Book Reviews
Members of the Institute, both regular and associate, may save money by ordering books through its Book Department, which will supply any obtainable book. A discount of 10 per cent is allowed on books published by the Institute, and on books of other publishers (government and foreign publications excepted). Address Secretary-Treasurer, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland.
A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. By Dudley W. Knox, Commodore, U.S.N. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. 1948. 704 pages, including indices. $7.50.
Reviewed by Captain Paul F. Dugan, U. S. Navy
“The sea is at our gates—east, west, and south,” concludes Commodore Knox in this second edition of A History of the U. S. Navy. But Fleet Admiral Nimitz, looking forward to the future, adds, “and to the north as well” in the Foreword.
The author’s primary purposes, as given in the Preface, are:
(a) To present a connected and accurate narrative of all important naval events in American history in readily understandable form;
(b) To indicate the cloes relationship that has existed between naval affairs and the political, economic, military, and other broad aspects of the national life during peace as well as war;
(c) To make available such a record as will adequately inform the student and the general reader of the national value of the Navy’s work, and will also serve as a source of inspiration to the Navy itself, whose current morale necessarily includes traditions as an important component.
The history is divided into Part I, The Navy Before World War II, 432 pages, and Part II, The Navy in World War II, 197 pages. Part I of the revised edition is almost an exact reprint of the 1936 edition. Part II adds the story of the Navy to the end of the hostilities of World War II. The book is well illustrated with 54 photographs and 42 maps and diagrams.
The role of the Navy as the strong right arm of public policy in both peace and war is clearly shown in this interesting book, which compresses in one volume all the important naval operations and related events since the founding of the republic. Many times in Part I are recounted the use of force or threatened force by determined naval commanders to protect American citizens or American commercial interests in foreign waters. For example, in 1856 Commander A. H. Foote led Navy landing parties of seamen and Marines ashore against the barrier forts below Canton, China, and captured the forts by assault with effective fire support from his ship, the Portsmouth, and other Navy vessels in order to obtain recognition of American commercial rights.
In covering such a long period the author narrates primarily the operations of naval and Marine forces. The engineering and ship construction advancements are touched only lightly. Statistics of armament, numbers and type of ships in commission, names of task unit commanders—such as destroyer squadron commanders and amphibious commanders—are not covered fully. A statistical appendix would add to the value of the history as it does to The Navy: A History, by Fletcher Pratt, published in 1941. The latter book, being written by a civilian, is less formal in its style, and, by dramatizing the personal side of famous commanders, tends to hold the interest of the average non-military reader.
Even in Commodore Knox’s generally accurate work the naval reader may note a few technical errors; for instance, on page 442, the seaplane tender Curtiss is referred to as a destroyer, the rank of the commanding officer, H. S. Kendall, is incorrect, and the ship’s part in the Pearl Harbor action is garbled. On page 583, all screening vessels with Rear Admiral C. A. F. Sprague’s escort carrier group in the Battle for Leyte Gulf are called destroyers, whereas several of them were destroyer escorts, and this fact makes their combat performance against a powerful Japanese battle force even more remarkable than if they had been destroyers. On page 184, the capital of the Great Liuchu Islands, where Commodore Matthew C. Perry visited in 1853, is called Napa. The author fails to note on page 614, where Naha, capital of Okinawa, in the presently called Ryukyu Islands is mentioned, that the two cities are one and the same. However, minor flaws or omissions do not detract from the great value of the book as the first complete history of the U. S. Navy to include World War II, and most readers will conclude that the author has succeeded admirably in his three purposes.
Commodore Knox was graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1896, retired in 1921 after 25 years service in peace and war, but has served many years of active duty since that time in charge of the archives of the Navy Department and of their editing for publication. He was Deputy Director of Naval History in the Navy Department under Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, beginning in 1944, and was Secretary of the Naval Historical Foundation. He finally reverted to inactive duty in 1947, after “carrying the torch” for naval history since 1921. Best known of his writings, prior to the 1936 edition of his History, is The Naval Genius of George Washington.
THE ART OF WAR ON LAND. By Lt. Colonel Alfred H. Burne, D.S.O., R.A. (Retired). Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Company. 1947. 205 pages. $2.50.
Reviewed by Major H. S. Roise, U.S.M.C., Executive Dept., U.S.N.A.
The Art of War on Land is a thoughtful and interesting account of the problems of what wins battles. As Major General J. N. Kennedy, C.B., M.C., has stated in his foreword to this book: “…it behooves us, if we are to preserve our freedom, to know what war means, and how it is waged. This knowledge in turn will assist to create an enlightened public opinion, without which the nation cannot be prepared to defend itself and will not make the sacrifices entailed by such preparedness.” In a global war such as we have just finished, it should be of great interest to the civilian public to have a general knowledge of the principles of war and their application. Col. Burne has presented this material in a manner which should prove both interesting and educational for the beginner in military studies. In brief, his book is a short study of military history covering thirteen campaigns from the Battle of Kadesh to the Tunisian Campaign.
Col. Burne has divided his book in two parts. The first encompasses the Principles and Strategy of War; the second describes battles or campaigns which illustrate the principles brought out in Part One. American readers may find the statement of some of the principles used in Part One vary from those in our manuals, but the scope is so broad the difference in phraseology is unimportant.
The battles and campaigns described in Part Two are easily followed through graphic representations of each operation. The comments at the end of each campaign cover the high points of each battle and endeavor to pin down the reasons for each victory or defeat. To quote from the comments of the Tunisian Campaign: “The cause of the debacle in Tunisia was fundamentally the same: it was the cumulative effect of the succession of hammer blows delivered by our armies from Alamein onward. Sheer hard fighting did it. It was the apotheosis of the offensive. The lesson is clear—there is no short cut to victory—sheer hard fighting,…in an implacable offensive, is the only sure precursor to victory in war.”
The author’s study of interior and exterior lines, to which he has devoted a large part of his book, is an interesting sidelight to which very little thought has been given in any American manuals. Col. Burne states that a study of the campaigns of the last 150 years will show that really decisive results have only been achieved by the use of exterior lines. It is believed that an entire book could be devoted to this one subject alone and that it would benefit the American military experts to make further studies along this line, especially of the rapid advance made by the Germans across France in the early part of World War II.
While The Art of War on Land in no wise can be considered to give the exact answers on how to win battles, it nevertheless is a worthwhile study which presents in an interesting and readable manner a number of very important lessons taught by the comparing of a series of great victories throughout the ages and noting what battle-winning features they have in common.
NUREMBERG DIARY. By G. M. Gilbert. New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1947. 471 pages including Introduction and Epilogue with the Judgement and Chronology and Index. $5.00.
Reviewed by Harold S. Hulberx, M.D. (Formerly Lieutenant, M.C., U.S.N.R.F.)
Professor G. M. Gilbert, Captain, U. S. Army, was the prison psychologist before the Nuremberg trials. At home in German language and idiom and history, his “visits” with the prisoners were fruitful. This is his diary; the events are in italics, and what the prisoners told him as well as his keen observations are in ordinary print. It is easy to read and to study. His readers see the cracking up and the breaking down of the prisoners.
Is the reader interested in knowing the size of the leaders of Nazi Germany? The portraits they painted in words of each other and revealed of themselves show that they were either little men or they were narrow men, and many were deviates. We realize that a nation with a constitution impregnable to dicta and governed by laws and not by capricious men, with a free press, and with two parties which check each other and by frequent elections alternate in administration, could never have retained such leaders. But the only way to force a change under a dictatorship is assassination: in Nazi Germany that was prevented by two means—a ruthless, strong, biased Security Police, and the Fuhrer-prinzip (Leadership Principle).
Psychological (I.Q.) tests showed that none of the Nazi leaders on trial was very, very bright. Alcoholism, drugs, perversions, blood lust, egomania, egocentricity, bigotry, insanity, thefts of property, dumb and clever lying, woeful ignorance (one said, “Army officers are untravelled, hence are more ignorant than Navy officers”), and restricted viewpoints characterized these arch criminal leaders. The personalities unmasked themselves and each other. Prussian militarism is a strict and lowly religion, and is malign because there are no federal courts to review its mistakes; it is inbred to the point of moral degeneracy with goose-stepping minds: its leaders were hanged, and properly so. No one denied the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and its Charter, for the German forces and the German people had surrendered unconditionally. They all said that a public legal trial with full opportunity for defense would never be granted by them. The politicians on trial had no shared religion except dumb devotion and blind loyalty to the Leader and his appointees. They had surrendered their morals as well as their conduct because of ambitions and greed, and lived in a bloody, ruthless world of idolatry. True honor was absent from each and all; false honor in the dishonorable for the dishonorable was their trait in common. Many were wilfully ignorant of the atrocities and crimes they as a group engendered and permitted.
The Nazi generals and admirals discussed certain historic moments. One was that Germany was not well balanced militarily and would not have been able to force her way into Czechoslovakia if England and France had not given way and signed the Munich Pact. Also Germany was not militarily able to hold the Ruhr when she first seized it after denouncing the Versailles Treaty. Further, Germany during the first fighting in Poland could have lost her 23 divisions in the West to the 110 divisions of France and England who were sitting behind the Maginot Line. But Hitler’s force of personality and ability to evaluate and bluff the political leaders of his enemies succeeded over those who inferred unfavorably and did not try their hardest at every opportunity. Even Von Runstedt’s attack against the unawed American lines was hopeless from the start because of lack of good reserves of men and equipment.
This splendid and unique book is highly recommended to the military of yesterday, today, and the future.
THE ARMY GROUND FORCES: THE ORGANIZATION OF GROUND COMBAT TROOPS. By Kent R. Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley. Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1947. 540 pages, illustrated, index. $3.25.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel J. D. Hittle, U. S. Marine Corps
This is the first of 99 volumes that will eventually comprise the official history of “The U. S. Army in World War II.” If this first volume is a fair sample, the series should as a whole be a significant contribution to the history of American arms.
This volume consists of six studies, all dealing with the problems of the ground forces. Although much of the book pertains specifically to the internal, and hence specialized, problems of the ground effort, there are some portions of the text that should provide useful reading for naval personnel.
The section entitled “The Relation of GHQ to Amphibious Training” is significant not only for what it says, but also for what is left unsaid. For instance, the book’s consideration of Army amphibious activities starts from June 26, 1940, when “the 1st and 3d Divisions (Army) were directed to practice landing operations.” In view of the magnitude of amphibious operations in the last war, it would have added much to the historical value of this portion of the book if the authors had delved a bit further into the record than they did. Even a shallow probing of the past might well have disclosed some very interesting information as to why Army amphibious activity was not initiated prior to 1940. Such further research by the authors would probably have helped answer a question that has puzzled many military readers: “Why did the War Department lack such interest in amphibious operations prior to World War II that it remained for the naval service to be the sole architect and custodian of amphibious know-how”? Far from being irrelevant, the answer to this question would probably have measurably assisted the authors—and the readers—in understanding the incessant difficulties that, according to the text, seemed to characterize the Army’s early World War II amphibious activities.
In view of Naval Aviation’s long established emphasis on support aviation, naval readers will probably find much of interest in the section “GHQ and the Development of Air Support Training and Doctrine.” Essentially this is an official story of a major phase of the Army Air Force’s struggle for autonomy, and, as such, sheds considerable light on the circumstances leading up to the recent (1947) statutory disassociation of the Air Force from the Army. Indeed, the authors are to be commended for their objective treatment of the air support problem as it evolved in our Army even after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe.
Readers will probably be surprised to learn of the extent of the conflict that existed between the ground forces and top air officers in the matter of air support. Quite significantly the authors, who use their words advisedly, write of the “struggle” over the question of instituting “immediate air-support tests.” That such a struggle was of major importance is indicated by the fact that the most persistent opponent of the proposed tests was Major General Delos C. Emmons (Commander of the GHQ Air Force) and who was for a time supported by Major General H. H. Arnold. Nor was this dispute over air-support confined to the matter of procedure tests. There was controversy over almost every major aspect of the air-ground problem.
Marine and Navy readers acquainted with landing force close air support doctrine will find some satisfaction in the realization that our air support doctrine has never been the source of such a struggle within the naval service. Such is probably a direct result of the fact that organization of the naval service is based upon the concept of balanced forces, with the result that each element—surface, submarine, aviation, and landing force—is a part of the naval combat team and each contributes to attainment of the mutual naval objective. Consequently questions resulting from a desire for organizational independence do not hamper the development of naval combat doctrine.
While this book is primarily an organizational and training study, it does, nevertheless, contain much in the way of a personal history of Lieutenant General McNair. Actually this adds to the readability and value of the book, for it shows all too clearly that in spite of the attempt to make the book a factual history, the powerful personality of McNair dominates even factual data. It is good that we should be reminded of McNair, for he, more than any other person, was the maker of the World War II field forces of the U. S. Army.
Interested readers may obtain this book by sending their orders to the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.
WIND WAVES AT SEA, BREAKERS AND SURF. By Henry B. Bigelow, Museum of Comparative Zoology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and W. T. Edmondson, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, Massachusetts. Washington, D. C.: Hydrographic Office (H. O. Pub. No. 602). 1947. 190 pages. $2.80.
Reviewed by Robert E. Trumble, Jr., Instructor, U. S. Naval Academy
Wind Waves at Sea, Breakers and Surf is a comprehensive summary and explanation of the currently available data concerning the phenomena of waves, swells, breakers, and surf as they affect the mariner. The treatment is essentially descriptive, with simple formulae and “rules of thumb” included wherever the data are sufficiently complete to permit the formulation of generalizations. The more complicated calculations and formulae are omitted, or indicated only in footnotes, but the results are arranged in tabular form. Thirty-seven tables summarize the conclusions. The text, therefore, is nontechnical, but the formulae in the footnotes and the wealth of selected references will guide the reader as far into the more technical aspects of the subject as he cares to go. Throughout the discussion the simple, direct style, the photographs, the drawings, and the many examples make the book very lucid and readable. This enhances the wealth of significant information, not otherwise readily obtainable, which is contained in this book.
The authors introduce the subject with a discussion of the physical nature of wind waves, which leads to the consideration of their dimensions and contours, and to the effects of currents and shoal waters on waves. Consideration of the process of alteration of seas into swells introduces the subject of swells, and leads finally to an analysis of the frequency of high and low seas and swells in different regions at different seasons, which concludes the discussion of wind waves at sea. The second part of the book is concerned with breakers and surf, the origin of surf and the character of surf under different conditions being first discussed. An analysis of the direction and height of breakers in relation to shape of coastline concludes the book.
The principles and data set forth in Wind Waves at Sea, Breakers and Surf will assist the planner predict probable sea conditions in distant regions months in advance, will assist the navigator predict sea and surf conditions hours or days in advance, and will suggest the best positions along a coastline to penetrate a surf. In the words of Rear Admiral R.O. Glover, U. S. Navy, the Hydrographer, “Wind Waves at Sea, Breakers and Surf is a detailed and non-technical discussion of the subject based on the researches of eminent scientists and on the observations of thousands of seafaring men throughout the past century. The mariner will find in this volume much of value that will assist him in the safe and economical operation of vessels on the high seas, in restricted waters, and in the surf zone.”