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Cargo Ships
About $10.00 per month less.
Mr. Walter R. Faries.—On pages 925 and 926 of the July 1948 issue of your publication appear two comments which prompt this letter. On page 925 you say: “The CIO Maritime Committee would like all such transports to be privately owned and civilian manned, even in wartime. We wonder what the assault troops who might have to travel aboard them will say to that.”
To this first comment we need devote little time. It is a matter of personal opinion, and it is obviously impossible to obtain a constructive expression of opinions from the hundreds of thousands of future assault troops who may have opinions then to present. For your assistance, I respectfully submit that an approximate answer might be reached by considering that such assault troops will be divided into two groups: those who are familiar with the U. S. Merchant Service and those whose only information would come from Navy indoctrination. Again it is a matter of personal opinion, but for your guidance, individuals consulted have stated that the first group would undoubtedly curse the day which took the efficiently operated Merchant Service away from its civilian control and placed it under the control of the Navy or of the Coast Guard. The consensus of opinion is also that the second group would simply curse, not knowing that better management was available. In these opinions I concur.
On page 926, you say, “Sure, what did an able seaman get per month in the war zone!”
It is to be hoped that this is a serious inquiry, as I cannot believe that you would intentionally publish a sneering comment, relative to those gallant seamen who died in open life-boats or in the icy sea on a Murmansk or North Atlantic winter voyage, or who died beneath the festering heat of a tropic sun, or whose death resulted from the explosion of a merchant ship carrying to the U. S. Armed Forces the ammunition, fuel oil, or gasoline without which the Navy would have been helpless. For your instruction, then, you are advised that the A.B. in the Merchant Service received a base wage as follows.
T ankers
1941.. . .$110.60 per month
1942.. .. 116.00 “ “
1943.. .. 116.00 “ “
1944.. .. 120.25 “ “
To this was added a bonus ranging from 25 per cent to 100 per cent, depending upon the danger incurred in helping the Navy. In a further limited zone of great hazard an additional $5.00 per day was paid while actually in that advanced area.
On this the merchant seaman A.B. paid a Federal Income Tax of not less than 22 per cent. He also paid full postage rates, full rail-road fares, and received only $5,000.00 insurance in case of death, and nothing in case of temporary or permanent injury. The premiums on his insurance he paid himself. If injured, he received only “care and maintenance,” which included hospitalization and medical and surgical care while actually hospitalized. Upon his discharge from a hospital, he received while convalescent the sum of $3.00 per day upon which to support his wife and children and himself until he was adjudged cured. Three dollars per day is a very small sum indeed upon which to support a sick man and his family, especially during war-time. This limited hospitalization
was restricted to the merchant seaman himself, and neither his wife nor his children could obtain any benefit therefrom. You will doubtless be interested to learn that even this inadequate medical care only covers illnesses or injuries received while actually sailing, or which appear within sixty days thereafter as a direct result of such efforts to help you. There is no life-time hospitalization available to the merchant seaman.
The merchant seaman received no uniform or clothing allowance, nor did his family receive any government allotment. He had no access to goods at a “ships stores” at low prices; if he bought anything at his ship’s “slop-chest” he paid the full shore price plus an added 10 per cent. He received no mustering-out pay, no “G.I. Bill of Rights,” and he had to provide for his old age out of his wages, as he was given no government pension to support him during his declining years if he had squandered his earnings.
During the War he suffered under the restrictions of the O.P.A., and was harassed and handicapped in the performance of his duties by many government bureaus. Not the least of his headaches was the United States Navy.
An unbiased examination of the respective “take-home” pay of the merchant seaman and of his comparable Navy rating would show very little difference between them, if all the intangible extra compensations of the Navy are given due and proper weight and consideration. According to the Congressional Record of June 15, 1948, the wartime earnings of an able-bodied merchant seaman (an “A.B.”) in the period of highest war bonuses, including base wages, overtime, all types of bonuses, etc., averaged $2,596.00 per annum gross. This nets $2,185.00 after income tax and social security are deducted. The annual earnings of comparable Navy ratings (Bos’n 1st class) aboard Navy- manned Liberty ships was $2,256.00 gross, or $2,246.00 net after the $10.00 income tax charged a Navy man is deducted. Thus, the Navy sailor actually was paid more than his merchant seaman counterpart, by $61.00 per year plus all the other benefits mentioned above.
As to the relative amount of work performed, I would like to say that in the South Pacific I personally have seen Navy “oilers” manned by crews of from 285 to 315 Navy men; those “oilers” were commercial tankers taken over by the Navy, and before their seizure they were manned by merchant crews of only from 36 to 52 merchant seamen.
I have no data on the pay of a Navy seaman first class: perhaps that rating should be used instead of the Bos’n’s Mate; if you could supply me with the seaman first class figures I would appreciate it. I believe that the facts are sufficiently clear that the merchant seaman never was paid as well as his Navy counterpart; in justice to the merchant seaman this fact should be hammered home, in order to discredit the wild idea that we were paid tremendous wages. I don’t suppose that that rumor can ever be scotched: but your publication can do a real service to the Navy and our Country by helping correct a vicious misapprehension which has caused and can in the future cause a lowering of our war-waging efficiency. I do not know who started this rumor; but it is a dangerous one and does our Country a disservice. Your publication can do much to correct the error. I hope you will for, after all, men on a merchant ship suffer alike. It makes no difference what uniform they may be wearing. When we are unjustly attacked and insulted, it creates an unnecessary bitterness which I hope you will help dispel.
(Editor’s Note: The original material in the Proceedings which inspired Mr. Faries’ comment was largely material quoted verbatim from the New York Times and reprinted in the Professional Notes Department of the Proceedings. This department is devoted to a digest of material appearing in the world’s leading periodicals relative to the National Defense, and this digest is offered so that Proceedings readers may keep up with world thought and comment on important subjects.
No one is more aware of the vast contributions, both in lives and effort, made by the seamen of the Merchant Marine during the war than are the editors of the Proceedings. In proof of our interest we may point to the numerous articles in the Proceedings calling attention to the problems of the American Merchant Marine. In his letter of comment Mr. Faries has pointed out the important fact that if the Merchant Seaman is not to be lured away by Industry ashore, he must receive wages equivalent to those paid by shore industries.
As to Mr. Faries’ statement of the size of Navy tanker crews as compared to merchant tanker crews, we ourselves are curious. Perhaps some of our readers can send us the answers.)
Mr. Clatjde O. Lanciano.—The editorial comment following the news caption on page 926 of the July 1948 issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings, entitled “C. I. O. Group Opposes Militarizing Ships,” will probably receive the approval of your reading public, which is predominantly naval. Nevertheless, in all fairness I feel that the insinuation made should be answered in the interest of a better understanding between the Navy and the U. S. Merchant Marine.
As a citizen who has seen duty in both services, I would reply to the question raised in this way. The war-time able bodied seaman got X dollars per month. Although the value of X fluctuated considerably, it was always determined by the government. The important thing from an efficiency point of view is that the cost to the government of operating a non-militarized Merchant Marine was considerably less than it would have been had the Navy been given absolute control over its direction. For example, a Liberty ship was manned by a merchant crew of 48, while the Navy required 160 bluejackets to operate the very same vessel.
Given the same pay scale and benefits as his brother in the Armed Forces, the merchant seaman would have been economically better off in the long run if he had been militarized. After all, how many former bluejackets are now getting a 5,000 dollar college education with all expenses paid? Such benefits need be taken into account if any fair evaluation is to be made of the relative compensation received by the war-time sailors of the two services.
Opposition to the militarization of the merchant marine was and is due to:
(1) Union leaders, who would obviously lose out.
(2) Large numbers of older men (a majority of whom have served in the Navy).
(3) The American love of freedom, which is perhaps as great an attribute as the concept of service to country.
Naming the New Carrier
Martin E. Holbrook.—A recent article in the New York Times which reported the Congressional approval of an appropriation providing for the construction of the new 65,000 ton aircraft carrier, also reported that among the several names suggested for the new vessel were Pearl Harbor, George Washington, and United Slates. It was the appearance of the last mentioned name that attracted my attention, for it has been one of my pet notions during recent times that entirely too many years have passed since the name United States last graced one of our country’s men-o’-war. Consequently it was with pleasure that I read of the name being once again, even though unofficially, considered for possible use.
It has been somewhat of a mystery as to why the name United Slates was not bestowed on one of the aircraft carriers built during the recent war. It possessed all of the necessary qualifications for the honor, but for some unknown reason was overlooked. There were certainly sufficient numbers of carriers constructed during the conflict to allow for its bestowal, yet the honor was not conferred. Moreover there has never been, so far as I have been able to make out, any definite reason for not so naming one of the new carriers; nevertheless it has not come to my attention that the name United States had even been considered for any one of the new vessels.
It is a matter of history that the first United States (and to my knowledge, the last), a sister ship of the illustrious 44-gun frigate Constitution, contributed in no small way to the renown, glory, and world praise which was accorded our Navy as a result of its victories in the War of 1812. A comprehensive and an extremely interesting and clear account of her action with H.M.S. Macedonian, during that conflict in which the United States not only conquered but also made a prize of that British vessel, appears in Theodore Roosevelt’s volume Naval War of 1812. The results of this action, which is regarded as one of the outstanding single ship duels in naval history, coming on the heels of the Constitution’s famous victory over H.M.S. Guerriere, not only did much towards raising the prestige of the then small American Navy and contributing to the glory of the vessel’s officers and men, but also was responsible in great measure for the raising of the public’s confidence in the outcome of the war.
Nevertheless, even though the United
States covered itself, its crew, and its country with glory, the boards which bestow names upon naval vessels have not seen fit to perpetuate its memory in that manner. Only once since 1794, when the United. States was authorized, has the name been assigned to a new vessel. The instance to which I refer occurred toward the end of the first World War when one of the six battle cruisers then authorized was designated to bear the name United Stales. Unfortunately in 1923 our country became involved in a disarmament conference, and as a result the battle cruiser United States, together with several sister vessels, was “sunk” in the “Battle of the Washington Naval Treaty,” the ship being, as I recall, rather less than 10 per cent complete at the time.
Since the above mentioned disaster, twenty-five years have passed, during which time the country has seen fit to ignore the memory of the famous frigate. Meanwhile vessels of her own era that contributed no more, and possibly even a mite less, to American Naval tradition have been honored— in several instances more than once—and the names Ranger, Bon Homme Richard, Intrepid, Hornet, Wasp, and Enterprise are not only familiar names to most Americans, but the vessels themselves have without exception added to, and enlarged upon the glory of their illustrious ancestor.
Decatur and Barry, two of the United Stales’ captains, have been honored with destroyer namesakes, as has Humphreys, her constructor, but the gallant vessel they built and manned and upon which many of their laurels were gained goes unhonored. I submit that the opportunity to correct this error of omission should not be overlooked, and that the name to be borne by the greatest warship of the world’s greatest navy should be that of the world’s greatest nation, the United States.
Ancient and Modern Aspects of Sea Power
(See page 1351, November 1948 Proceedings)
Assistant Professor Robert W. Daly, U. S. Naval Academy.-—In his article on Sea Power, Captain Puleston makes several statements which I should like to question.
(1) “In 1571 the Spanish Fleet won the battle of Lepanto and the long struggle between Christians and Moslems for the western Mediterranean.”
Here Captain Puleston by over-simplification misinterprets the essential feature of the Lepanto campaign. 1571 was a Christian crusade, not a Spanish enterprise. If it is necessary to give a generic character to the heterogeneous fighting men who won the battle, the honor would properly belong to the Italian city-states. Of the estimated 202 to 209 Christian galleys present at Lepanto, the bulk, or 105, came from Venice, 30 from Genoa, 19 from Naples, and 12 from the Pope, with other small detachments from Savoy, Sicily, and Malta. Spain was represented by only 31. Of 30 ships, 20 were Spanish and 10 were Venetian; but the Venetians also sent the 6 galleasses which played such an important part in the fight. Of some 28,000 soldiers, 8,000 were Spanish and German, and the balance were Italian. Of some 13,000 sailors, only 1,700 were Spanish. Spain certainly contributed to the victory, but it is misleading to place the quoted sentence at the head of a paragraph about Spanish history, implying that Spain at Lepanto became the sea power. By the victory, the western Mediterranean became safer for Christian travel, but not much more. English popular historians writing loosely about the Armada enhanced the prestige of the Elizabethans by presenting the Spaniards as the victors of Lepanto. A study of the Spanish sources quickly dispels the illusion that Phillip understood the use of a navy, which, similar to the fleet of Xerxes, was subordinated to the requirements of the army. But then, of course, Elizabeth didn’t have a real navy either; England had to wait for Cromwell for that.
(2) For Captain Puleston to devote some 1,200 words to the American Revolution and only two sentences to the services of the French Navy seems to be looking through the wrong end of the telescope. To dismiss the French Revolution and Empire in less than 300 words, with roughly the same space devoted to “Washington’s Navy,” is a trifle unbalanced. It is probably insulting news to Americans, but except for the exploit of Arnold on Lake Champlain, European authorities tend to pay very little attention to John Paul Jones and his colleagues, preferring instead to treat the American Revolution as a strictly maritime conflict between England and France, with Spain and Holland acting as France’s seconds. In the Naval
Academy library there is a book by W. M. James, The British Navy in Adversity, considered by many to be the standard work on the American Revolution. James dispenses with Jones in some 300 words, but one sentence of his inspired some reader to pencil an indignant question mark in the margin. “The French casualties were about 116, and the Bon Homme Richard was so badly knocked about that she sank the day after the engagement” (p. 186). Since the word “French” is lightly underlined, we may assume that the question mark was the result of patriotic dyspepsia rather than an acquaintance with the complement of the converted Duras. Nothing can diminish the sheer glory of “I have not yet begun to fight!,” and knowledge of the difficulties Jones surmounted in internal organization of a polyglot crew should actually serve to enhance his exploit.
(3) “During the Civil War an improvised Navy opened the Mississippi and maintained the longest and most effective blockade yet maintained.”
Authorities seem to be in agreement about this achievement of the Union Navy, but an excellent study recently made by Marcus W. Price on “Ships that Tested the Blockade of the Carolina Ports” (American Neptune, July, 1948, pages 196-241) offers considerable food for thought. Mr. Price has tabulated the available material on the subject, and reached the somewhat surprising inference that the blockade, until the last year of the war, was relatively ineffectual in that area. For the complete period (1861-1865), Mr. Price reveals that of 1,093 runs made by steamers, 953 were successful, and of 961 made by sailing vessels, 782 were successful, with the steamers thus having an overall success of 87 per cent, and sailing vessels, 81 per cent. In 1865, naturally the peak of the blockade’s strength, steamers were still 66 per cent successful, although sailing ships had dropped to 40 per cent. Being a special study of a section, rather than the complete survey of the entire coastal blockade, Mr. Price has not invalidated Captain Puleston’s authoritative statement, yet Mr. Price does incline one to wonder just what was meant by blockade prior to the Civil War.