China’s New Navy, American Built, Starts from Scratch
Commander Louis J. Gulliver, U. S. Navy (Retired).—A navy for China, in replacement of General Chiang Kai-shek’s small and ineffective fleet that was scuttled or went down from Japanese hits in 1937, is a partly achieved objective that had its inception under joint American Navy-Chinese control only four months after V-J day. Definitely underway is the world’s youngest navy and the only one afloat composed exclusively of World War II designed ships.
China’s new navy ships will resemble not at all the pre-war classic type of warship, excepting only some ex-American destroyer escort types. Currently and for the most part, it is made up of ex-U. S. Navy amphibious types, such as Landing Ships Tank and Landing Ships Infantry.
In July, 1946, the U. S. Congress authorized the transfer of 271 surplus American naval vessels to the Government of China, specifying only amphibious types, a Landing Ship Dock, and an unknown number of destroyer escorts. Later it developed that China is to receive an ex-Japanese cruiser and a British cruiser, concerning which there is no public information.
Importantly, our Congress conditioned the gift of ships: American naval officers and petty officers shall act as naval instructors to their Chinese opposite numbers. It is the joint responsibility of the Chinese Naval Ministry and the U. S. Seventh Fleet to devise training procedures, afloat and ashore, to insure that Chinese naval personnel are certified as qualified to operate the ships. Reports from the Tsingtao training center are to the effect that the Chinese are apt.
Currently, at least, China has primary need for American amphibious naval vessels and so expressed her wishes on the basis of her program requiring a water patrol of her thousand-mile-long coast line and her many navigable rivers. Such a patrol by lightly armed vessels that can land almost anywhere and at any time will be of maximum effectiveness, the more so now when China’s piers and pier facilities, which cargo amphibious ships can ignore, are largely war casualties.
While a navy of 271 ships sounds fairly impressive, certainly for China, it need not be said that these are but the barest beginning. Yet to be acquired are carriers and submarines plus shore stations, bases, and educational establishments for embryo naval personnel. China once had an “Annapolis” and will again, it appears.
Only four months after the Japanese surrender, China received the first increment of ex-U. S. Navy ships—three Landing Ships Tank from the U. S. Seventh Fleet, then at Tsingtao. The first class for shipboard training consisted of sixty Chinese officers and 300 enlisted. Each month thereafter came new groups of 20 officers and 150 men. In general charge at the outset were Commodore Penn Carroll for the United States and Captain S. K. Lin, veteran officer, for China.
Later other groups of prospective Chinese officers and men received training in Miami, Florida, and in England where 50 officers and 300 men have manned a British cruiser for eventual transfer to China.
The Chinese Navy as of last June is reported to consist of 36 amphibious ships, manned by 256 qualified officers and 2,024 men. Included is an ex-U. S. Navy Landing Ship Dock (most necessary now in the absence of shore drydocks), Landing Ships Tank, Landing Craft Infantry, Landing Ships Medium, and Landing Craft Tank, all designed for light armament.
The Chinese Naval Ministry has acted swiftly and concurrently with the acquisition of the ships to provide the latest available educational facilities for the instruction that Chinese officer personnel must have when the time comes, soon perhaps, to take over the several types of combat craft and post-war weapons. The Ministry has implemented an “Annapolis” with a five year course to cover modern naval sciences. Naval text books, conforming to the latest for U. S. officer training, have already been procured in the United States.
Shooting a Mirage
(See page 1083, September 1947JPROCEEDINGS)
Captain F. L. Oliver, U. S. Navy (retired).—Joe Taussig’s account in the September Proceedings of the mirage he witnessed in 1903 was of particular interest to me, as I was the officer of the deck of the Texas on the evening the phenomenon was observed.
I well recall my amazement when Cape Charles light appeared above the horizon hours before it was due to be sighted. We knew where we were, as the ship had obtained a fix on Hatteras lighthouse when it was passed not so many hours previously. In fact I think that Hatteras light was still in sight when the queer things began to happen.
The navigator, Lieutenant H. O. Stickney, came on the bridge bristling with incredulity over the reported sighting and demanded he be shown the light. By that time there were five or six Cape Charles lights superimposed on each other, so he had no difficulty in seeing what I saw. Currituck, Cape Henry, and Hatteras lights were all in sight at the same time, so we obtained a good fix.
It is my recollection that after perhaps a half an hour the lights began to disappear one by one, and were not again sighted until they normally were due to be seen.
I definitely remember that Cape Charles light was plotted 92 miles distant by the above referenced fix.
Soviet Sea Power
(See page 61, January 1948 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (j.g.) P. W. Rairden, Jr., U. S. Navy.—Concerning my article, “Soviet Sea Power,” in the January 1948 issue of Proceedings—two discrepancies have been pointed out to me since its publication and I hasten to acknowledge them:
- Failure to mention the Moscow-Volga Canal in connection with internal waterways of importance.
- Attributing to the Swedes the integration of the first Russian Kaganate.
In connection with this second discrepancy it appears that there are two schools of thought. Vernadsky’s History of Russia was my source on this point and appears to be one of the outstanding contemporary proponents of this idea. In the Autumn 1947 issue of The Russian Review is an article by N. Riasanovsky which reviews all the historic evidence to date and concludes that the Russian state grew out of Slavic culture and people, the European factor being “merely a minor or even a superfluous element in the formation of that state.”
The evidence brought to my attention seems to favor Riasanovsky’s views. Readers who may be interested are referred to the sources.
A Britisher Looks at Annapolis
Commander C. D. Chretien, U. S. Naval Reserve.-—It may interest officers of the Navy to hear the opinion of a British officer, Commander M. LeFanu, D.S.C., R.N., who served a year at sea with our Navy during the late war, on the U. S. Naval Academy. I quote from his article, “American Sea Power Since 1775,” published in the May, 1947, issue of the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution. The passage cited will be found on page 236 of that issue, and is reproduced with the kind permission of Captain E. Altham, C.B., R.N., Secretary, Editor, and Chief Executive Officer of the Royal United Service Institution. After comparing the methods of the Royal Navy for educating its officers with those in force in the United States Navy, Commander LeFanu makes this statement:
“One could multiply cases where the one system has the advantage over the other, and it may be that each is the best for the national characteristics which it has to mould. It does, however, seem that the gradually increasing complexity of modern warfare, putting as it does an increased premium on technical ‘know-how’ and driving capacity for hard work, is reacting steadily and progressively to the advantage of the American method. This belief is strengthened by consideration of the single factor in which the training of the American naval officer would appear to be most advanced. This is in the ability to think scientifically—an ability which stems directly from his training at Annapolis. It is not of course a cultivated aptitude for physics or any other scientific subject. Rather it is the capacity to make the scientific approach, the casting of a beady eye upon the data, the power of breaking a problem down to its factual fundamentals and synthesizing the logical solution—founded on facts. It was this ruthless application of logic which pointed the path from Pearl Harbour across the Central Pacific.”
This independent testimony from an officer in the service of another country, and based on a year’s close-in experience, should not be ignored in any evaluation of the success of the Naval Academy in achieving its purposes. Commander LeFanu pays a high compliment to the teaching staff of the Naval Academy, all the more to be appreciated as it comes unsolicited and incidentally.
Seron Ten
(See page 153, February 1948 Proceedings)
Captain H. E. Eccles, U. S. Navy.—The article by Commodore Carter on Seron 10 in the February Proceedings is outstanding in its complete description of a vital Naval logistic activity in the Pacific. The manner in which Commodore Carter and his officers handled the tremendous and frequently unpredictable loads that were placed on them aroused the admiration of all officers who had any understanding of the problems which Service Squadron 10 faced. Commodore Carter’s insistence on mobility of future Naval logistic forces is sound. His plea to keep this in the forefront of our minds during peace and to continue our development of these mobile fleet support resources is of very great importance. Mobility is the key to the successful use of Naval power, and mobility of combat forces is entirely dependent upon the mobility of logistic support. The problem of balance between floating mobile support facilities and fixed advanced naval bases will never be easy to solve because in some instances we undoubtedly must build shore establishments in the advanced areas. However, whenever possible the Navy should keep afloat and self- propelled.
Method of Using the Stars Listed Under Additional Stars
(See page 68, January 1948 Proceedings)
Commander Henry H. Shufeldt, U. S. Naval Reserve (inactive) .—The article in the January 1948 issue of the Proceedings by Lieutenant J. B. Feaster, U.S.N., entitled “Method of Using the Stars listed under ‘Additional Stars’ ” was very interesting.
However, the Greenwich Hour Angle of the “Additional Stars” can be obtained rather more easily with the aid of the Air Almanac than by the method suggested by Lieutenant Feaster, and this method is submitted herewith as a “wrinkle” that may be helpful upon occasion to the navigator. It was used to advantage aboard various carriers during the war.
This method consists of the following steps:
- Convert tabulated Right Ascension to arc, preferably rounding off to nearest whole minute.
- Subtract the resultant from 360° to obtain Sidereal Hour Angle.
- Add the SHA thus obtained to the corrected GHA of Aries, obtained from the Air Almanac, to get GHA of star.
Example:
Required GHA Alkaid (eta Ursae Majoris) for 05-23-14 GCT, 24 July 1948.
Right Ascension of star from Nautical Almanac — 13h 45m 31s; in arc this is 206°23'.
- 360°—206°23'=SHA star = 153°37'
- GHA of Aries for 05-23-14 24 July = 22°39'
176°16
GHA of star =