People who do not understand ships and the sea do not understand or believe that many things which they are customarily used to seeing done on shore, by shore establishments and equipment, can also be done afloat. And even among some who profess to know ships and the sea, there arises much reluctance to attempt afloat many of those activities which have previously been done on shore.
It was such lack of understanding, coupled with the losses in bottoms then being suffered at the hands of the German submarines, that led to some skepticism of the completeness of the service which could be given to our combatant vessels by means of a mobile floating base alone.
The desirability of such a base, however, was apparent to all who had the Pacific planning before them. The material, the effort, and even the vessels which would be required to build the orthodox shore bases necessary to support the fleet on its drive across the Pacific, would be tremendous, even if barely adequate land areas could be found in the Central Pacific Islands. And, notwithstanding Seversky’s axiom that islands can’t be sunk, the corollary that they can’t be moved was equally true—'which meant that by the time such a base was built, used, and left in the rear, another base had to be ready nearer the operational area of the fleet, and so on. This would require time, and would greatly slow our offensive. It was desirable to hit the enemy and keep hitting him as he reeled back from each succeeding blow. Building shore bases was too slow!
In the fall of 1943 Admiral Nimitz gave Vice Admiral Calhoun, Commander Service Force, orders to form two service squadrons to act as mobile floating bases. The idea was that one would leap-frog over the other as the fleet advanced. Service Squadron Four, formed first, was only a small unit, and it started operations at Funifuti in the Ellice Islands; but the fleet never really based there, continuing to return to Pearl or Espiritu for its principal services until the Marshalls campaign was launched in January, 1944.
At the close of the first phase of the Marshalls campaign with the taking of the Majuro and Kwajalein atolls, Squadron Four was ordered to Kwajalein to furnish services for vessels using that anchorage. Admiral Spruance based his Fifth Fleet at Majuro; and Service Squadron Ten, which had been organized and was waiting in Pearl, was ordered to set up its floating facilities at Majuro with all possible dispatch.
The first servicing was pretty hectic and pretty ragged. To begin with, I, Commander Service Squadron Ten, was out in command of a detachment of six transports, and all my staff and many of the servicing vessels were still at Pearl. However, command of transports was turned over to the senior captain, a temporary administrative vessel was assigned, together with temporary assignments of officers, and servicing was started.
A very hurried and elementary chart had been made on which only sufficient anchorage berths had been shown to accommodate the transports; consequently, the positions of many of the vessels of the Fifth Fleet were undesignated, and much difficulty was encountered in locating them for services. For example, the Princeton wants ammunition, but which one is she? She isn’t in one of the numbered berths! Finally she would be located in daylight, and the service given. Then there were the problems of locating ships by night, for, even if they were in numbered berths, the charts were so few that the servicing craft frequently had none.
The senior captain of the ammunition ships was made head of the “ammo” department. But about the time he would be getting to know where the ships of the fleet were anchored, and which ones had been supplied, he would be sent back to Pearl with his own ship for another load, and his successor would have to start from scratch, learning which ones had been serviced, which ones came next, and what they needed. Then on top of this confusion came actual shortages in some calibers which had to be largely obtained by “cannibalizing” those vessels which were returning to Pearl for repairs or other reasons. However, even cannibalizing—transferring material from one ship to another—was not an easy matter with the equipment then available.
The fueling went better, although one tanker got her bow hung up on a coral head for several hours.
Repairs were very meager and mostly of a temporary nature, as we had started with only one repair ship and one ARB (battle damage repair, the Phaon, a converted LST), and they had about all they could do in getting two collision-damaged battleships ready to return to the Navy Yard.
Before the servicing was completed, changes in our temporary administrative vessels confused matters for a short time.
From the first, there were never boats enough to take care of the actual essential business of the Fleet and recreation parties at the same time. During this first servicing all the boats of the transports present in Majuro were commandeered. These formed the beginning of Seron Ten’s Fleet boat pool. Realizing that the boat situation would be a difficult one, word was sent to Pearl to send boats by every possible vessel. This was done throughout the war at every opportunity—on tankers, AK’s, and any other craft which could carry them. But it was a problem of transportation to get them to the Squadron fast enough to make up for losses and the growing demands by the multiplying numbers of the vessels of the Fleet. This boat pool grew from a small beginning of about 50 boats with an organization of 3 officers and 150 men, to a pool of 300 boats with an organization of 24 officers and 1,100 men. This sounds, at first thought, like a tremendously larger outfit than necessary. But when we consider that if the Fleet had been equipped with its usual peacetime boats, the figure on February 7, 1945, at Ulithi would have been 803, it can be seen why the pool was never big enough to meet all the demands made upon it.
Early in February the destroyer-tender Prairie arrived, bringing the permanently assigned personnel of the staff of Squadron Ten except for the only supply officer as yet assigned, who was in San Francisco getting the concrete barges fitted out and stocked. Squadron Ten was off to a start which grew from this small beginning to an organization of 300 vessels and a staff of 301 officers and 450 men to administer them. This was of course in addition to the personnel of the vessels and of the boat pool.
At first the Squadron organization was as follows:
(1) The Secretariat, which at first handled all squadron mail, Fleet mail, issue of confidential documents, morale and disciplinary matters, and personnel. This was subsequently changed into separate activities for Fleet mail, confidential documents, discipline, and personnel, as will be seen later on.
(2) Operations, which controlled all movement and tactics. Each other department made its own plans for services, but Operations then executed the berthing, shifting, and movement, together with the assignment of boats and barges. The boat pool and small craft were at first a part of Operations, but were later made a separate department, although the actual assignment was still done by Operations. (Port Director duty was performed at Majuro.)
(3) Communications, which handled all Morse, voice, and visual; this included the Port Director messages at first.
(4) Supply, which included food, fuel and water, general stores, clothing, canteen, small stores, fleet freight, and disbursing.
(5) Maintenance and Repair. This department, just as the name implies, had cognizance over all maintenance and repair work, and it made estimates, arrangements, and assignments to drydocks, repair vessels, and tenders.
(6) Ammunition. This department started with 8 ammunition barges and a personnel of 4 officers and 11 men. The officers had the duty of planning the operation of the ammunition ships, barges, and small craft required in replenishing vessels of the Fleet. It had, in addition, to make estimates of future requirements and to forward the same to CincPac in time to permit loading and transportation. This department expanded to where it was controlling as many as 40 ammunition ships, with the attendant increase in barges, LCT’s, and LCM’s. We had trouble at the beginning due largely to loading of the ammunition ships at some continental port. For instance, during the Mariannas campaign we once found a thousand tons of Loran Navigation Structure loaded over the top of the ammunition which was being urgently called for during the Mariannas campaign. Then we labored for two hectic nights and days to unload the stuff into another ammunition ship, excavate the needed ammunition, and put the whole thousand tons of it back into the hold again, meanwhile catching hell from the front because the ammo wasn’t on the way. When we finally got them to “issue-load” (so that any ammo could be unloaded without touching any other kind) much of our trouble disappeared.
Such then was our starting organization.
With the Prairie for flagship, there came at the same time the destroyer-tender Markab, the repair ship Ajax, one floating Ard (the Ard 13), six 500-ton ammunition lighters, three tugs, two YO’s and a YP refrigerator barge.
Admiral Calhoun promised to send more service craft as fast as he could. Some were ready, some were building and had to be completed, and some had to be coaxed away from other assignments which were only seemingly too important for curtailment.
Meanwhile we had put the survey ship Bowditch to work making a more complete survey of the atoll; and, with the placing of better buoys and navigational markers, we prepared anchorage berthing charts in sufficient quantity to supply all the vessels of the Fleet. Commander Squadron Ten was given the duties of Port Director and Harbor Master, as at that time the Island Commander’s organization was insufficient to handle the amount of detail which the Fleet anchorage involved. A signal tower, known as the H.E.C.P. (Harbor Entrance Control Post), was erected near the entrance to furnish ships with information for entering, berthing, etc., and to likewise inform the Port Director about the vessels.
While Admiral Spruance was away on the Truk strike, we got busy and assigned all his ships to specific anchorage berths; prepared a program of fueling, provisioning, and ammunitioning; made tentative assignments for destroyers alongside tenders; designated recreation and swimming beaches; and arranged for two berths for use by ships firing anti-aircraft target practice at sleeves or drones. Much of this data was put into our information bulletin, of which sufficient numbers were mimeographed so that each ship might have one. It was planned to meet each ship with one of the entrance patrol vessels and deliver copies of the anchorage chart and the information bulletin. (These papers were revised from time to time, of course). This frequently-revised bulletin was continued throughout the war, and the ships came to expect it and hollered critically if something happened so that they missed it. In addition to these helps we had a number of entrance channel pilots available for the larger vessels to take on board.
Some time before this the U.S.S. Vega had been assigned to Service Squadron Ten as a floating pontoon barge construction depot. It had been observed by the Squadron Commander that much delay usually resulted in initiating the construction of pontoon barges on a newly captured island. Very often, if there were any desirable sites on the shore line for such construction, they were preempted by some other activity. There was the delay of making camp for the construction crew, the delay of unloading, locating, storing, and arranging the pontoons and parts, and the delay of making the assembly and launching ways. It was therefore proposed that a vessel be properly loaded for sequence unloading and construction on board and alongside, carrying the construction unit as a part of its crew. This was approved by the Commander Service Force, and the Sea Bee Depot instructed as to her loading and the kind of construction unit wanted. The scheme proved to be a Godsend to us at a time when we were short of boats and floating equipment, for she arrived a few days after Squadron Ten made its start. And nineteen days later she had completed twenty barges, consisting of two 10-ton crane barges, six 50-ton cargo barges, and twelve 100-ton cargo barges, nearly all power driven by outboard engines. These barges were put to very hard service; they were used to carry stores of many kinds, airplanes, and liberty parties; they served as drydocks for boats, for ammunition storage, and as camels between ships, and, on one occasion at least, as a lightship to mark a shoal. Needless to say, they were badly battered—’and so, I might add, were their crews. The crews built ramshackle sheds on the sterns and practically lived there, for often several days would pass before any man got back to his regular berthing quarters—which indeed might not even be available to him then, being frequently found to be occupied by some other tired and displaced chap. These barges were put in the boat pool organization.
The Fleet arrived, and we went to work on it. Though the job of servicing was far from perfect, it had some system to it and people of the Fleet knew better where and when they could get service. Admiral Spruance expressed himself pleased to see that it could be done, and realized that it would improve as time went on and we learned more; he said he didn’t see any reason for the Fleet going to Pearl any more, and it never again did during the war. Individual vessels were sent back to Pearl or sometimes to the continent for certain repair work, but the Fleet as a whole stayed in the Forward Area from then on and received its services from Squadron Ten afloat.
The Fifth Fleet continued to base at Majuro until June 1944, returning after each strike for replenishment and repair. In April, CincPac ordered Squadron Four discontinued, and its vessels and equipment to be placed under Squadron Ten. Many vessels were being added to Squadron Ten during this period of basing at Majuro. Among them were old tankers too slow and unreliable for open sea but suitable for harbor and mobile base movement; some of these tankers were forty years old, and one at least had been sunk in shoal water earlier in the war. There were some converted Liberty ship tankers also; these were very good vessels, too slow to be used for fueling at sea but very useful in transportation between anchorages within the Forward Areas.
With the absorption of Service Squadron Four by Ten, the commander of that detachment, then at Kwajalein, became known as Representative A of Seron Ten. Interchanges of vessels between Kwajalein and Majuro were ordered as circumstances required.
In May, just as Seron Ten was going so well with the Fifth Fleet that I was beginning to get too big for my breeches, we got a jolt which we probably would have foreseen more clearly had we been closer to the planning center, but which, coming as it did, knocked all cockiness completely out of us. It was a decision at Pearl for Seron Ten to service the Amphibious Force staging through for the Mariannas invasion—not only the troop-carrying vessels of the Amphibious Force, but all the Support and Bombardment Groups as well, which latter were in addition to Admiral Spruance’s Fifth Fleet!
Eniwetok atoll was to be used for servicing Amphibious Force troop vessels, and Kwajalein for the Support and Bombardment Groups plus one of the groups of larger transports. Anchorage charts of both places were made and berths assigned, and it was up to Seron Ten to get fuel, water, and provisions to them all in three days. There were some three hundred vessels large and small in this armada. We knew and had visualized that from time to time in the future we should have Amphibious Force vessels to service, but we had been so busy with the Fifth Fleet that we had not analyzed the matter and consequently had not expected anything of such volume in such a short time.
At Majuro we started breaking our backs to get things ready. Admiral Spruance’s Fifth Fleet had to be serviced and made ready for its part in the attack, after which Seron Ten must be divided between Kwajalein and Eniwetok, leaving only enough at Majuro to take care of the patrol and escort craft operating there. It was not difficult to proportion the fuel, water, and food vessels properly between the two places, but Commander Rep. A at Kwajalein lacked boats for delivery of provisions and stores, and there were not enough for both places. The principal part of Seron Ten moved to Eniwetok, as that was to be the next Fifth Fleet anchorage. Three large convoys sailing on separate days comprised the main body of the squadron. I sailed early in order to get busy with the amphibious preparations.
Meanwhile the boat problem was solved by the Amphibious Force itself, for Admiral Turner gave orders that the transports would use their boats in sufficient numbers to make up the shortage. The water supply was another of our problems—where was all that water to be obtained? The Islands did not have any, and Pearl was too far to send all our empty water craft. This time it was the Fifth Fleet and the bigger vessels of Seron Ten which, distilling to capacity, supplied water in excess of their own needs to many of our water carriers before they sailed for Eniwetok and Kwajalein.
We were seriously concerned about getting our convoys safely into these anchorages, for if we lost any it would be too late to make replacements, and the Amphibs would just have to go short by that much. There had been Jap submarines around more or less continuously, although it must be admitted that they seemed more interested in relieving the garrisons of the isolated Japanese-held islands than in sinking Uncle Sam’s ships. However, we made it; one of the air patrol officers told me that our convoys looked more like a circus en route than a fleet of vessels, and he thought that if a Jap submarine had seen them it would probably have suspected that it was a trap of some kind and eased away as fast as it could. No doubt, it was a sight-—tows of drydocks, big and little, on the same towline; oil barges heavy and empty, awash and high out; refrigerator barges, ammunition barges, machine-shop barges, crane barges, concrete ships, pontoon barges many with boats, buoys, and gear of all sorts piled high on deck and deck-houses; big tugs, little tugs, old tankers towing and being towed, some tugs being towed; some of the LCM’s were towed in the open sea, too; Liberty ships towing, the older repair ships towing; and, hovering and hurrying on the fringes, the escort craft consisting of DD’s, DE’s, YM’s, SC’s, PC’s, and YP’s. I think very likely it would have been a poser to any Jap sub skipper, particularly as at that time Seron Ten was a secret to the Japs.
We made it, our first test of mobility, and we met our first big problem of staging the Amphibious Force. Some changes in the berthing had to be made because of rough water, and there were some unscheduled requests and several fast repair jobs, but we managed.
Kwajalein handled its first big job of servicing splendidly, and so the invasion of the Mariannas was off on its final sortie to recover some U. S. territory as well as to capture some Japanese.
Most of the lower or Southern anchorage in the Eniwetok atoll, where we had just serviced the Amphibs, proved to be very rough for lying alongside tenders and repair ships, etc., so we had set the good old Bowditch to work surveying the eastern and northern areas and making up new charts. This was done, and we moved up to the Eastern anchorage where there was smoother water under the lee of the reef and Runit Island. Then Seron Ten figuratively drew a long breath and leaned back for a brief rest.
Not for long, however. Presently we began to take the worst punishment yet. We had a tremendous amount of ammunition to transfer, much of it badly loaded. The chartered vessels were not sent to the Mariannas at first, so it was a big job of transfer from them to the regular naval ammunition ships. Every available barge was used, and all the men who could be spared were used to make up working parties. Many of the returning ships brought empty ammunition cases in large quantity which had to be taken off if the ship was to return to Saipan, as was often the case. The handling and stowage of these was a troublesome thing—troublesome for the ship as well as for Seron Ten—and I suspect that some of those empties “fell” overboard before they reached Eniwetok, and maybe a few even in Eniwetok. All the barges were in full use, and several Liberty ships and one of the small islands of the atoll were in ammunition service. We had about two hundred Sea Bee Specials who worked as ammunition stevedores during this period; they lived on a second-rate hotel barge which was known as the “Sea Hag”; after this ammunition period these Sea Bees were referred to as the “Sea Haggards.”
Soon after the campaign had started, the resistance offered at Saipan, together with the activity of the Japanese fleet, was such that it was decided to postpone the landing on Guam and hold off with Admiral Connolly’s Guam attack force until the situation became more favorable. So the next thing added to Seron Ten’s duties was to have all this force of vessels return to the Northern Anchorage of Eniwetok, where the troops proceeded to eat up all their provisions and wear out all their clothes. We had reserves of field rations and of clothes, but we had not expected this additional force for such a long visit, and the strain was great. A lot of juggling of transportation was required to supply both this force and the force at Saipan at the same time, separated as they were by some nine hundred miles. And of course everybody wanted fresh and frozen provisions, and gave all sorts of reasons why they couldn’t fight or be prepared to fight on dried and canned field provisions. One officer claimed his men could not stand a proper night patrol or picket duty on dry stores because they couldn’t see in the dark unless they had plenty of fresh vitamines, particularly carrots and oranges. Of course there were not enough fresh and frozen food ships in the Pacific to have satisfied all the demands, but we gave them what we could, and promised, reasoned, and cajoled, all the time quaking in our boots lest a group of the Fast Carrier Force suddenly drop in on us and demand more than we could supply. But we managed to make the grade somehow; Seron Ten literally went meatless and sockless, but we held to our motto.
During the July and August servicing of the Fleet at Eniwetok we had no insurmountable difficulties other than delivery of Fleet freight, and even a goodly quantity of that was distributed. There was the usual complaint about shortage of boats and recreation facilities, which, of course, was justifiable; there was some complaint about the slowness with which the replacement planes were put on board, and some also because the replenishment of ammunition did not go faster.
The drain on Seron Ten was becoming tremendous. With the capture of Saipan a Representative with a staff had to be set up there. Admiral Connolly’s Guam Attack Force had left, Guam had been invaded, and the organized enemy resistance broken up; therefore there was an immediate use for Apra Harbor, and an order for Seron Ten to establish a service detachment there also. It was planned to construct a great base and make extensive harbor improvements at Apra, which would take time, and meanwhile ships wanted service there. The Mobile Base again to the rescue!
The number of experienced or capable officers for this kind of staff work was far from sufficient. We were growing fast, there was hardly any kind of service which a navy requires which we did not give in greater or less degree, but the demands grew as fast as the Squadron, and experienced officers in logistic services were too few. Most of us had to learn while doing the job; it was like learning to swim and being a lifeguard at the same time, and a number did not qualify. But we were learning much of naval logistics. The whole Navy was learning —learning things which we should have known but which we had neglected in our pursuit of the more exciting and romantic branches of tactics and gunnery.
The need for quarters for men and officers had grown so serious that we could not find space for the necessary stevedores and for the replacement personnel arriving for the vessels of the Fleet. The “Sea Hag” was full. The barracks ship Orvetta was full; so full that two wooden buildings had to be built upon her well decks to provide the eighteen hundred square feet required to take care of the small craft disbursing, tug and barge administration, U. S. Registered Mail, and the Fleet Motion Picture Exchange. More messages to Pearl about it.
Finally the first hotel barge, APL-14, arrived with promises of others at tentative dates. However, they never came quite soon enough to take care of the continuing demand. But they did come, and they filled the places of ships which at that time could ill be spared for barracks. I do not recommend them for future wars because of their lack of motive power.
A recreation place was built on Runit Island for the men of the Fleet, only to be dismantled six weeks later and transported to Ulithi.
In the first days of September a westerly storm did a lot of damage to our boats and barges, and put our high speed target rafts ashore for some damage. This was a bad break coming at this time, as the boat shortage was unlikely to get much relief, with every ship being put to some other use than transporting boats, in view of the early forthcoming Carolines campaign (D-day set for September 15). Then, too, we were getting ready for a move to the westward in the typhoon season where boats would suffer but would be harder and harder to get. The boat situation definitely had a grim appearance. Our Maintenance Officer was told to repair boats even if he had only the rudder left to start on.
A great job of repairing was done, every available drydock, barge, and superstructure was put to work, and boats began to reappear where there had been little besides engine beds or a few ribs and keel. The engine people too had an overload, although not so heavy as the hull workers. And all this time the usual service to ships was continuing; it must be admitted that some of the kicks about no boats for recreation, etc., were made without any sympathy whatsoever for our weather of misfortune. “Weather be hanged,” it was up to us to furnish them with the required boats! Later on, when the ships of the Fleet were themselves victims of the worst storm that most naval men had ever experienced, I like to think that we of Seron Ten were more sympathetic, though we too had again suffered losses. But Seron Ten’s duty and motto called for us to give them anything we had, and why not sympathy? So we sympathized and patted them on the back and said better luck next time, and went to work on their damages and our own too.
We had learned much, and now, with more and more confidence in our ability to deliver being placed in us by the higher-ups, we began to plan for a move to Ulithi. This move brought up the problems of water supply and the tankers for it, what additional equipment could be given to Seron’s Rep. A at Manus, what to get up from the South Pacific, and when and how. Admiral Halsey had relieved Admiral Spruance for the Western Carolines move, and it was expected that he would wish to use Manus for his base. A sizable shore base, consisting of a partial Lion, was being established there but had not reached the stage of completion necessary to take care of the Third Fleet. In addition to the Third Fleet there would be the major part of the Seventh Fleet, staging through for Leyte, which would need some services, and these we proposed to give as far as we were able without seriously curtailing the Third Fleet. Mobile Base once again to the support!
For the next five months Seron Ten was a Task Group under Admiral Halsey, and on September 28, 1944, the order came to begin moving forward, but with self- propelled equipment only. Something was wrong with that; there was some misunderstanding. Of non-self-propelled craft we had, in addition to six drydocks and three repair barges, the following:
7 concrete 3,000-ton storage and issue vessels
19 YO’s and YW’s, oil or water
17 YD G’s, gasoline and oils
24 500-ton barges—ammunition, freight, spare parts, radio, medical, mail, refrigerated food, etc.
1 APL-14. Hotel barge with stevedores.
(How often we had wished these craft were self-propelled! It has been strongly urged that in the future all service craft be self-propelled, and right here the opportunity is seized to urge again that now, in peace time, the design, construction, and use of self-propelled logistics craft be given high priority.)
Obviously, we could not do a good job of servicing without these vessels, so a message was sent to that effect. The reply came back to use our own judgment, bearing in mind the typhoons. We had studied that very thing for months, but the non-self propelled equipment was not much good unless it could be used, and the service required by the Fleet could not be given without it; so the decision was to go forward with practically all of it. This time the “circus” was much larger and the distance more than twice as far (1,400 miles of open water just a little beyond visibility of enemy-held Truk), and the season and area historically boisterous.
A Rep. was left at Eniwetok for a time not only to see that the main body of Seron Ten got away properly, but also that the small detachment left to carry on there got a proper start on its duties. Some idea of these duties may be obtained from some excerpts taken from the message board:
HAVE OFFICERS FOR TRANSPORTATION. . . . REQUIRED TWO HUNDRED TONS BOILER WATER. . . . REPAIRS NEEDED TBY RADIO RECEIVER AND TUBE TESTER. . . . OUR ENGINES HAVE STOPPED X CANT MANOEUVER X SEND TUG X. . . . HAVING TROUBLE WITH ICEBOX X. ... TO COMSERON TEN REP X MUST TRANSFER MY COLD STORAGE AT ONCE X. . . . REQUEST DRINKING ASSIGNMENT. . . . WE NEED FUEL PROVISIONS AND REPAIRS. . . . SEND BOAT TO PICK UP MAN. . . . REFUSE ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOADING OPERATIONS. . . . WHERE CAN WE OBTAIN FIVE HUNDRED POUNDS GROUND COFFEE X. . . . GYRO COMPASS TECHNICIAN DESIRED. . . REQUEST BOILER REPAIRS. ... NO BOAT AVAILABLE. . . . PLEASE FORWARD OFFICER MESSENGER MAIL TO OMMC. ... X HELLO JOE X COME OVER IF POSSIBLE X SIGNED JOSHUA.
The move to Ulithi was made in four separate groups spread over a period of two weeks. One group had fourteen tows, although some of these towed craft were small. The speed averaged about six knots, so it was at best a long ten days of alert watchfulness. Towlines parted and had to be re-run, but this had been expected and a number of stand-by and pick-up vessels had been detailed before starting and provided with extra towlines and gear. The convoys had been so divided and grouped that any disaster which might befall one group would not result in absolute shortage in anything. We had prepared to accept some losses. We had none, each group pulling into Ulithi battered, rusty, and tired, but all present.
At Ulithi we serviced the Third Fleet during its hectic period of fighting the Jap Fleet and supporting the Philippine campaign. There were some frenzied spells for Seron Ten in that time. Admiral Halsey didn’t spare the horses, and when he sent in a group of carriers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers to be serviced and ready to sail in twenty-four hours he meant just that. Once he meant it three times in succession without a break between groups, and when the whistle blew, figuratively speaking, at the end of that period Seron Ten dropped in its tracks and slept around the clock. When he ordered tugs or tankers sent to some point in the ocean he didn’t ask whether they were available or not—he needed them, and it was up to us to send them no matter what they were doing. But every time he walloped the Japs, Seron Ten rejoiced and felt, “We fixed him up for that one!” During this period we patched up torpedoed ships, mined ships, bombed ships, and typhoon- damaged ships. We had two midget submarine attacks at Ulithi, one of which on November 20, 1944, cost us a new fleet tanker, and the other on January 12, 1945, a damaged ammunition ship. We suffered some typhoon loss in boats and damage to barges, etc., but were lucky enough not to get the full fury of these storms. The Third Fleet was not so lucky; one of our jobs of typhoon damage was the carrier Bennington which came in with the forward end of her flight deck doubled down over her bow. Some forty feet had to be rebuilt; it was shortened a few feet, but was stronger than before when it was finished ten days later. Then there was the twice-torpedoed cruiser Houston which our tugs brought in practically awash and ready to sink, but which was finally patched up, shored up, and stiffened until she could be towed at sea to her port of repair. There were other torpedoed cruisers, too, but none brought back from such a close call as the Houston. The weather was kind to us during her salvage or we would probably have lost her right in the anchorage.
Then there was the wooden net-layer Viburnum which hit a mine in Ulithi and had twenty feet of starboard bilge and two decks above blown off. This job, which had very little bearing on the result of the war, was nevertheless unique. The Viburnum couldn’t go back to a port where there was a wooden ship-building facility as she could never have outlasted the voyage. Seron Ten had no wood or such facility, so we rebuilt her of steel from and including the keel up to the starboard bulwarks for a length of some thirty feet, and she was again raring to go except for one thing: she had a magnetic compass, and Ponce-Muir himself could not have compensated it after Seron Ten finished her repairs!
Fleet Mail, a big factor in morale, but a very difficult one to handle due to the accumulations arising from irregularity of transportation, absence of ships to which addressed, and incorrect addresses, was, by combining floating mail sorting and distributing facilities with the very efficient ones set up on the shore, greatly improved.
With the capture of Peleliu and Angaur and the starting at Leyte of the Philippine campaign, there was much staging of ships through Kossol Roads in the northern end of the Pelews, so our Rep. A at Manus was brought up to continue at Kossol, although on a smaller scale. It wasn’t long, however, before he was needed more on Leyte, and there he went.
Admiral Halsey sailed for his China Sea raid while we sat tight, wondering what sort of demands would come our way. However, except for juggling of tankers to meet the frequent changes in rendezvous, we got no unusual load.
On January 26, 1945, the whole Third Fleet returned, and Admiral Spruance relieved Admiral Halsey and we had the Fifth Fleet again. On February 7, there were in Ulithi 492 vessels, not counting boats and barges. Of these 211 were combat, and the remainder were auxiliary ships except for 19 of the “splinter fleet” (PC’s, SC’s, YM’s). These vessels were assigned berths to best meet the services required, ease of handling within the anchorage, and with some regard to safety, recreation, and to conference facility among flag officers. Whenever possible it was customary for an officer of the task groups to fly in a day ahead of his task group to furnish us with preliminary information of the group requirements so that we could make advance preparations and be ready to start immediately upon the arrival of the group.
I mention this large concentration not only as an item of interest but also to express the opinion and the warning that with the advent of the newer weapons, atomic bombs, guided atomic missiles, etc., we should plan our future naval activities to avoid forever such concentration, not only in war time but in peace, lest there be another Pearl Harbor, with the conquest of our great Republic following it.
Soon came bloody Iwo Jima, which as far as Seron Ten and the Fifth Fleet were concerned went along very smoothly. About this time, however, the logistic load at Leyte was getting heavier and heavier; the development of the base planned at Samar was, of course, far behind, and the Seventh Fleet’s floating service equipment was inadequate, so it was necessary to bolster up services there. Also there would be a large detachment of the Amphibious Force to service for the Okinawa campaign which was then under preparation. So, with some hope that the Iwo show would not overload us at Ulithi with damages, the destroyer- tenders Dixie and Markab and the fleet repair ships Hector and Prometheus were dispatched to Rep. A, now at Leyte.
Back in Ulithi, on March 11, 1945, Seron Ten undertook its biggest and fastest repair job. That evening we were at the movies on deck when the Japs got in a surprise Kamikaze attack, and one plane succeeded in landing on the carrier Randolph and wrecking the after sixty feet of her flight deck and upper works. Another plane passed low over Admiral Spruance’s flagship, the Indianapolis, then passed low over our ship, and crashed on Sorlen Island just beyond. We ducked when he passed over, and the Chief Signalman reported next morning that the commission pennant was missing. This was quite a thrill for noncombatant Seron Ten, whose only real excitement in months of its war service had been the midget submarine attacks.
On the Randolph seventeen men were killed, about a dozen planes destroyed, and fires started which our on-the-job firefighting tugs assisted the crew of the carrier in extinguishing. With a big show coming off soon and still considerable uncertainty as to what to expect from the Japs, it was highly desirable to keep the ship in the forward area where she would be quickly available. We estimated that we could cut away the damaged portion, do a little patch work, and have her sixty feet shorter on the flight deck, in four days; or we could rebuild the flight deck and make her fully ready in two weeks. I so reported to Admiral Spruance, and he gave the word to go ahead on the rebuilding proposition. We put the Jason, ARH (heavy repair ship), alongside, and the job was completed in seventeen days, although we knew before its completion that the Randolph would not be needed at sea and would stay in the anchorage several days more than were necessary to finish her. Some of the I-beams used came from a dismantled Japanese sugar mill on Saipan. It was rumored that this job made such an impression that the Navy Yard complained that we were taking work away from it.
Another activity in which one section of the Staff of Seron Ten had many headaches and some laughs was the handling of disciplinary matters and courts-martial, including deck, summary, and general. Almost every crime and misdemeanor in the calendar, as well as murder, came up. Two officers were assigned to this section, and the bulk of the work fell on them. It was not easy, for there were many cases of lads not really vicious who got themselves into trouble through temper, foolishness, thoughtlessness, or inveiglement by others who were vicious. Courtmartial gems, while furnishing a laugh, also furnished work. For example:
“ ... in that _____ seaman first class attached to the LST ____, while serving on board the U.S.S. LST ____, did, on or about May 13, 1945, on board said ship refer to one ____, coxswain, United States Naval Reserve, attached to the said ship, say, in the presence of two or more enlisted men of the Navy, ‘You’d better watch your step, or I’ll bend a wrench over your head,’ or words to that effect, meaning thereby that he would compromise or otherwise injure the said man in retaliation for an act or acts performed by the said ____ in the execution of the duties of his office, the United States then being in a state of war.”
Another, specification, in usual legal phraseology, read something to this effect:
“In that ____, serving on the ____, did, on board the said ship, wilfully and maliciously and with justifiable cause assault and strike with dangerous weapons, to wit, two cross-cut saws, etc. . . .”
The getting ready for Okinawa involved a good deal of overhaul and repair work on many Amphibious Force vessels, and also on the escort carriers and the ships of the Bombardment group which comprised the old battleships and some of the cruisers and destroyers which had been with the Seventh Fleet. Then we did a small job of servicing the British Task Group under Vice Admiral Sir Hubert Rawlings, R. N. Everyone was busy, for the job was now one of mammoth business with thousands of details.
During the Iwo campaign, Service Squadron Six (Rear Admiral Beary) had demonstrated that more than fuel and a few odds and ends of supplies could be furnished ships at sea. So it was to be done on a much larger scale for the Okinawa show, and we, Seron Ten, were to supply Squadron Six.
Some examples of the activity of Seron Ten during sixty-four days of the Okinawa Operation are given below; and, in view of the future importance of replenishment at sea, some examples of what Service Squadron Six was furnished, with the recommendation that more and more time in actual practice be devoted to this phase of logistic support:
Fuel. Seron Ten supplied to the Fleet 13,864,000 barrels of fuel, 39,002,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 24,000 drums of lubricating oil.
Provisions. Little food was issued at sea during Okinawa, although in port we distributed 26,000 tons of dry provisions and more than 22,000 tons of fresh and frozen food, issued respectively to 1,424 and 682 ships.
General Stores, Ship’s Stores, Clothing, Small Stores. Some 17,500 tons of general stores, 650 tons of clothing and small stores, and 3,800 tons of ship’s stores went to 7,600 ships and activities. Specific figures, such as 5,000,000 candy bars, 7,500,000 cigarettes, 284,000 gallons of paint, and 27,600 gas cylinders, are illuminating.
Freight. 5,049 deliveries totaling about 10,900 tons of freight, air and surface, were made, besides transshipping 14,280 tons.
Disbursing. Our office passed on to the Fleet and to Seron Six $1,300,419.00; this does not include the work of payments to the many vessels without disbursing officers.
Medical Stores, Supplies, Services. The medical section distributed supplies, and arranged for hospitalization and evacuation of personnel. Approximately 320 tons of supplies and 2,284 pints of whole blood were issued to Fleet units.
Ammunition. We had 40 ammunition ships, of which five handled the rearming at sea with CTG 50.8, nine were assigned to CTF 51 with reserve ammunition, and the remainder held to service various fleet units and to reload the ammunition ships for CTG 50.8 and CTF 51. In addition, 16 LST’s, each with 1,200 tons of ammunition, were sent to CTF 51 who received more than 26,000 tons of ammunition.
Maintenance. Major repairs made on 20 ships, miscellaneous repairs on 1,800 others, and 240 ships drydocked. The various branches issued a total of 162,665 spare parts, electronic devices, engine parts, and Mark 14 sights; 390 small boats were extensively repaired.
Operations. This department controlled an average of 480 vessels involved in every kind of work. Consequently, it had to supervise the movement and location of each ship in the area, and institute all emergency and security measures. There was an average of 573 ships in the harbor, and during this period 314 arrived and 294 sailed.
Personnel. Seron Ten conducted the transfer of 7,911 officers and men to 587 different commands.
Motion Pictures. This section issued 10,793 programs in this period. Its repair unit hustled, although Fleet units kindly wrecked about one-third of their programs irreparably.
Communications. Exclusive of voice circuits, and visual traffic, an average of 212 messages daily, or, for this period, 13,596 messages comprising 1,319,888 code groups, was handled.
Examples of Support to Service Squadron Six. Servron Six received from us and issued at sea 8,352,000 barrels of fuel, 23,408,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, and a great bulk of lubricating oil. Fleet oilers and tankers also delivered 2,500 tons of food, 50 tons of urgent air freight, and 60 tons of medical supply packs.
The 13,600 tons of general ammunition may be partly itemized as 800 16-inch shells, 300,000 rounds of 40 mm. ammunition, more than 18,000 500-pound bombs.
The accurate picture of the activities of Service Squadron Ten cannot be portrayed through statistics alone. While the above summary lists some of the results obtained by the efforts of the officers and men of the Squadron, no factual statement can present a true picture of the effort expended in achieving those results. Take, as one example, the statement that so many thousands of tons of ammunition were delivered to various units of the fleet. This bare statement leaves to the imagination of the reader the vast and intricate planning required of the officers of the ammunition section in scheduling the movements of ammunition ships, lighters, boarding officers, and station ship officers, so that the ammunition might be at the right place at the right times, and in the required quantities and varieties needed. It does not suggest the unremitting toil of crews of small boats carrying ammunition about the harbor, many of whom worked for weeks at a stretch, eating and sleeping when and where they could; nor does it take into account the sheer physical toil of hundreds of stevedores working against time to meet the difficult loading schedules necessitated by the pressing demands for ammunition in the combat area.
To take another example, no compilation of statistics can properly represent the ’round-the-clock activities of the operations department where the records of all support shipping in the forward area were kept; where hundreds of voice messages were sent and received daily; where the routing and berthing of hundreds of ships of all types was arranged; where the administration of tug and small boat activities was maintained; and where scores of other activities vital to the efficient operation of the Squadron’s equipment were carried on.
But the most important factor common to all Seron Ten’s activities to be remembered is, primarily, that all such activities were carried on by Mobile Floating Units. Any summary of the activities of the usual shore- based service unit presupposes the existence of labor-saving devices such as “dockside” cranes, trucks, railroad spurs, docks, and similar facilities. With Seron Ten none of these aids were available since everything had to be handled afloat, without reference to shore-based equipment. Moreover, strong winds and rough water in the exposed anchorages frequently prevented ships from coming alongside each other for loading operations as planned, or interrupted operations already underway, and interfered with the movement of small craft. Consequently the ingenuity of officers and men handling and delivering supplies of all sorts was frequently taxed to the utmost, and constant improvisation was necessary to meet delivery schedules. And seamanship, rather than being a thing of the past, is a profession calling for the scientific resourcefulness of men more than ever!
In the Okinawa area the kamikazes had been doing a lot of damage to our ships, particularly to the destroyers and smaller craft to which they seemed to be giving their greatest attention, although they did not exactly neglect the larger vessels. We had dispatched an ARD (floating drydock capable of taking a 3,000-ton ship), an ARB (battle damage repair ship), and -a YP (machine shop repair barge) for salvage and temporary repair so that the injured vessels could be kept afloat and eventually towed to a place of permanent repair. The damage, however, was mounting faster than these salvage and repair facilities, together with those of the Attack Force, could handle. At Okinawa we saw some of the weirdest kinds of damage ever inflicted on ships. Freaks of explosion which could be but doubtfully explained, if at all, were numerous. The fact that so often the damaged vessels made the anchorage at Karama Rhetto speaks volumes, not only for their designers and builders, but doubly so for their efficient crews. If the Japanese high command could have realized how much damage American ships could take and how difficult it was to sink them, I’m sure they would have realized much sooner that the jig was up, notwithstanding the Divine Wind and all else.
But Seron Ten still had a job ahead. It was decided that we could risk sending forward another drydock, one of our better repair ships, and a few other mobile facilities to Okinawa. This was done, and a short time later it seemed feasible to establish a regular “Rep” detachment there. This Rep. first established the detachment at Karama Rhetto, then later was ordered over to Buckner Bay on the east side of Okinawa, which, good seaman that he was, he said was not a good anchorage—-and how right he was!
Meanwhile it was time for the main body of Seron Ten to be moving forward again. So, on May 24, 1945, the “circus” again went to sea. This time the distance was shorter, the season better, and the submarines fewer. And once more the move was made successfully, although my flagship, the Ocelot (sometimes called the “Spotted Cat,” sometimes the “Green Dragon,” and sometimes, no doubt, more opprobrious names—she was painted a bright green with big yellow blotches) broke down four times during the passage.
At Leyte we set up the Mobile Base again, and on June 14 Admiral Halsey, who had relieved Admiral Spruance, came in with the greater part of the Fleet. Thereupon we went through the usual routine—fuel, ammunition, food, stores, mail, repairs, target practice, and recreation.
The invasion of Kyushu was being prepared for, and it was planned to base Admiral Halsey’s striking force on Eniwetok, which was as near Japan as Leyte, and the fuel and other stores could be supplied from continental ports more easily at Eniwetok. We planned to divide Seron Ten into four divisions with a commodore for each, and separate the Squadron Administration from any direct superintendence over division details. However, the Japs surrendered before the Eniwetok division ever received Halsey’s ships. The first Division went to Japan, Korea, and China, where, instead of rushing ammunition and patching battle wounds, it was called upon for all sorts of duties, such as ferrying horses from Shanghai to north China, repatriation of prisoners, and establishment of harbor controls. Two divisions were sent to Okinawa, where in Buckner Bay two typhoons played havoc with them and the old “Spotted Cat” was lost.
The fighting was finished, and Seron Ten of those days was done. But those who served in it, and those whom it served, and, it is hoped, the Navy as a whole learned that in modern wars ships must be kept indefinitely in the battle areas, to maintain the dominance which is the essence of sea power; and that they can remain in such areas only when they are serviced by Mobile Bases which can deliver the goods on the spot.