This cold and colorless statement gained neither warmth nor color by its frequent repetition, almost unaltered in expression, in countless war communiques. Few persons were concerned about small merchant vessels and trawlers. Fewer were impressed. Yet behind these bare words, repeated day after day, lay the brilliant completion of a mission, an accomplishment unparalleled in the history of military and naval aviation.
The aviators and aircrewmen of the Navy’s patrol bombing squadrons might be said to have deserved more and received less public recognition than any other tactical group of naval personnel. Even the submariners, during the war a completely “silent service,” have emerged in their true light. Not so the patrol crews; they are still largely unknown and unsung.
A few recall the breath-taking forays of the late “Bus” Miller and his famous Liberator, Thunder Mug. More recently the spectacular flight of the P2V Truculent Turtle from Australia to Ohio has focused some attention on the Navy’s patrol aviation. These flights, together with the starry statements about “Old Faithful,” the PBY Catalina, just about measure the extent of our patrol aviation in the minds of most citizens. Unfortunately large numbers of military personnel are no better informed. To a public accustomed to daring carrier task-force strikes and thundering multi-Fortress bombing raids, the sinking of this small merchant vessel off southern Kyushu had no significance at all. Few bothered to realize that it happened every day, that during every twenty-four hour period thousands of miles of enemy coastline and hundreds of enemy vessels were under constant surveillance by Navy search planes, usually alone, flying—day in and day out— search sectors which kept them in the air twelve to sixteen hours, seeking out the enemy, reporting his movements, and destroying what they could. To the crews who manned these planes, the dangers, the hardships and the wearisome work of war were brought home with an impact which they, at least, will never forget.
Naval air search and reconnaissance is a vital and necessary function of the United States Fleet. An appraisal of its tactical worth can well be drawn by an examination of operations and accomplishments in the western and southwestern Pacific during the final months of the war, a time when it had fully developed into an efficient and effective agent of our naval and military might.
THE MISSION
The primary mission of any Navy patrol plane is normally long-range search, patrol, and armed reconnaissance. It is the misunderstanding of that fundamental fact that so often leads to improper evaluations of success. In simple terms, the task is to see what is there and then tell some one about it. Patrols are not satisfactorily completed unless both elements of the mission are accomplished. Neither is sufficient without the other. All other tasks, including the destruction of enemy targets, are normally secondary to the primary search mission. On routine patrols no patrol plane commander is expected to deviate from the normal execution of his search plan in any manner which would endanger or prejudice the search mission. When a target is sighted, he usually has complete discretion in deciding whether to attack.
The frequency and success of these patrol plane attacks demonstrated a tactical efficiency and destructive power far beyond the contemplated doctrinary results of routine patrols. It was this aspect, the almost unbounded development of the secondary mission, which established Naval patrol aviation as an even more important function of the Fleet, and which should conclude, once and for all, the ill-advised attempts to separate it from the Navy. Our patrol squadrons became patrol bombing squadrons in fact as well as in name.1
These attacks were executed with a vicious aggressiveness far exceeding the limitations of the calculated risk involved. Most of the patrols were flown by single planes, and a large proportion of the attacks were made in the extremities of the search sectors, very often 800 to 1,000 miles from the nearest friendly base. Because of the heavy odds against a single attacking plane, these crews usually found it prudent not to attack well- armed warships. They did attack merchant vessels with incredible regularity and astonishing success. Using an attack technique all their own, their approach was usually made “on the deck,” often only 50 feet above the water, in order to effect maximum surprise, in many cases so complete that antiaircraft guns were not manned or fired until bombs were away and the plane was retiring.
Patrol bombing squadrons were also called upon to perform innumerable other special missions. Occasional two, four, or six-plane strikes were called. Many thousand of hours were spent in anti-submarine patrols, a dull and monotonous job when results were negative, as they almost always were. When the Fleet operated in the search area, entire squadrons were sent out to fly barrier or screening patrols to warn of impending air, surface, or submarine attack. Finally, no summary of missions could be complete without acknowledging the magnificent air-sea rescue work done by the patrol squadrons, as well as by the rescue squadrons organized and maintained for that purpose alone.
THE PLANES
The work-horses of the patrol squadrons were the PBM Mariner, the PB4Y-1 Liberator and the PB4Y-2 Privateer, the Navy’s own special development of the Liberator.
Naval aircraft seem during their development to have a facility for attracting the ridicule and scorn of those who may fly them. To this tradition the Mariner was certainly no exception.2 Engine limitations drew attention from the fact that the Mariner had the finest seaplane hull ever built. It took the open-sea, rough-water operations at Saipan to prove the hulls to the skeptics. Not until Okinawa, when the PBM-5 was fully proven by the patrol and rescue squadrons, would the last of the die-hards give in. By July, 1945, there were thirteen Mariner squadrons in and west of the Marianas and they almost completely succeeded the older seaplanes, although there were still two squadrons flying PB2Y Coronados and three or four flying PBY-5A Catalinas. The latter squadrons all flew the amphibian model of the famed old flying boat. Shortly after the amphibian came into service in 1942, PBY squadrons became largely land-based, except for one squadron in the Philippines which operated as a truly amphibious squadron for a short period of time.
The Privateer first appeared in the forward area during January, 1945, and it gradually replaced the older Liberator, which we had borrowed from the Army in the absence of a good long-range land-based patrol plane of our own. The Privateer was a success from the start. Equipped with the latest and most complete radar equipment and greatly increased fire power, it was able to go deep into enemy territory without fighter protection. With the addition of the second deck, or top, turret and blister turrets in each waist, every attacking fighter plane faced at least six machine guns. Even in the hands of some of the most aggressive crews, who seemed to be trying to make an attack plane of it, the Privateer had tremendous endurance, strength, and staying power. It was a great improvement over the Liberator in almost every aspect.
The PV-1 Ventura, partially succeeded late in the war by the slightly larger PV-2 Harpoon, was perhaps the most misunderstood plane of all. Essentially a very fast3 twin-engine medium bomber, it made a fine attack plane but did not have the range necessary to perform many of the searches required, and in most areas the Navy was not engaged in missions which required the use of land-based medium-range attack planes. With the exception of one squadron which performed regular strike missions in the Philippines and another which made rocket attacks in coordination with Privateers on picket boats north of Iwo Jima and attacks on land targets in southern Honshu, the Ventura was largely confined to antisubmarine patrols and medium-range “white- cap” patrols.
PATROLS FLOWN FROM THE MARIANAS
Navy patrol planes played a vital role in our first thrust into pre-war Japanese islands. Although they had engaged in the operations in the Gilberts and Marshalls for some time, it was not until the invasion of the Marianas that they were brought within range of the home islands of the Japanese Empire.
Even before the original landings, Navy Liberators based at Eniwetok flew patrols covering the approach of the invasion fleets, patrolling day and night ahead and on each flank of the invasion armada, and relieving one another on station when their fuel ran low. Their job was to make certain that there were no enemy ships in the path of our advance and to knock out any Japanese search planes which might be snooping in the area.
Only two days after the Marines hit the beach, in the late afternoon of June 17,1944, five Mariners of VP-16 arrived at Saipan from Eniwetok to patrol the western approaches to the Marianas. It was still many days before the Saipan airfields would become operational, and Tanapag Harbor was not yet sufficiently cleared to permit operations there. The five Mariners found that their base of operations consisted of an old World War I four-stack destroyer, converted to a seaplane tender and anchored about three miles off shore in the open sea. Almost immediately after landing, their heartbreaking difficulties began. An enemy air raid damaged one plane, and another was damaged during refueling operations, a tricky procedure in calm water but immensely complicated by these mountainous seas. The three remaining planes were ordered to take off at midnight for their first searches, which were negative. During similar patrols the following night one plane made a contact with an enemy fleet 470 miles to the west, which led to the Battle of the Philippine Sea despite a long delay in the receipt of the contact report sent from the plane. The continued heavy seas and the consequent impossibility of adequate maintenance, coupled with the loss of one of the planes to a friendly destroyer and the near loss of another to friendly fighter planes, sorely tested both the men and the equipment of the squadron, and it was not for many days that they were able to move into Tanapag Harbor. They continued to fly searches to the north and west every night, together with night anti-submarine barrier patrols entirely around the island.
Meanwhile, Liberators, still based at Eniwetok, a thousand miles to the east, continued their almost daily attacks on nearby Tinian and Guam. On July 12, two VB-109 planes landed on Saipan and the next afternoon made the first land-based strike on Iwo Jima, which lay 650 miles to the north, halfway to the Empire. The crews of the two Liberators demonstrated superb airmanship, to the surprise and amazement of the Army personnel present, when they took their heavily over-loaded planes off from Isley Field, at that time a strip only 3,800 feet long.
Two more Liberators joined them in their strikes on Iwo Jima, Haha Jima, and Chichi Jima during each of the next two days, and the official score of the results of these operations showed the destruction or probable destruction of two destroyers, two large merchant vessels, two small tankers, three coastal vessels, and thirty-three planes, and damage to three cargo ships, twenty coastal vessels, twenty to thirty planes, and a destroyer escort, together with the destruction of barracks, hangars, oil and ammunition dumps, and other installations ashore. These three strike missions were a fitting climax to the record of the squadron commanding officer, the late Comdr. Norman M. (“Bus”) Miller, U. S. Navy, who with his crew during their tour of duty sank or damaged sixty-six ships, totalling over 63,000 tons, and destroyed fifteen enemy planes, together with innumerable small barges, sampans, and small craft never reported.
Once Saipan and Tinian were secured, the Liberator squadrons then in the Marianas were moved to Tinian, while the seaplanes continued to base at Tanapag Harbor at Saipan. Routine patrols were flown thereafter by Liberators covering the northwest, north, and northeast sectors to a distance of 1,000 miles, together with repeated reconnaissance flights over Truk. The seaplanes continued to fly anti-submarine' barrier patrols around the island and 700-mile search sectors to the west and southwest.
It took two Liberators to take the sting out of the northern sectors which covered Iwo Jima and the rest of the Bonin Islands. Iwo Jima, as we later learned, was a veritable fortress and was the base for enemy air operations against our newly won installations in the Marianas. Because of the known enemy fighter strength based at Iwo Jima, it was standard practice for the plane drawing that sector to drop to minimum altitude 50 to 75 miles away from the island and to approach at an altitude of not over 100 feet above the water. By doing this it was able to get within two or three miles of the island undetected, and would then quickly climb up to several hundred feet, high enough to observe quickly the enemy planes on the air fields. On this occasion these two VPB-116 planes flew up together to search for another plane which had failed to return from a patrol. They were jumped by eight fighters from Iwo Jima. After a running battle, the two Liberators shot down six of them and the other two scurried for the home base. Thereafter, the Japanese fighters stayed away from our search Liberators and we were able to patrol Iwo Jima thereafter at almost any altitude, entirely unmolested by enemy planes.
The Tinian patrols continued substantially unchanged until the capture of Iwo Jima. Meanwhile the invasion of the Philippines opened many new thousands of square miles of enemy waters to the eyes and attacks of the patrol bombers.
PATROLS FLOWN FROM THE PHILIPPINES
Prior to the original landings in the Philippines, which took place at Leyte on October 20, 1944, long-range patrols to the northwest had been flown from each succeeding base in the Southwest Pacific campaign, beginning at Guadalcanal. Now pre-invasion patrols were flown from Biak and Morotai, covering the approaches to Leyte. Once the air strip at Tacloban was secured, Liberator squadron VPB-117 moved in and flew very long patrols to the west and north. From Leyte they and the next squadron covered not only the coast of French Indo-China, but also ranged north on a few occasions beyond Okinawa, flying patrols as long as 1,200 miles.
As the Philippines campaign progressed, Liberator, Mariner, and Ventura squadrons moved in, and as additional air fields were captured patrol coverage was considerably extended. By early in 1945, five Liberator and Privateer squadrons were covering the entire enemy coastline every day, from Singapore north almost to Shanghai. Iwo squadrons based at Puerto Princesa on Palawan covered the west coast of the Celebes, both the east and west coasts of Borneo, and from Singapore to the tip of French Indo-China. The squadron based on Mindoro took the French Indo-China sectors to a point as far north as Hainan, and two squadrons at Clark field, just north of Manila, covered the China coast from Hainan nearly to Shanghai.
Several Mariner squadrons were based in various parts of the Philippines. Although called upon by the Army area command to perform a varied combination of utility missions, some of them nevertheless performed extremely effective night patrols of the China coast in the Hong Kong area and around Formosa, supplemented by the only truly amphibious squadron of Catalinas, VPB-71. Venturas again flew a large number of negative anti-submarine patrols, although VPB-128 had the good fortune to be called upon regularly for strike missions against targets in Borneo, frequently flown in coordination with Army fighters.
Our submarines had almost entirely cleared Japanese shipping from the South China Sea, but the enemy nevertheless made sporadic attempts to get merchant ships from the East Indies to the home islands. The few medium and large cargo vessels left at the time the first patrols reached the China coast normally hugged the coastline during the entire time they were within range of our search planes. It was a futile gesture, however, and during the first few months, while there were still some of these sizeable targets available, new bombing records were established. A VPB-117 Liberator crew is reported to have sunk over 30,000 tons of shipping in one month. A VPB-17 Mariner crew succeeded in sinking five ships, totalling 17,000 tons, on one night patrol.4 A VPB-104 Liberator crew, in a demonstration of “Seaman’s Eye,”5 bombing at its finest, on one patrol sank eleven small ships with ten 100 pound bombs, dropped one to a target. Furthermore, for the first time co-ordinated action between our submarines and search planes was established as a regular tactical procedure. On several occasions when search planes sighted large shipping targets, they vectored submarines in for the kill.
Enemy fighter planes here too failed to be as effective as had been feared. After the first few months almost no enemy planes were seen by any of the Philippines patrols, except over Singapore and Formosa. In some instances combat with enemy planes was unexpectedly successful. A VPB-104 Liberator crew had a happy experience one day on the Hong Kong sector. Approaching the China coast, they commenced to let down through the heavy overcast which then customarily lay over that part of the coast. Coming down into the clear over Hong Kong harbor, they found themselves in the midst of a formation of two Japanese “Topsy” transport planes (similar to our DC-2) and three “Val” dive bombers. The Liberator shot down the transports and two of the bombers, but the third got away. Soon thereafter another crew from the same squadron had the kind of a day these men often dreamed about. Patrolling the sector covering the China coast north of Formosa, they spotted a 4,000 ton freighter and went in for a bombing attack. Six of their string of ten bombs hit the target, leaving it sinking. Completing their run, they spotted two “Jake” scout float planes, and headed for them. The Jakes immediately split up. The Liberator shot one down, and while turning back to give chase to the other, the crew spotted a large four-engine “Emily” flying boat coming up the China coast. The Jake was quickly forgotten and a long chase after the Emily begun. During the half-hour chase the Emily was within gun range only twice. After using full military power for this length of time, the Liberator was forced to turn back because of the resulting high fuel consumption and the long distance back to base. The few shots at the Emily must have hit their mark, however, for it was soon afterwards definitely established that the Emily crashed as a result of the damage inflicted and that in it two high-ranking Japanese Naval officers and their staffs were carried to their deaths.
As the aircraft targets dwindled, however, so did the ships, and after February, 1945, the only Japanese shipping left consisted of small wooden vessels which hugged the Malaya, Indo-China, and China coasts. A large number of these small wooden vessels were built in the rivers of Borneo, and they became favorite targets for the planes flying the Borneo coastal sectors. Their practice was to move only at night and to tie up to the shore under a cover of camouflage during the day time. It was not unusual for the Borneo search planes to get several ships during each flight, and the hunting was so good around Pontianak that three successive VPB-109 Privateer patrols destroyed more than sixty of these small vessels.
The first Naval reconnaissance of Singapore took place when two VPB-106 Privateers from Palawan searched the area on May 23, 1945. Repeated reconnaissance flights were made by VPB-106 and VPB-111 in order to observe the progress of the repairs being made on four Japanese cruisers which had returned there after the Battle for Leyte Gulf. Because of frequent and aggressive fighter interceptions, two planes were sent on this sector for mutual protection. Nevertheless, one Privateer was lost to these fighter attacks. Two of the cruisers were sunk by British submarines shortly after they were observed leaving Singapore harbor.
With the approach of summer, enemy shipping and aircraft became so scarce along the Indo-China and China coasts" that the Liberator and Privateer squadrons began to range inland in search of targets. VPB-117 soon became almost exclusively an antirailroad squadron. Its patrols every day included attacks on the Saigon-Tourane railroad and resulted in the almost daily destruction of numerous locomotives, innumerable railroad cars, bridges, stations, shops and other railroad installations. Shortly after the attacks were begun the railroad was effectively put out of commission. Finding their sea lanes and their railroad line effectively cut, the Japanese now had to resort to highway transportation. Our search planes were ready for that, too, and in the final few months of the war the Clark Field and Mindoro squadrons destroyed hundreds of motor vehicles along the coast. The destruction of trucks became so routine that one crew took special delight in being able to report as one of its novel accomplishments for the day the attacking and destruction of one 1937 Ford V-8 Tudor Sedan!6 Many attacks were also made on Japanese blockhouses on the island of Hainan and on numerous Japanese troops evacuating the coastal areas on foot. On many occasions our planes were guided to these troop movements by friendly personnel on the ground who had been furnished with radio equipment.
Meanwhile, during the time when these developments were taking place in the Southwest Pacific area, our patrol bombers to the north were seeing the Japanese home islands for the first time.
PATROLS BLOWN FROM IWO JIMA
The invasion of Iwo Jima, commencing February 19, 1945, finally brought the mainland of Japan within reach of our search planes. Iwo Jima lay within 650 miles of the main Japanese island of Honshu, and for the first time the coastal waters of Japan were searched every day. The air field at Iwo Jima soon was so improved that heavy planes could land, and on March 5 Liberators and Privateers commenced their daily runs to the Empire. It was not, however, until over a month later that these planes could be based at Iwo Jima. Until that time they took off from their base at Tinian, usually before dawn, flew to the coast of Japan and back to Iwo Jima. After a short stop for re-fueling they had to return to Tinian and usually arrived after sundown. These patrols were the longest regularly flown patrols of the war, covering a total distance of about 2,350 miles and many of them requiring sixteen hours of flight. Even on these rugged patrols the crews maintained their regular schedule, and each crew flew a patrol every third day.
The waters between Iwo Jima and Japan were at this time well patrolled by the Japanese, who maintained an extensive fleet of picket boats to warn the homeland of approaching bombing raids and vessels. These ships were small, extremely maneuverable, well defended and heavily armed, and had proved on previous occasions to be tough targets for an unescorted patrol plane to sink. The use of Iwo Jima, however, presented a fine opportunity for attacks on these vessels at shorter range, utilizing the combined capabilities of Venturas and Liberators or Privateers. Venturas, equipped with rockets, were maintained on station north of Iwo Jima or were called to the scene of a contact reported by one of the Empire patrols. A co-ordinated attack was then delivered, the Venturas making a high speed rocket attack in a power glide and the Privateers following a few seconds later with a low-level strafing and bombing run. The first day of these co-ordinated attacks showed promising results. Thirteen attacks were made and nine of them resulted in definite sinkings. The Japanese were quick to learn, however, and almost immediately thereafter grouped their picket boats in pairs, so that it was impossible to deliver an attack on one without being subjected to cross-fire from another. Nevertheless, the attacks were continued with a modified degree of success.
The first Empire patrols were flown with considerable trepidation and anxiety, for no one knew just what to expect. Because heavy fighter opposition was anticipated, the first patrols in this area were flown in two-plane sections so that any fighter attack could be warded off by the application of proven two- plane tactics. With a few exceptions, however, the expected opposition did not materialize, and it was soon found unnecessary to send two planes on each sector. Japanese fighter planes were conspicuous by their absence, although our patrols were flown close to Japanese air fields and our planes were under constant enemy radar surveillance. Nearly all patrols were within range of Japanese radar and it was not unusual for a plane to be constantly tracked by several radar sets at the same time.
Shipping between the Empire and the Bonin Islands entirely disappeared, and even coastal shipping in Empire waters was drastically reduced. The picket boats stood their ground for a short period but soon they too were forced back to coastal waters.
Attacks on the remaining shipping targets continued during the summer of 1945 and aggressive attacks even on land installations in the Japanese homeland were made daily, a fact apparently entirely unknown at home. Privateer squadron VPB-108 tremendously increased the effectiveness of their attacks by the installation and use of a fixed 20 mm. gun in the nose of their planes for strafing and knocking out anti-aircraft batteries. Even Venturas based at Iwo Jima were flown to the home islands at extreme range to deliver attacks on shipyards, docks, railroads, and bridges. One VPB-133 Ventura is reported to have blocked a railroad tunnel by firing rockets into the tunnel entrance! Probably the most unexpectedly successful land attack however, was that made by a VPB-116 Liberator which made a very low approach to deliver an attack on a military installation in Honshu. Flying over the small hill which separated it from the target, the pilots and gunners were greeted with the sight of several hundred Japanese troops lined up on the drill field for a dress inspection. The aiming point was quickly changed. The plane came in strafing and dropped the first of its string of bombs on the number one man in line and continued on down to the last man!
The July, 1945, surface operations, which produced not only numerous carrier strikes against targets in Japan but shore bombardment as well, drew tremendously on the energy and efforts of the patrol bombing squadrons. In addition to their regular flights, they were required to fly constant barrier patrols between the fleet and Japan to intercept any approaching aircraft or surface vessels and also to cover refueling operations farther out to sea. These flights required the operation of patrols up the east coast of Honshu to points north of Tokyo. Together with special weather flights, air-sea rescue missions, anti-submarine patrols around Iwo Jima, and numerous super-Dumbo flights covering B-29 and P-51 strikes, coupled with vigorous flying conditions and the normal discomforts of living at Iwo Jima, they required an unparalleled effort on the part of the squadrons involved. The four Liberator and Privateer squadrons then at Iwo Jima found it necessary during this period to fly some crews two days out of every three, a schedule which sorely tested all those subjected to it.
PATROLS FLOWN FROM OKINAWA
The strategic plan for the capture of Okinawa called for the preliminary seizure of Kerama Retto, a small group of islands shaped somewhat like an inverted U and located about twenty miles southwest of Okinawa. Troops went ashore seven days prior to the initial assault on Okinawa in order to establish a seaplane base and repair facilities for surface vessels. On the day before the initial landing on Okinawa (April 1, 1945), the occupation was completed, the seaplane base established, and the first patrols were flown from that area by Mariners. Almost at once several squadrons moved to Kerama Retto, which quickly became the largest seaplane base in the world, with approximately one hundred large patrol seaplanes based on seventeen tenders. Two squadrons of Mariners performed day and night anti-submarine barrier patrols around Okinawa, and three Mariner squadrons and one Coronado squadron immediately undertook daily and nightly searches west to the China coast, north to Korea, and northeast to the coasts of Kyushu. During the first three weeks of April these seaplane searches were almost entirely defensive and the Mariners and Coronados logged more than 8,000 hours of patrol flights, covering the sea approaches to the Okinawa beachhead.
Mariners of VPB-21 took part in the sinking of the Japanese battleship Yamato during this period. They spotted the enemy task force in the morning of April 7 and shadowed it the rest of the day, vectoring the attacking carrier planes to the target. After the attack they landed on the open sea to rescue several aviators who had been shot down by anti-aircraft fire.
Privateers came to Okinawa on April 22, when six of them arrived at Yontan Field. For the next few weeks these landplane crews literally lived, ate, and slept in mud, scarcely conducive to adequate aircraft maintenance. The rough condition of the field and continued enemy air attacks also kept many planes out of commission. Here the normal rivalry between the seaplane and landplane crews took on a new aspect. Seaplane personnel, long accustomed to the friendly but persistent jibes of the landplane boys concerning the inconvenience and delays attending the operation of seaplanes from tenders, finally were able to persuade their hecklers that living on a tender, even though crowded, had advantages over the mud at Yontan Field!
By May, Privateers were based there in increased numbers and from that time on there were usually two full squadrons there, rotating every few weeks between Tinian and Okinawa. The role of these planes quickly changed from defensive patrols to offensive searches and armed reconnaissance flights, as a full-scale aggressive campaign against Japanese shipping was launched. Prior to this time Japanese shipping had followed the China coast to Shanghai and had crossed the east China Sea with impunity to the Tsushima Straits, the Inland Sea and the home ports. Now our search planes found and attacked the few medium- size merchant vessels which had escaped the effective raids of our submarines, and for the last time in the war and the first time in six months, our search planes were regularly sighting convoys of medium and large merchant ships.
These searches and attacks were usually flown in two-plane sectors, Privateers by day and Mariners by night. Within a very few weeks they had become so effective that shipping between Shanghai and Japan had been forced to follow the coast of China north to the Shantung Peninsula, then across the Yellow Sea to Korea and down the west coast to Tsushima Straits, which they crossed under cover of darkness to gain the comparative safety of the home islands. In spite of the difficulty of finding these vessels among the innumerable islands off the coast of Korea, the successful attacks continued and the last remaining life line to the Empire from China from the south was effectively blocked. The results of one strike against merchant shipping in the mouth of the Yangtze River demonstrated the effectiveness of this campaign. Four VPB-109 Privateers on May 30 sank a 600-ton tanker and a picket boat and damaged a 4,500-ton freighter-transport, a 2,300-ton cargo ship, a 4,000 ton cargo ship, a tug, nine picket boats, two lightships, a 600-ton tanker and two 7,000 ton transports. The accompanying illustration of an attack made by a VPB-118 Privateer shows the results of another successful attack. In a little more than two months the Okinawa Privateers had sunk 78 enemy ships and damaged 105, while the Mariners and Coronados had sunk 61 and damaged 89. Between them, 41 enemy planes were destroyed and 29 damaged.
The shipping targets soon became smaller, and strikes were called on inland targets, following the same plan that had been followed earlier by the patrol planes based in the Philippines. Strikes were flown against industrial and railroad targets in Korea during July and were carried out with considerable success.
A heavy price was paid, however, for the effective results of this campaign. There were several planes, both Mariners and Privateers, which were shot down while attacking well defended ships and land targets. Two were lost to enemy fighters, and there were a few about which no more is known than that they failed to return from their patrols. One squadron of Privateers had the great misfortune to lose six crews within a month’s time. Although members of two of these crews were found after the war as prisoners, two other crews are still entirely unaccounted for.
The often intense anti-aircraft fire, both from ships and shore batteries, demonstrated in many cases the ability of both Mariners and Privateers to absorb a tremendous amount of damage and still to continue in flight. Planes frequently returned to base peppered with large bullet holes and in many cases with engines out of commission. On several occasions Mariners returned on one engine and Privateers on three.7 On several occasions planes were so damaged that they were unable to maintain flight and were forced to ditch. One Mariner which had an engine shot out by enemy fighters was forced to land in seas estimated to be 20 to 25 feet high and remained afloat for a short period of time, despite the fact that the force of landing was enough to cause the engines to break from the wings and to cause all the instruments to pop out of the instrument panel. After a rough night in their rubber boat, the crew was picked up about a mile from the coast of Japan by one of our submarines.
The rescues performed by the Mariners of Rescue Squadron (VH) 3 played a tremendous part in the success of this campaign, in that they furnished almost unfailing assurance that any downed crews would be rescued quickly. During the first two months of the campaign, the nine crews of the squadron made thirty-three landings in rough open seas and picked up and saved sixty-three aviators and aircrewmen. Twenty- one of the rescues were made within ten miles of enemy shoreline and seven were made while under fire from shore batteries. The squadron never failed to pick up a flyer whom it went out to rescue. Even the land- plane crews now had words of praise for the seaplanes. Their gratitude was particularly heartfelt under circumstances such as those which attended the rescue of the commanding officer of VPB-118 and his Privateer crew. In attacking a merchant vessel off the Korean coast, their two starboard engines and propellers were shot out of commission by anti-aircraft and they were forced to ditch (their second successful Privateer ditching) barely three miles from the target. All hands got out of the plane safely and anxiously watched the approach of the vessel which had been their target and which now seemed intent upon their capture. A VH-3 Mariner landed and picked them up just before the ship reached them; and less than 30 minutes after they had hit the water, they were on their way back to base again.
CONCLUSION
When war’s end finally arrived, our patrol bombers had fully proven themselves as extraordinarily effective units of the Fleet. Not only had thousands upon thousands of square miles of enemy sea and coast line been searched daily, but it had been done with a minimum expenditure of men and equipment. The patrol record illustrates the vast and startling extent of the daily Liberator and Privateer search sectors during the last four months of the war. More startling, however, is the fact that relatively so few planes were required to accomplish the mission—twelve 15-plane 18-crew squadrons, each flying six routine patrols a day. Seventy-two daily flights thus accounted for complete daylight search coverage from Singapore and Borneo to Korea, Kyushu, and Honshu. Coupled with the day and night patrols of the Mariners, Coronados, Catalinas, and Venturas, totalling twenty- one squadrons, or 126 flights a day, it is therefore evident that all search and patrol operations in the entire western and southwestern Pacific areas were accomplished with fewer daily combat sorties than those flown from a single large carrier or in a small Air Forces bombing raid against a single target.
The role of the patrol bombers in emerging as powerful destructive agents of Naval warfare was, however, probably the outstanding tactical advance in patrol-plane operations. Perhaps it was only the result of the normal reactions of skilled, aggressive airmen to the challenge of the dull, boring monotony of seemingly endless searches. Nevertheless, the record stands, and the job was done: done by men such as—to name a few of those who will not return—-Van Voorhis, Kasperson, Muldrow, Turner, Bass, Mears, Goodloe, and Comstock, and their nameless co-pilots and aircrewmen, obscure heroes all.
1. In October, 1944, the names of all seaplane patrol squadrons (VP) and land-based multi-engine bombing squadrons (VB) were changed to patrol bombing squadrons (VPB).
2. See The Patrol Plane Controversy by Lieut. E. M. Morgan, U.S.N., in the July, 1943, Proceedings.
3. A Fleet Air Wing Four Ventura operating from a base in the Aleutians and being chased by four Japanese “Zekes” is reported to have maintained an indicated air speed of 270 knots for over thirty minutes with power settings of 55 inches manifold pressure and 2700 r.p.m.
4. The pilot made an attack on what he thought was one target vessel which showed up on his radar screen as a vessel located among several small islands. After dropping all his bombs on the target and setting it afire, the illumination revealed that four of these islands were other ships. He set them afire and destroyed them in strafing attacks.
5. With the exception of Coronado squadron VPB-13, which used a simple, low-altitude sighting device, and Marine PBJ Mitchell squadron VMB-612, which developed a radar sight for night rocket firing, nearly all patrol bomber attacks were made without the use of bombsights. Standard procedure was a fast minimum- altitude run, the pilot sighting by eye and releasing a string of three or more bombs, spaced by an inter-valometer.
6. The value of photographic analysis in accurately assessing the damage to enemy targets was once again demonstrated when study of the attack pictures revealed that it was not a Tudor after all, but a Fordor!
7. Mariners were seldom able to maintain level flight on one of their two engines, although they remained controllable and with altitude could fly a considerable distance. At Saipan one had even made a successful open-sea landing after both engines cut out, a feat theretofore considered impossible. Liberators and Privateers had on numerous occasions flown as much as 900 to 1,050 miles on three engines, and one VPB-111 Liberator crew even did it twice!