One of the most important problems of the present day is the organization of the nation for national defense. After the experience of fighting and winning the greatest conflict of all time, many feel that our organization for war leaves much to be desired. Among those who advocate change, two primary tendencies are apparent —there is on the one hand the urge for greater independence of air power, and on the other the urge for closer integration of all forces for waging total war.
It is obvious that there must be some form of joint command. If ever that was true, it is true today, for it is not the Army, Navy, or Air Force which fights, but it is the nation itself which wages total war with all the resources at its disposal. When an all-out effort is required, it is particularly evident that there must be coordinated effort with regard to such problems as allocation of men and material, assignment of tasks, and provision for tactical support. World War II witnessed amphibious landings unusual in scope and number, requiring the closest cooperation of the armed forces. Air power exerted a most important effect on these landings in the approach and on the beaches, besides ranging over the land and sea areas which were formerly the domain of the soldier and sailor respectively. The atom bomb and guided missiles have introduced new problems in organizing our national defense.
Prior to World War II, no other nation probably gave such serious thought to the problems of joint command as did Germany; this led to the establishment of the Armed Forces High Command. Fortunately we have a fairly complete picture of the German high command in World War II, where there was an independent air force operating under a closely integrated joint command. A study of this should prove most profitable in guiding us to an effective solution of this important problem.
In February, 1938, Adolph Hitler, as the Fuehrer of the German Reich and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht) dismissed the Reich Minister of War and Commander of the Armed Forces (Ober Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), General v. Blomberg, and announced that “The command over all armed forces henceforth is exercised by me directly and personally.” The functions of the Reich Minister of War were incorporated into the newly created Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), headed by General Keitel.
A struggle for power now ensued, in which General Keitel sought to bring Army, Navy, and Air Force under his command. The Commander in Chief, Army, General v. Brauchitsch, strenuously opposed this primarily because it contemplated setting up a high command with a planning and operating staff between himself and the person to whom he felt he should be solely responsible, that is, to the Fuehrer as head of the State. The Commander in Chief, Navy, opposed the proposition because he felt that the Navy would inevitably be submerged if it were under the Armed Forces High Command headed by a regular Army officer and staffed, as it was bound to be, largely by Army officers. No record has been found that the Commander in Chief, Air (Reichsmar- schall Goering) entered this controversy. It may be that the latter felt that, as number 2 Nazi, Reich Minister for Air, and Deputy for the Four Year Plan, as well as other offices, he could wield enough influence to safeguard the interests of his air force whatever the organization.
On June 13, 1938, Hitler issued a directive entitled “Executive Order for the Preparation of National Defense in all Fields,” outlining the duties and responsibilities of the Armed Forces High Command. Since this directive served as the basis on which the German High Command operated during World War II, it is well to consider its provisions in some detail. It read as follows:
(1) The Armed Forces High Command is responsible for the preparation of national defense in all fields in accord with my directives.
(2) The preparations extend essentially to the following fields:
Unity of command of the armed forces in time of war
Coordination of propaganda and economic warfare with the broad aims of armed warfare Defense of the home territory in an emergency (executive power)
Organization of the fighting nation Organization of espionage, intelligence, and counterintelligence services Problems of armed forces policy, of military law and international law Organization and distribution in time of war of all communications to the armed forces and other agencies involved Organization of war economy, which includes The direction of war economy Armament industry Raw materials Contracts and price control Securing of supplies needed by the armed forces.
(3) I shall issue directives for the preparation of war from time to time to
The Commander in Chief, Army The Commander in Chief, Navy The Minister for Air and Commander in Chief, Air
The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.
The Armed Forces High Command is responsible for the written formulation of these strategic directives; it will conduct the conferences dealing with such details which concern several arms.
(4) All documents which are needed for the carrying out of the duties listed under (2) and for personal information are to be submitted to the Armed Forces High Command. This regulation does not limit in any way the right of the Commanders in Chief to represent to me in direct conference any matter concerning their individual branch.
(5) I reserve for myself the right to nominate in accord with the needs of the political and military situation, in the event of a threatening war, a Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, as my responsible adviser and representative for the over-all command.
(6) I also reserve the right to order exercises for the preparation of the national defense in all fields, such as mobilization exercises, studies, armed forces maneuvers, communication exercises, etc. I shall give the command of such exercises from case to case, to one of the Commanders in Chief. In the preparation and execution of such exercises, the Armed Forces High Command will serve as Staff to this Commander in Chief.
(signed) Adolph Hitler
(countersigned) Jodi, Colonel, General Staff
This directive contemplated the setting up under the Fuehrer of four separate and essentially coequal branches—General v. Brauchitsch and the Army, Admiral Raeder and the Navy, Field Marshal Goering and the Air Force, and General Keitel and the Armed Forces High Command. It is not strictly correct to chart the lines of command as has been done, from the Fuehrer to the Armed Forces High Command and thence radiating to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, since Hitler issued directives to each of the four branches and the head of each reported to him directly. Properly speaking, the Armed Forces High Command was a misnomer; it was not a command, but rather it was thought of as a balance wheel to coordinate industry, war economy, manpower, etc., with the armed forces, as well as to coordinate the assignments and to provide tactical support of the forces.
While the original intention may have been to set up the four branches—Armed Forces High Command, Army, Navy, and Air Force—on an equal level, this did not eventuate in practice. An organization on paper is one thing, but the way it works out in practice is quite another. The former takes no account of personalities, and in the German organization personalities played a determinant role.
In this connection it is necessary to devote some thought to what constitutes a German. What manner of man is he? What kind of a warrior has his heritage, experience, and training produced?
Germany has been a battleground for many centuries. This country has been invaded many times—in early history by the Romans, and later by the Swedes, French, Russians, and other nationals and allied armies. Alternating therewith have been the movements out of Germany; the early migrations and later invasions carried the Germans to the periphery of the continent— Italy, England, Poland, Russia, and even distant Spain bear witness thereof. Thus, the German was reared in the tradition of war and his first duty was to be a soldier. From the time of the Cimbri and Teutones down to the present day, they have been good soldiers, and if they had good leadership and unity they were always dangerous foes. Good leadership and unity have been frequently lacking in German history.
Only very belatedly in modern times did the Germans turn to the sea. At the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century, Kaiser Wilhelm II undertook the construction and development of a modern navy under the impulse of securing for Germany “a place in the sun.” Economic, as well as political, reasons motivated this move. Germany, as she turned from agriculture to industry as her basic living, required more and more raw materials, colonies, bases, and foreign trade. However, by that time colonial empires and trade routes had been established.
The building of the Navy did not spring from an innate urge of the people, rather it resulted from a recognition of the need thereof by a small group. The German remained a farmer, technician, soldier by instinct and necessity. He had no understanding of the sea; his thought was bounded by the limits of the continent. With German intelligence, industry, thoroughness, and technical ability, they were able to build up a remarkably effective Navy by World War I, but it reminds us of the Roman Navy in its wars with Carthage. The Germans, like the Romans, remained soldiers at heart. Instead of fighting on land, they fought on board ship. Their navy men were properly “soldiers of the sea.”
After their defeat in World War I, the German’s first thought turned to defense; the primary consideration was national security, for which they needed an army. They desired to abrogate the so-called inequities of the Treaty of Versailles and to resurrect the German nation. This meant recovery of all those portions which had been detached from Germany by force—the Polish Corridor, Danzig, Alsace-Lorraine, etc. Under Hitler the plan was extended to unite racial Germans of neighboring states into one Greater Reich. For this again they needed an army, and, of course, the present day requirement in any major war, especially in view of their vulnerability to air attacks—an air force. What with limited raw materials and foreign exchange a, navy was bound to come in for belated, and then only scant, recognition.
Hitler had served in World War I as a private and later on as a corporal. During a conference in World War II, he referred to himself as a “land soldat” (literally, a land soldier). A German sailor was also a “soldat.” Sometimes, the Fuehrer referred to himself as a “political soldier.” By instinct, early training, subsequent development, and primary necessity he was, even though not a career soldier, at least in part military, and definitely continental minded. He was an omniverous reader, and military reading formed a large part thereof. He acquired extensive knowledge, and along military lines he showed at times good understanding. As might be expected, along naval lines he showed some knowledge but little understanding.
Thus it is apparent that, when we speak of the German services being on a coequal level, it may have been intended but never could be so in fact. Army influence was paramount, and under Hitler the Navy went to bat with two strikes against it. Hitler had assured Raeder that he need not reckon with war with Great Britain prior to 1944-45, and the naval construction program was pointed to this period. When Great Britain declared war on September 3, 1939, the German Navy felt overwhelmed—it was faced with an impossible task,
When in the fall of 1941, the German Army was not able to gain a decisive victory on the Eastern Front, Hitler relieved the Commander in Chief, Army, General von Brauchitsch, and announced: “The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander took over on 19 December 1941 the post of Commander in Chief, Army, personally,” There is no doubt that his move was harmful to the German Army for it enabled Hitler to superimpose more directly his ideas on strategy and tactics. But also there is no doubt that he endeavored to reinforce his army with men and equipment to the best of his ability, even to the prejudice of other services.
The Air Force, which had been secretly organized, was officially established in 1935. It remained under the administration of the Reich Minister for Air, Field Marshal Goering, who became simultaneously Commander in Chief, Air. Prior to this time, the Navy had developed and maintained its own air force, and according to Admiral Raeder in conference with the Fuehrer on May 14, 1942, it was “excellent.”
In addition to his capacity as Reich Minister for Air and Commander in Chief, Air, Goering was the Number 2 Nazi, Deputy for the Four Year Plan, and holder of numerous other offices. As a former aviator, he was a firm believer in a big air force and it was his pride and joy. There can therefore be no question that similarly to the Army, the Air Force held a superior position to the Navy—not in a command relationship, but in its position to receive preferential treatment.
The superior position of Goering and his Air Force relative to Admiral Raeder and the Navy is well illustrated in the minutes of a conference of the former with a representative of the Naval Construction Bureau (Admiral v. Fischel) concerning naval building, equipment, and priorities on May 19, 1939. Goering contended that the Navy’s program was seriously cutting into plane production and said that this attitude of the Navy would cause an inter-service struggle in which he would certainly carry more weight. Admiral v. Fischel reported, “The entire session gave the impression of a trumped-up attack on the Navy and was thoroughly unfair to the representatives of the Navy, as they had not been given any advance notice of the reason for the conference.”
Following a long period of contention, the Commander in Chief, Navy, and the Commander in Chief, Air, signed an agreement on February 3, 1939 which formed the basis for naval air operations on which Germany embarked on war. This document covered the following principal points for the event of war: (a) the main objective of the Air Force is the British Isles; (b) all reconnaissance over sea is the task of the Navy; (c)
Air Force units will participate in naval engagements only upon request by the Naval Staff, and then only with such units as have been trained for this task; (d) minelaying operations by the Air Force will be carried out only in agreement with the Navy. For the carrying out of naval air operations, the Commander in Chief, Air Force, agreed to provide Navy with a total of 41 squadrons by 1941, all of them up to the standards of naval requirements. All naval air squadrons were to be supplied and administered by the Air Force but were to operate under the tactical command of the Naval Staff.
After the outbreak of war, the Air Force began to circumvent this agreement by cutting allocation to the Navy and at the same time by establishing its own air units for operations at sea. The latter were organized initially in Flieger Corps X (10th Air Corps), and later in other units as well. As the war progressed, weaknesses of the original agreement became evident. The Navy, which was altogether too weak for its original war responsibilities of September, 1939, became saddled with vastly greater defense requirements with the conquest of Norway and the Channel coast, and had meanwhile suffered severe losses. The Air Force was carrying the “blitz” against England. Both arms therefore required additional air strength for their tasks. In this contest the Navy lost out, for Goering was able to withdraw air units from naval command, thereby increasing his Air Force and weakening seriously the operational readiness of the other, service.
Moreover, the Commander in Chief, Air Force, went much further and gave operational orders to naval air units. A violent clash occurred in the summer of 1940 when Naval Coastal Air Group 606 was designated to participate in the Air Force attacks on London. The Commander in Chief, Navy, vetoed this order, but the appeal was carried to the Armed Forces High Command who decided in favor of the Air Force, and Coastal Air Group 606 was so used in the air attacks on London.
Some of the dangers of such a situation are brought to light by this case. The Air Force is heavily engaged and is winning fame and glory, while their brothers in Coastal Air Group 606 are engaged in reconnaissance and similar less spectacular assignments. What is more natural than that the air men of Coastal Air Group 606 should go to their brethren in the Luftwaffe and say in effect, “We are not doing very much. How about making arrangements for Coast Air Group 606 to join you in the attacks on London?” This is just what happened. The Air Force was only too willing to listen and to use the opinions of the air men in Coastal Air Group 606, who perhaps little understood the full importance of reconnaissance for the total war effort and who could not know what the plans of the Naval High Command for their future employment might be.
It was apparent that a new modus vivendi was required. The Navy and Air Force appear to have made equal efforts to win over the Fuehrer to their point of view. Hitler rendered his decisions in a sequence of three orders. While the second order gave the Navy reason for renewed hope, the final order stated that all air units engaged in coastal patrol should operate under the Commander in Chief, Air Force. This order initiated the end of the naval air force.
By fall of 1941 the Air Force had drained the resources of the naval air arm until only one coastal air group, plus two depleted squadrons, were left to the Commander, Naval Air. In November, 1941, the Air Force requested, and the Navy agreed, to the transfer of this last group from Navy to Air Force command. Admiral Raeder did not put up a fight, realizing that he would lose this air group to Hermann Goering in the end anyway. Therewith, for all practical purposes, the naval air arm ceased to exist.
Some change in the situation took place when on January 30, 1943, Admiral Doenitz succeeded Raeder as the Commander in Chief, Navy. The former was close to the Fuehrer and a much better negotiator than his predecessor had ever been. Doenitz was out to get support for the submarine war on commerce; he was not inclined to be a stickler for strict operational control of air units operating with the Navy, so long as the support was provided. So although the Navy was willing to cooperate 100 per cent and Hermann Goering was more inclined to be helpful, he was still reluctant to give much actual support. Also the war situation had begun to deteriorate; Soviet Russia was showing surprising resistance and recuperative power, the United States was building up a huge war potential, and enemy air power in the west was growing rapidly.
Doenitz’s appeals to the Fuehrer for air support for the submarine war on commerce were as persistent as they were pathetic. In February, 1943, Doenitz reports to the Fuehrer, “The month of February may be considered as typical for present submarine warfare. During fourteen days at sea nothing was sunk because nothing was sighted. Three reasons may be advanced: bad weather and poor visibility, possibly the location of the submarines’ position by the enemy, but above all, of the complete absence of our own reconnaissance.” In April, 1944, the Commander in Chief, Navy, explains to the Fuehrer the part enemy carrier planes are playing in the Arctic in connection with convoy operations. He points out that the submarines can no longer get near the convoys, how close the carriers have come to the Norwegian coast, and how easily the Luftwaffe could have attacked them. “This would have given our submarines a chance to get closer to the convoy, and thereby provided further opportunity for destroying valuable war materials intended for Russia.” But Goering did not agree that “carrier planes alone prevent submarines from approaching the convoy.” He considered that “the enemy carriers are too far from our own bases.”
The position of General Keitel and his Armed Forces High Command, relative to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, is not so simple to delineate. As has been indicated, he had no direct command relationship to the three services. To simplify the duties and responsibilities of the Armed Forces High Command as previously listed in this article, and to particularize those primary points on which this office came into the picture in the command relationship to the three services, the following are noted:
(a) to implement (interpret) the Fuehrer directives
(b) to allocate personnel and materials to the three services
(c) to exercise command in occupied countries.
Just prior to the outbreak of war with Poland in 1939, Keitel suggested to Raeder that, in view of the delayed opening of hostilities, instructions which had previously gone out to merchant shipping be amended in conformity therewith. Raeder replied that the instructions were adequate and required no amendment. Keitel thereupon caused new instructions to be sent out to merchant shipping over the head of the Commander in Chief, Navy. In such cases, Raeder could of course carry his protest directly to Hitler, but in many cases of disagreement did not do so because he either did not consider the matter of sufficiently great importance or refrained for the sake of harmony.
During most of the war both manpower and raw materials were critically short. It follows that whoever controlled these had a decisive effect on the efficiency of any one, or all three, of the arms of national defense. Goering, as “Deputy (of the Fuehrer) for the Four Year Plan,” issued directives to such government agencies as the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Transportation in all matters concerning the Armed Forces. He therefore had a decisive influence on all armament production.
Consequently the Air Force was in a favored position to get both manpower and raw materials, as was the Army through its Commander in Chief and through General Keitel, who controlled allocation. The Navy received scant consideration, and upon protest was told the Army must have priority because of the life-and-death struggle with Russia, or the Air Force must be reinforced because of the intensified air warfare in the west and because of air support for the German forces in the east. Nor was much gained when Raeder appealed to the Fuehrer for support—the latter agreed, for instance, that the submarine program must be accelerated and directed Keitel to see what could be done about it. Usually it was nothing, because allocations to Army and Air Force had to stand.
After 1942, a change in the organization took place when the new Reich Minister for Armament, Professor Speer, took over from Armed Forces High Command several pertinent sections and functioned directly under Hitler. Gradually this new ministry took complete charge of all war production. However, Minister Speer too exercised some of his authority as Deputy to the “Deputy for the Four Year Plan,” Goering. In addition, the Undersecretary of the Air Minister, Milch, was made undersecretary for aircraft production in the Armament Ministry. No similar post was created for either Army or Navy.
Incident to the resignation of Grand Admiral Raeder as Commander in Chief, Navy, he delivered a farewell address to the Navy on February 1, 1943, and had the following to say in this connection:
Today the situation is as follows: The Fuehrer himself commands the Army. Minister Speer (in charge of armament) is at his disposal, primarily to see that Army demands are fulfilled. For instance, if the Fuehrer orders Speer to reinforce the tank forces 100 per cent, Speer will try to achieve this if need be at the expense of other branches of the Armed Forces. The Reichsmarschall (and Commander in Chief, Air, Goering) has control of all sectors of industry, or has at least much influence on them; naturally he will take advantage of this influence to obtain everything for the Air Force that he considers necessary for its functioning. This is the situation confronting the Navy.
It is true that by the time Raeder resigned the war situation for Germany had deteriorated. The Russian campaign was bleeding the nation white; Allied air power in the west was striking heavier and heavier blows.
Following the Allied landings in North Africa in November, 1942, the Axis forces on that continent were being squeezed from the east and west. The submarine campaign showed definite indications of diminishing returns. All in all, the requirements of defense appeared to call in first line for Army and Air Force reinforcement. The Fuehrer supported the submarine war on commerce, but expressed the following point of view to Vice Admiral Krancke on January 17, 1943, “Yet we have to realize that all this (submarine war) will be of no use unless we can defeat the Russians in the east.”
Military administration of all occupied territory was as a rule vested in the Armed Forces High Command, represented by a Commanding General. In Norway, for example, the Armed Forces Commander in Chief in Norway, General v. Falkenhorst, operated under a loose directive by which: (1) he was to deal with matters of mutual importance to the three arms—he represents the German Armed Forces in their relation to the Norwegian State and people; (2) he was responsible for military security in the interior and in the event of an enemy invasion—prosecution of the war against England from Norway by sea and air was the responsibility of the respective Commanders in Chief and of their subordinate commands in Norway; (3) in the event of danger, especially in defense of an enemy attack, he could transmit requests for defense support to the local commanders of the three arms. These were obliged to follow such requests insofar as their own operations and technical capabilities permitted. The situation in Norway was typical of that in most occupied countries.
The Armed Forces High Command was also involved in the command of certain operational areas, as for instance in Italy. In 1943, with the African campaign under way, Hitler named General Kesselring, an Air Force officer, as Commander in Chief, South (Oberbefehlshaber Sued). The Fuehrer directive empowering him provided, in the main, as follows: (1) The Commander in Chief, South, being by rank the senior German officer in Italy, is the representative of the German Armed Forces at Headquarters, Italian Armed Forces, for all questions pertaining to the conduct of war in the central and western Mediterranean; (2) he is responsible for the execution of Fuehrer directives and orders; (3) he is responsible for the conduct of war of the German troops of the three arms within the area of his command, insofar as these troops are not operating under Italian command—in that case he is to assure that the German troops are operating in accord with German principles of command and strategy; (4) he is responsible for the close cooperation of the three arms with each other and with the Italian forces, and he assures exchange and coordination of communications for reconnaissance and operations; (5) he governs the use of all cargo space (ship and air transport) in his area; (6) in all matters mentioned as well as in principal problems of organization he reports to the Armed Forces High Command and maintains close contact with the three Commanders in Chief; (7) without limiting the administrative authority of the three arms, the Commander in Chief, South, exercises full authority over: (a) all army, SS, and air force units assigned to ground duty, including units operating under Italian tactical command; (b) the German Naval Command, Italy, including units operating under the Italian Naval Command—over-all directives for naval warfare in the Mediterranean are issued by the Naval Staff, Commander in Chief, Navy; (8) the staff of the Commander in Chief, South, is a joint armed forces staff.
Despite this directive, the command situation in the central and western Mediterranean was confused and led to serious friction, even violent clashes. The provision of (6) requiring the submission of reports to the Armed Forces High Command does not mean that Keitel was Kesselring’s^ immediate superior in command, rather it indicated the routing of reports to reach the Fuehrer. Keitel may be said to have had administrative supervision, but he did not have command. The chain of command was from the Fuehrer direct to Commander in Chief, South.
Until 1943, the supply of the German and Italian armies in North Africa was the major problem in the Mediterranean. It was primarily a naval task to get these supplies across, and the Germany Navy, in liaison with the Italians, had set up an organization to cope with this problem. The German air force was also called in to help with this supply problem, but it was primarily a naval task. As the Fuehrer aptly pointed out in a conference on March 14, 1943, “It is impossible to supply armies by air. A single 9,000 ton steamer, for example, can carry as much on one voyage as a whole air fleet can carry over a longer period of time. Protection of convoys by the Air Force alone is not possible; ships continue to be required. The Straits of Sicily must teem with patrol and escort vessels. Good organization is essential. Only the German Navy can organize this on the basis of its experience and success in this field.”
As Deputy for the Four Year Plan, Hermann Goering took a hand in the transportation problem. He had appointed the Nazi party leader, Gauleiter Kaufmann, as Reich Commissioner for Merchant Shipping, usually referred to as “RKS.” Early in December, 1942, Goering and Kaufmann made an inspection trip to Italy. There Goering signed an order drafted by Kaufmann, establishing under the jurisdiction of “RKS” a new office, the Deputy for Transportation in the Mediterranean, abbreviated “BVM.”
These administrative actions became of most immediate concern to the German Naval Command, Italy when on December 24, 1942 Goering issued a directive by which:
(a) BVM was to function under the authority of the Commander in Chief, South;
(b) BVM was authorized to give direct orders to all naval commands, offices, and technical personnel with regard to shipping.
Commanding German Admiral, Italy, immediately informed Naval Staff that “this move restricts the authority and responsibility of the German Naval Command, Italy, and will, in the long run, eliminate its function completely since the chain of command now runs from Commander in Chief, South, via ‘BVM,’ directly to Naval Transport Offices, Harbor Captains, and so on. I cannot accept responsibility for the deterioration of the over-all war situation which will result from this order.”
Consequences of the Goering directive were not limited to this urgent protest by German Naval Command, Italy. This command now received orders directly from the Commander in Chief, Navy, and the Commander in Chief, South. This situation resulted in the clash recorded by Naval Staff on December 25, 1942:
“Telephone call from General Deichmann, Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief, South.
‘General Deichmann declared that the Grand Admiral (Raeder) has issued orders to the German naval offices in Italy which cannot be carried out. The Commander in Chief, South, has ordered that his own directives are to be carried out without paying attention to the orders of the Grand Admiral, if this is required for the conduct of the war in the Mediterranean. The Commander in Chief, South, will arrest any Admiral who does not obey this order.”
Under date of December 28, 1942, the War Diary of the Naval Staff records: “The Commander in Chief, Navy, reported personally to the Fuehrer by phone on 25 December that he was rescinding his order, after the Armed Forces High Command had sanctioned the orders of the Reichsmarschall (Goering) which are now being carried out.”
On December 28 the matter was discussed during the daily staff conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy. The Chief of the Navy’s Quartermaster Office pointed out “the impossible attitude which the Commander in Chief, South, or his staff, has adopted vis-a-vis the Commander in Chief, Navy.” In answer to this statement, the record says that “Commander in Chief, Navy, is disregarding such all-too-human failings for the sake of the cause.”
In the west when invasion began to threaten, (1943), a Commander in Chief, West (Field Marshal Rundstedt), was appointed to command all armed forces in that area. Unlike the sphere of the Commander in Chief, South where the lines of responsibility and command ran in devious directions not only to the German armed forces but to the Italians as well, the situation was much clearer in the west and consequently the friction was much less. In fact no serious friction is evident until after the invasion of Normandy had commenced.
On August 10, 1944, the Commanding Admiral, Naval Group Command, West (Vice Admiral Krancke), addressed a message to the Naval Staff. The following are excerpts thereof:
As already pointed out during my last visit to the Commander in Chief, Navy, I am most doubtful as to the merits of the steadily increasing authority of the Army in the Western Theater. The more the point of gravity of our defense shifts to the land, the more does the Navy become subordinate to Army commanders who are given the authority of joint commanders, but who lack the proper appreciation of naval requirements and who therefore decide according to the Army’s way of thinking.
The Army is lacking in proper understanding of the fundamentals of coast defense. The principle is alien to the soldier that the beach is the front line and that the enemy must be destroyed while still at sea. The soldier mistrusts the water in front of him; it is strange and threatening and he tries to get away from the shore. Such tendencies are also evident in the higher Army staffs. For example, the fact that coastal batteries are the backbone of all coast defense has not been properly understood, as evidenced in the reluctant and inadequate allocation of concrete for the construction of such batteries. The coast defense grouping of the Army is not based on the shore batteries. There is often no contact between the batteries and the infantry formations to the right and left, thereby isolating the batteries.
A tendency is evident to withdraw coastal batteries and to use them instead as divisional artillery. Even after the invasion had started, the Army tended to withdraw coastal guns from the shore, using the inaccurate argument that these batteries would be silenced by enemy naval guns. Naval gunnery personnel is looked upon by the Army as a reserve of soldiers who can be used to reinforce infantry during an engagement. Nowhere is the important role of coastal batteries for coast defense properly recognized.
Admiral Krancke then cites numerous specific instances, such as: (a) on the day after the invasion, the local commander at Bayeux ordered the shore battery “Longues” to withdraw to Bayeux—the officer in charge of the battery refused to carry out this order; (b) Radar Outpost La Percee was ordered by the major in command of the sector to withdraw from the station and to reinforce the infantry in the defense of Isigny—personnel had to abandon the radar station with equipment fully intact and installed in a well-fortified building; (c) the modern naval shore batteries “Blankenese” and “Bastion Cherbourg” were blown up by order of the division commander without having been attacked from either sea or land; the naval gunnery personnel was assigned to reinforce infantry units.
Admiral Krancke concludes:
The Army does not understand the task of the Navy .... Yet everywhere there is evident a tendency to bring naval personnel under the immediate command of Army officers and to use our personnel for infantry or Army supply duties. In this effort use is made of the authority vested in Army commanders as the officer in charge for all operations on land. The position of the Commander in Chief, West, as joint commander is also used to a certain extent to serve the same ends. Furthermore the Commander in Chief, West, holds (in addition to his joint command) the Army command in the theater; in cases of friction he naturally often decides against the Navy, with whose requirements he is not familiar. I want to point out that the personal attitude of the Commander in Chief, West (Field Marshal Rund- stedt), as well as of Field Marshal Rommel has been correct. However, the Commander in Chief, West, passed on his joint command authority to section chiefs and to Army group commands which in turn passed the authority down to the divisional level. Thereby the Navy has become subject to the decision of Army commanders in many important issues. Wrong decisions are the natural result, and the Naval Group Command has to try again and again to rectify such mistakes ....
General Keitel, as Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, was always close to the Fuehrer and was constantly advising with him. Even though after the war Admiral Doenitz characterized him as “a mere technical general,” nevertheless due to Keitel’s proximity to the Fuehrer he doubtless exerted a very considerable influence on the latter.
In a broad generalization it might be said that the powers which were granted the Armed Forces High Command by the Fuehrer directive of 1938 dwindled more and more during the war and it became a purely administrative office. From this generalization, however, it must not be concluded that the Commanders in Chief were able to outwit the Armed Forces High Command and to maintain full operational authority and unlimited command in the field.
Beginning in 1940, a new development took place in the command situation by which in the end operational command became largely centered in the hands of the few Army officers who formed Hitler’s closest entourage. The organizational frame-work thereof was found in the small staff referred to as “WFSt op” (Wehrmachtsjuehrungsstab, Operations-Abteilung—Armed Forces Command Staff, Operations Section). The Wehrmachtsfuehrungsslab was composed of three sections—army, navy, and air force. Then over this large staff was a small group, designated by “op” (Operations), composed largely of army officers and headed by General Jodi, which at daily conferences at the Fuehrer’s Field Headquarters shaped the day to day operations of the German armed forces. “WFSt op” exerted very important influence on decisions.
As the war progressed, it is apparent that the personal influence of General Jodi became of great importance. It appears that he was an able officer and devoted to the cause of National-Socialism. There was something earthy about him which made him kin to Hitler. The Fuehrer was frequently ill at ease with career army officers, but he seemed to feel on more common ground with Jodi. Prior to the Normandy invasion, the latter made an inspection trip in France and Belgium and roundly criticized the attitude of Commander in Chief, West, Field Marshal Rundstedt. He could do it and get away with it.
A few army and air forces officers, plus one or two naval officers, from “WFSt op” made up the select group which took part in the conferences called by Hitler two, three, or four times daily at any hour, day or night. Records of these conferences show clearly that naval representatives (such as Vice Admiral Krancke and Captain Assmann) attended these sessions mainly to report and to receive orders. It was in the close personal conversations which Hitler had during these conferences with Goering and with his chief strategist, General Jodi, that day to day operations were decided upon as well as overall plans, allocating of materials, and any similar large problem. This small and exclusive group, operating beyond the influence and reach of the Commander in Chief, Navy, constituted from 1941 onwards the true “Armed Forces High Command.”
To the end, Adolph Hitler was the one who made the decisions, and he was intolerant of those who sought to presume on this prerogative or even to question his decisions. However, he did listen to advice. According to Goebbels, Hitler was only too glad to lean on those surrounding him, and if he (Goebbels) wished to put something across to the Fuehrer he always endeavored to bring it to the former’s attention in as many ways as possible.
The relationship between the Fuehrer and the first Commander in Chief, Navy (Grand Admiral Raeder), was never very cordial, rather it became more and more formal as time went on. In January, 1943, their growing divergence reached a culmination when Hitler lectured Raeder and other high- ranking naval officers on the worthlessness of the ^German Navy, proposed and thereafter directed the decommissioning of all cruisers and battleships except those to be used for training purposes. Some excerpts of this talk indicate his trend of thought:
The Navy (German) has always been careful to consider the number of their own ships and men as compared with the enemy before entering an engagement. The Army does not follow this principle. As a soldier, he (the Fuehrer) demands that, once forces have been committed to action, the battle be fought to a decision. Due to the present critical situation, where all fighting power, all personnel, and all material must be brought into action, we cannot permit our large ships to ride idly at anchor for months. They require constant protection by the Air Force as well as by numerous smaller surface craft. Until now light naval forces have been doing most of the fighting. Whenever the larger ships put to sea, light forces have to accompany them. It is not the large ships which protect the small, but rather the reverse is true.
The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports that he “rarely had an opportunity to comment.” This was the culmination of a series of differences, and led to Raeder’s resignation; Admiral Doenitz succeeded him as Commander in Chief, Navy, on January 30, 1943.
Up to that time Admiral Doenitz had been Commanding Admiral, Submarines. In his zeal for his submarine branch, he had voiced leanings to Hitler’s suggestion to dismantle the big ships and concentrate on submarine warfare; but upon taking over his new and higher office and having the entire responsibility of naval warfare, he seemed to modify his views and he disagreed to some extent with Hitler on the scrapping of big ships.
Doenitz was on friendly terms with Hitler and in fact almost idolized the latter. After returning from one conference with the Fuehrer, Doenitz said, “In comparison to him (Hitler) we are all ‘Kleine Wuerstchen’ (literally, “little sausages”).” Thus, although Doenitz had Hitler’s ear, he got no more results than his predecessor; WFSt op was in the saddle, the general war situation had deteriorated, and defense requirements for Army and Air Force seemed paramount.
The German record is not impressive for smooth cooperation in joint command in World War II. Some of the reasons therefor are apparent, while others require more thorough analysis. This study can only indicate a few of them.
Hitler, as the authoritarian head of the state, desired on the one hand a centralized administration, while on the other hand he feared the concentration of power in the hands of any one man under him. His directive outlining the relationship between the newly created “Armed Forces High Command” and the three Commanders in Chief left the situation in a vague and precarious balance. Had General Keitel been a stronger character, it is likely that his office might have served better as the “balance wheel” which appeared to be indicated by the organization.
The relationship of the three Commanders in Chief, which in theory should have been on a footing of equality, was thrown entirely out of balance by the fact that Nazi Number 1, Hitler, assumed command of the Army, while Nazi Number 2, Goering, held the command of the Air Force. Moreover these two held other positions of power and influence, while only the Commander in Chief, Navy, was limited to his command function.
Interservice friction and clash of personalities were very prevalent. A basic influence was the growth and infiltration of Nazi ideology into the armed forces, causing a cleavage in the officer corps. Before Hitler, there is little evidence of serious friction; men like General v. Seeckt appear to have made conscientious efforts to give army and navy officers a feeling of close relationship. German officers felt they were representatives of an old common tradition. Nazi Germany broke with this tradition. It could not eliminate the “reactionary officer caste”; it could only accomplish a gradual infiltration of new elements and ideas into the officer corps, principally through the younger generation. Certain officers, who were able to advance rapidly through their political affiliation, tended to look down on other officers as remnants of a by-gone age. Some leading Air Force officers were young in years, and with the self-importance of the young tended to look down upon the officers of the older services.
With the increasing influence of these officers, the homogeneity of the German officer corps was broken up. These differences were of secondary importance while the war went well, but when the going was tough it was difficult for men with entirely different attitudes and aspirations to face a common danger at critical moments shoulder to shoulder.- This situation found its most serious expression in the high command. The resignation and relief of such officers as Generals v. Seeckt, v. Fritsch, Beck, v. Brauchitsch, as well as Grand Admiral Raeder, are fundamentally attributable to this clash of ideologies.
The clash of personalities appears to have constituted one of Germany’s major problems of the conduct of war. A very great amount of time and effort was consumed in fruitless inter-service contention. Since a dictator must always avoid being confronted by a “united front” of the armed forces, it can be assumed that Hitler silently sanctioned such inter-service controversies. It appears that he hardly ever entered into the differences of opinion unless directly approached, and even then his decisions very frequently had a more temporary than permanent character, often ending with the statement, “The Fuehrer reserves for himself the final decision in this matter.” Not only was Hitler not inclined to work along systematic and orderly lines, but he was given to shift his position with new ideas and inspirations. Thus there is reflected in the records of the Naval Staff a state of tension, which was expressed in a marginal note by the phrase: “The whole problem boils down to this: how can I tell it to my Fuehrer?”
Germany failed to produce a mind which could cope with the higher problems of joint operations and grand strategy. Hitler’s reputed “intuition” soon ran out and left Germany virtually leaderless, except insofar as he still maintained the reins firmly in hand and almost to the end still had firm faith in his cause. Moreover, with the outbreak of war, no facilities existed for joint- strategic planning. Later there was a semblance of such a staff in the Armed Forces Command Staff, but it was dominated by Jodi and a small Army group. Thus the three arms planned and operated pretty much independently of one another, unless forced by necessity to do otherwise. The Norwegian campaign is a notable exception of a successfully conducted joint operation.
The war against the British Isles was viewed by Goering as his own prerogative. While the Navy tried to share in this campaign, nothing has been uncovered which would indicate that there was anything like joint Navy-Air Force planning. The actual situation tended to give the Navy the role of supporting the air arm, provided the Air Force could spare the Navy the material for such support.
By the end of 1943, the Germans knew that they faced enemies in the west who had successfully coordinated their forces by land, sea, and air. They recognized that a major assault on “Fortress Europe” was imminent, but nothing appears to have been done to develop over-all strategy for combined land- sea-air defense. It is true that, in the face of this danger, Field Marshal v. Rundstedt was set up as joint commander, but he did not even have a joint armed forces staff—only an army staff to advise him in a situation which obviously called for joint defense. In August, 1944, with Allied forces well established in France, the responsible army and navy commanders in the west were still debating whether coastal fortifications should properly be commanded by army or navy officers.
It is thus apparent that the German joint command organization did not cope effectively with the problems of modern war. Joint command exercised by the Fuehrer and merged administration carried out by the Armed Forces High Command failed to establish a proper balance between the three arms and to secure for each the assignment most desirable for the common objective.