Any history of the War of 1812 is incomplete without an evaluation of the role of William Jones, Secretary of the Navy during 1813 and 1814. Evidence obtained from Jones' personal papers, only recently available to the historian, indicates that Jones was active in precipitating the conflict, and that when war came he was the unifying ·and coordinating force which was perhaps the decisive weight in bringing to the Navy the considerable success it won.
In our wars, no other Secretary of the Navy has been confronted with odds so adverse as those faced by Jones. With inadequate facilities and forces he was expected to protect our shores from invasion; send our few but excellent frigates and sloops on commerce destroying cruises which would be both profitable and reasonably safe; map strategy and suggest tactics to the commanders on the lakes and oceans; and furnish personnel and materiel for all campaigns. And all this had to be done in the face of the greatest naval power of its day.
There were other handicaps. Jones labored for a country torn by partisan and sectional strife, whose military and naval establishments were in chaotic disorder; whose treasury was nearly empty; a country which had neither paper currency nor the specie with which to back one; a country whose credit was poorer than that of many of its wealthy citizens. And, furthermore, so lacking in qualified personnel was the party in power that Jones, in addition to the Navy secretaryship, was required to carry the heavy burdens of Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, when Gallatin was sent to Europe to take a place at the peace table.
Jones' efforts, in many instances, were checkmated by overwhelming enemy forces. The British, in overwhelming strength, entered Chesapeake Bay and burned Washington in what must correctly be termed a raid; and in 1814 they had apparently blockaded our ocean-going ships in our Atlantic ports, but that blockage had not been put to a serious test when the war ended. And Jones had drawn comprehensive plans to loose our ships during the stormy winter months of 1815.
Although Jones' administration had its failures, it also had its accomplishments. Our frigates, sloops, and privateers, sent on commerce destroying missions, forced the British to convoy merchantmen and pushed insurance rates sky-high; difficult and highly successful campaigns on the lakes secured our northern and western boundaries; supply, morale, and intelligence which before his regime had been neglected or left to chance were vastly improved; policies which have since been integrated into our naval system as essential elements were supported or originated.
Jones is to be commended particularly for his insistence on coordinated efforts within the Navy; for his efforts to develop effective combined operations by the Army and Navy; and for his encouragement of amphibious missions by the Navy-features conspicuous in our recent vast struggle. when they reached the peaks of magnitude and efficiency.
Jones' notable contributions to our naval war, when coupled with his important part in bringing that war about, are an essential part of the full story of the War of 1812, that desultory struggle which shaped our national economic, social, and political destiny.
William Jones was a native of Pennsylvania, and a resident of Philadelphia during much of his life. He fought in the Revolution, both on land and sea. Although family legend has it that a ship which he commanded captured a 32-gun British frigate, available records do not corroborate this story. It is quite certain that he captained at least two armed vessels during the Revolution and that he was taken prisoner.
After the Revolution Jones settled in Charleston, South Carolina, but the coastwise trading business in which he engaged languished. Socially, Jones seems to have enjoyed great success in Charleston. He became an officer of the aristocratic Charleston Battalion of Artillery; and at the balls and parties that graced the social calendar of the organization, Jones was equally at home on the dance floor, around the punch bowl, and in the gentlemen's smoking rooms. It was at this time that he began to develop important political sponsorship and became identified with the Francophile Republican opposition to the politically potent, pro-British Federalist party.
But Jones could not support himself in the kind of life he desired on the promises of a political minority nor on the proceeds of his Philadelphia-Charleston trading venture. This circumstance forced him to resign from the Charleston Artillery, sell his business interest, and return to Philadelphia. There, in 1795, he reestablished himself in commerce and extended his activities to include trade with the Orient.
A man of remarkably catholic interests and abilities, Jones, in Canton, China, in 1805, invented a light lead case to enclose the powder used in muzzle loading cannons. The lead cases worked perfectly in practice: they enabled a ship to protect its powder supply from some of the hazards of fire and dampness; they gave a much more rapid rate of fire; they controlled powder charges, a variable that greatly affected the accuracy of naval gunnery. The American Philosophical Society tested them and recommended their adoption by the Army and Navy, but this recommendation was never carried out.
During the decade preceding the War of 1812 Jones engaged in commerce in and out of Philadelphia and increased in wealth and prominence. He became active in politics and stood high in the counsels of the Republican party. An admirer, confidante, and correspondent of Jefferson and Madison, his anti-British feelings and his political associations led him into the ranks of those loudest in their demands for war against Britain.
He had no sympathy with the view that war with Britain would upset the balance of power in Europe to the extent that we need fear an attack by Napoleon, or that this country would be forced into the sphere of French domination. As he perceived the approach of the climax of the great European struggle, he urged early and determined war, saying in 1812 that if hostilities were not soon begun, it would be too late. He believed British aggressive potentialities against the United States to be infinitely more serious than those of France; and that, furthermore, Britain was the nation whose commerce we could harass by naval action and by trade competition on the Continent; whose territory was accessible to us, and whose resources we could damage more seriously.
As affairs moved toward a crisis, the war-hungry Republicans attempted to whip public sentiment to a fever pitch. In Baltimore, Jones' friend, General Sam Smith, promoted a mass meeting in which the aroused citizens loudly demanded war. The excitement aroused by this meeting resulted in a riot some time later, which caused the mayor to call out the militia. Shots were exchanged and much hard feeling was engendered between anti-British and pro-British factions. In Philadelphia, Jones was instrumental in bringing about a prototype of the Baltimore mass meeting. The assemblage adopted resolutions supporting Madison's policies, and the young Warhawks in Congress became more active than ever.
The Warhawks knew that the United States was ill-prepared for war, although they did not appreciate the almost unbelievable extent of this unpreparedness. They planned an organization of civil and military affairs which they hoped would withstand the pressure of war. There were several places in which Jones' talents could be utilized, and the one for which his name was mentioned from the start was that of Secretary of the Navy. That it was commonly believed that Jones would become Secretary is indicated by a letter from Lieutenant George Read, of the frigate United States, who wrote Jones in 1812 that he had seen in the papers that Jones was to be the new Secretary of the Navy. Read offered Jones congratulations and assured him of his willingness to do everything in his power to follow Jones' policies, but his letter was premature, for Jones was not to become Secretary for months.
Republican bigwigs had a less exciting post in mind. Dr. Richard Rush wrote in March, 1812, advising Jones of his nomination as Commissioner General of Purchases. When Jones received a transcript of the law outlining his responsibilities and powers he quickly declined the nomination, principally, he said, because of the heavy responsibilities and the disproportionally weak powers which would be allowed him.
Jones' disappointment at the post tendered him failed to diminish his ardor for war. He was in constant communication with the Republican leaders in both Congress and commerce. These latter, merchants for the most part, urged him to use his influence to have the embargo continued but to enable United States merchants to get their goods out of England- to temporize, permitting the British to ship goods here while we prepared for war.
Disregarding this pressure, he continued to advocate immediate hostilities, on the idealistic grounds that "... love of comfort, avarice and voluptuousness [were] destroying morals ...." Be believed that Madison and Gerry of New England could bring factious elements into line, and that insurgency would end once a definitive step were taken, when "all patriotic citizens would fly to the standards of the country"- an unreasonable expectation in view of the prevalent violent sectionalism and partisanship.
With his friend in Congress, Jonathan Roberts, he rejoiced that there was no deterioration in our relations with France, and he entered wholeheartedly into Roberts' campaign to unseat Secretary of War Eustis. Meanwhile, he continued to be available for the post he desired, the Navy Secretaryship.
In the autumn of 1812, Jones was finally offered the coveted position. He accepted with alacrity and immediately threw himself into his duties with enthusiasm and intelligence, excluding all private to "... public interests, for which [he] felt a degree of responsibility and solicitude unknown hitherto."
A few weeks after he became Secretary, Jones asked Congress for certain ships and departmental reorganization that presaged a change from the hitherto prevailing hit-or-miss system, and a bold departure from the ridiculous premise of challenging British sea power in encounters on the high seas. Jones built his strategy upon:
- Commercial warfare against English shipping, utilizing the Navy and the privateer fleet. Fast, light ships such as the Wasp and the Hornet to be built.
- Avoidance of actual combat upon the ocean, with its inevitable attrition of our forces.
- Building up of aggressive strength on the Great Lakes. Control of the Lakes, thus safeguarding the inland empire and forestalling attacks by the traditional routes.
- Raising to a high peak the morale and efficiency of the Navy.
Jones requested Congress for a purveyor's department, to relieve him of the burden of details connected with purchasing. This, he said, "... would free him for the great and effective objects of the establishment," in itself an admission that he saw in the Secretaryship functions comparable to those of a commanding admiral. And while he deemed further reorganization essential, he was of the opinion that it should wait for more propitious times.
He requested extra personnel: civilian office secretaries, ship captains, and other officers, to fill posts in the rapidly expanding bases of the Navy and to man its new ships. The crews of many of the Jeffersonian gunboats, craft which he deplored as worse than ineffectual, he intended· o send to the Lakes, where he had already ordered the building of three Hornet class corvettes. He anticipated additional construction "to control the Lakes." For the Atlantic service, he requested six Hornet class corvettes and ten sloops of the Wasp class.
Appreciating the need for a military amphibious force on the Lakes more reliable than the already infamous 1812 militia, Jones recommended maximum use of the United States Marine Corps. Later he gave the Corps great credit for its accomplishments in the Lakes Campaigns, where Marines manned the fighting tops of the fir frigates, fought in the rowing galleys, and performed other amphibious services of great value in the many cutting-out expeditions and raids.
To provide sufficient personnel, Jones, in January, 1814, requested an increase in the enlisted strength of the Corps, from 1,600 men to 2,500, promotions for veteran officers and men, salary increases and bounties that would place members of the corps on a par with Army personnel, and increased public recognition of the vital role of the Corps in our successes on the Lakes. All these recommendations were adopted by Congress.
Jones believed in the principle of the Naval Reserve, as is shown by his request for authority to grant temporary commissions in both Lakes and Atlantic services. Officers with such commissions were few in number, and had generally been restricted in their service to the areas around New York and Chesapeake Bay, where navigation hazards made it necessary that the Navy utilize men familiar with the local waters. Such appointments were not without precedent, and Jones was authorized to grant commissions to eligible men.
In answer to an inquiry from the House Naval Affairs Committee, Jones gave the enlisted strength of the Navy as 10,000 men. The terms of service, he said, made it difficult to give a strictly accurate total of the muster rolls at any time. Recruiting for Lakes service was particularly slow, as there was small expectation of receiving prize money, and hardships of all kinds were sure to be encountered.
When the first American frigate victories of the war were announced, enthusiasm led to the ill-advised laying down of 74-gun ships and additional frigates. Jones was opposed to this extravagant use of our slender resources, and diverted materials from the 74's and frigates to the construction of sloops and corvettes. He pointed out in his report to President Madison in December, 1813, that the Navy had purchased no timber for a number of years for the frigate General Greene, which had been building for a decade. With the outbreak of war, Congress had appropriated $25,000 for the timber for the revival of building operations on this and other half-built large ships. These hulks were useless, in Jones' opinion, and the timber was better utilized in 16-gun schooners of the Chesapeake Bay design and 22- gun sloops of the Wasp class, the latter for commerce raiding, the former for carrying supplies and ordnance coastwise and for raiding.
In justification of his attitude on building large ships, Jones pointed out the restricting influence of the available supplies of suitable oak and pine for large ships' timbers. Material for the large 74's and frigates was hard enough to obtain in peacetime, he said, and in wartime nearly impossible forget. On the other hand, lumber adapted to the building of sloops and schooners was available nearby in large quantities, and the smaller ships could be built in three months.
Jones' recommendations were followed in the main. No more large ships were projected, although work on those under construction was continued. A number of famous sloops were built, notably, Wasp, Frolic, Peacock, Ontario, and Erie, and a number of schooners were added to the Navy rolls.
Lacking an income suited to his needs, Jones' spending habits soon placed him in financial straits. Thus, as early as July, 1813, he wrote to his brother-in-law, asking him to obtain an extension on a note for $2,000.00 Jones owed, saying "... my personal resources are exhausted." This unfortunate financial vulnerability and his nationwide popularity were no doubt factors in his later acceptance of the post of President of the Bank of the United States.
Jones seems to have worked out matters of broad policy with President Madison and Representatives Lowndes and Gaillard of the House Naval Affairs Committee, but his leadership within his department was personal and forceful. Virtually every detail of provisioning, supplying, arming, manning, and strategic direction of the naval forces he directed himself.
Accustomed to the unabashed rapaciousness of the politics of his times, Jones sometimes did things quite openly which nowadays would bring down on his head the criticism of the opposing party. For example, he directed Dr. Barton, at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, to procure his drugs and other medical supplies from a Philadelphia concern which was owned by relatives of Jones' wife. To Jones' credit, he made the proviso that quality and price should equal that of competitors. He was constantly plagued by recalcitrant or inefficient aides; thus when George Harrison, Navy Agent at Philadelphia, held up payment of bills to drug firms and to other Navy Department-approved houses, Jones was forced to obtain compliance by peremptory command. This same George Harrison was dilatory in making payments of chief petty officer's and seaman's family allotments. On this score Jones upbraided him, saying, "Being sanctioned ... orders go unpaid and families in want and my letters unanswered. I paid the wife of the chief petty officer of the Perseverance the amount of her order."
Because of the insufficient number of clerks and assistants, Jones had to attend to many of these small details himself. Thus, fragments of memoranda from his desk indicate that in a few days in September, 1813, he directed addition of 15 inches to the length and 10 inches to the beam of the sloop Adams, building, making her dimensions 143 feet, 4 inches, by 45 feet; he acceded to a request from a Mrs. Dulany that her son be detached from the Constitution at Norfolk and be sent to sea with Captain Ridgely on his sloop; and he received and overruled a protest from Bainbridge objecting to Jones' transfer of CPO's and WO's from his crew to Sackett's Harbor to man the growing fleet there. An interesting reaction to Jones' perhaps dictatorial rule was expressed by Bainbridge, who complained that it is "... exceedingly difficult for the Navy Department to attend to the minutiae of appointments," a view which, if held by Jones, might have lost the battle of Lake Erie. On another occasion Midshipman Farragut and others wrote Jones of waste and unmilitary actions on certain vessels. To the commanders of these ships Jones sent terse orders, "... investigate and stop."
Jones was strongly opposed to the practice of giving or accepting challenges for ship-to-ship duels with the enemy. American captains, because of their considerable success in single ship actions, were loath to pass up opportunities for glory, and it must be remembered that naval heroes of the War of 1812 were acclaimed as were few naval heroes of our recent wars. Obviously, the end result of continuance of this practice- a relic of chivalry-would have been the wiping out of the American Navy. To give weight to his order forbidding these duels, Jones issued it in the name of President Madison.
Even before he became Secretary, Jones had exerted considerable influence in at least one campaign- that of Bainbridge and Porter in 1812-13:
Bainbridge's command, in the fall of 1812, included the Constitution, Essex, and Hornet. Although thi3 little squadron was ready for sea, Bainbridge had received no orders giving specific instructions as to cruising grounds or strategy. In his anxiety to make the best possible cruise, Bainbridge turned to Jones for advice and received a detailed plan for interfering with British shipping in the South Atlantic and South Pacific. This plan, adopted by Bainbridge, was followed as closely as the exigencies of war would permit. It resulted in the Constitution's defeat of H.M.S. Java, and Porter's historic cruise with the Essex which smashed British shipping in the South Pacific.
Later, when he became Secretary, Jones issued similar detailed orders to commanders of ocean forces. As is normal in war, some carefully planned cruises were fruitless, but others were highly successful, such as Blakeley's with the second Wasp.
Jones charted a commerce raiding cruise for the Wasp with great exactness, specifying the cruising grounds in degrees of latitude and longitude, and the time to be spent in each locality in days. The voyage was to take in the English and Irish coasts, refitting at Lorient, and a return voyage to Cayenne from Madeira.
Jones said that he had such confidence in the qualities of the Wasp that he felt a brilliant cruise was in prospect. He warned Blakeley not to attempt to send in prizes except under the most favorable circumstances and near a friendly coast. Blakely was ordered to destroy all captures, with exceptions as mentioned, and the acceptance or giving of challenges was expressly forbidden.
The Wasp left Portsmouth May 1, 1814, with a crew of 173 men - not a foreign seaman aboard. She cruised in the English Channel, burning and scuttling many ships, and June 28-29 she fought and defeated H.M.S. Reindeer in a celebrated action. After sinking her prize, she sailed for Lorient, arriving there July 8.
Having refitted there, Blakeley enlisted new crewmen from American privateers, and August 27 the Wasp sailed again. The first three days out she captured two ships. Then, September 1, she came upon a Gibraltar- bound convoy, protected by a 74-gun ship-of-the-line. The wisdom of Jones' advocacy of sloops then became apparent. The Wasp sailed in and around the convoy, always eluding the 74. She succeeded in cutting out and burning a ship laden with valuable ordnance and ammunition, then four sails hove in sight. Selecting one, Blakeley headed straight for it, and, as night fell, came upon H.M.S. Avon. Battle commenced at 9:30 P.M., and within 30 minutes the A von surrendered. Another warship hove down upon the Wasp, but shortly after opening fire turned back to rescue the crew of the sinking Avon.
The Wasp then stood to southward and took and scuttled two prizes. September 21 she captured the brig Atlanta at 33° 12' N. latitude, 14° 56' W. longitude. The prize was valuable and the odds were not too great, so she was sent to Savannah and arrived there November 4. On October 19 the Wasp stopped the Swedish brig Adonis and took out Lieutenant McKnight and Mr. Lyman, late officers of the U.S.S. Essex. That was the last heard of the Wasp; no one knows what happened to her, but it is certain that she was wisely conceived, ably directed, and skillfully fought.
Every cruise made during 1813-14 followed such detailed orders as Blakeley's, and the results were certainly better than would have resulted had the ships been allowed to circulate at will, accepting challenges and striving for the capture and sale of prizes. It is possible, however, that instructions such as these led to the later adverse reaction of some higher officers when Jones submitted his plan for reorganization of the Navy Department late in 1814, for such a good friend as Bainbridge then objected to the power possible to be exerted by a Secretary of the Navy who would lack the ability of Jones.
When Jones made the happy choice of Commodore Barney to the command of the naval forces around Washington, including the miserable Jeffersonian gunboats, the proponents of one Samuel Taylor, an unsuccessful candidate, raised a loud hullabaloo. Taylor himself published a scurrilous attack on Jones in the Georgetown Federal Republican of September 7, 1813. This he followed with a challenge to a duel. Barney then called Taylor out, fought him, and seriously wounded him. Thanks to Barney's good aim, the Secretary of the Navy was spared the ignominy of defending his public acts on the Washington dueling grounds.
Recognizing the importance of American control of Lake Erie, Jones sent Oliver Hazard Perry orders directing him to proceed to Erie, assume the command of Lieutenant Elliot, then seize control of all the waters between Lake Erie and Lake Superior, and reduce the enemy forts at St. Joseph and Michelmackinack. Perry was to open an immediate correspondence with the military commander at Detroit and request transfer to his naval force of 300 hardy volunteers, half riflemen, who would serve as marines. Jones ordered Perry to break up British movement of supplies and ordnance from York to Gloucester Bay, which was their building and fitting-out headquarters, and to interfere with ship building at the Erie end of Lake Superior, by expeditions to raid and occupy York and Gloucester Bay, as well as St. Joseph and Michelmackinack.
Disciplinary difficulties had been numerous in the service on the Lakes. Insubordination and quarrels among the officers and men were frequent, probably as a result of the rigors of the service and the lack of opportunity to make prize money. On cine occasion an officer had pushed a man, presumably a civilian, overboard and the man drowned. Jones ordered Perry to put a stop to all such conduct, and directed that the officer be turned over to the civilian authorities. Other officers contributing to the disorders were to be arrested and tried by court martial Lieutenant Elliot was to be transferred to Lake Ontario, and pay of seamen and officers on the Lakes was to be raised, that of seamen to $15 per month.
Two ships, the Queen Charlotte and the Detroit, had been wrecked outside the harbor of Erie. These vessels were too deep in draft to negotiate the bar, but Lieutenant Elliot had requisitioned large sums of money and supplies of stores, evidently to refit the vessels. Jones ordered Perry immediately to put a stop to that business and secure them with the available mechanics, stores, and money, using captured and our own ordnance, but not to waste time on them and not to count on them. However, he was to keep the enemy from recovering the ships. Jones pointed out that if the hulls were empty, they could be brought over the bar at Erie by careening them and raising them between two small vessels first filled with water and them pumped out, an expedient later used by Perry in the battle at Lake Erie. These particular ships, however, were taken by the British and later fought against Perry in the battle of Lake Erie.
In all the building and repairing Perry was to keep in mind that the Lake fleet was for temporary use only, that it was expensive to maintain at best, and that he was to use plain, solid, rough equipment, avoiding unnecessary expense for that which in the Atlantic service was costly but necessary.
Perry succeeded in executing all of Jones' orders, with minor exceptions resulting from the efforts of an enterprising enemy. He controlled the waters of the lakes, he restored order and discipline among the troops and sailors, he reduced the British forts at several of the places ordered, and destroyed the enemy forces on the Lake. His everlasting fame in American history is based not only on his enterprise and skill, but also on the ability and willingness he showed in carrying out the orders of his superior in the Navy Department.
At the beginning of the Hudson River-Great Lakes campaigns, Jones made a survey of the Hudson River valley as an avenue for military and naval supply. This waterway Jones thought to be the best, both for supply purposes and for defense of the building and repairing facilities that he had in mind installing there.
On Lake Ontario there was no such cooperation as on Lake Erie, and but little enterprise or skill. General Wilkinson reported from Oswego. September 1, 1813, advising Jones of the progress of the campaign on Lake Ontario, where Commodore Chauncey commanded the fleet of freshwater ships of the Navy, and Wilkinson commanded the Army. Wilkinson, whose military reputation had long been tarnished, told Jones in his usual flamboyant style that Chauncey was shortly to become the most distinguished naval commander of the country. However, despite Wilkinson's glowing praise, reports of continued inaction on the part of the fleet there caused Jones great apprehension. Perry's decisive victory on Lake Erie was not matched by any such decisive action on Ontario, although Chauncey did gain several partial victories. One of the excuses presented for his failure to destroy the British fleet there was his ill health.
Finally losing patience, June 28, 1814, Jones wrote to Stephen Decatur on board the U.S.S. President in New York harbor, issuing orders for Decatur to proceed to Sackett's Harbor. If the squadron there should still be in port, and Commodore Chauncey disqualified from exercising command by reason of ill health, Decatur was to present the confidential order to Chauncey and assume command of the fleet. Upon doing this he was to carry into effect the designs of the campaign in that quarter. Jones explained the objectives of the campaign to Decatur, which, in essence, were to control the lake and destroy the enemy, and left to his general judgment and discretion the means of attaining them.
To Jones the only course to follow required action: the defeat of the British squadron and the gaining of absolute command of the lake. Otherwise the British would add to their fleet the line-of-battle ship they were building, and would force the American squadron on the defensive, a course so close to defeat in its ultimate consequences that Jones could not draw any distinction.
If the British should evade action, Jones directed Decatur to shut off all communication with the upper end of the lake and institute a blockade, using both ships and boats. Regardless of the course he was to select in attaining the aims of the campaign, Jones insisted that Decatur at all times cooperate with the Army, adding that the character of the war on the Lakes required a peculiar degree of joint operations of the naval and military forces. Said Jones:
“… You will on all occasions, with the utmost and perfect harmony, combine with the movements of the Army all the aid and effect which the nature of your force and the important naval objects which have been explained to you will admit. You will judge the propriety and expedience of any particular mode of cooperation with a special view to the safety of the fleet, the nature of the navigation, and the elements, whose violence and caprice on that lake have scarcely a parallel anywhere.”
It is to be conjectured that Chauncey must have heard of his impending demotion, for his health suddenly improved and the orders of Jones to Decatur never became effective. Decatur remained in command of the U.S.S. President until her unfortunate attempt to run the gauntlet of British ships blockading her at New York in December, 1814, and Chauncey and British Commodore Yeo continued their indecisive naval race. Although American forces generally dominated the Lake, a clear-cut victory was never achieved. It is evident, however, that Jones grasped the situation, and but for the improvement in Chauncey's health, Decatur might have gained for the country a duplicate of Perry's victory on Lake Erie and MacDonough's on Lake Champlain.
After Perry, Chauncey, and Elliot had established our dominion over the Great Lakes, the British attempted another invasion of the United States, via the traditional land and water route to the Hudson River Valley. This invasion was apparently earmarked for success. The British army under General Prevost included 11,000 veterans of Continental warfare, and it was supported by a fleet under Captain Downie that was to enter Lake Champlain and secure the rear of the army with frigates which had been made on frames brought from England.
Opposing the British were General Macomb with 2,000 men, at Plattsburg, and Commodore Thomas MacDonough, on Lake Champlain, with a small fleet of hastily constructed fir ships. The Delaware-born MacDonough at this time had not distinguished himself, but he had served under Chauncey on Lake Ontario. Jones considered him the most experienced lake warfare expert available, when he placed him in 1813 at the head of our naval forces on Lake Champlain. There MacDonough was to augment his fleet, to match the British at Isle-aux-Noyes, control the Lake, and thwart any possible invasion. In this campaign Jones recommended to MacDonough the row gallies or gunboats that ordinarily he despised, because he realized their peculiar advantages for the small-lake warfare.
During the latter part of 1813 and early 1814 there had been considerable skirmishing on Lake Champlain, but in August, 1814, serious warfare opened. Prevost crossed the border and advanced on Plattsburg. Jones immediately advised MacDonough of the situation and gave him discretionary powers as to the plan he should follow to defeat Downie's fleet when it came down the Lake, specifying only that the enemy be defeated in the action that was expected in early September.
President Madison nervously asked Jones, then under pressure because he had, quite properly, set fire to the Washington Navy Yard when the British took Washington, what steps he had taken to secure the Lake Frontier. To this question Jones was able to say that he had the utmost confidence in MacDonough, that the latter had been apprised of the threat, and that he had been given broad discretion in the way he should fight.
MacDonough overwhelmed Downie in a unique battle fought at anchor in which the gunboats figured prominently, as well as bombs (grenades), rockets, and small arms fire. Since he could not control Lake Champlain, Prevost was forced to abandon his expedition.
This victory was of the greatest importance in the peace negotiations, preventing, as it did, any valid British claim to the rich upper New York regions. Furthermore, had MacDonough lost. Prevost's fate might have been as glorious as it was ignominious.
When the Americans planned an offensive into Canada in 1914, most of Jones' colleagues were enthusiastic; however, Jones was skeptical of the value of such expeditions to the Nation and the war effort. The distances involved, requiring transportation of great quantities of war materials hundreds of miles by team and boat, over wilderness roads and tempestuous lakes, through territory open to depredations of the Indians and the British, made the chance of failure too great. Furthermore, casualties from both disease and battle would be out of proportion to those the Nation, disunited as it was on the war question, could possibly afford. Jones also distrusted the militia system forced on the Army, and the leadership provided by the Army, which with but few exceptions had been poor or mediocre at best. This lax military organization, Jones complained, had time and again left such important Navy supply bases as Sackett's Harbor and Oswego wide open to the attacks of the enterprising British.
Our role on the Lakes he viewed as offensively defensive, with the aim of achieving naval control of the Lakes and assuring military defense of the gaps between the Lakes. He informed Madison of these views in May, 1814, at the same time assuring the President of his complete and unequivocal support of any plans decided upon.
In March, 1914, Jones made his long deliberated report on the Navy and the Navy Department. This reiterated the aim of relieving the Secretary of the burden of small details of administration that prevented his devoting as much time as possible to what we would now call grand strategy, policy, and broad administration. This he intended to accomplish by means of a Naval Purveyor's Office, which should be situated, not in Washington, but at some port close to the center of naval activity. The activities of this group he intended to be checked by naval inspectors, while another group, a board composed of the Secretary and the highest ranking officers of the Navy, would act as a general staff. Another innovation was the recommendation of a naval academy for the training of midshipmen to fill the officer ranks of the Navy. Although it is true that these suggestions were not original with him - they had been made previously in 1795 and 1798 - they had never been given the stress which Jones, because of his great influence and popularity in a nation newly conscious of its naval power, was able to give them. Many officers of high rank were questioned by the members of a congressional committee regarding their attitudes on this proposed legislation. All the officers quoted in the American State Papers favored the proposed legislation in principle, but all objected to one or more of the features. All recognized the need for some improvement in organization, against the time when the Navy Department would be headed by a civilian not possessing the maritime and naval abilities of the then present Secretary. The great increase in interest in naval affairs and the expansion in the size of the navy made it important that some changes be made, but Congress was loath to make as many drastic changes as were indicated in the Jones' report. The Navy Board, later expanded into the present system of bureaus, came into existence, improvements in the supply system were made, and better supervision of repair and building facilities was provided, but the steps taken fell short of the recommendations of Jones.
The Naval Academy was not forthcoming for many years, the powers of the Naval Board were less than those asked, and another request, made independently of the report, for authorization to commission officers in the rank of rear admiral, and eventually as vice admiral and admiral, was not favorably viewed. Nevertheless, the impetus provided for these improvements led to their eventual acceptance.
Jones contributed to our keeping our natural boundaries on the North. Also, under him, American seapower was greatly augmented.
It may well be said that Jones anticipated much of this nation's later-developed philosophy of naval war, with its emphasis on combined operations, firepower, commerce destruction, development of distant bases, use of marine infantry, and assignment of specific tasks to fleets built, manned, outfitted, and made up for the task at hand. Americans should honor him for his leadership in a time of great national peril.