Book Reviews

 

SCIENTISTS AGAINST TIME: By James Phinney Baxter, 3rd. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1946. 459 pages-f- 74 illustrations+index. $5.00.

Reviewed by Senior Professor Earl W.

Thompson, United States Naval Academy

Seventeen months before Pearl Harbor, on June 27, 1940, President Roosevelt ap­proved an “Order Establishing the National Defense Research Committee” to “correlate and support scientific research on the mech­anisms and devices of warfare ... to aid and supplement the experimental and re­search activities of the War and Navy De­partments; and to conduct research for the creation and improvement of instrumentali­ties, methods and materials of warfare.” One year later, with 6000 scientists working on military problems throughout the na­tion, the President greatly expanded the duties of this committee in the establish­ment of the Office of Scientific Research and Development within the Office for Emer­gency Management of the Executive Office. Scientific research in potential and imme­diate weapons and counter-weapons was thus placed directly under and responsible only to the President. Dr. Vannevar Bush, chairman of NDRC and OSRD, took his place with Admiral King and General Mar­shall as only oncc-removed-from-FDR. The remainder of the original, and subsequent committees, was taken from the top-drawer of American scientists with research and executive ability: Dr. James B. Conant, Dr. Richard C. Tolman, Dr. Karl T. Compton, Dr. Frank P. Jewett, and Conway P. Coe.

Dr. Baxter, on leave of absence as Presi­dent of Williams College, was appointed historian of OSRD. The present encyclo­pedic volume, Scientists Against Time, is the first of a series to be entitled Science in World War II which will relate the official history of the activities of the organization. Dr. Baxter and his staff were given access to the records of the Army, the Navy, and OSRD, and this volume therefore contains much material which previously was con­sidered secret or confidential.

In a book of this sort there can be little originality as the statements cannot be far different from those of the official reports. Dr. Baxter has, however, given us a readable mixture of history and science—interesting, but somewhat repetitious. As a student of both strategy and football he emphasizes the maintenance of a proper balance between offensive and defensive weapons, and meta­phorically classifies various research as as­sisting the tactics of power plays, single­wing offensives, triple threats, mouse traps and sweeps around both ends. The historian evidently depended heavily upon the post­war intelligence studies of Germany and Japan which are excellent source material, and upon the daily copy of the Public Rela­tions Officers which, without the marinating influence of time, never can be so accurate.

It seems too bad that Dr. Baxter, carried away by the diurnal enthusiasms of some

P.R.O’s, has repeated inaccuracies which were good copy, but never scientifically nor statistically accurate. There is credit enough in the marvelous work of the scientists with­out the necessity of claiming omniscience— the scientists adapted science to weapons, the planners of Army and Navy adapted these weapons to victorious warfare. As a case in point Dr. Baxter copies a statement from an Operational Research Section mem­orandum: “Flak inflicted such severe losses on the 8th Air Force in 1943 that day bomb­ing might have had to be suspended if we had not found a way to blind the eyes of the German fire-control radars.” The mightiest word in this quote is “might.” Your reviewer, during the period in question, was Flak Offi­cer for the VIII Bomber Command and knows the above statement is somewhat over-exaggerated. At this time losses were greatest from enemy fighters and from air-to- air bombing (Schweinfurt). In addition, al­though “carpet” and “window” helped, the greatest factor in the continuation of day bombing was the advent of the long-range P-51. Admiral of the Fleet Lord Keyes is quoted as saying in another situation: “It cannot be set dow'n as a maxim that any one factor can be exclusively decisive.”

This volume covers the whole span of scientific development, radar and radar counter-measures, loran, proximity fuses, the Dukw and Weasel, incendiaries and flame throwers, military medicine, including dis­cussion of high altitude effects, penicillin and insecticides, and finally the Manhattan project and the atomic bomb. It is not ne­cessary to have a scientific education to read the book intelligently, as there are few tech­nical descriptions of material. However, it does help to know the basic science in some of the territory covered: acoustics, super- sonics, infra-red, 3-cm-radio, photoelectri­city, electrons, oscilloscopes, and atomic nuclei.

The factor of time is emphasized through­out the book, particularly in the race for the atomic bomb:

The race against time on the scientific front was not a short sprint but a long-distance affair consisting of several laps. “The entire program of bringing a device into operation against the enemy,” as Bush explained it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “consists of several stages. If any one of these is omitted, the device will be ineffective. For a newly conceived device, these stages involve primary research, engineering development, ini­tial production for extended field tests, and engi­neering for quantity production. For devices that have gone through these stages . . . there are also the stages of production, installation, main­tenance, development of tactics, training, and use.”

The most harassing problem of the OSRD was the procurement, protection, and main­tenance of its scientifically trained research personnel in the controversy over manpower which raged around a draft engendered by the democracy. The biggest single accomp­lishment was the extraordinary degree of collaboration and cooperation secured among the civilians, the services, and industry— “an experiment in the relations of civilians with officers when the civilians are walking on the terrain of the soldier.” The Navy was given a clean bill-of-health on the subject of cooperation; some of the others were not so fortunate.

The layman is prone to assume that if knowl­edge exists in one part of an army or navy, it will automatically come to the attention of all the authorities who need to know it. There are few greater illusions.

The difficult problem of the relationships of the scientists to the military at the strategic level still awaits a solution. . . . Planning at the top level in the absence of the scientific mind was an incom­plete and hence dangerous procedure.

The Bat was conceived by the Navy Bureau of Ordnance, using principles developed at the NDRC Radiation Laboratory at the Massachu­setts Institute of Technology. Its radar was de­signed and built by the Western Electric Com­pany under Navy contract and fitted to an air frame developed at the National Bureau of Stand­ards. The complete missile was tuned up and put into service under the eyes of technicians and re­search men from M.I.T. Field Experiment Sta­tion under a Division 5 contract.

Tuve (Dr. M. A.), Ilafstad (Dr. L. R.),Hop­kins (Dr. D. L), Parsons (Rear Adm., U. S. N.), and his relief, Tyler (Capt. C. L., U. S. N.), con­stituted one of the ablest and smoothest working teams which ever sought to translate new scientific ideas into mass-produced devices for combat use. Their drive, enthusiasm, and ability to inculcate team play, secrecy, and standards of highest qual­ity pervaded not merely the central laboratory but the fifty allied establishments, academic and industrial, that shared in this great work (proxim­ity fuses).

The prize bit of information in the book is on the naming of the Dukw: “D stood for the year 1942, U for utility, K for front-wheel drive, and W for two rear driving axles.” We suspect someone of humor.

The American democracy must be con­gratulated that men with the salaries of pro­fessors, civil service employees, Army and Navy officers, were allowed and enabled to spend hundreds of millions of dollars in the invention and development of billions of dollars worth of military impedimenta and yet maintain their scientific and financial honesty.

This official history of OSRD should be required reading for admirals, generals, and all officers who ever expect some day to exist in the rarefied atmosphere of high level mili­tary and naval planning. This volume is the triumphant battle-cry of American men of science returning with their shields.

THE COASTWATCHERS. by Commander Eric A. Feldt, R. A. N. New York and Melbourne. Oxford University Press. 1946. 264 pages. $3.50.

Reviewed by Assistant Professor Elmer J. Mahoney, U. S. Naval Academy

This is the story of a highly unorthodox military organization known in the South­west Pacific as the Coastwatchers. It heralds the heroic exploits of a tiny band of planters, prospectors, harbor masters, and govern­ment administrators who braved the dangers of the Jap-infested jungles to provide an al- seeing “eye” for the Allied cause.

The origin of the coastwatching system goes back to the disarmament period which followed World War I. Australia, ever real­istic, feared an attack on her thinly popu­lated northern shores. Pondering this prob­lem, the Australian Navy pulled a flank maneuver around the strictures of a limited national defense budget by hitting on a scheme of appointing selected civilians in coastal areas to watch for suspicious move­ments of ships and aircraft.

Slowly and carefully the system was built up and, in time, expanded to include the islands of the Southwest Pacific. When World War II spread to the Pacific, a small but efficient force was ready with the tele­radio as its chief weapon.

The Coastwatcher’s vigils were invariably lonely and fraught with many dangers and agonizing privations, but from their tree-top lookouts they supplied the information which enabled the Allies to deliver many crippling blows to the Japs.

The achievements of this outfit were far out of proportion to its size, especially in the early days when the Allied victory hopes seemed to be in total eclipse. Despair had no place in their lexicon. They carried on to win many appreciative words from the senior officers of the South Pacific Command. Most treasured were those of Admiral Halsey who credited them with saving Guadalcanal, the key to the South Pacific.

The code name of the Coastwatchers was Ferdinand, an inspiration gleaned from the pages of Munro Leaf’s storybook for chil­dren, later glamorized in celluloid by Walt Disney. As the author points out, no frivo­lous purpose determined this choice. Ferdi­nand was not only a tag of identification but also a definition of their job. It reminded them that their duty was not to fight and draw attention to themselves, but to sit cir­cumspectly and gather information. Of course, like Disney’s protagonist, they could fight if stung.

It is fitting that Commander Feldt should tell this story. He organized the Coastwatch­ers for war in 1939 and guided them through the most trying period of their existence. A coronary thrombosis forced him to relinquish active control in 1943.

His authorship of this book was undoubt­edly a labor of love. He writes with a quiet admiration for his heroes and a full appre- ciationof their accomplishments. The sharply curtailed quantity of the book unquestion­ably sent the quality upward. Ferdinand's story is well worth telling, and 264 pages are not too many to cover it.

THUNDER OUT OF CHINA. By Theo­dore H. White and Annalee Jacoby. William Sloane Associates, Inc. New York. 1946. 331 pages. $3.00.

Reviewed by Richard S. West, Jr.

Associate Professor, U. S.

Naval Academy

Ever since the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 a social revolution has been rumbling and gathering headway in China. The great Sun Yat-sen’s principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and Social Amelioration sup­plied China with a vision which shone brightly and hopefully during the troubled 1920’s while Chiang Kai Shek was suppress­ing various regional war lords and establish­ing the Nationalist (Kuomintang) Govern­ment. Then in the 1930’s, after it became evident that Chiang’s government, admin­istered by the propertied classes, was really resisting land and taxation reforms and that the expected social amelioration was as far away as ever, there sprang up in the north- central province of Yenan a Communist party, which opened an attack on the Na­tionalist Government about the time the Japanese began their aggressions. After a bitter and indecisive strife extending through the ’Thirties, the two warring Chinese parties—Nationalist and Communist—agreed to a truce for the duration in order to direct all their military action against the Japanese invader. By the truce Chiang’s forces under­took to wage all position warfare while the Communists took over guerrilla fighting. As the Japanese armies advanced to southward and westward, Communist guerrillas infil­trated into the territory behind them. Back of the Japanese lines, beyond Chiang’s reach, they propagated their ideology among the peasants and perfected their political organi­zation. Now, Japan having been defeated, the stage has been set for renewed civil war between Communist and Nationalist groups.

Such is the framework of an absorbingly interesting book, Thunder out of China, by Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby. The authors, who were war correspondents for Time magazine, spent most of the war in Chungking, from which base of operations Mr. White made several excursions to the fighting fronts and into Honan province at the time of the great famine. In this most successful literary collaboration Mrs. Jacoby, widow of Correspondent Melville Jacoby, specializes in reporting the ever-colorful political scene in Chungking.

Within its vast framework Thunder out of China offers a variety of materials. There are descriptions of the Chinese peasantry, the famine- and war-torn countryside, and fan­tastically overcrowded cities. There are por­traits and characterizations of such leaders as the Generalissimo; T. V. Soong, Chiang’s great political opponent within the Kuo­mintang; Mao Tse-tung, the Communist leader; General Joseph Stilwell; and Am­bassador Patrick J. Hurley. While the chief emphasis of the book is upon the war years, the chief interest centers in such episodes as the military disaster at Kweilin, the Honan famine, the Stilwcll crisis, and the none-too- liappy experiences of Ambassador Hurley.

A significant portion of the book concerns America’s wartime aid to China. China was virtually out of the war before Pearl Harbor, and by that time the Burma Road route had been closed. Herculean difficulties were over­come and supplies from India were flown in over the Himalayas, but these supplies were never enough to support Chennault’s fliers, still less to resuscitate the debilitated Chi­nese war machine. The bureaucratic weak­nesses of the Nationalist Government, since they were continually under the observation of the authors, are discussed with greater fullness than the workings of the Communist group in China. In their appraisal of Com­munist-controlled China the authors seem to have been swayed more by the inadequacies of the Nationalist Government than by any adequate observation of the Communists themselves. The book throughout is suffused with admiration for the starving and inade­quately equipped Chinese soldier and for the famine-stricken or famine-threatened peas­antry, whose voice is now being raised in the thunder of civil war and social revolt.

THE STRENGTH WE NEED. George Fielding Eliot. New York: Viking Press. 1946. 261 pages. $3.00.

Reviewed by John Roger Fredland, Assistant Professor,

U. S. Naval Academy

The Strength We Need is a sober, well- documented study of all the various military aspects of present and future U. S. national policy. To this reader it seems by far the best thing of its kind yet to appear. I believe every officer of our armed forces, and every citizen aware of the implications of the atom bomb, would benefit from a careful reading of this book.

The topics considered include the relation­ship of national armed forces to the world police under the United Nations, the basic organization of the armed forces, the ques­tion of compulsory military training, scien­tific research as related to national security, and—perhaps most important of all—the post-war missions of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces.

The Strength We Need excels most books of this type not only because Eliot has taken the trouble to provide the specific, factual basis for such a discussion, but also because it is not an argumentative “thesis” book. The author does, to be sure, take for granted that some form of universal military service is inevitable, but lie does not even commit himself on the “best” way of unifying the services. (Ilis suggestions as to a National Security Council correlate with those of the Eberstadt report.) On the whole, his effort has been to provide the officer, the citizen, and, it may be hoped, the legislator with the information he needs to answer such vital questions as “How big an Army must the United States maintain to protect her vital interests? How big a Navy? How big an Air Force? Flow necessary to our national inter­ests is American retention of Okinawa? What exactly are our military responsibilities to ourselves and to the world in this period of post-war indecision and doubt?” It is be­cause Eliot answers these questions satis­factorily that The Strength We Need has such value.

It is not a source book in higher strategy; it is not probably a book that will grace many bookshelves a hundred years hence. But it is not meant to be. It is a sound examination of important contemporary problems, and it is therefore an important contemporary book.

Recent Rooks of Professional Interest

Angas, William M. Celestial Navigation Simpli­fied. New York. Motor Boating. 1946. $1.50. Bergstrom, A. R. (U.S.M.C.). Your Marine Corps

in World War II. Atlanta, Ga. Albert Love

Enterprises. 1946. $5.50.

Brill, A. A. Lectures on Psychoanalytic Psychiatry. New York: Knopf. 1946. $3.00. Fundamentals of Freudian Theories.

Burger, Samuel. Careers in Aviation. New York: Greenberg. 1946. $2.75.

Chamberlain, Lawrence H. The President, Con­gress and Legislation. New York, Columbia University Press. 1946. $5.00. Case histories of the role of the President in shaping legislation between 1880 and 1940.

Chase, Stuart. For This Wc Fought. New York. Twentieth Century Fund. 1946. $1.00. A book for the American citizen concerned lest we lose the fruits of our victorv in the second World War.

Churchill, Winston. Secret Session Speeches. New York: Simon & Schuster. 1946. $2.00.

Croft, Terrell W. Steam Power Plant Auxiliaries and Accessories. 2nd edition. New York: McGraw-Hill. 1946. $5.00.

Crow, John A. The Epic of Latin America. New Ycrk. Doubleday. 1946. $5.00. A book out­lining the political systems and distinctive cul­tural phases of each South American country before independence.

Fellman, David. Post-war Governments of Europe. Gainesville, Fla. Kallman Publ. Co. 1946. $1.50.

Fischer, Louis. The Great Challenge. New York: Ducll, Sloan & Pearce. 1946. $4.00. A thorough discussion of international affairs including the part played by Soviet Russia.

Ilirschman, Albert O. National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley, Calif. Uni­versity of California Press. 1946. $.3.00. Role of international trade in power politics.

Hoke, Henry. It’s a Secret. New York: Rcynal & Hitchcock. 1946. $2.50. Activities and back­ground of Fascist and Nazi agents who were accused of seditious activities during the second World War.

Hudson, Ralph G. An Introduction to Electronics. New York: Macmillan. 1946. $.3.00.

Ironside, R. N. Aviation Neuro-Psychiatry. Balti­more: Williams & Wilkins. 1946. $.3.00. Re­ports on psychiatric disorders of world fliers.

Jackson, Robert. The Case Against the Nasi War Criminals. New York: Knopf. 1946. $2.00.

Kahn, Ely J. McNair, Educator of an Army. Washington. Infantry Journal. 1946. $2.00. An informed statement of General McNair’s per­sonality and achievements.

Korf, Serge A. Electron and Nuclear Counters. New York: Van Nostrand. 1946. $3.00.

La Dagc, John. Stability and Trim for the Ship's Officer. New York: Van Nostrand. 1946. $.3.00.

Lawrence, William L. Dawn Over Zero; The Story of the Atomic Bomb. New York: Knopf. 1946. $.3.00.