DISCUSSIONS, COMMENTS, NOTES
Camouflage of Wakes
Contributed by Lieutenant Commander Charles N. Cutter, U.S. Naval Reserve—We attempted to bring the squids method of camouflage to the Navy. First, a study was made of the causes of phosphorescent glow of sea water. It was found that by means of oxidization, the millions of minute organisms living in the sea showed a light when disturbed. According to E. Harvey Newton’s book, Cold Light, these Flagellata lighted up for three reasons; namely, sex, fear, and hunger. Whatever their reasons for turning on the light, the Navy didn’t like it, so, with assistance of the Calco division of the American Cyanamid Company, it was found that the dye used in shark cakes would cover the glow and render it invisible from the surface as well as from the air.
Having determined the color and spectral distribution of bioluminescent glow in sea water with the use of a spectrophotometer, the experts formulated a dye composed of colors opposite—that is, complementary to—cold light in order that each would render the existing lights in water invisible.
We were especially indebted to Captain Charles Bittinger, leader of the camouflage division of the Bureau of Ships, who is renowned for his many scientific experiments for the Navy and for his knowledge of color.
We studied the exact location and angles of wakes flowing from the hulls of both PT boats and submarines. Sea water was scooped up and fed through an inch pipe to eight fog nozzles properly placed. The water was brought to 80 psi by means of a centrifugal pump. Dye of 55% concentration was fed into the line at a venturi. The result was a black fog shot out over the white water which covered all trace of light from the surface or from aircraft.
The first tests were conducted off Miami at night in the Gulf Stream with observers in a blimp. At this stage of development, we were able to camouflage the wake for only 20 minutes because of the weight of the necessary equipment. After the creation of a new formula and cutting down the diameter of the fog nozzles, one hour complete camouflage was possible for PT’s.
The new dye was tested for its effect upon skin, rubber, paint, brass, iron, eyes, cotton, and wool, and was found to be satisfactory and not dangerous. It would stand up at 150 degrees and would not freeze at 27 degrees.
The final test came on the night of July 3-4, 1945. We were in Long Island sound with two PT boats and the cruiser Brooklyn. The PT’s were ordered to attack the cruiser whose observers were to report to the bridge any attacking vessel. One boat was equipped with the new camouflage rig and the other was not. Both PT’s started their attack from 3800 yards. Weather was calm, wind force 10, no moon, sky clear. Six and seven power binoculars were used for observation.
In his report the Captain of the Brooklyn said, “Personal observation of the Commanding Officer indicated that the camouflaged boat showed no white bow wave or white wake even when the boat passed close aboard of the ship at the end of the run.” On the other hand, the non-camouflaged boat was visible from the Brooklyn’s bridge at 1300 yards and could be seen by the Brooklyn’s ordnance spotters at 1000 yards.
Thus our nine months of experimenting came to a successful conclusion, and had not the war ended when it did, it is felt that PT’s and submarines would have been equipped with this special camouflage which would have permitted night passage without enemy observation of their wakes.
The Panama Canal: Operations or Engineering?
(See page 1455, December 1947 Proceedings)
Contributed by Captain E. B. Small, First Vice President, National Organization Masters, Mates and Pilots of America.—The members of the Canal Zone Branch of the Masters, Mates and Pilots Organization, having read the article in the December 1947 issue of the Proceedings, written by Commander Arthur Stanley Riggs, entitled “The Panama Canal: Operations or Engineering?”, which stated that “The Canal Pilots to a man” were behind the Terminal Lake Plan, wish to refute this statement.
The Balboa Pilots, far from being unanimously behind the Terminal Lake Plan, have already gone on record as being in favor of the Sea Level Plan. The enclosed copy showing the results of our referendum of April 17, 1947, is self-explanatory.
Referendum to Determine which Type of Canal the Balboa Pilots Preferred
Total votes sent out............................. 38
Votes returned.................................... 30
In Favor of Sea Level Canal................. 27
In Favor of Lock Type Canal................ 2
No Vote................................................. 1
Of the eight unreturned votes, four were due to vacations, one to sickness in hospital, and three to no apparent reason.
Reply by Commander Riggs.—In answer to Captain Small’s statement, permit me to say that the information on which the words objected to were based, came from an unquestionably authentic source directly connected with the Canal, and I had no reason whatever to question it.
It is to be noted, moreover, that the poll of the Balboa branch of the Masters, Mates and Pilots of America was dated April 28, 1947, fully a year ago, and which I am credibly informed did not represent the views of the entire body of the pilots in December, when my article was published. The poll admits by its own text that it does not even pretend to represent all the pilots, since it reports only the views of the Balboa branch, or less than half the total number.
An additional defect is that the nature of the questionnaire upon which the poll was based, and the circumstances under which it was circulated, are not reported. This makes it impossible for me to determine what bearing the poll has, if any, upon the question under consideration.
Obviously it is understood that individual pilots have the right to change their minds on the subject, and I understand that many have done so in recent months. Assuming, however, that the pilots do not approve the terminal lake plan “to a man” for reasons best known to themselves, this fact has no significance or effect upon the other salient facts in my article, nor does it in any way nullify the basic thesis that the terminal lake plan is the soundest and most economical and provident solution of the canal question—and the one which should be adopted.
Additional Discussion by Captain H. H. Little, U. S. Navy (Retired).—Ever since early in 1913, when as a young ensign I walked through the length of the Culebra Cut, I have been thrilled by this monumental work and have pondered its grave and increasing problems. To find now, after thirty-four years, a consideration of these problems, so able, and a solution so simple, logical and inexpensive compared to the chimerical schemes offered by dreamers, is most reassuring. Commander Riggs demonstrates irrefutably that when Congress holds public hearings to decide upon the plan required to give us the best and most practical Canal, men will come forward whose suggestions will be based solidly upon their personal experience in building the Big Ditch, in handling vessels passing through it, in arranging for the vital details of financing, construction, operation under normal and abnormal conditions, and all the rest.
Early in his consideration of the matter, Commander Riggs comes out boldly with the statement—the first I have ever seen, incidentally, in public print—that “The men most competent to handle such problems [solving the operating problems] are obviously the men who operate the ships traversing the Canal, whether they are naval craft or of the merchant marine of this or any other nation.”
Completely objective in his view, Commander Riggs quite properly does not criticise the engineers per se. He does, with devastating logic, entire clearness and considerable force, project the beam of his intelligence into the fog of confusion characteristic of most thinking about the Canal problems, demolishes contemptuously the fantastic whims of the dreamers of ship-tunnels, elevated railroads and the like, and disposes of the sea-level plan by showing how completely irrelevant it is to the greatest points its advocates bring forward in its defense—national security and defensibility from atomic attack.
Naturally all the recent discussion causes many to wonder how the Panama Canal happens to be in a non-marine agency of the Government. The explanation is simple. President Theodore Roosevelt on May 9, 1904, placed the Isthmian Canal Commission, then charged with building the Canal, under the Secretary of War, as the War Department had jurisdiction over rivers and harbors in the United States. At that time the Commission was headed by a naval officer, later by civilians. It was only the accident of resignation by the civilian chief engineer that caused the Canal building project to be headed by a distinguished Army engineer. That policy has been continued ever since, and it is no mystery that military engineers found it difficult to grapple successfully with problems peculiar to ship handling especially in restricted waters.
Commander Riggs’ timely article not only justifies careful rereading, but close study. It is the ablest, most concise presentation of all phases of the situation thus far given to the world, and is as notable for its unwritten connotations as for its hard-hitting statements of fact.
(Editor’s Note: Due to evident disagreement among experts and operators as to the form the future Panama Canal should take, the Proceedings will endeavor to publish the viewpoint of the proponents of the Sea Level Canal, as distinguished from the Terminal Lake Plan as advocated in Commander Riggs’ article. The Proceedings therefore has invited one of the leading authorities on the Sea Level Canal Plan to write a special article for the Proceedings outlining and analyzing the merits of the Sea Level Canal.)