No one would ever dream of holding a warm African breeze responsible for the next Dardanelles Straits Convention. Nevertheless, here is the background on a trouble spot which, while it is glowing red, shall never burst into open war if words are given a chance first. So long as men adhere to the principles of the United Nations Organization there shall never be a naval battle in the Dardanelles zone.
It all began when the receding of the Last Ice Age projected its influence into the future; our present day political affairs and foreign policies are now feeling that influence. With the melting of the frigid sheath of ice over Europe, the water level in the gigantic landlocked lake we call the Black Sea began to rise. Southward across the comparatively narrow stretch of land connecting Asia Minor with Greece started a trickle of water. The trickle became a stream, then a river, and every cascading ton of water bit deeper and deeper until there were formed the Straits of the Dardanelles—some 42 miles long, varying in width from 1,400 yards to 5 miles.
Another phenomenon set in which resembles the political movements in Europe today. The water in the Straits divided itself into two layers. There is an upper current of fresh water, aided by southerly winds for ten months of the year, rushing from the Black Sea which tries to permeate the entire Mediterranean Sea. Underneath, as if bitter over the experience, is a current of salt water returning to the Black Sea.
Then deep in Asia a population began shifting west and southward; in 658 B.C. a band of wanderers from Megara established the village of Byzantium at the Black Sea entrance to the Straits. In 200 A.D., and again a thousand years later, there was another westward movement. In the first group were Seljuk Turks who centered their civilization along the Dardanelles, and a part of the second group were the Ottoman Turks who settled among the Seljuks and eventually displaced them.
Paralleling this, a small nation, now named Georgia, began to form between the Empire of the Ottoman Turks and the Persians. Sometime in the early 300’s A.D., Byzantium became Constantinople, and in the latter part of the same century a capital was built in the central part of Georgia called Tifiis which was to be the birthplace of a man so closely connected with the state of affairs now overshadowing the Dardanelles. Becoming tired of encroachments upon his realm, the King of Georgia asked for protection from the Russians in 1783 and again in 1799. What started as protection ended as expansion; on September 12, 1801, the double headed eagle of Russia was perched atop the capital of Georgia gazing grimly in both directions—at Turkey on the west and at Iran on the east; but Turkey wasn’t too worried, for she had been staring at one or the other of those hooked beaks since 865 A.D. However, it was the year 1711 that launched the two growing nations into a series of more wars, peace treaties, and mutual agreements than a single individual can keep track of. Sometimes the two heads of the Black Eagle shrilled victoriously, at other times the thirsty scimitar dripped bloodily for years; and in every peace treaty, freedom of passage through the Dardanelles took first place on the agenda.
From 1841 to 1914 other nations began taking an interest in who guarded the Dardanelles. Some of them governed by principles of one kind or another, and some of them because of forethought based on distrust, guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire in order to insure the opening or closing of the Straits of the Dardanelles—whichever promised the greatest good for the greatest number. As an example of this fluctuating, when Turkey was weak, Russia stressed the closing of the Straits; when Turkey was strong, Russia pressed for opening the Straits.
Following World War I and the Russian Revolution, Lenin bettered Russo-Turkish relations during the struggle between Enver Pasha and Kemal Pasha in 1921 by giving the latter arms and funds; then he followed this with aid in the war on Greece. On March 6, 1921, Russia partially emerged from its shell, to the extent of concluding an agreement with Kemal Pasha to call a convocation for settling the Straits question once and for all. The Treaty of Lausanne with its Straits Convention opened the Straits to all nations, and provided for their demilitarization and their control by an international commission. Lenin also renounced all claims to Turkish territory. Shortly after that an historic change took place in Russia. Just a little more than twelve decades from the date that Georgia gave up its sovereignty to become part of Russia, the son of a modest and respectable shoemaker, named Djugashvilli, born in Tiflis, became the powerful leader of Russia under the new name of “Stalin.” This man declared he would follow the principles laid down by Lenin.
The Lausanne agreements were unsatisfactory, but proved adequate as long as things stayed on an even keel. Mussolini was the first to upset the balance of a comparatively peaceful Europe as he went slashing into Ethiopia. Bulgaria and Austria, in turn, eyed the antics of a paperhanger in Germany and began drawing blueprints for bigger guns. Hitler’s denunciation of the Locarno Pact tipped the scales; and Turkey, on April 11, 1936, dashed off notes to Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, Rumania, Russia, and Yugoslavia. The nations, except for Italy, gathered somewhat pessimistically at Montreux, Switzerland, on June 22, 1936, to try once more to bolster their hopes with pen and ink.
Turkey arrived with proposals which she thought would disperse the danger clouds that had hovered over the Dardanelles for some 2000 years. The debaters howled themselves hoarse on some of the questions and passed others with such facility and ease that a celebration all around was called for. On July 20, the Convention emerged with a document which would have lasted until 1956 but for the fact that certain populations who had arrived from Asia hadn’t lost their wanderlust in the intervening centuries and still wanted to roam.
In keeping with the trend of world events, a special protocol attached to the Montreux agreements authorized Turkey to remilitarize the Straits. This she proceeded to do at once.
Regulations were adopted concerning the passage of merchant vessels: in time of peace they were to enjoy complete freedom of transit by day or night under any flag and with any cargo; in time of war, with Turkey a non-belligerent, merchant vessels under any flag or with any cargo were to “enjoy freedom of transit and navigation.” Thus states Article 4. In time of war, with Turkey a belligerent, merchant vessels which did not belong to a country at war with Turkey were to “enjoy freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits on condition that they do not in any way assist the enemy.” Such ships, however, according to Article 5, must enter the Straits by day and follow a route indicated by the Turkish Government. Article 6 deals with the situation when Turkey considers herself “threatened with imminent danger of war." In that case, the ordinary provisions of Article 2, with respect to passage in time of peace, continued in force but merchant vessels must enter the Straits by day and follow a transit route laid out by Turkey.
Since it involved the security of Turkey as well as the Black Sea powers, passage of warships into and through the Straits was discussed at great length, and every word of Articles 8 to 22 was scrutinized thoroughly before being passed.
Article 8 outlined the definitions of warships and their specifications as set down in the London Naval Treaty of March 25,1936. In reading over the specifications it is at once evident that every means was used to bar the then-new pocket battleships of the German navy.
General Rules for Transit (Article 13) state that transit of warships through the Straits is to be preceded by notification to the Turkish Government through diplomatic channels, fifteen days ahead of time for nonlittoral powers and a mere eight days for Black Sea powers. The maximum tonnage for all foreign naval forces in transit through the Straits was not to exceed 15,000 tons (Article 14). Black Sea powers, according to Article 11, could send through capital ships of greater tonnage than 15,000 provided they “pass through the Straits singly, escorted by not more than two destroyers.”
No provisions were made for the passage of submarines belonging to non-Black Sea states; however, those of Black Sea powers were entitled to pass through the Straits for repair outside Black Sea ports provided that detailed information regarding the matter was handed to the Turkish Government, and that the submarines (Article 12) travel by day on the surface and pass through singly.
The total tonnage permitted non-littoral states inside the Black Sea at any one time was limited to 30,000 tons unless the Russian Black Sea Fleet should be increased by 10,000 tons. This would advance the nonlittoral tonnage on a sliding scale to a maximum of 45,000 tons. In any case, naval vessels in transit were not to comprise more than nine vessels.
Far-seeing diplomats were responsible for Article 15, which in effect stated that under no circumstances were warships allowed to make use of any aircraft which they might be carrying while in transit through the Straits. However, civil aircraft were taken care of in Article 23 which stipulated that civil aircraft whose route carried them over the area must follow the lane designated by the Turkish Government after the Government had been notified in advance.
Turkey may or may not have had something special in mind when Article 17 was discussed: this stated that nothing in the Convention was to prevent a naval force of any tonnage or composition from paying a courtesy visit of limited duration to a port in the Straits at the invitation of the Turkish Government.
Great Britain included a thought for suffering humanity in her agenda and demanded entry for warships for “humanitarian purposes.” The privileges were outlined in Article 18; and Turkey, while admitting she trusted Great Britain not to use the Article as a blind for moving excessive tonnage into the Black Sea, required the incorporation of sentences which stipulated that should Turkey consider the Black Sea already congested, then the Black Sea powers were to be consulted before such ships were permitted entrance. Also, if a State demanding entry already had her quota of tonnage in the Sea, or if the ships desiring entrance would raise the allotment above the prescribed amount, Turkey would inform the Black Sea powers and request a decision on the matter. Further, she wanted her answer in twenty-four hours—and no stalling. If no objections arrived in that time, then the ships went through the Straits.
One of the most bitterly fought issues was the status of warships in time of war, with Turkey a non-belligerent. The settlement was a compromise in which the Straits would be closed to all belligerent vessels except those sent by the League of Nations or acting under a regional pact to which Turkey was a party. This provision did not prohibit Russia or other Black Sea powers from leaving the Black Sea, nor did it stop the fleets of belligerent littoral powers from returning to home ports. Non-belligerent warships, under Articles 10 to 18, according to Article 19, were to enjoy freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits.
In time of War, with Turkey a belligerent, Article 20 provides that Articles 10 to 18 do not apply; the passage of warships is “left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government.” Turkey under threat of war may also bring Article 20 into force, but it must at the same time notify the signatories of the Convention and the Secretary General of the League of Nations.
While acting under fear of war and having closed the Straits, Turkey must permit warships which have passed through before the discretionary powers were put into action, to return to their bases. In this connection there is a peculiar double-edged Article bearing the number “21,” under which Turkey may “deny this right to vessels of war belonging to the State whose attitude has given rise to the application of the present article.”
This brings us to one of the many anachronisms behind the contention at Potsdam that a new Straits Convention was necessary to bring the regulations up to date, especially the articles dealing with the League of Nations. Harry N. Howard, writing in the Department of State Bulletin, brings out one of the examples: “If the Turkish Government makes use of these powers (Article 21), it is provided in the article that it should notify both the high contracting parties of the Convention and the Secretary General of the League of Nations. If the Council of the League of Nations, by a two-thirds majority, decide that the measure taken by Turkey was not justified, and if this opinion was shared by a majority of the high contracting parties, the Turkish Government agreed ‘to discontinue the measures in question’ as to the passage of warships, and also to discontinue any measures which may have been undertaken in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 which apply to the passage of merchant vessels.”
The Montreux Convention was to remain in force for 20 years, although at the end of five year periods any signatory might propose amendments through diplomatic channels. Should the proposed amendment fail to be accepted, a Convention was to be summoned. Unanimity was necessary for revision of the Convention except for Articles 14 to 18 dealing with restrictions on the passage of non-littoral warships. Revision of these articles might be accomplished by a three-fourths majority comprising the Black Sea powers and Turkey (Article 28-29).
The principle of freedom expressed in the First Article of the Convention, however, was to have unlimited duration, and in short declared that the high contracting parties recognize and affirm “the principles of freedom of transit and navigation by sea in the Straits.” (Article 23 of the Lausanne Treaty included the words “by air” also—note the difference.)
Through the Montreux Convention, the Soviet Union of 1936 gained practically complete freedom of passage into and out of the Mediterranean Sea for its Black Sea Fleet, something that Czarist Russia never possessed. It was hoped for many years that the method adopted by Turkey and the success it achieved would tend to discourage other European states from following Nazi Germany’s path. The London Times said, “So ends an international conference which it is hoped will set an example to all states desiring a revision of treaties to which they have been parties ... it is only a beginning of the more extensive and more difficult process of seeking and ensuring peace by negotiation which will have to be undertaken if Europe is not to return to the old and dangerous system of rival alliances.”
The American Government was not present at Montreux, but it was agreed at Potsdam in August, 1945, that we should have a voice in the settlement of future Dardanelles questions. At Potsdam, Russia as well as Great Britain and the United States recognized that the Convention on the Straits concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present day conditions, and in a protocol it was further agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversation between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government. However, one nation has somewhat divergent views on the subject.
In submitting her views for changes to Great Britain, the United States, and Turkey, the Soviet Union proposed, as did the others, that (1) the Straits must always be open to the passage of merchant vessels of all countries; (2) the Straits must always be open to the passage of warships of the powers neighboring on the Black Sea; (3) the passage through the Straits of warships of States not neighboring on the Black Sea shall not be permitted with the exception of especially provided cases.
In general, all these provisions are now in existence and are similar to those advanced by the United States and Great Britain, but there the similarity stops in its tracks. Russia’s fourth and fifth proposals fly off at a tangent with respect to principles of the United Nations: (4) the establishment of the Straits as the only passage from the Black Sea and to the Black Sea must be the responsibility of Turkey and other Black Sea powers; (5) Turkey and the Soviet Union, as states which must be interested and he able to guarantee the freedom of merchant fleet navigation and security in the Straits, will by joint means (guarantee) the defense of the Straits and the prevention of the use of the Straits by other states which arc hostile to the Black Sea powers.
The United States does not desire to interfere with the claims of Russia for freedom of navigation nor does it wish to see those rights hampered by a unilateral action of Turkey, but international observers are looking askance at those last two proposals. The Soviet Union has neither reason nor the right to expect attack; so our own assertion on the matter was, “This Government has given careful study to the views expressed. ... It would appear from a comparison of this Government’s note of November 2, 1945, with the Soviet note to the Turkish Government of August 7, 1946, that the views of the Government of the United States and of the Soviet Union while not in entire accord are in general agreement.”
The note repeats the first three proposals set forth in the Soviet note and then continues, “The fourth proposal set forth in the Soviet note does not appear to envisage a revision of the Montreux Convention as suggested in our note . . . but rather an establishment of a new regime which would be confined to Turkey and the other Black Sea powers. It is the view of this Government that the regime of the Straits is a matter of concern not only to the Black Sea powers but also to other powers, including the United States. This Government cannot therefore agree with the Soviet view that the establishment of the regime of the Straits should come under the competence of the Black Sea powers to the exclusion of other powers.
“The fifth proposal set forth in the note of the Soviet Government was that Turkey and the Soviet Union should organize joint means of defense of the Straits. It is the firm opinion of this Government that Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits. Should the Straits become the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor, the resulting situation would constitute a threat to international security and would clearly be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council.
“It is observed that the note of the Soviet Government contains no reference to the United Nations. The position of the Government of the United States is that the regime of the Straits should be brought into appropriate relationship with the United Nations and should function in a manner consistent with the principles and aims of the United Nations.”
Many years before the Montreux Convention, during the Lausanne Conference, M. Georgia Chicgerin, Soviet representative, asserted, “Before, we had a Czarist Russia with aggressive ambitions that were a constant menace to Turkey and to peace. Now we have a Soviet Russia which has renounced all imperialistic aims and which is inspired by friendly and fraternal feelings. ...”
Neal Stanford, astute correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, after reading Russia’s fourth and fifth proposals, decided that the Dardanelles question had far greater implications than appeared on the surface because of the Soviet’s surprising demands for military and naval bases in an area she could very easily cover with an air force of moderate size. He went into a huddle with some of his military friends and came out with, “Defense of the Straits or any piece of territory, for that matter, does not depend today on any construction of a fort or two here and there. Defense requires depth, authority, and power. For the Soviet to share in any defense of the Straits that would be realistic, Russia would have to occupy Turkish territory.”
In this connection, Premier Recep Peker, of Turkey, declared, “We are bound in this matter by international agreements. So above all we must defend and safeguard our soil and sovereignty. This is our unchangeable view.”
Many strange phenomena have been born in the so-called Dark Continent, but none were, perhaps, as intangible as the warm breeze that ages ago melted a glacier blanketing Europe and touched off a chain of events whose influence now embraces the naval and political affairs of the entire globe.