The views expressed herein are the personal ones of the writer and do not reflect the views or opinions of the U. S. Marine Corps, the Marine Corps Schools, or the Navy Department in any official manner.
"All of our concepts of war are outmoded—the Navy is obsolete!" Such is the cry heard from the self-styled prophets of the atomic age who have set up shop on every street corner. It is time that officers of all the services buckled down to serious thinking on the problems facing the armed forces in the future and set down their conclusions on paper. The ideas of the many should be thoroughly explored in the service journals; from them may be synthesized a sound doctrine.
As this is being written, the tentative drafts of the publications of the Navy which prescribe doctrine, tactics, and technique to be used in the present and near future are being edited and readied for promulgation. It must be clearly understood, however, that these are the rationalization of the doctrines developed during the past war. As such they must never be allowed to become a dead hand, stifling new thought and the development of new doctrines and techniques to keep pace with the tremendous technical developments already being perfected. In spite of these current doctrines, therefore, there is a real need for all of us to prepare for the future, and it is hoped that this article may present one facet of one of the many ideas which must be used as building stones in the erection of the doctrine of the future.
While it is apparent from a review of the events of the past war that amphibious warfare played a primary part in the defeat of our enemies, it is a fact often overlooked that ability to wage amphibious warfare must constitute an integral part of naval power. Sea power, as Mahan said, is composed of the fleet and its bases, both interdependent. In our day, the fleet must include within itself naval air power sufficient to guarantee supremacy in the air over the fleet and must include mobile Marine forces capable of seizing and holding bases. These bases must include air as well as fleet establishments. During the past war the importance of this ability of sea power to seize and hold its own advance bases was clearly highlighted. Acting as an integral type command of the fleet was the Fleet Marine Force, trained and equipped to wage amphibious war. A moment's reflection reveals the important connection: advance bases are the method of projecting our sea power toward the enemy and into his sphere; sea power should therefore include the means of seizing and holding such bases. The future of amphibious warfare is thus seen to be a naval subject of primary importance.
It will provide clarity if we digress here a moment and outline the projected treatment of the subject we have taken up. Having shown that amphibious warfare is a naval subject of great importance, we must first examine its relationship to naval warfare at the present time. The next step is to establish certain basic deductions, founded not upon secret reports but upon logical reasoning from source material available to everyone, which will govern naval warfare in the future. We can then project the relationship of amphibious warfare and naval warfare into this pattern of the future and reexamine it in order to establish certain conclusions regarding the future of amphibious war as a naval weapon.
RELATIONSHIP OF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE TO NAVAL POWER AT PRESENT
Certain fundamental facts, well known to students of naval strategy, will bear restatement here. First, in every case the term "naval power" is understood to include integrated naval air power. Second, naval power is an offensive weapon and carries out its missions by offensive tactics whether the strategic situation of the country as a whole is offensive or defensive. This fact is important because the realization that our nation is not an aggressor and will habitually find herself on the defensive at the beginning of a war has led to many misconceptions regarding the role of naval power in defending this country. Third, naval power must have bases to support the fleet. It must be clearly understood that the immense floating trains developed during the past war were actually a seaborne extension of advance bases and did not substitute for these bases but supplemented them.
Still confining ourselves to the present, we can develop the thesis that naval power is essential in the conduct of the defense of our country and in the waging of offensive war for the destruction of our enemies. The claim has been advanced recently that air power, operating as a separate arm, is sufficient defense. No one can deny that air power, with its ability for rapid concentration, might in all probability cause such destruction in any invading force which closed on our shores that the attack would fail. This destruction of the enemy force would of course be dependent upon the ability of air power to wrest tactical air superiority from the attackers at the point of invasion and prevent isolation of the battlefield. This premise can usually be granted under present conditions and with present weapons. The question remains, "Is the defeat of a hostile invasion force in close proximity to our shores considered to be 'sufficient defense' of our country?" Sober reflection indicates that it is not. Limitations are placed on aircraft operations by adverse conditions of weather and visibility; there also exist inherent limitations of flight range, staying power over distant targets, and accuracy of bomb delivery. These factors indicate that destructive raids by the enemy might take place and that outlying bases might be seized by hostile forces. Even with present weapons, by these tactics an enemy could eventually lay waste to the important points along our coasts and build up his forces to the point where they could overcome the problem of attaining local air superiority, and an invasion could be made. Isn't this very similar to the plan we ourselves followed in invading the continent of Europe in this past war?
Defense by air power alone, therefore, presents us with a defense which is so passive in the strategic sense as to be unacceptable as doctrine. This stems from the fact that combat aviation, by itself, can employ only the hit and run tactics of the raid. These tactics can no more stop an aggressive force of all arms over a long period of time than could the Maginot line of a bygone day halt the advance of a determined and resourceful ground force.
There may be some who say in rebuttal: "This reasoning admits that air power alone can give a rather prolonged, but still temporary, protection against seaborne invasion but does not consider two important alternatives, in the first of which air power operates from a network of outlying bases, and in the second of which invasion comes from north or south and not from the sea."
Answers exist to these two questions. While it was admitted that air power could stop an initial invasion, it was predicated upon the dispersion over a large land mass of great quantities of planes, the majority of which are out of any possible combat zone until they are flown to, and concentrated at, the threatened point. Air power, by itself, however, cannot defend an outlying base of small proportions, or even a network of mutually supporting outlying bases, because of the ease with which individual ones can be isolated and destroyed or captured. One of the fatal errors of the Japanese in the past war was relying upon just this theory. Naval power, however, can defend these bases by offensive missions against enemy naval power, and in conjunction with air power can provide a powerful and far reaching defensive system in this manner.
In event of attack from the south, the enemy must first have invaded by sea some portion of the southern continent. There can be no argument that here the Navy must be the principal arm to implement the Monroe Doctrine and prevent such an attack, not after the landing when hostile forces have commenced their advance up the land mass toward us, but before the enemy can attain such a foothold.
In event of an attack from the north, naval power has an extremely important part to play. Large portions of the northwest passage permit the employment of naval forces. While in places these forces cannot be employed as they would in the open sea, they can, in effect, establish floating bases from which security can be maintained when the elements and the terrain conspire against the establishment of habitable outposts on land.
But the most important point is this: the far north is a formidable barrier to any type of invasion; and should an enemy force surmount this obstacle, the major contribution to defense of the country by naval power must be to control the flanks of the conflict. In any attack of this country along the axis of the continent, whether from north or south, he who commands the sea places in serious jeopardy the flanks of the opponent and must eventually win the struggle.
One further argument remains: the employment of vast airborne forces by the enemy. In answering this we must remember that we are still considering the present day, and that airborne forces operating with current equipment cannot be considered capable of the sustained independent action required for the invasion of a large land mass without prompt follow-up by sea-borne forces. In any event, since naval power includes naval air power, the forces afloat possess a powerful weapon against such attack and one which can be placed in action at great distance from our shores.
The foregoing discussion would seem to indicate that naval power is essential to the defense of our country, and that it can be, and should be, powerfully supplemented by air power operating from bases protected by that naval power. Only in this way can our defenses be established at a distance from our shores which will not only protect us from invasion but also from raids and the hostile seizure of staging bases for enemy forces. Note the continual appearance of the term "bases." Possession of naval bases is imperative for the continuous operation of the fleet; and if the fleet's aggressive actions are not continuous, then naval power subjects itself to the same criticism just leveled at air power—namely, inability to employ anything but the hit and run tactics of the raid which, as we have demonstrated, are insufficient for successful defense.
Bases, therefore, are an integral and vital part of the naval establishment. Their importance in supporting the fleet in defense has been shown, and it is evident that they play an equally important part in supporting an offensive. Although at the start of hostilities we may have sufficient bases for the initial defensive moves, we shall inevitably need more so that we may wage a more aggressive and far reaching defense later, and so that we may more readily shift to the offensive when the means have been concentrated. It is therefore necessary that, within itself, naval power contain the means for seizing and defending such bases for its own use and also to deny them to the enemy. Fleet Marine Forces are just such a means.
There is strong reason to believe that in the past war one reason that the Pacific Ocean Area was a naval theater (beside the evident fact that the Japanese Fleet had to be destroyed) was the fact that the Fleet Marine Force Pacific provided the Pacific Fleet with an organic power to advance across the Pacific, establish its own bases, and project its operations to the enemy's doorstep. Without this organic means the Fleet might well have found its operations subordinated (as were those of the Japanese Fleet) to Army and Air Force operations with attendant difficulties in accomplishing the primary mission of sea power—attaining command of the sea. Although this harkening into the past is speculative, it is true, and a fact to be fought for, that amphibious warfare is a naval concern and a naval functional. Furthermore, amphibious warfare is tri-elemental—land, sea, and air—and naval power must always include, as it does now, all three types of forces. This is the present day relationship of amphibious warfare to naval power.
BASIC DEDUCTIONS REGARDING THE FUTURE
The most important fact concerning the new technical developments is that they have measurable, finite characteristics which thus allow us to forecast their effect on the strategy and tactics of the foreseeable future. These developments fall into the general fields of weapons and tactical trends.
First in the field of weapons is the atomic bomb. While the effects of the bomb are devastating and horrible to contemplate, it is nevertheless important to note that this devastation occurs within a definitely circumscribed area. There would seem to be three effects of atomic explosion: blast, heat and radiation. Radiation at the time of explosion can be as deadly as heat or blast and can therefore be considered as part of the destructive force of the explosion. In addition, this radiation extends the duration of the deadly effect of the explosion. Against residual radioactivity, defenses probably can be developed; but against the shower of deadly rays at the moment of detonation, the success of passive defensive measures is doubtful. Heat and blast, on the other hand, are common to any explosion, but of course occur on a vastly larger scale in an atomic explosion. Their effects are measurable and limited both in time and area, however. We have always had the problem, on an ever increasing scale, of protecting ships and men from explosions since the day gunpowder was invented. It makes small difference to the individual sailor or Marine whether he is destroyed by the explosion of one mortar shell or torpedo, or whether he meets his end by nuclear fission—it is final in either event. Important as it is for a commander to know that one shell will destroy one man or one ship in present formations, it is vastly more important that the atomic bomb will destroy scores of vessels and hundreds of men unless they are dispersed. The problem must be met as it has been in the past—by dispersion. In this manner each explosion is limited in the amount of destruction it can cause to important formations. We must avoid presenting to enemy bombardment, troops or ships in large enough "packages" to afford lucrative targets. The conclusion that we may reach from this is that while changes in the tactics and strategy of the operating forces of the Navy will become necessary because of the military use of atomic energy, the over-all conception of the employment of these forces is not changed. In fact, as will be discussed subsequently, the traditional Navy roles in both offense and defense are even further emphasized.
In this discussion of atomic weapons it should be noted that we are assuming the most effective form of delivery—by guided missiles operating at supersonic speeds. It is still necessary at present to use the only practical but most theoretically ineffective method, the bombing plane. Actually, the method of delivery makes no difference in this discussion; we simply assume that the atomic bomb will be delivered against its chosen target, and start our reasoning on that basis.
Another important consideration in evaluating the atomic bomb is that at present, and apparently for the foreseeable future, it must be a strategic weapon. The limitation imposed by the size of the weapon apparently prevents its being incorporated into artillery or naval shells; similarly, the immense industrial effort necessary to produce the weapon precludes abundance of supply. Targets for the weapon must therefore be limited in number and assigned by the highest level of command. This fact, taken in conjunction with the passive defensive measures indicated above, demonstrates that it will be entirely feasible to carefully calculate the risk from atomic weapons which must be taken in any given undertaking, and the gains weighed against the maximum possible loss. It also indicates that targets for atomic bombs will almost certainly be those which are most lucrative, and formations of naval operating forces afloat are most decidedly poor targets in this sense.
A different situation faces us, however, when we consider the future status of naval bases. The more highly developed these may be, the more profitable a target they will make for atomic weapons. Notice, though, that this threat does not eliminate the need for bases; rather it demands that we disperse base facilities, maintain the maximum secrecy regarding the internal arrangements of large bases, and never accumulate in close quarters sufficient combatant ships of the operating forces at anchor to provide an additional target at any base. These measures will only minimize, not prevent, destruction of recognized and established major bases. It therefore becomes more important than ever before that we increase the number of bases at the fleet's disposal. Only in this way can we gain dispersion.
Another future development may well be guided missiles carrying, the more usual types of explosive. While these no doubt will be produced in far greater numbers than atomic bombs, they will also have a far less powerful destructive effect. It therefore appears that in carefully attempting to evaluate the atomic bomb we have also included the effects of these other more numerous but lesser projectiles. We still believe that developments in the weapons field may change the tactics and strategy of the Navy, but not the concept of the employment of the Navy as a whole.
Before leaving the field of weapons we should note that these which we have discussed will with equal facility be employed as offensive weapons by the Navy. Guided missiles with atomic or high explosive warheads may be launched from surface craft or submarines, or the modern conventional atomic bomb may be developed so that carrier borne planes can deliver the bomb against a selected target.
Just as in the field of weapons we discovered that only one, the atomic bomb, had such far reaching effects that it touched upon our conception of the employment of the Navy and thus required discussion, so in the field of tactical trends we find only one which can be said to influence our subject. That trend is the use of air power to carry troops to battle. Every nation is undoubtedly at this time striving to make every division air transportable; that is, capable of being carried to an area and landed by aircraft. A proper proportion of all ground forces will be composed of airborne divisions; that is, divisions which can be launched into battle from the air by means of gliders or parachutes. All equipment will be lightened, and cargo planes increased in capacity until the two factors merge. This means that in the future vast numbers of troops can strike quickly through vertical envelopment. Even in the future, however, the size of this force will be limited by the ability of the air forces to deliver supplies and air support. To sustain such a large force by air would demand unquestioned air superiority. The result of these developments in the foreseeable future would seem to be that much larger forces could be landed than at present, and that they could maintain sustained independent action for a much longer period, but that eventually they would have to be relieved by forces brought into action and supplied by conventional means if the conflict was to be waged on a large land mass against a formidable hostile force.
It is evident that this limitation does not apply to naval bases, and that here we have another threat. Such an airborne force as we envision for the future could seize any selected base, and in so doing could fly over any protecting surface formations or avoid them by speed of approach. Does this fact change the aspect of our employment of naval forces? No. We may liken the result of a successful airborne attack against one of our bases to that of an atomic bomb—a base is lost to our use. In this case, however, unlike that of the atomic bomb, we have defenses which we can use to great effect. First, while an airborne attack may be used against a base, it cannot be employed against a fleet. Naval power will thus be able to interpose formidable defenses against resupply and relief of the attacking force. Second, naval air power may well be able to contest the action if they are in the vicinity; if not, it can proceed to the point of attack and contest the air superiority which is vital to the attacker. We see that these considerations again lead us to the conclusion that this tactical trend emphasizes the need which we will have for a large number of advance bases, and also shows that the role of the Navy as the defender of the country is not to be discarded because of this development.
RELATIONSHIP OF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE TO NAVAL POWER IN THE FUTURE
Throughout this discussion we have developed the thesis that naval power and bases are interdependent. The Fleet cannot operate without bases, and bases cannot exist without the protection of the Fleet. That this is true now we believe there is no doubt. That this will be true in the future we believe has been shown in this paper. In fact, as we examine the very probable effects of future developments on the question of bases we see that a greater need for more and more bases will exist. We will need more bases for the operation of the fleet as a dispersal measure for safety; we will need more bases from which aircraft can operate; we will require advance launching sites for missiles, the threat of whose employment may constitute a powerful defensive measure in itself; and we will need bases for interception purposes when this type of missile has been perfected. The need for more advance bases in the future is thus apparent, and the seizure of such bases is a naval function now and will continue to be in the future. These bases may be gained by peaceful acquisition before hostilities commence, or, a much more likely contingency, by amphibious warfare after the conflict starts. It should be noted that in seizing bases in the future, a certain amount of security from atomic counterattack may be obtained by capturing extensive areas on a large land mass and dispersing the base throughout this area, or by capturing many small islands for the same reason.
Once again we see that whether we discuss the present or the future, the moment we say "bases" we bring amphibious warfare into the picture. Amphibious warfare will provide the means for seizing bases in the future just as it does today although, of course, the technique will be different.
We can say, in fact, that the importance of amphibious warfare as an integral part of naval power will increase with the years because the need for bases will increase. The arguments advanced in the first paragraphs of this paper have been reaffirmed by a study of the effects of future developments. The relationship of amphibious warfare to naval power in the future will thus continue to be one of close integration; naval power will be even more necessary than now to the defense of our country and the initiation of offensive efforts, and the organic ability of naval power to seize and hold advance bases will also increase in importance.
CONCLUSIONS
Sufficient bases should be acquired and adequately defended to support the Fleet in its initial defense of our country.
The amphibious forces of the Navy must be maintained in a high state. of readiness and must keep pace with pending developments. These amphibious forces must include air means and must use every applicable technical development. As stated by law, the tactical development of amphibious warfare is a mission of the Marine Corps. This development must be continuous.
Naval power must continue to be strong and it must contain within itself, as it does now, the power to fight in the air, on the sea, and on land. The Navy must be able to undertake, at a moment's notice, an amphibious assault with forces entirely organic.
Commissioned in the Marine Corps after graduation from the Naval Academy in 1935, Lieutenant Colonel Cushman served with the 4th Marines in Shanghai, China, for two years, and then was with the New York World's Fair Marine Detachment for almost two years. At the time of Pearl Harbor he was commanding the Marine detachment on the U.S.S. Pennsylvania. He was commander of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Marine Division in the campaigns of Bougainville, Guam, and Iwo Jima. At present he is Instructor in the Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, Virginia.