One day during the first week of February, 1942, the gallant American and Filipino forces defending Bataan took advantage of a lull in the fighting, and in the absence of better entertainment, listened to the Japanese-controlled radio station at Manila. The program contained intermittent bursts of Japanese propaganda, with the invaders being quite verbose concerning their claims of victory in the Philippines and elsewhere. At one point, the announcer suddenly interrupted a presentation of musical recordings, and the weary soldiers sensed that they were about to hear a pronouncement of unusual significance. They did not have to wait long before their impression was substantiated. An aged but firm Filipino voice began to make an appeal for the immediate surrender of the beleagured United States troops hemmed in on the small peninsula, with their backs to the sea.
The speaker was General Emilio Aguinaldo, universally regarded as one of the most colorful personalities in Filipino history. Well beyond his prime, the old insurrecto had been a motivating figure in the native revolt which originally flared up against the Spaniards in 1896, and though temporarily checked, broke out with increased fury against American authority shortly after Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States. Both the Spaniards and the Americans initially underestimated the military resourcefulness of the natives. The number of Spanish troops in the Philippines rose from 1,500 in August, 1896, which was fifty per cent greater than the normal garrison, to an army of 28,000 during the following year, when the main center of Filipino resistance collapsed. More troops had been asked for, but the conflagration in Cuba kept to a minimum the reinforcements sent to the Far East.
The subsequent resurgence of the Filipino revolutionary movement resulted in fiercely fought battles with the American expeditionary force, and it was necessary for the United States to make a major effort before peace was restored throughout the colonial possession. On April 1, 1898, the regular army of the United States included 28,183 officers and enlisted men; by contrast, a total of 126,468 troops, or more than four times that number, traversed the Pacific to the Philippines and participated in the campaign to crush Aguinaldo and his followers. The Filipinos offered tenacious resistance, and even after the central power of the Revolutionary Government had been broken they resorted to harassing guerilla warfare on Luzon and several other islands of the archipelago.
It is needless to say that Aguinaldo’s plea for the capitulation of the Bataan forces received an unenthusiastic response. By some, he was accused of being a Japanese pawn; others, looking at the situation more cautiously, believed that the invaders had compelled him to make the radio address. Whatever the truth may have been with reference to this matter, the unusual speech made one think of events of more than forty years ago, when Aguinaldo and his supporters challenged the military might of the United States. The Tagalog’s address from Manila was given on a date closely approximating the forty-third anniversary of the opening clash between Americans and Filipinos on February 4, 1899. At that time, Aguinaldo, as a youthful but preeminent native officer, welcomed the test of strength on the battlefield, because he had been in the forefront of those advocating an open break with the armed forces of the United States. More than four decades later, his role was reversed; instead of admonishing his countrymen to resist the foreign invaders, he asked them to lay down their arms and to accept the Japanese as their liberators.
It is generally accepted knowledge that, beginning with the Spanish-American War, the Japanese enjoyed an ever-increasing influence in the Philippines, culminating in their invasion and conquest of that insular country while it was still protected by the flag of the United States. The presence of Japan as a factor in Filipino affairs is not restricted to the period of American sovereignty, however. Japan being an insular country, her inhabitants responded to the attraction of the sea, and in their conception of water-borne commerce, a logical route lay to the southward, where the Philippines constituted the first great archipelago encountered when sailing from the Japanese mainland in that direction. In view of this geographical pattern, Japanese seafarers probably touched at the Philippines as far back as the dawn of the Christian era. Beginning with the twelfth and thirteenth centuries a flourishing exchange of goods materialized between the two countries. Long before Magellan explored the Western Pacific, Japanese traders were making excursions to the coasts of the Philippines, where they gave cloth, arms, and trifles of various sorts for gold which the natives brought from the mountains.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Japanese-Philippine relations during the seventy-five years (1565-1640), which began with Spain’s appearance in the Far East colony and ended with Japan’s adoption of isolation, pertained to various attempts by the rulers of the northern kingdom to gain control of the rich archipelago. Late in the sixteenth century, the great Japanese shogun, Hideyoshi Toyotomi, endeavored to seize the Spanish possession. In addition to the Philippines, he aspired to conquer a vast area, including Formosa, China, and India, but his widespread intrigues, although comprising an interesting chapter in the history of Japan, did not produce the desired results. During the first part of the next century, other Japanese entertained similar ambitions. One adventurer, Sigemasa Matsukura, petitioned the Tokugawa Government to allow him to prepare an expedition for an invasion of the Philippines. The necessary permission was granted, but he died in 1630 before he could carry out the pretentious plan.
It is entirely possible that only Japan’s abrupt termination of relations with the outside world prevented the renewal, and perhaps successful execution, of her smoldering yearning to acquire Formosa, the Philippines, and other outlying countries. As it was, the Japanese were confronted by unfavorable circumstances when some of their number revived previous dreams of empire during the decades immediately following the abandonment of isolation in 1853. Japan’s renewal of intercourse with the rest of the world coincided with an intensification of effort by the western nations in East Asia. Being unable to challenge the intruders, the Japanese applied themselves industriously to national rehabilitation. In the decades which followed, the rapid “modernization” of the erstwhile hermit kingdom, including the establishment of a westernized army and navy, was regarded by foreign observers as one of the most remarkable developments of modern history. It was not until Japan’s crushing defeat of China in 1894-1895, however, that widespread concern appeared abroad regarding the apparent intent of the small insular country to embark upon a far-reaching policy of overseas expansion.
Although Japan’s imperialism was not sufficiently far-advanced by the end of the first Sino-Japanese War to enable foreign observers to make a detailed analysis of its ultimate goals, in some quarters the feeling already prevailed, though vaguely conceived, that the rising Asiatic power, aside from its continental ambitions, intended to obtain a number of insular colonies in the Pacific Ocean, of which Formosa was to be the first. It is related that one of the first appraisals of this kind was made by President Ulysses S. Grant, who, after returning from a voyage to the Far East, declared that Japan was destined to rule the Philippines. Shortly after the Battle of Manila Bay, a similar reaction was voiced by Admiral George Dewey, who apparently chose to ignore the contingency that Spain might be supplanted by the United States in the Philippines. Dewey, as a naval officer, sensed that Japan’s increasing strength at sea foreshadowed an acceleration—but not immediately—of her territorial expansion in the South Pacific. John Barrett, former American Minister to Siam, and present with the Admiral on the Olympia as an observer subsequent to the famous naval action of May 1, 1898, recorded the other’s prophecy as follows:
I look forward some 40 or 50 years and forsee a Japanese naval squadron entering this harbor, as I have just done, and demanding surrender of Manila and the Philippines, with the plan of making these islands a part of the great Pacific Japanese empire of the future.
I will not live to witness what you will see if you live your ordinary life. That will be the conquest of China by Japan, and when that is dong, conquest of all island possessions from north to south off the Pacific coast of the Far East.
Notwithstanding this speculation about the possibility that some day the Philippines would pass, into the hands of Japan, the latter’s reestablishment of intercourse with foreign lands brought her into friendly contact with the Spanish colony, and the Japanese, in a normal and orderly fashion, took the initiative in fostering the growth of trade with the Filipino people. A Japanese consulate was established at Manila in 1888, to be closed in 1893, and reopened in 1896. This renewal of economic and political relations between Japan and the Philippines had another effect. Like the occasional neutral observer who felt that the Japanese planned to expand southward, the Spanish colonial authorities soon manifested uneasiness over Japan’s intentions in that region. The Europeans noticed that Japan’s official encouragement of trade with the Philippines occurred almost simultaneously with the recall of her military forces from Formosa, and when an Imperial Trade Commission arrived at Manila in 1875, it was received with marked coolness.
The unexpected strength displayed by Japan in the war with China heightened Spain’s concern about the security of the Philippines. Sensational rumors made their appearance regarding alleged Japanese intrigues and plots to gain control of the rich archipelago. In 1895, a widely circulated news story excited Spanish government circles. The account in question, appearing in the Correo Español as a letter from a correspondent at Manila, and dated January 23, 1895, stated that “news had been received from Hongkong that the Japanese expect to come and take possession of these Islands.” It then continued to tell of a Japanese spy who went to the Philippines to secure information which would be of assistance to the northern kingdom in some surprise assault upon the colonial possession.
Adding further fuel to the fire, some selections of the Japanese press, carried away by the smashing victories of their country in the armed struggle with the Chinese giant, began to make disparaging remarks about the shortcomings of Spanish rule in the Philippines. Responding to this hostile attitude, newspapers in Spain and the Philippines countered with adverse criticism of the Asiatic nation. Genuinely worried about the implications of Japan’s newly recognized position in Far Eastern affairs, a false braggadocio was assumed by Spanish commentators and writers. Their chief theme embraced the theory that Japan, though able to master the decrepit Chinese, was no match on the battlefield for any of the ranking western powers. A typical analysis of this kind was that by Jenaro Alas, a well-known Spanish expert on military affairs, who asserted, “I do not imagine that it has occurred to the imagination of any Japanese, even the best- varnished (with civilization), to try to expel from Asia and Oceania the whites, who are meat-eaters. However vain they may be, they will comprehend the difference there is between race and race, or perhaps species and species. It is one thing to scratch the coasts of China, and another to invade inland territory where there are Englishmen, Frenchmen, Russians, or Spaniards.”
Responsible Spanish statesmen, speaking fundamentally from a political point of view, entered the discussion in a more dignified vein. Senor Dupuy de Lome, the veteran of some diplomatic service in the Far East, and who later became involved in an embarrassing fiasco at Washington and was declared persona non grata by the United States Government, urged caution and restraint in evaluating the future course of Japanese policy. In a book devoted to an analysis of Far Eastern affairs, he counseled the arrangement of a friendly understanding with Japan, for in his judgment the latter nation would continue to play an even more influential role in world politics. Writing in February, 1895, Señor Segismundo Moret y Prendergast, former Spanish Minister of State and a leading authority upon colonial problems, examined in detail the various aspects of Japanese-Philippine relations. It was his impression that the rise of Japan to the position of a first-class power implied “a radical transformation in the relations of Europe with the Orient, and especially with the possessions of Spain in those seas.” In a word of warning, he added, “To refuse to recognize this fact, waiting for events which will not delay in coming, would be equivalent to a man sleeping on the rails of a railroad track, confident that the vibrations of those rails produced by the oncoming train will warn him of the danger.” Outlining what he considered to be a sound procedure for the protection of Spain’s interests in the Philippines, Moret asserted that “the Japanese are a coldblooded people; they are intelligent and good observers; the way in which we can influence them is by demonstrating that we are aware of our position and our destinies. ...”
From almost every point of view, the Spaniards were not in a position to defend the Philippines against Japan or any strong military power. It had become a fixed practice for the Government at Madrid to maintain not more that one thousand Spanish troops throughout the entire insular territory. This small force, being inadequate to effect public order and to safeguard Spanish sovereignty, was necessarily supplemented by larger numbers of native militia which had been drafted into military service. When the Filipino revolt broke out in August, 1896, 700 of the 1,500 European troops dispersed throughout the colony were in Manila. The garrison at the latter point consisted of 300 peninsular artillery, the remainder being principally marine infantry and detachments of sailors from the Spanish naval squadron anchored off Cavite. There were about 2,000 native auxiliaries of all kinds stationed at the capital, and 4,000 others in the provinces.
These troops, in numbers alone, were inadequate for a vigorous defense of the Spanish possession. The problem was made much worse when' the mounting discontent among the Filipino populace spread to the native soldiers, which normally comprised about seventy-five percent of all of the armed forces in the colony. From the very beginning, the Spaniards had employed native militia to suppress internal disorders and to repel attacks from the outside. Once Spain lost the loyalty of the Filipinos in military service, their control of the archipelago would become considerably weakened. The degree of disaffection existing among the colonial troops was demonstrated by the half-hearted attitude or outright desertion of many of them during the rebellion of 1896-1897 and its resurgence in 1898. In the latter case, the wholesale desertion from Spanish ranks by the Filipino militiamen and their co-operation with the Americans hastened the downfall of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines. There is no reason to believe that a parallel development would not have taken place in the event of a war between Spain and Japan.
The physical defenses of the Philippines had undergone a similar change for the worse. The fortifications guarding Manila and other key points in the archipelago were antiquated and weakened by neglect. A vivid picture of the situation, as it existed in 1896, was given by General Francisco Borrero, formerly a high-ranking military official in the Philippines:
Manila is at the mercy of any fleet. There is not a single gun at the Corregidor Island, which should be the key to the harbor. For all defense the capital city has four modern cannon, thirty mortars and 100 old cannon. At Cottabatto there is one modern cannon and several old ones that are totally useless. There are also some old battle pieces, the carriages of which are broken. At Sooloo we have only four modern guns. At Cavite there are but five iron guns, each worse than the other. There are no gunpowder supplies. At Zamboanga we have eight guns and four at Panay-Panay. The military warehouses are totally empty.
This deterioration of the permanent land defenses, in addition to having been caused by the generally decadent state of Spain’s colonial administration, also stemmed from the fact that the Philippines had not been directly involved in an international conflict since the British captured, and later evacuated, Manila in 1762. At sea, Spain’s defence forces were in little better shape than those ashore. This was important, for in a war with Japan, like that with the United States, Spain’s retention or loss of the Philippines would have been determined primarily by naval battles. Japan’s attitude for mastering the fundamentals of sea warfare was indicated by the outcome of the armed struggle with China. On the other hand, Spain, once the mistress of the world’s oceans, defended her Far Eastern colonies with an inadequate naval force. Her warships were outmoded and illkept, and the naval station at Cavite had fallen into disrepair.
Cavite originally was designated as the principal Spanish base in the Philippines during 1795, when the British seemed to be on the verge of attempting a reoccupation of the country. One hundred years later, with the prospect of serious friction with the Japanese looming large in the minds of the Spaniards, consideration was given to the long-standing problems of erecting a modern naval base in the Philippines and of providing formidable shore fortifications to protect Manila and the other strategic areas in the colony. Realizing the need for prompt action, Spanish naval engineers had proposed a plan whereby Olongapo, fifty miles north of Manila on Subic Bay, was to be the site of the main Philippine base, with Cavite relegated to a secondary position. Despite their constant agitation for a more vigorous policy previously, the proponents of this plan were given little encouragement by the apathetic government authorities. These naval engineers understood that Spain, as in the case of the United States which succeeded her, needed a major Philippine base before effective defensive operations could be carried out against an enemy in that sector. The lack of facilities for the repairing and servicing of a fleet was especially bad, and the Philippines possessed no dock capable of accommodating vessels of over one thousand tons.
The increasing fear of Japan and the strained relations with the United States caused the Spaniards to cast aside much of their former indifference, and preliminary work, including the construction of buildings at Olongapo, had been accomplished prior to the outbreak of the Spanish American War. The triumphant Americans likewise designated the Subic Bay site as the most favorable location for the principal base of the United States Fleet in the Far East. Reverting to the precedent established by the Spaniards, the American Government followed a course of indecision, and grandiose plans for the development of Olongapo were subsequently abandoned. This failure to build a major base in the Philippines imposed a severe handicap upon the United States when Japan launched her treacherous attack in 1941. The Japanese, for their part, constructed great naval and military establishments in Formosa and the Pescadores which served them well in the conduct of their offensive operations.
The demoralized condition of the Philippine defenses was strikingly illustrated by the ease with which Admiral George Dewey, U. S. Navy, won the Battle of Manila Bay on May 1, 1898. Besides the absence of sufficient preparation, the Spaniards, by not taking advantage of certain factors which tended to favor them, were unable to coordinate the determined use of shore batteries, the mining of adjacent waters, and the strategic deployment of their available naval power into a single, effective plan of defense. Naval annals have rarely recorded such a one-sided victory as scored by the Americans. Whereas the Spanish fleet was virtually annihilated, the warships under Dewey’s command were hardly touched by enemy fire, with none of the American sailors killed and but eight wounded.
It probably has not been generally realized that the Filipino rebellion of 1896-1897 profoundly affected the course of American action in the Philippines subsequent to May 1, 1898. If, after winning the memorable naval engagement, Dewey had been confronted with the normal garrison of Spaniards at Manila, ranging from 500 to 700 soldiers, his strength as compared to that of the defending forces would have permitted him, without further delay, to attempt a storming of the capital with Marines and sailors; and if he had captured this key city, which was entirely possible, the entire Philippine Archipelago, for all practical purposes, might have passed quickly under American control. Had this happened, undoubtedly there also would have been deep repercussions with reference to the role of the natives in ensuing events, but whether this change would have worked to the benefit of the United States, one can not say.
If the Japanese, instead of ourselves, had fought with Spain during this period, their task of occupying the Philippines would have been a simpler undertaking. With bases in Japan proper only about one-sixth the distance from the Philippines as those of the United States, the Japanese would have been in a position to concentrate a greater preponderance of naval strength against the Spaniards than Dewey was able to do. Similarly, the question of expediting reinforcements to follow up the initial blows at sea would have been solved more easily by the Asiatic nation, especially when supplies and men could be transported from nearby Formosa to the Spanish colony within twenty-four hours. However numerous the armed forces of Spain might have been at Manila and in the provinces, a Japanese invasion thrust would have enjoyed great chances of success.
In view of these facts, one can understand why the Spaniards were disturbed about the future of the Philippines, particularly with respect to Japan. Spanish disquietude reached a high point when the Japanese, as a sequel to their overwhelming defeat of the Chinese, acquired Formosa and the Pescadores. The vulnerability of the Philippines to attack was reemphasized to the worried Spaniards. This was not the first time that the occupation of Formosa by a potential antagonist had troubled Spain. In the seventeenth century, the notorious Chinese pirate, Koxinga, made his headquarters there and threatened to overwhelm the defenders of the Philippines. Spain’s strategic problem in her Far Eastern colony, to be inherited by the United States, was how to cope effectively with a strong sea power which had occupied a nearby territory.
An acceleration of the rather feeble and obviously belated efforts of the Spaniards to strengthen Philippine defenses was not the sole effect of Japan’s acquisition of Formosa. Feeling uneasy about the Japanese advance southward, the Madrid Government decided to sound out Toyko with respect to Japan’s official attitude toward Spain’s colonies in the Far East. Besides the larger issues under consideration, there was the specific problem of determining the territorial limits of Formosa. The Spaniards, although previously aware of Formosa’s strategic location, apparently had never bothered to determine the line of demarcation between Formosan and Philippine territory. The appearance of aggressive Japan in the former Chinese possession forced the Madrid Government to weigh this question.
It is not unnatural that the factor of geographical propinquity exerted a strong influence in Spain’s urgent desire to arrive at a peaceful accord with Japan regarding the latter’s southern policy. The proximity of Formosan territory to a number of small islands of the Philippine Archipelago extending above Luzon is probably not fully realized in the United States. The northernmost piece of land in the Philippines, the islet of Y’Ami, is 88 miles southeast of the Japanese possession. Y’Ami is 43 miles north of Basco, the capital of the Batan Islands, one of the two principal insular groups between Japanese territorial waters and Luzon. Basco possesses a fairly good anchorage, and the United States Navy subsequently maintained a cruising station there for a number of years. Some 100 miles farther south lies the island of Camiguin in the Bubayan group, which is roughly 50 miles northeast of the port of Appari, a point of landing for the Japanese invasion forces during December, 1941.
The resulting international agreement which Spain negotiated with Japan, and the diplomatic negotiations preceding it, comprise a chapter of some importance in the history of the Far East which has been generally overlooked by" American students of foreign affairs. The entire incident is closely associated with the better-known intervention of France, Germany, and Russia in the peace settlement of the Sino- Japanese War. The treaty of Shimoneseki, concluded on April 17,1895, besides awarding Japan the southern islands, presented her with the Liaotung Peninsula in Manchuria. The three European powers, seeking to prevent the Japanese from obtaining a point d’appui on the Chinese mainland, urged the Tokyo Government to renounce the possession of the peninsular territory. Since Japan was not strong enough to contest the combined wills of these powers, she acquiesced to their wishes and grudgingly returned the disputed land to China in a subsequent action of November 8.
Spain, though not participating in the joint representations made to Tokyo, took advantage of Japan’s dilemma and pressed her own demands regarding the clarification of Spanish-Japanese relations. The western powers which instigated the Liaotung controversy took an interest in strategically- located Formosa as well. Although there is a dearth of information on this subject, they seem to have queried Toyko about the new possessions in the south, and consequently the channel between Formosa and the Chinese Coast (The Channel of Formosa) was declared internationalized and open to commerce of all nations. Moreover, Japan allegedly promised that neither Formosa nor the Pescadores would be ceded to any other power.
Before commencing negotiations with the Japanese, the Madrid Government first sought assistance from the more influential countries of Europe. Great Britain was disregarded by the Spaniards in this instance, for the British had revealed their position with reference to the Japanese by refusing to participate in the Liaotung affair. The groundwork for the creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 was already apparent. The attitude of Imperial Germany was disappointing to the Iberian kingdom. The Berlin Government, perhaps remembering the dispute with Spain over the Caroline Islands in 1885-1886, remained cool to the other’s proposals. In contrast to the negative reaction of Germany, Czarist Russia, which was eager to check Japanese influence in any part of the Far East, and especially France, whose security in Indo-China would have been threatened by a further extension of Japanese influence in a southern direction, lent their active support to the plans of Spain. With this strong backing, Spain secured a favorable response from Japan, and on August 7, 1895, a treaty was signed at Tokyo by the accredited representatives of the two nations. This was a favorable time for the Spaniards to press their case, because the Tokyo Government was in the midst of debating the advisability of acquiescing to the western powers with regard to the Liaotung Peninsula, and it was not until three months afterward that the formal reversion of the disputed territory was agreed to.
In considering the evolution of Japan’s relations with the Philippines, the Spanish- Japanese agreement of August 7, 1895 was brief and to the point. Don José de la Rica y Calvo, the Spanish Minister at Tokyo, represented his government in the negotiations and signed the completed document. Marquis (later Prince) Saionji, Minister of Public Instruction and Minister of Foreign Affairs ad interim in the Japanese Government, who subsequently gained renown as an elder statesman, or genro, served his country in a like capacity. In the opening statement of the treaty, it was asserted that Japan and Spain, in the spirit of the good relations existing between them, wished to determine their respective territorial rights in the western Pacific. It was decided by the two contracting parties that the degree of latitude which passes through the middle of the Channel of Bachi comprised the boundary line between Japanese and Spanish territory. Japan also announced that she did not have any claims upon the islands to the south and southeast of this line. Spain made a similar assertion concerning the islands to the north and northeast. Obviously the territories most affected by these statements were Formosa and the Philippines.
Not many months passed before the Philippines witnessed the outbreak of the rebellion which brought Emilio Aguinaldo into the limelight as a Filipino leader. This uprising, more fierce and widespread than those of the past, severely tested Spanish sovereignty in the archipelago. It was widely circulated throughout the Islands that Japan intended to intervene in behalf of the insurgents. Spanish newspapers and books which discussed the insurrection dwelt extensively on the alleged efforts of Japan to aid the natives in their struggle. According to some sources, the Filipino society called the Katipunan, which led the revolt of 1896, had sought to purchase arms and ammunition from Japan during the previous year. Captured documents of the Tagalog revolutionists seemed to indicate that the Katipunan had appointed a special committee to carry on the necessary negotiations with the Japanese at Tokyo.
That the Spaniards were concerned over the possibility of Japan lending armed assistance to Aguinaldo and his associates was demonstrated by the details of an alleged incident which circulated within official circles at Manila. During the first part of February, 1896, a Japanese cruiser arrived at the Philippine capital on a courtesy visit. The Katipunan apparently decided to take advantage of this opportunity and sent representatives to make an effort to confer with the officers of the vessel. It was claimed that this delegation met and talked with an Admiral Hirawa and a fellow officer. According to reliable sources, an agreement was negotiated between the Japanese Consul- General, on the one hand, and the Katipunan, on the other. It was agreed that the Filipinos were to pay one million two hundred thousand pesos in eight installments for a large quantity of arms and ammunition. This plan was said to have failed because the Katipunan was not able to raise the necessary sum of money before its activities were discovered and curtailed by the Spanish officials.
Although some impartial observers tended to discredit this story at the time, official documents of the Spanish Government tended to substantiate it. The Governor- General of the Philippines, writing on September 20, 1896, to Marquis de la Barrera, Spain’s Minister to Japan, stated, “I have no doubt that the Japanese Government is exerting effort to show good will toward our Government, but I note something strange which induces me not to confide absolutely in the promises of Japanese officials nor to act in accordance therewith. The coming to Manila of a Japanese Viscount, the son of an Admiral, under the pretext of business, who conferred secretly with the most prominent Filipino agitators, makes me presume that, even if I am not aware of an agreement which might have been concluded between them, at least an understanding was established which may be dangerous in the future.”
Spain’s colonial authorities also regarded with suspicion the presence of certain Filipinos at Tokyo and Yokohama, who since 1892 had sought to enlist the aid of the Japanese in the struggle against their western rulers. This small group of Filipino expatriates was augmented early in 1896 by the arrival of several representatives of Aguinaldo who were entrusted with the special mission of soliciting help from the Japanese Government. Their activity caused some concern to the Spaniards during the rebellion of 1896-1897, and they were constantly under the observation of Her Catholic Majesty’s diplomatic representatives in Japan. The Spanish Minister to Japan uncovered some facts of importance in connection with these Filipino agitators. In one place, he spoke of their having intercourse with the Japanese masoneria. In a second report, the Filipinos were said to be in contact with the soshis. The soshis and masoneria were elements belonging to the Genyosha society and similar organizations of a super- nationalistic character which had begun to work secretly for the unification of the Far East under Japanese leadership. While the Japanese Government, under the circumstances, could not have openly encouraged the ambitions of the Filipino insurrectionists, the secret societies, having among their members men of prominence and influence, were in a position to maintain relations with the Katipunan. Marquis Hirobumi Ito, one of the most powerful men in Japan, later admitted that he had been familiar with conditions in the Philippines since 1894.
It was confirmed that the Japanese government attempted to prevent its nationals from negotiating with the Filipinos. In a communication from Yokohama, August 26, 1896, the Spanish Minister informed the Governor-General that the Japanese authorities had taken stringent measures to break up the intercourse between the soshis and Aguinaldo’s representatives. In order to be absolutely certain about the matter, the Spanish Government asked the Tokyo Foreign office if there were any Japanese subjects involved in the Tagalog rebellion. Desiring to give Spain complete satisfaction, Tokyo ordered the Japanese Consul at Hongkong to make a thorough investigation. The eagerness of Japan to satisfy Spain was reflected by the fact that this investigation was conducted at a time when the Japanese were in the midst of a severe cabinet crisis.
Despite these precautionary steps, the Spanish authorities were convinced that the Japanese would continue to play a role of increasing importance in the future of the Philippines. Without doubt, the recent success of Japan in asserting herself as a strong nation had encouraged the Filipinos in their attempt to throw off the Spanish yoke. This fact was aired openly by Governor- General Camilio Palavieja who succeeded in crushing the revolt. According to some observers, Aguinaldo’s emissaries in Japan had dispatched a petition to the Emperor asking him to establish a protectorate over the Philippines. This petition, signed by some 5,000 Filipinos, was allegedly accepted without comment or subsequent action.
It was also rumored that Spain, tiring of its colonial responsibilities, offered to sell the Philippines to Japan in 1896 for $3,000,000 gold. The Japanese, according to this account, refused to consider the proposition. On the other hand, an eminent Spanish diplomat, Don Francisco de Reynoso, reiterated that Japan herself had proposed to purchase the Philippines. Marshal Yamagata, while at Moscow during the coronation of Czar Nicholas II in 1894, tentatively suggested that Spain sell the archipelago to Japan for forty million pounds sterling. Reynoso stated that the Japanese were then disposed to give this sum for the Far Eastern colony because of its strategic location and its possible use for the diversion of their increasing population.
One might speculate at great length as to what would have happened to the Philippines if the War of 1898 between Spain and the United States had not occurred. However limited were the activities of expansionist- minded Japanese in connection with the Filipino rebellion of 1896-1897, they pointed to a program which subsequently was to be adopted as the official policy of the Japanese Government. Another significant but little publicized chapter in the evolution of this program was to transpire during Aguinaldo’s insurrection against the United States, 1899-1902.
It has often been said that human progress can be achieved only if we understand the lessons taught us by the careful analysis of history. This is certainly true with reference to our future policies regarding Japan. At the present time, following a bloody war waged victoriously by the United States in checking Japan’s predatory ambitions, it must not be forgotten that our former foe’s program of empire-building was firmly embedded in the past.