Akagi, Famous Japanese Carrier
(See page 579, May 1948 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel R. D. Heinl, Jr., U. S. Marine Corps.—Mr. Walton L. Robinson’s article, “Akagi, Famous Japanese Carrier,” in the May 1948 Proceedings, was a splendid job, but I must nevertheless submit to the Proceedings two major historical corrections, both of which relate to his somewhat casual handling of the operations of Marine Air Group 22 during the Battle of Midway on June 4, 1942.
On page 590, in listing the casualties sustained by the Japanese carrier air-strike against Midway on that morning, he accepts the Japanese figures as the losses sustained, summarizing that only six Japanese aircraft failed to return from this strike. To accept enemy figures under such conditions is normally good practice, but in this instance these (taken from “The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway,” Admiral Nagumo’s Special Action Report) represent a Japanese unwillingness to lose face by admitting losses which are, nevertheless, beyond any doubt.
The facts are as follows: 108 Japanese fighters and bombers took off for Midway from the carriers Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu. This force contained 36 fighters, 36 bombers, and 36 attack planes. At approximately 0616 (Midway time) Marine Fighting Squadron 221, with 25 fighters, attacked this force, inflicting, according to pilot reports, a considerable number of casualties. The latter, however, are notoriously subject to downward revision in the interests of accuracy. On Midway itself, though, two independent counts were made of the number of attacking bombers in each wave, by officers of anti-aircraft or aviation experience. In the first wave, delivering a horizontal attack, there had originally been 36 bombers from Kaga and Akagi. By the time this wave reached Midway, it was counted by Major William S. McCormick, one of the most experienced antiaircraft officers then in the Marine Corps, to contain 22 aircraft—or a net loss of 14. The second wave, dive bombers, had also started out 36 strong; when this group reached Midway to deliver attacks on the north shore of Sand and Eastern Islands, it was counted, plane by plane, by Captain Marshall A. Tyler, a Marine pilot, whose airplane was grounded and who had, against his will, nothing to do but watch, to contain 18 aircraft, or a net loss of 18. In addition to this, ten certain kills of Japanese aircraft were made by anti-aircraft fire (from the 3d and 6th Defense Battalions, Fleet Marine Force). In a subsequent assessment, the Secretary of the Navy credited these organizations with 20 enemy planes, but the figure 10 is of a rock-bottom character, based upon physical evidence.
Thus it will be seen that, between the Marine fighters and the Marine anti-aircraft gunners, the Japanese lost at least 42 aircraft short of or at Midway. In addition to this, Marine fighter and dive bomber pilots reported seeing a number of retiring enemy planes crash at sea.
So much, then, for the defense of Midway proper.
My next point relates to Mr. Robinson’s omission of the two dive-bombing hits scored by the SBD’s of Marine Scout Bombing Squadron 241 on the Akagi at approximately 0800 (Midway time). Until the end of hostilities there had been some question as to which, if any, of the enemy carriers
VMSB-241 had actually hit during this attack, but the Akagi’s records, together with Admiral Nagumo’s report, jibe quite accurately with the report of the Marine squadron. According to the Nagumo report, at 0800 (Midway time), the Akagi sighted “16 enemy planes,” which shortly afterward delivered a dive bombing attack. The only 16-plane group of dive bombers in the battle of Midway at this time and place, of course, was the 16-plane SBD division of VMSB- 241, led initially by Major Lofton Henderson. The Marine squadron reported securing two certain hits and one “possible” on a carrier shortly after 0800. Prior to 0810, moreover (Midway time), other ships in the Japanese task force, as indicated in the Nagumo report, logged the fact that the Akagi had received bomb hits. Under interrogation, finally, the commanding officer of the Akagi, Captain Taijiro Aoki, I.J.N., stated that the first damage sustained by the Akagi had occurred by fire as a result of “two bombs by dive bombing, about two hours after sunrise ...” (as stated in U.S.S.B.S. Interrogation, NAV-4). Sunrise on June 4 took place at approximately 0600, and Captain Aoki’s relation of this event to sunrise eliminates any possibility of a misconversion between Tokyo time, on which the Japanese forces were keeping their records, and Midway time, by which our forces were naturally operating. Thus, in effect, Captain Aoki states that his first damage occurred during the 0800 attack, which was that of the Marine squadron.
I suggest that an accurate sequence of this attack, especially when clinched independently by Captain Aoki’s testimony, can be reconstructed from pages 18 and 19 of the “O.N.I. Review,” May 1947, which reprints Admiral Nagumo’s Action Report. The entries of particular interest are those shown under June 5 at 0500 (Tokyo date and time, which would be 0800, June 4, Midway time); and 0510 (0810 Midway time). I presume Mr. Robinson bases his statement that the first two hits scored on Akagi took place at 0726 Japanese time (or 1026 our time) on the damage chart contained on page 55 of the “O.N.I. Review.” It will be noted, however, that this chart fails to include the attack listed in the chronological log on pages 18 and 19. Obviously it was the Enterprise and Hornet attacks which made the final kill, but it is certainly clear that the Marine dive bombing attack drew first blood and inflicted considerable injury on the carrier.
The Navy Helps Them Feed Themselves
Captain T. W. Davison, U. S. Navy.— “Save Wheat and Meat” is a slogan of the day. Your navy is furthering this national program of resisting the spread of starvation and communism in some unique ways. Here are two examples from the Pacific area in which the navy contributed.
The first case affects Japanese soil productivity. Last fall a navy cargo vessel carried to Guam a considerable deck load of special equipment for handling bulk phosphate from deposit to ship. Conveyor, cranes and derricks were included. Also an experienced engineer, who stayed with this equipment from San Francisco to its arrival at Anguar Island in the South Pacific. At Guam the equipment was transferred to an LST. Stores, quonset huts and personnel were added. At Anguar Island the Japanese provide unskilled labor. This island is estimated to hold two hundred million tons of pure phosphate deposits. Untold flocks of sea birds over centuries of time found prolific feeding grounds nearby. They flocked on this tiny barren island. The integration of time and vast quantities of birds nesting there eventually formed an island of pure bird lime, dried and hardened by centuries of baking tropic sun.
The birds have gone. Perhaps the vast schools of small fish on which they fed were eventually consumed in their entirety. Or perhaps some change in ocean current cut off the rich marine life of plankton, diatoms and other marine algae that sustain small fish like silversides and anchovies. Schools of large ocean fish feed on their small cousins, driving hard into the dense school. The tiny fish leap into the air, and at best try to hug the surface of the water. At this point flocks of sea birds dive into the school of tiny fish, catching some in the air, others on or near the surface of the ocean. Those that find their way into the inlets or shallows of the island are no more successful in escaping the sea birds. A similar process of feeding: from algae to minnows to large fish and sea birds (Guanay of the Cormorant family) is still found off the phosphate islands of Peru. The process is so valuable that it is protected by the government as a natural resource. Bird lime has great utility. It is pure fertilizer in a very concentrated form. On Anguar it is mined by Japanese under United States supervision, loaded into Japanese operated ships and hauled north for use in the home islands.
To recognize the importance of this, glance at a bas-relief map of Japan and note the few good agricultural plains fed by fertile valleys. These are subjected to intensive agriculture of the most aggressive type. A large part of the country is mountainous and unsuited to agriculture except in terraced hillsides and small artificially flattened garden plots.
These gardens are fertilized customarily with locally acquired “night soil.” Uncooked products from such gardens give dysentery to Americans. It is necessary to the Japanese because of the intense cultivation required of their land. The great agricultural plains and valleys, on the other hand, require effective fertilization on a large scale. In no other way will this old farm land support the great city populations of Japan.
The phosphates that help the Japanese feed themselves are a “saving” of possible wheat demands on the United States. Our self-imposed commitments to ensure that friendly peoples do not starve are met in various ways. The aforementioned is one of the more effective, less costly and less publicized of these.
The last choice and least desirable is the shipment of American grain and meat.
The Oriental diet is basically rice and fish. The sea fed the birds that produce the phosphates that increase Japanese rice production. Of course the sea also feeds Asiatic peoples in a far more conventional way: fish. And this is the second example.
But the fishing fleets were largely destroyed and worn out during the war. Of the power-driven fishing boats still available* shortages and high costs of petroleum products is an impassable barrier to the average oriental fisherman.
So the navy steps in again. Last winter a navy ship delivered to the port of Fusan in south Korea about 7000 drums of navy fog oil for use as fuel. This was just one of such shipments.
In south Korea the occupation authorities gathered together the available driven fishing boats, previously Japanese owned for the most part. By providing them with fuel, some operating supervision, and protection at sea by U. S. destroyer patrols, we make possible a large fish catch by Koreans to feed their densely populated south coast communities.
The Koreans are happy to eat fish—not like some Americans who eat it once a week in a sense of duty.
The low compression, old and worn diesel engines of their fishing fleet would be heavy fuel consumers of today’s expensive and hard to get (out there) product. So the Navy has been giving them excess fog oil left over from war time supply still on hand at advance bases when the roll-up program began. This fog oil would clog up and possibly ruin a modern American high compression diesel engine. It has little utility to us except perhaps to lay road dust. It is first cousin to low grade diesel oil with soot qualities added. The Korean fishing boats chug along on it contentedly, streaming great clouds of smoke; and bring back large catches of fish to the hungry populace. The use of surplus fog oil after the war to help a friendly people survive starvation is a good example of effective and efficient fulfillment of American policy. The cost to the United States can be considered the cost of shipment there from its roll-up base or from its storage in the hills of Guam. Its cost of development, production, transportation during war to an advance base, and its truck transportation to a dump area, all add up to a very considerable figure. But war is admittedly expensive, and the fog oil that came into use from the Marianas campaign on throughout the rest of the war period was a great saver of American lives and ships. As such it has written off for itself all its original costs. There remains only its last contribution to our time, as combustion fuel to help the navy in fulfilling its share of a great national program.
These are only two examples of how your navy is contributing to the peace time policy of the United States Government.
Axis Submarine Losses to Allied Submarines
Mr. Warren S. Howard.—As Rear- Admiral Stoeve and Mr. Francis McMurtrie have commented on Axis submarines destroyed by undersea craft of the Dutch navy, it might be worthwhile to complete the record and give a complete list of German and Italian submarine losses to Allied subs.
The following table lists the 21 German and 19 Italian casualties in this category.
In summary, United States submarines destroyed twenty-five Axis subs—23 Japanese and two German—and British 36, including 16 German, 18 Italian, and two Japanese. One U-boat fell victim to a Norwegian undersea craft, and three enemy submarines were sunk by Dutch subs.
At the present time, only one Allied sub seems to be definitely known to have fallen victim to Axis subs—this was HMS Rainbow destroyed by the gunfire of an Italian submarine off the south coast of Italy on October 19, 1940. Three other British submarines are presently listed as “unconfirmed” losses to enemy subs.
GERMANY
Name of Allied sub | Date | Name of Axis sub | Location |
HMS Salmon | 12/4/39 | U-36 | Off the Skagerral |
HMS Porpoise | 4/16/40 | U-I | S. coast of Norway |
HMS Cachalot | 8/20/40 | U-51 | Bay of Biscay |
H. Neth. Ms.S. 0-21 | 11/28/41 | U-95 | E. of Gibraltar |
HMS Unbeaten | 1/12/42 | U-347 | Off “toe” of Italy |
HMS Saracen | 8/3/42 | U-335 | NE. of Shetland Is. |
HMS Sahib | 1/21/43 | U-301 | NW of Sardinia |
HMS Tuna | 4/7/43 | U-644 | NE of Iceland |
HMS Sickle | 5/21/43 | U-303 | Off Toulon |
HMS Truculent | 6/4/43 | U-308 | NE of Faroes |
HMS Ultimatum | 10/30/43 | U-431 | Off Toulon |
HMS Tally Ho | 2/14/44 | U-IT23 | Malacca Strait |
H. Nor. M.S. Ula | 4/19/44 | U-974 | S. coast of Norway |
HMS Satyr | 6/15/44 | U-987 | Off N. coast of Norway |
HMS Trenchant | 9/23/44 | U-859 | Off Penang |
H. Neth. M.S. Zwaardvisch | 10/5/44 | U-I-68 | Java Sea |
USS Flounder | 11/9/44 | U-537 | Java Sea |
HMS Venturer | 11/11/44 | U-771 | N. coast of Norway |
HMS Venturer | 2/9/45 | U-864 | S. coast of Norway |
HMS Tapir | 4/12/45 | U-486 | S. coast of Norway |
USS Besugo | 4/23/45 | U-183 | Java Sea |
ITALY
Name of Allied sub | Date | Name of Axis sub | Location |
HMS Thunderbolt | 12/15/40 | Tarantini | Bay of Biscay |
HMS Rorqual | 3/31/41 | Pier Capponi | NE. of Sicily |
HMS Triumph | 6/27/41 | Salpa | Off Libya |
HMS Torbay | 7/ 5/41 | Jantina | Grecian Arch. |
HMS Severn | 8/ 7/41 | Michele Bianchi | W. of Gibraltar |
HMS Upholder | 1/ 5/42 | Ammiraglio St. Bon | Off “toe” of Italy |
HMS Thorn | 1/30/42 | Medusa | Uppei Adriatic |
HMS Ultimatum | 3/14/42 | Ammiraglio Millo | Off “toe” of Italy |
HMS Unbeaten | 3/17/42 | Guglielmotti | Off “toe” of Italy |
HMS Upholder | 3/18/42 | Tricheco | Lower Adriatic |
HMS Ultimatum | 6/24/42 | Zaffiro | S. of Crete |
HMS Saracen | 11/9/42 | Granito | W. of Sicily |
HMS Tigris | 12/6/42 | Porfido | S. of Sardinia |
H. Neth. M.S. Dolfyn | 2/9/43 | Malachite | S. of Sardinia |
HMS Unruly | 7/13/43 | Accaiio | Off “toe” of Italy |
HMS United | 7/15/43 | Remo | S. coast of Italy |
HMS Trooper | 7/29/43 | Pietro Micca | S. coast of Italy |
HMS Shakespeare | 9/7/43 | Velella | S. coast of Italy |
Top honors among Allied submarines are shared by the USS Batfish and HMS Ultimatum, each of which destroyed three Axis subs, while the USS Tautog, HMS Venturer, and HMS Upholder got two apiece.
Arlington National Cemetery
(See page 733, June 1948 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Robert S. Burpo, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve (Inactive).—Major C. A. Phillip’s article “Arlington National Cemetery,” was most interesting and informative. There was one statement in this article that might be misleading: “The Lee family lived at Arlington until 1861 when Robert E. Lee resigned from the Army to become Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate forces.”
In all justice to General Lee, it should be remembered that he filled several unglamorous, although none-the-less important, positions before he became Commander-in-Chief.
When he resigned from the Army, Colonel Lee had expected to retire to civil life. Instead, on “Pawnee Sunday” (21 April 1861), he was invited by Governor Letcher to attend a conference in Richmond; at this meeting Lee was offered the position of Commander-in-Chief of the military and naval forces in the State of Virginia. This position was accepted on 23 April.
Shortly afterward, on 8 June 1861, the Virginia troops were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Confederate States Army by proclamation of the governor of the state. Thus Lee was left without a command, after working diligently to organize and train the raw volunteers from his native state and to furnish them with suitable equipment for the forthcoming conflict.
Off “toe” of Italy Lower Adriatic S. of Crete W. of Sicily S. of Sardinia S. of Sardinia Off “toe” of Italy S. coast of Italy S. coast of Italy S. coast of Italy
Then Lee became a military adviser to President Davis with the rank of brigadier general. His first important assignment was the thankless task of coordinating the actions of Generals Floyd and Wise in the western part of the state.
In the fall of 1861, President Davis recalled Lee and ordered him to the South to organize the defenses of the southern Atlantic States.
As a result of a series of Confederate reverses, the morale in Richmond sank to a dangerously low level. Martial law was declared in the capital on 5 March 1862, and General Lee was recalled from the South.
The public dissatisfaction with the conduct of the War culminated in a move by the Confederate Congress to invite President Davis to make Lee his secretary of war. Following this an attempt to create the office of Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate Army was either vetoed or failed of passage in a secret session of the Confederate Congress. The outcome of this maneuvering was to give Lee “the conduct of military operations under the direction of the president” and he was specifically prohibited from exercising any command in the field.
Later this same year, the Union Army under McClellan moved toward Richmond. After an unsuccessful attempt on the Capital, McClellan withdrew. During the fighting around Richmond, General Johnston sustained a serious wound and his place as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia was taken by Lee on the 31st of May.
It was not until February of 1865, when the war was practically over, that Lee became Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate Armies.