plans, hence it is well for the materials officer to consult frequently on both sides and arrive at a plan which is mutually satisfactory.
When plans are formulated, the supply officer must then arrange his outgoing shipments so that they will arrive at the dockside in an orderly procession. This means that the handling procedure back at the accumulation dump must be carefully thought out in order to avoid the possibility of sending the wrong materials at the wrong time.
When loading plans are completed, it is then appropriate to give consideration to what the target area will offer in operational difficulties. Before supplies are unloaded at the destination, there must be some idea as to where they are to be dumped. In planning this phase one should review his target area characteristics and pick out several alternate spots which may be available as of the estimated time of arrival.
This determination, of course, can be but an estimate at best, for in military operations it cannot be promised for certain that any particular plots of ground will be available. With a view to all possible contingencies, several alternate places should be considered and submitted to the theater combat commanders for their review.
In Seabee operations frequently a timetable is developed which, if all goes well, permits fairly firm plans as to the establishment of a camp site with definite areas allocated for storage and equipment dispersal. Top Seabee type commanders, who in themselves represent but one phase of the over-all logistics problem, obtain their instructions on the basis of estimated military operations. From here the information travels downward until the individual Seabee supply officer is given a rather restricted area within which he will eventually set up shop.
Plans for this operation at the target area should be carefully worked out. Again centralized material handling authority must be established, for at the target area there is enough confusion without interjecting the influence of cross-purposes within individual units. Plans should be developed for ship unloading, beach operations, trucking to the dump, final unloading, and material distribution at the camp site.
Initial landing operations present many difficulties. During early beaching operations, of course, there are always several different organizations using the same beach, loading and unloading. The whole waterfront area is a hub of activity, and while it appears to be a confused tangle of trucks, cranes, men, and equipment, the whole operation is actually well coordinated by the beach master, who controls a given waterfront area. Thus it is really quite difficult to become confused at that point. However, when a driver leaves the beach for his dump area, he is at the mercy of military police, independent traffic directors, confusing signs, long lines of vehicles, tooting horns, crossroads, forks, and general traffic tie-up.
Against the possibility that trucks, men, and equipment may become irretrievably lost in the excitement of early-day activity, supply officers should plan to issue written instructions, complete with maps, to all drivers. In most instances officers charged with materials responsibilities will load all trucks at the beach and then convoy them to the dump area for the first trip in order to make sure that each driver may “get the lay of the land.”
Security
Anyone who has been exposed to advanced base life can testify to the advisability of providing adequate security for one’s equipment and supplies. The code numbering system previously discussed suggests a partial solution to this problem. However, even though a potential borrower can not fathom what a box contains, he does not usually bother himself with details. He simply takes whatever is left unguarded.
Security measures, therefore, must be instituted upon the first receipt of materials, and must be maintained until those materials are finally put to use. This means that a sentry system should be established where supplies may be vulnerable to unauthorized requisition. When materials are placed aboard ship for transportation to the target, a responsible cargo officer should be appointed to accompany the supplies. This function, incidentally, is usually regarded as choice duty, for the accommodations provided such cargo officers are normally well appointed, and, since there are only two or three such cargo officers aboard, they become special guests of the wardroom with all the privileges accorded regular ship’s officers.
Passenger life on a transport is necessarily more restricted due to the number of passengers aboard, hence the competition for appointment as cargo officer is usually quite keen.
It is the function of the cargo officer to accompany the unit’s supplies from staging area to target area. At the target he is responsible for establishing contact with his unit to report the arrival of equipment. If he arrives before the transport, he normally requests that his equipment be left intact until the Commanding Officer arrives.
This does not usually happen, of course; but when it does, the cargo officer finds himself hard pressed to unload his gear and get off. Against this possibility, therefore, the cargo officer should be chosen for his ingenuity as well as his sense of personal responsibility. One officer was faced with a situation where he had to go ashore, choose a site, borrow trucks, cranes, and men, supervise the whole operation, and establish his own headquarters at the dump area—all prior to the arrival of his battalion.
He was very successful in his project. In fact he had been able to recruit men from so many other different units that his borrowed helpers were unable to collude amongst themselves to the detriment of his outfit’s material security. By the time his battalion arrived he had a dump established and operating; he was living and messing with another outfit; and in general he was quite happily situated. A lesser person could have had a rough time under these circumstances.
The problem of security is a continuing one which is not solely the responsibility of the supply officer. For even after equipments have been placed in full operation, security precautions must be observed.
The lengths to which some outfits will go to borrow equipment is illustrated by the extreme occurrence which took place in the Southwest Pacific in 1944.
During a particularly long and heavy rainstorm on one small island, one unit’s light crane became bogged down in several feet of sticky mud and clay. A whole day was spent in trying to push, pull, tug, and dig that machine out, but all efforts were futile. When night fell it was decided that the job could be continued the next day with more men and heavier equipment. The crew returned to camp for a good night’s sleep in preparation for a tough job ahead.
Next morning when they returned to the scene the crane was gone. All that remained was a gaping hole where the crane had been. At first supreme indignation swept the group. They were ready to comb every camp in the region to find the crane, and they were prepared to mop up the crowd who stole it.
But anger gave way to curiosity, for when they began to think about it, they wondered how it was possible to accomplish the job during the night under the most trying circumstances. Then curiosity gave way to admiration. Whoever took the crane probably needed it badly. It was finally concluded that the culprits deserved the crane after all the difficulties which must have attended their acquiring it. The crane, incidentally, was never found.
But the incident serves to illustrate what can happen even after one has taken all the steps necessary to furnish his organization with what it needs to operate. To provide for security is to reduce the chance of neutralizing a good plan. And a good plan is necessary for successful operations.
Many a vacation has been spoiled because of poor preparatory planning prior to departure from home. In naval operations we cannot afford to jeopardize some vastly more important stake by incomplete supply planning.
Although plans follow a similar pattern, the comparison between a vacation trip and a forward military move ends with the planning phase. In vacation plans, the anticipating of what is to come is half the game. In staging a forward move, the planning is only the bare beginning. When operations begin, outfitting is indeed no holiday frolic.