One would have to display that well known characteristic of the ostrich— burying his head—not to recognize that much uncertainty and confusion in thought exist among members of the Armed Services today. This condition is not unnatural, nor is it necessarily unhealthy. Almost every man, whatever his field of endeavor, experiences similar situations during his lifetime. There comes a time when he wonders whether or not the eventual results of the course of endeavor he is following will be truly fruitful; lie suspects that he may be building a house upon sand, that the objectives for which he had been striving may, in fact, be of less value than he had formerly estimated. At such times, his spiritual advisers, who usually are able to view his problems from a more substantial basic perspective, recommend that he weigh those elements which are causing his confusion against the fundamental aims of this life of ours. Should he heed their advice, the chances are that a great deal of his confusion will disappear. It seems timely that we of the naval profession undertake a similar introspection. A logical as well as timely procedure would be to:
- determine the causes of our confused thought.
- re-examine the fundamentals of naval strategy and the role of naval forces in war.
- determine, insofar as practicable, the extent to which these fundamentals will hold true in the future.
This procedure should enable us to evaluate more accurately the many criticisms and prophecies one encounters today in the field of military thought, as they relate to the Navy.
Cause of Confused Thought on Military Matters
The most serious doubts that we encounter today among members of the military profession are in regard to the future usefulness of certain types of forces and the implications of new weapons upon future strategy. Most of these critics draw their conclusions from personal observations gained during World War II. Usually, these critics have been strongly impressed by the effectiveness of a weapon or of a force, as demonstrated in operations which they personally observed. Unfortunately, World War II encompassed the earth, and saw American military forces operating or observing in just about every niche and corner of the globe. Very few, if any, military men had the opportunity to serve in all theaters or to make detailed observations of the performance of all types of forces during actual operations. Only a limited number were intimately acquainted with the over-all picture. It was next to impossible for an observer serving in a single theater to gain a picture, in proper perspective, of the war as a whole. The usual experience of those who served in any one theater, even among senior officers, was that they were well acquainted with the effectiveness of their own force or unit. They knew why this method worked well at the particular time, why that did not; but their information relative to other forces or units was gained from the most meager reports. It is especially noticeable that the farther down in the echelon of command the observer happened to be, the more positive are his convictions as to the universal effectiveness of a particular type of force; his convictions are less clouded than those of officers who had access to more detailed information or who have had a background of wider experience.
The general public is even more confused than the military regarding the relative effectiveness of various types of forces. They were at a greater disadvantage in regard to their opportunity to view the over-all picture of the war in proper perspective. They drew their conclusions mostly from flash newspaper headlines, which were based upon early reports made by the units that were the first to return from the battle area. Many reports of this type were grossly misleading, not through dishonesty, but because the observer’s conclusions were drawn from impressions gained as a result of hasty glimpses, often at only the fringe of the situation. Naval operations suffered particularly, because in many instances by the time the ships returned to their bases and could make a detailed report, the news was stale. A pertinent example of this was the Battle of Midway. In this instance, the true effectiveness of the various types of forces engaged was not learned until after the war, when our analysts examined Japanese records and interrogated Japanese officers who had participated in the action as to the damage actually inflicted and by what types. Furthermore, throughout a large part of the war, it was of the utmost importance that the enemy gain no knowledge of the amount of effective force we actually had available. During the first two years of the war, this force was at all times critically small; during certain precarious periods it possessed little, if any, effective capability. Had the enemy gained knowledge of this, he might well have severed our line of communication to U. S. forces in the Solomon Islands area and in Australia. Until the Navy began to acquire an ascendency over enemy forces, this necessity for secrecy, combined with the inability to render prompt reports, prevented the American public from learning much about naval operations. When this ascendancy was finally acquired, however, the Navy could then tell its story more promptly and with greater freedom. These early unfavorable circumstances resulted in the general public gaining an extremely distorted opinion regarding the relative effectiveness of naval operations.
Another factor which has contributed to existing confusion is the fact that there are often two or more types of forces or of weapons which, under favorable conditions, are capable of accomplishing a given task. It is perfectly natural that an officer who has had all of his experience with one type of weapon and knows that it can perform a particular task under normal conditions should believe that it is the best weapon to employ for this type of task. It might have been at the time and under the conditions he observed its employment during the war, but under other conditions it might not have been. Abnormal conditions might even have precluded its use. Many rash statements have been made as to the types of forces the United States should maintain in the future. In selecting either a type of force or a weapon to perform prospective tasks, consideration must be given to all tasks that might have to be performed. That force or weapon must be chosen which will provide the maximum practicable flexibility of purpose with the best over-all economy. Such considerations might well dictate that, in the long run, another type of weapon or force than that which first inclinations seemed to dictate is of far greater advantage. This type of confused thinking is found most often amongst junior officers, but has been noticed also in some very senior officers who, after years of training in one method and in one type of force, have not been able to recognize with sufficient rapidity the inherent advantages of other types.
In contrast to the aforementioned group of old timers, there are other extremists, mostly in the blissfully young group, who lean over backwards to avoid “fighting the last war over again.” In their enthusiasm, they devise strategic concepts for the future based exclusively upon undeveloped new weapons, and they advocate scrapping just about all of the old. Some of these extremists violate almost every fundamental of sound strategy. The advent of the atomic bomb and the guided missile has given these prophets a wealth of ammunition. So much for cause of confused thought.
The Fundamentals or Naval Strategy and the Role of Naval Forces in War
To gain a clear concept of the fundamentals of naval strategy and of naval missions, one must review their derivation. Just as self defense is the first law of nature with man; so it is with nations. The primary mission of a nation’s military forces is the defense of the homeland of that nation. Even though a nation launches upon a campaign of aggression, this primary mission does not change. The military forces of a nation may be assigned a more immediate mission—the objective of such aggression—but their primary mission of national defense is not thereby altered.
In the case of the United States, we may rule out such a mission of aggression. Due to our form of government and our national characteristics, it is not possible for the United States to make the secret political and military preparations that would be necessary to prosecute successfully a war of aggression. In place of such a mission, we may substitute that of providing aid to friendly powers who have been attacked and whom our national policy may deem it expedient to assist. The prosecution of such a mission requires no such secrecy as the former and is in accord with our national characteristics. Thus, the basic mission of U. S. military forces may be stated as follows:
- To defend the U.S. and her possessions.
- To assist friendly powers who have been made victims of aggression, or
- To defeat an aggressor nation.
From these basic general missions of the military forces, flow the roles and missions of the U.S. Naval Forces.
Basically, the function of U.S. Naval Forces is to carry out those parts of these three general missions which take place upon the sea. In some instances other forces will assist, but the primary responsibility rests upon the Navy.
In order to gain a realistic appreciation of the role naval forces must fulfill in the event of war, one must first consider the fundamental nature of an ocean. In a military sense, an ocean is a good deal like a railroad (particularly during wartime), with the exception that in the case of the ocean the railroad runs in all directions. If we control this railroad, we are able to say who may use it and who may not. If an enemy must use ocean transport to attain a given objective, and we control the intervening ocean, he is automatically denied the capability of attaining that objective. Furthermore, since naval force is not so readily built and developed as other types of forces, it is a relatively static force and more capable of accurate appraisement than most other types of military force. For this reason, so long as we possess sufficient force to control the intervening ocean, it is highly unlikely that an enemy will launch upon a campaign to seize such an objective.
The importance of the naval role varies with different countries and depends largely upon their geographic position. In the case of the United States, lying between two vast expanses of ocean and having outlying possessions and many far-flung commitments, the naval role is of primary importance, particularly in respect to defense. Today, the only feasible routes which sizeable forces might utilize to invade the United States are ocean routes. Any invasion force coming from overseas, and of sufficient size to constitute a real threat, must depend upon ocean transport. As valuable as air transport is in an emergency, it is not feasible for any nation to support sizeable military forces by air; fuel requirements alone would preclude such an undertaking. If we examine the requirements for moving 100,000 tons of supplies per month from San Francisco to Australia, for example, based upon performance figures of World War II, we find that 44 Liberty Ships manned by 3,200 men and requiring 165,000 barrels of fuel oil per month, could do the job. By contrast, 10,000 large cargo airplanes of the R5D type, manned by 120,000 highly trained men, would be required. Furthermore, each month 9,000,000 barrels of gasoline would have to be transported overseas in order to keep them flying. This latter task alone would require about 85 large tankers; almost double the number of Liberty Ships that would be required to carry out the entire mission.
To defend the United States against an actual invasion, however, is insufficient. Today, we must be able to deny an enemy the ability to seize bases within air or guided missile striking distance of our country. Operating from these bases, he might seriously disrupt our war production. It will be remembered that, in the final analysis, in both World Wars I and II, it was our manufacturing capability which enabled this country, during the early phases of these wars, to provide critically needed support to our allies and, during the later phases, to produce the overwhelming quantities of war materials which finally enabled the Allies to achieve victory. So long as we are able to control the sea areas surrounding such possible base areas, no enemy will be able to present a serious threat to this industrial potential which is the heart of our strength. Unescorted enemy bombers may cause interference, but if we maintain defensive fighters and stations for launching intercepting missiles along their possible routes, serious disruption to our industrial production will be improbable.
Over-seas transportation of men and supplies, although supplemented by air transport, is still dependent on successful convoys for any sustained, major operations.
In regard to offensive capabilities, if during war we control the critical ocean areas, we gain the great strategic advantage of being able to move our own forces at will to any destination around the periphery of these ocean areas. This advantage in mobility and choice of destination permits us to effect a local superiority of force in an area where an opportunity for favorable limited action may exist. In war, especially during the early phases, opportunities of this type are bound to occur, even though the total force available to us may be much smaller than the total available to the enemy. If we possess the necessary mobile force, we will be in a position to grasp these opportunities which, if taken advantage of, pay such large dividends. To do so, our naval forces must carry weapons, airplanes, and missiles in sufficient numbers to insure local superiority over the enemy.
Hence, we may state the basic missions of U. S. Naval Forces as follows:
- During the initial stages of a war, while the United States is on the strategic defensive, the mission of its naval forces will be to:
- Destroy enemy forces intent on seizing bases within striking distance of the U. S. or its vital overseas areas.
- Destroy enemy forces intending to invade the U. S. or her possessions via the sea and, in as far as practicable, destroy those intending to strike via the air.
- Protect the war potential of the U. S. in so far as it may be possible to do so by naval forces. This includes protection of our sea lines of communication to the vital combat areas and also those over which critical war materials are imported.
- Blunt the enemy’s offensive capabilities to the maximum extent practicable, in order to slow him down and gain time for our own forces to ready themselves.
- Ensure that degree of strategic flexibility which will permit U. S. forces to retain the choice of where and when they will invade areas held by the enemy.
- During the time that the U. S. is on the strategic offensive the mission of naval forces will be to:
- Provide invading forces during amphibious landings with local superiority in supporting weapons until the necessary supporting types can be established ashore.
- Ensure that the sea lines of communication to our forces overseas remain uninterrupted.
- Reduce the enemy’s military capabilities, both on land and on sea, to the maximum extent practicable, in order to promote a decision.
- Ensure that our merchant shipping is able, without unacceptable losses, to continue the importation of those products and materials which are vital to our war effort.
- At all times be able to provide timely forces in adequate strength at limited critical areas.
These missions boil down to two basic strategic requirements.
I. To control vital sea areas.
II. To be able to provide timely local superiority of forces in an acceptable number of distant critical areas.
Future Validity of Present Day Concept
- Fundamental Hypotheses
To what degree will these two basic naval requirements hold true in the future? In order to determine this, it is necessary to review certain fundamental hypotheses which may be stated as follows:
a. The surface of the earth will continue to be composed of land and water and be surrounded by a band of air.
b. Military strategy will continue to have as its basic purposes the defense or seizure of specific land areas.
c. Fundamentally, although weapons and instruments of war will be transmitted through the air, they must be launched originally either from land or from some type of floating platform.
d. In the over-all military strategy of the United States, control of its vital sea areas will be the first basic strategic requirement.
e. He who gets there “fustest with the mostest” gains a most important advantage.
These homely platitudes certainly are not profound, but it is surprising how often our prophets of the future overlook or disregard principles that flow directly from them. No comment is required regarding a, b, and c. From the primary mission of military forces—defense of the homeland— we derived. Since any serious invasion of the U. S. must utilize the sea, and any serious bombing or rocket attack must be launched from land bases closer than those now held by any potential enemy, and since these land bases must be reached via water, our most important defense is that of the affected sea areas.
The thought arises immediately as to why control of the air is not included in the foregoing list as a strategic objective of equal importance to control of the sea. None can dispute that, as a general rule, tactical control of the air was a prerequisite to successful operations, either on land or at sea, during World War II. The effectiveness of air operations made a tremendous impression upon all who participated in almost any major operation of the war. Careful analysis, however, will disclose that however important control of the air may have been, in reality, it was a tactical objective to a far greater degree than it was a strategic objective.
Control of the air differs from control of the sea in two fundamental respects. The first of these relates to the practicability of exercising it to an absolute degree. On the sea, movement is slow and will continue to be held down by the physical resistance of the water medium. In the air, however, future possibilities regarding speed seem comparatively limitless. As speeds increase, the difficulties of interception increase. With the supersonic speeds now in prospect, instead of a belligerent being able to attain control of the air in any considerable degree, it is more probable that both he and his opponent will retain the ability to use the air with relative freedom. Planes or missiles will probably travel through the air in much the same manner as shells now travel between opposing ships in a naval gun battle. Furthermore, compared to the time that a ship can keep the sea, the duration of flight of an aircraft is extremely brief. The effort, or number of planes, required to maintain a continuous air patrol soon becomes disproportionate to the results achieved. Some day in the future it may be possible to build planes capable of sustained flight comparable to the time a ship can stay at sea; but by this time, it is highly probable that surface to air guided missiles will have attained ascendancy over aircraft of the size and type that such a plane would have to be. Control of the Sea, on the other hand, can be rigidly exercised in limited areas, even against submarines.
The second point of difference between control of the sea and control of the air lies in the comparative advantages gained by that degree of control which it is practicable to exercise over each medium. As was pointed out in the preceding paragraph, there is a large difference between the degree of control practicable in the air, as compared to that possible on the sea. Control of the sea affords a comparatively exclusive use of that medium over which any sizable body of troops or amount of war material must pass, if one belligerent is to conduct military operations capable of effecting a decision over his antagonist. Control of the sea is a “sine qua non” for a belligerent contemplating decisive trans-oceanic operations.
For the foregoing reasons, control of the air, per se, as a strategic objective, is important, but in a less degree than control of the sea. The important criterion regarding the air is the radius over which planes can conduct effective operations, rather than their ability to deny the air space to enemy aircraft. This quality is primarily tactical.
The last hypothesis, e—Getting there “fustest with the mostest”—is borrowed from General Forrest, a Southern cavalry leader, who is reputed to have summarized the science of war in this manner. It simply points to the advantages to be derived from early effective action. The old adage, “a stitch in time saves nine,” is never more true than in war. The adversary who is able to strike the first effective blow gains a most important advantage both tactically and strategically. In all probability, he will severely blunt the enemy’s offensive capabilities and also will be afforded excellent opportunities to deliver further telling blows. The Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor was a striking example of the application of this principle.
With these hypotheses as background, we may now endeavor to determine the prospective validity of the Navy’s two basic strategic requirements; first to control vital sea areas, and second to provide timely local superiority of force in critical combat areas adjacent to these sea areas. We will consider first certain conclusions that may be drawn from experience gained during World War II and then discuss changes that might result from prospective new developments.
- Conclusions to be Drawn from World War II
Our experiences during World War II, both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific, provided striking examples of what might have been the result of permanent loss of control of the sea. In the Atlantic, during the early part of the war, submarines were taking a heavy daily toll of our merchant shipping throughout this ocean area, even at the very entrances to our harbors. For a long time the United States was in grave danger of being cut off from her allies in Europe. Those who participated will not soon forget the losses we suffered on the convoy run to Murmansk. In Washington, a drastic decision had to be made. A priority, overriding all other war production, was given anti-submarine weapons. This continued for a considerable period of time. In spite of our early shipbuilding achievements, which were little short of miraculous, the toll extracted by enemy submarines brought this nation to the very brink of defeat.
Although backed to the wall, Great Britain managed to retain control of the sea between the British Isles and the continent. When the ill-fated days of Dunkirk arrived, this control of the sea enabled her to evacuate a large portion of her armies which were being pushed off the continent into the sea. Following Dunkirk, this same control of the sea prevented her homeland from being invaded. This control of the sea was maintained in spite of the fact that the enemy held a great superiority in the air and had many airfields within short range.
In the Pacific, the blow that the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor confined the remainder of our Pacific Fleet for several months to the area east of Midway Island. It permitted the Japanese to move with relative freedom over the remainder of that ocean. They quickly overran the Philippines, the Malayan Peninsula, and the East Indies. Three long years of hard fighting were required for us to regain the territory they walked into with little effort. Had we been able, initially, to control the affected ocean areas, seizure of the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya by the Japanese would have been avoided. So much for the period when the Allies were on the strategic defensive.
What lessons should be drawn from that period of the war which began when the Allies were able to undertake the strategic offensive? In the Atlantic, the enemy had been unable to negotiate the sea passage to the British Isles or to any other islands in the Atlantic. The submarine menace was finally brought under control. This permitted the Allies to begin a substantial build up in England of troops, their supplies and equipment, and of naval amphibious forces. With these and a large contingent sent from the United States, the invasion of North Africa was launched. Only Naval Forces could have provided the required air support for this landing because there were no adequate Allied airfields within range; naval forces provided also the required surface gunfire support.
Following the invasion of North Africa, Allied Naval Forces in the Mediterranean, with the assistance of some land based air forces, were able to reduce to a dribble the Axis sea line of supply to Rommel in Libia. When this happened, Rommel realized that his situation was hopeless. Defeat was inevitable. It was but a question of time.
Soon after the North African landing, an uninterrupted stream of troops and their necessary supplies and equipment, of naval amphibious forces, and of land based air forces was poured into the British Isles over the Atlantic sea lines of communication, until a sufficient amount had arrived to undertake a landing on the Continent. For this landing, the British Isles were very close at hand, and land based aircraft were used for the required air support. All major gunfire support, however, had to be provided by naval surface forces. Our third fundamental hypothesis states that shells and other missiles of war must be launched either from land or else from a floating platform. If land is not at the required position, the floating platform must be provided.
In the Pacific, our first sustained offensive was a small island to island amphibious advance up the Solomon Island chain. This was coordinated with a tedious advance up the coast of New Guinea. Lack of naval supporting forces limited the steps of these advances to the effective range of fighter aircraft from the last secure airfield. When sufficient carrier based air and naval surface gunfire support finally became available, it was possible to undertake the long hops required in the Central Pacific. It was possible also to make more rapid strides along the northern coast of New Guinea. With this increased tempo, we were soon able to undertake the invasion of Leyte-Samar, which placed our forces once again in the Philippine Islands. Due to the length of this hop, land based air could not provide adequate support for the landing, but carrier based aircraft were able to accomplish this mission. Furthermore, the Third Fleet, under command of Admiral Halsey, supporting this and succeeding offensives in the Philippines, operated in the area for a period of five months. They cruised around the Philippine Islands, past Formosa, down into the China Sea, up again to the northward, and back around Luzon, destroying 7315 Japanese airplanes. This broke the back of Japanese airpower in the area.
The foregoing is by no means a complete strategic picture of the war, but these considerations illustrate clearly the vital importance of controlling critical sea areas, whether a nation is on the strategic offensive or defensive. They illustrate also the tremendous advantage provided by the inherent mobility of both carrier based air and naval surface gunfire support. This advantage permits the adversary who possesses it to select the enemy’s vulnerable spots and to strike where most can be gained at a minimum cost.
At this point, it may be appropriate for the author to state that, in discussing World War II, he has dealt exclusively with those major critical strategic factors which related to naval operations. It was far from his intention to disparage the effectiveness of the major strategic efforts carried out by other services, or to imply that naval operations were primarily responsible for winning World War II. Quite to the contrary. He is convinced that only the combined effort of all services attained victory. And incidentally, viewing the over-all picture in retrospect, he has serious doubts that the forces of any service could have been employed to substantially better advantage.
- Some Erroneous Conclusions That Have Been Drawn From World War II
Some critics have contended that ocean areas can be controlled more effectively and more economically by aircraft, because aircraft travel at speed so much greater than ships. During World War II, our forces fought their way, step by step, across the Pacific and established air fields on just about every suitable island and atoll that came under our control. By the end of the war, our land based aircraft could have controlled most of the Central Pacific area to a very satisfactory degree. This situation seems to have sired an unusually large crop of prophets who, totally unaware of other missions performed by Naval forces, arrived at the “obvious” conclusion that there was no longer a need for naval forces. These prophets overlooked the naval effort which was required to obtain these island bases. They neglected to investigate the heavy cost of building the air fields and of establishing and maintaining the land based air forces that were stationed on them. They failed to mention the further cost of providing and maintaining the defense forces required for these islands.
If the required geographical features are available, ocean areas can be controlled, to a degree, exclusively by land based aircraft, against all enemy types except the modern submarines. However, in order to establish this control, it is necessary to maintain a sufficient number of airbases, so distributed, that any part of the vital ocean area is within combat radius of a fighter base. As a defensive measure, each of these bases must have, either at the base or in the vicinity and on call at short notice, sufficient fighter aircraft to ensure supremacy over any fighter air strength that the enemy may be capable of bringing to bear, either from his land bases or from aircraft carriers. Furthermore, these bases must be stockpiled with ammunition and supplies and must have the necessary personnel and facilities to service these aircraft. In addition to the aforementioned defensive requirements, if control is to be exercised over the ocean area, there must be available at a base within range a striking force composed of types suitable for offensive operations against enemy aircraft carriers and other types of vessels. Even in those ocean areas which have the required number of suitably situated islands, the cost of so many fixed bases is prohibitive, especially when compared with the relative economy and advantages of mobile bases—carriers. Large areas of the Pacific do not contain such islands or atolls. The Atlantic has very few.
These fixed bases are unsinkable but, due to this very fact, they have a disadvantage that, in the long run, might well outweigh this advantage. Should the enemy capture one of them, he acquires immediately a ready-made base within striking distance of other, perhaps more vital, bases in our system. Each one of these island bases, therefore, must be adequately defended. In time of war, particularly during the early stages, forces are always critically short. Defense commitments of this nature would detract, in direct proportion to their size, from our offensive capabilities.
Air alone is not an effective countermeasure against submarines. A combination of air, primarily to search, and surface types, to pin down and kill, is required. Modern submarine developments have accentuated this latter requirement. The most effective and efficient means of controlling an ocean area is by a combination of mobile surface types, including aircraft carriers, supplemented in critical areas by land based aircraft.
Other critics question the necessity for controlling ocean areas, and particularly the wisdom of allocating to this mission the amount of force required to do the job. Time after time, we encounter those whose military thought is profound from the opposite shore onward but who glide over the requirements for getting there as though no difficulties were involved. They regard the task as so minor, in the overall perspective, as to merit only the briefest consideration. Perhaps this is the result of a state of mind that existed during the closing months of World War II. By this time, our naval forces had gained such a degree of control over all vital sea areas that the enemy threat at sea was reduced to insignificance. Many have forgotten the struggle that took place to gain this control. They are unaware of that critical period when anti-submarine warfare weapons had to be given over-riding priority over all other war production. Others seem to assume that, since the Allies controlled all critical ocean areas at the end of the war, this condition will continue in perpetuity. As a matter of fact, from the day we began to demobilize our naval forces, our ability to exercise this control began to decline. Today it is extremely limited. There will always be a cost to controlling ocean areas, but the accomplishment of this objective will remain a prerequisite to our capability of conducting decisive offensive or defensive military operations against any enemy located overseas. The ability to control our critical sea areas, therefore, is the first basic requirement for our national defense.
What Changes Will tile Future Bring?
If accuracy be a requirement, any attempt to be specific in speculation regarding the future would be dangerous; the picture must be painted with a broad brush. As a point of departure, I shall review briefly the new weapons that were introduced towards the close of World War II, whose possibilities were not fully developed before the war terminated; then, appraise the effect that these weapons have had on tactics and strategy; and, following this, attempt to estimate the effect that probable future developments of these same weapons will have upon these two military factors. Finally, I shall discuss the effects that weapons developed since the war and those that may be developed in the future will probably have upon naval tactics and strategy.
One of the first new weapons to appear was the rocket. Although this weapon was employed for many purposes, its most effective utilization was probably by rocket ships against beachheads during amphibious landings. Although the range of the rockets was very limited, it soon became apparent that within this limit they could smother beach defenses, just prior to the landing, in a most thorough manner. In fact they were more effective than the airplanes that had previously been depended upon to carry out this mission. It was necessary to continue to use airplanes, however, to neutralize the larger batteries before advancing the rocket ships to their firing position and to cover the zone that was beyond the range of the rockets. In order to extend the effectiveness of these rockets, it is probable that the aim of future developments in this field will be to produce rockets of longer ranges and of greater destructive power. This will permit their employment to a greater depth behind the beach line and their utilization against targets now considered beyond their capabilities. Furthermore, since it appears that floating platforms will always be able to carry a much larger number of rockets and will be more capable of sustained fire than any airborne launcher, it is probable that surface rocket ships will continue to be the most effective mobile launching platform. Rockets enhance the effectiveness of naval support for amphibious landings. It is probable that future developments will increase this effectiveness. It is improbable, however, that these new rockets will dictate any noteworthy changes in either naval tactics or naval strategy.
Appearing shortly after rockets were VT fuses. These fuses are actuated by a self- contained radio which permits them to detonate in close proximity to their target. This new development increased greatly the effectiveness of anti-aircraft gunnery and also provided a more accurate means of bursting shrapnel at the desired height above ground. As a result, when naval vessels were operating within range of enemy aircraft, the hazard of night air attacks was greatly reduced, and the effectiveness of naval gunfire support for operations ashore was increased. The introduction of the VT fuse facilitated naval tactical operations but had no appreciable effect upon naval strategy. It is improbable that any future development of this device will be contrary to this trend.
Another class of weapons which made their appearance during the latter part of the war were several types of comparatively low speed guided missiles. These missiles ranged from the “Kamikaze,” which employed a human pilot, to others which depended either upon radio or else upon electronics to guide them to their target. The “Kamikazes” proved to be the most troublesome of any of these missiles. In spite of their apparent effectiveness, however, when compared with the results attained, the “Kamikaze” was in fact a very expensive weapon. Less than 5% of those launched made hits, and one trained pilot had to be expended with each unit launched. Those missiles which employed other than manual control proved to be vulnerable to jamming or to other countermeasures. Many of these weapons made quite an impression when they first appeared, but none of them proved to be of outstanding effectiveness. It is improbable that any of these missiles will produce substantial changes in naval tactics or strategy.
World War II ended before the Germans were able to place their high underwater speed submarines in service. The tactical capabilities of these vessels far exceeded those of their predecessors. Had the Germans been able to utilize these new submarines in effective numbers before the Allies gained the ascendancy on the continent, it is possible that the Germans would have succeeded in effectively severing Allied communications at sea. With resupply drastically limited on both sides, the result of the war would have depended upon which side could have held out longest. Until an economical countermeasure is brought forth, defense against these new submarines will require an anti-submarine escort considerably larger than was formerly necessary. Until an economical countermeasure is developed, these submarines may have an effect upon naval tactics, but it is improbable that they will greatly affect naval strategic concepts.
The most impressive new weapon developed during the war was the atomic bomb. It opened an entirely new field in explosives and in all other types of energy. It introduced also the possibility of neutralizing large areas on shore, in the sea, or in the air, by means of radioactive material. The great effectiveness of this bomb is indisputable. If dropped over a formation of war ships at sea, it is almost certain that several of the ships would be either destroyed or damaged. If dropped amongst a group of merchant ships in a harbor, it is probable that several would be destroyed. If dropped just off a beach while an invasion force was landing, the bomb would eliminate all combatants within a range of several thousand yards.
There are certain factors, however, which mitigate against free and extensive use of the atomic bomb. In the first place, the manufacturing process required to produce the bomb is long, delicate, highly technical, and extremely costly. It is improbable that any nation will possess large quantities of these bombs until great advances are made in the manufacturing process and in the technical development of the bomb. The length of time that will be required to achieve these advances will depend upon the incentive behind the project and upon the resources made available for the work. Our scientists tell us that it is improbable that these problems will be solved for some years. In the meantime, it is to be expected that any nation possessing limited quantities of bombs will use them sparingly.
If nations must husband their limited supply of atomic bombs, the question arises as to what targets will be considered suitable for the expenditure of a bomb. In the future, it is certain that warships at sea will adopt formations providing greater dispersion. Would the expenditure of an atomic bomb on such a formation pay as large a dividend as the expenditure of the same bomb against a large number of attacking troops, or against an enemy airfield that was proving to be particularly troublesome? My thought is that the answer would depend upon the number of bombs available to the belligerent and the strength of the threat of future invasion confronting him. If his supply of bombs was limited and a threat of invasion existed, it is probable that he would reserve his bombs for use against a more immediate threat.
The case of the merchant ships at anchor in a harbor would present a similar problem. In the future, during times of war, merchant ships also may be expected to disperse to a greater degree than has been customary in the past. Whether or not they would be considered a worthwhile target would depend upon their number and the threat they represented. Should a large invasion force be loaded aboard these ships, and should a reasonable supply of atomic bombs be available, other factors being equal, it is fairly certain that such a group of ships would be considered a worth-while target. If, on the other hand, this opponent had an ample supply of ships, a sizable invasion force was not loaded aboard these particular ships, and the available supply of atomic bombs was strictly limited, it is improbable that these ships would be considered a worthwhile target. Numerous situations between these two cases might exist, but the considerations outlined above would, in general, apply.
The amphibious tactical methods employed during World War II will certainly be seriously affected by the atomic bomb. In the amphibious invasion, we find all the impelling elements which would cause a defending nation to make an all out effort to repulse such a threat. Should the invasion area be the defenders’ homeland, in all probability that nation would expend its available supply of atomic bombs with little or no reservation. As pointed out previously, this bomb could reasonably be expected to eliminate all personnel and all but the heaviest material within several thousand yards of the bursting point. What changes in amphibious tactics will be required to meet this threat? Probably wider dispersion, greater surprise, and also provision for destroying or neutralizing likely vehicles for carrying the bomb or means of actuating it.
There is still another consideration regarding employment of the atomic bomb that must be taken into account. This is the matter of a suitable carrier to deliver the bomb. Since the war, there has been a marked advancement in the development of jet airplanes. These are now approaching supersonic speed. There has been a similar advancement in the development of higher speed long range rockets and also of interceptor rockets. These latter are capable of speeds even greater than the long range rockets. Certainly in the face of these new weapons our large bombers are not going to be a suitable vehicle. Jet fighters or interceptor rockets would make short work of them. The obvious solution for a suitable carrier, of course, is to use the long range high speed rocket. Unfortunately, the utilization of these rockets to carry the bomb involves many factors that are so difficult to solve that this solution seems a long way from probable realization. Meanwhile, in the less distant future, the extremely high speed interceptor rocket gives promise of being capable of bringing down the larger long range rockets with a reasonable degree of certainty. Consequently, a positively suitable future carrier for the atomic bomb is not yet in sight.
And so the cycle goes. A new weapon is developed, has its day of glory, and then is dimmed by an effective counterweapon. Viewing those new weapons that have recently been developed, it seems that some of them, notably the atomic bomb, will have a positive effect upon some naval tactical methods. In the future, some new developments may for a time affect even naval strategy—until a countermeasure is developed. But, in these days of rapid scientific development, that time of ascendency will probably be short-lived. As soon as the countermeasure is developed, the strategic picture settles back to its normal balance.
Using the foregoing consideration of new weapons and their probable effect upon naval tactics and strategy as a guide, one may speculate in regard to the more distant future and its probable effect upon basic naval strategic requirements.
The second fundamental hypothesis listed earlier in this article states that military strategy will continue to have as its basic objective the defense or seizure of specific land areas. In the final analysis, this means that one adversary or the other must eventually cross the intervening ocean area. So long as this holds true, the ability to seize control of this intervening ocean area and the ability to utilize it will continue to be of first strategic importance. Even though atomic propulsion is developed and this permits high speed air transportation on a larger scale, it is highly probable that the intercepting rocket will make such a means of transportation unprofitably hazardous. It is likely that ocean transport, also utilizing atomic propulsion, will still be the primary means of transport. It will be necessary for these ships to be escorted by other ships carrying interceptor rockets and other countermeasures capable of effective defense against long range rockets and other weapons of the period. These weapons, and the high airspeeds that by this time will have become prevalent, will preclude the use of very large airborne platforms. The floating platform, therefore, will continue to possess a greater capacity to carry both offensive and defensive weapons. Consequently, ocean transport will lend itself to a more positive defense than would be possible for air transport.
Should the day arrive when transportation on the surface of the ocean becomes unacceptably hazardous and no prospect of effective countermeasures exists, it is probable that the functions of present day surface transports will be taken over by submarines and underwater transport resorted to on a large scale.
Whether the transportation be surface or subsurface, upon arrival at the objective area, it will still be necessary to “get there fustest with the mostest,” as stated in the last fundamental hypothesis. The escorting and supporting forces, whether of surface or subsurface type, must still be capable of ensuring a local superiority of force if the invading forces are to be capable of effecting a landing.
Should unforeseen weapons and developments of the future make underwater transportation no longer feasible, war will probably consist of one belligerent nation bombarding the other into supplication. After this has been accomplished, however, it will still be necessary to transport occupation forces to the shores of the vanquished nation. Before this can be done, control of the intervening ocean areas must be established. Forces must be available to seek out and destroy such enemy forces as may be disputing control of these ocean areas. Finally, there must arrive at the objective area, concurrently with the forces to be landed, sufficient supporting forces to ensure a local superiority over such defensive weapons as may be present.
If the foregoing be logical, it is extremely doubtful that any new weapon or development of the future will bring about a marked change in basic naval tasks or fundamental naval strategy. When the North American continent was fashioned by the creator, he bordered it with two large oceans; the Atlantic and the Pacific. In both World Wars I and II, by exercising control of this heritage, the United States has prevented its homeland from suffering the ravages of war. If you are to be a critic or a prophet of the future, it would be well that you weigh fully the foregoing considerations before you advocate that our country neglect its birthright.
One midafternoon in port, during the Captain’s usual “coffee conference” in the small wardroom of our submarine, a messenger appeared with an urgent message from the Big Flag requesting an immediate estimate of the amount of fuel oil we expected to consume during the first quarter of the next fiscal year. Ordinarily estimates of this nature are no particular chore, but in this case the schedule for the next year had not been published. We didn’t know when our overhaul would be scheduled, whether there would be a Fleet problem, or even a hint as to the form or extent of our routine exercises. Under the circumstances some heavy and pretty accurate crystal ball gazing was in order.
The Captain called on the officers for estimates, but these varied so widely that there seemed no course but to average all the guesses and send that figure in. During the discussion, which by this time had become general and highly vocal, Gonzales, our faithful and highly intelligent mess boy, had been serving coffee. Suddenly the Skipper, obviously with an idea, quieted the hubbub. “Gonzales,” he asked, “how much fuel oil do you think we will need?”
Gonzales stopped short, and when he saw the Skipper was in earnest he gazed long and steadily at a light globe for some half a minute. “Sixty two thousand gallons,” he replied abruptly, and began gathering empty coffee cups.
The discussion that followed seemed to indicate that Gonzales’ crystal ball guess was as logical as any other, so we sent that figure into the higher command—and Gonzales at least was not at all surprised when, some months later, we were commended for having made the most accurate estimate in the Squadron!
A graduate of the Naval Academy in 1922, Captain Riggs, as navigator and later as executive officer of the U.S.S. New Orleans, was present at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and participated in the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Guadalcanal-Tulagi landings, the Battle of Midway, the Eastern Solomons action, and the Battle of Tassafaronga. During this last action, the New Orleans had 164 feet of her bow blown off. Later Captain Riggs served on the staffs of Admiral Halsey and of Admiral Newton, and then was assigned to the Joint War Plans Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.