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the war reports of general
MARSHALL, GENERAL ARNOLD, ADMIRAL KING. Foreword by Walter Millis. New York: J. B. Lippincott Company. 1947. 801 pages. $7.50.
Reviewed by Senior Professor Allan Westcott, U. S. Naval Academy
Here, readily available for present day readers and future students, are gathered the nine reports—three by each leader—of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, the men who during four years bore the heaviest responsibilities for the American conduct of the war. The reports, even though they may veil to some extent the problems, difficulties, and crosspurposes, reveal clearly how the course of the war was viewed by those in best position to know, not only when its outcome was determined, but during the critical years.
Though contemporary history in themselves, and invaluable material for history, the reports have limitations which the authors themselves would readily acknowledge. In the first place, while generous in recognizing the contribution of all arms, each writer was primarily and properly concerned in presenting the record of his own branch of the national service. In wartime, furthermore, there were essential restrictions on the information that could be made public. And finally, however gifted with knowledge and foresight, the writers could not always measure accurately the success of their own undertakings; nor were their enemies’ plans, purposes, difficulties, and losses fully revealed at that time.
The reports as here brought together show interesting differences in tone and content, best suggested, perhaps, by a paraphrase of Walter Millis’s comment in his brief Foreword. He speaks of “the touch of broad statesmanship” in General Marshall’s reports, of his concern with political as well as military issues, with problems of production, and with both past and future military policy. Of General Arnold’s series, he remarks that they are “the most dramatic and least formal”; their author is “passionately convinced of the significance of the air contribution” and eager to make it generally understood. Of Admiral King’s series it is said that they are chiefly factual in content and “admirably express the terse, self- contained, and rigidly professional traditions of the Navy.”
The order in which the reports are here printed, indicated by the sequence of names in the title, is explained largely by the fact that General Marshall’s reports usually appeared earlier, and are more comprehensive in scope. The Arnold series are placed next because they are more closely related and supplementary to those of the Army. The Navy series come last since they were later in date of issue, and since, though the Navy’s contribution was vital in all theaters, its major effort was in the Pacific War.
The complete trustworthiness of these reports, and the feeling of confidence which they inspired in American readers and throughout the Allied world, are well known. The counsel which they give and the lessons which they draw for the future may seem to have lost something of their immediacy even after the lapse of some two years. But in truth the records here presented will bear the closest study, not only by statesmen and strategists of our own time, but by those of years to come.
AMERICAN SEA POWER SINCE 1775.
Edited by Allan Westcott. Philadelphia,
Pa.: J. B. Lippincott Co. 1947. 609
pages. $5.00.
Reviewed by Captain John B.
Heffernan, U. S. Navy
The preface declares that “the present volume is primarily an operational history of the Navy,” and goes on to mention the continued importance of sea power. It is the work of seven members of the Department of English, History, and Government, of the Naval Academy: J. Roger Fredland; William W. Jeffries; Neville T. Kirk; Thomas F. McManus; Elmer B. Potter; Richard S. West, Jr.; Allan Westcott. The chapters on the Revolution, War of 1812, and Spanish War were the work of Westcott, and are very good. The excellent chapters on the Civil War and the years immediately following it were written by West, whose biographies of Gideon Welles and David D. Porter are outstanding.
Among other chapters in the book are three entitled “Geography and War Strategy”; “Geography and Logistics”; “Sea Power, Life Lines, and Bases.” These chapters contain many facts worth thinking about, and some useful conclusions, but they also place before the reader an astonishing amount of misinformation. The Hawaiian Islands are referred to as our “defense” in the Pacific; we read “Britain had to let Singapore and her possessions in the Far East go by default because it was simply too far to send and maintain a large enough army”; and, also, “Lake Champlain has twice proved a barrier to successful invasion from Canada.” All three of these statements betray a lack of understanding of Sea Power, and they are doubly surprising in a book with this title. Elsewhere in this volume the excellent accounts of the two Battles of Lake Champlain make plain that the Lake was the only satisfactory route for invasion; it was no barrier! The squadrons which disputed a southward advance were the barriers! The writer of this chapter concludes that naval officers fail to understand geography because they are accustomed to Mercator charts; and he states that Truk was by-passed because we found a shorter route. The chapters on logistics and bases serve to draw attention to the importance of both, but they leave me with the impression that the writer is confused about the meaning and significance of Sea Power. He quotes Lord Fisher, “Five keys lock up the world,” but cites no authority. Mahan repudiated this idea in his book, Naval Strategy, pages 212-213.
The account of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 seems to be based on contemporary newspaper reports and >s superficial. The Bibliography is almost silent on this subject. The writer should have consulted Yo\mg\Powerfid America (1936); Yardley, American Black Chamber (1931); Knox, Eclipse of American Sea Power (1922); Sullivan, Great Adventure (1922); Blythe, Trained and Untrained Seals, Saturday Evening Post, March 11, 1922.
Potter’s narrative of World War II is good, on the whole. His account of the operations of the Wasp (Captain Forrest Sherman) m the Solomons, however, is inaccurate; his dissertations on the relative performances of types of ships sound like newspaper writing; his remarks on the strategic decisions of task force commanders in the Central Pacific ignore the fact that they were following the plans of Admiral Nimitz; he fails to emphasize the Sea Power significance of the Japanese plane losses at Santa Cruz; he makes various far-fetched comparisons; in the account of the Battle for Leyte Gulf, his statement that Vice Admiral Frederick C- Sherman’s carriers took no part in the attacks of October 23 is erroneous; and there is no mention of the Sea Power lessons involved in the failure of the Italian Navy-
This book is good, but it should be better. The basic idea is splendid, but much of the present material should give way to a sound exposition of the principles of Sea Power exemplified in various campaigns. The two final pages are a summing up, but they are disappointing.
Editorial Note.—American Sea Power Since 1775 was written to fill an immediate need for a one-volume textbook on American naval history which would give adequate coverage to the naval operations of World War II aod reduce the earlier history to its proper proportions ln relation with World War II. More inaccuracies than reported by the reviewer will probably be discovered as more and more classified material is released by the Navy Department.
Also, it is possible that various experienced readers and commentators will not agree in some emphases, and •n the scope, significance of treatment, and pointing up of logistics, broad strategy, and the importance to our sea power of the submarine effort, the Marine Corps, and Naval Aviation. As in the case of specific inaccuracies noted above, it is expected that the authorship, in collaboration with official sources, will in future revisions execute essential reorientation of treatment as may be indicated. In this connection the Editor is informed that the text, in its employment by the midshipmen at the U. S. Naval Academy during the year, will be supplemented by such additional material as Admiral Spruance’s paper, “Victory in the Pacific”, and Rear Admiral Ofstie’s “War in the Pacific.”
JANE’S FIGHTING SHIPS, 1944^45 (Corrected to April, 1946). Edited by Francis E. McMurtrie. New York: The Macmillan Company. $19.00.
Reviewed by Assistant Professor Ellery H. Clark, Jr., U. S.
Naval Academy
Jane's forty-eighth edition is bigger and better than ever. A record total number of pages and illustrations substantiates the first assertion, while ample fresh, accurate textual and photographic material confirms the second.
The current edition makes full use of its Janus-like position and both looks ahead editorially to the immediate naval future and also reviews textually and photographically the recent war at sea.
One of the more prominent attributes is an excellent War Loss section. In this the statistics indirectly emphasize the rather well publicized sinkings accomplished by submarines, but directly record the less familiar war losses of 1112 submarines by the navies of the United States, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, and Japan.
The publishers express two significant opinions: one, that this is the last time that the German and Japanese navies are likely to be recorded in Fighting Ships, and the other, that only five of Britain’s battleships meet today’s modern requirements.
The navies of the United States and Great Britain deservedly fill approximately one- third of this volume. For the first time, new construction accomplished by both of these navies during World War II is portrayed fully and accurately. In particular, the carrier sections are very well done.
Selected from more than 700 new illustrations (another record), Britain’s standard type cruiser Swiftsure occupies the frontispiece position. Of the American photographs, one of the best is of the Iowa, although by sheer force of numbers the Midway, with ten illustrations, leads them all. Perhaps the most striking photograph is of France’s Richelieu.
Jane’s first post-World War II edition has been well worth waiting for and stands as a tangible tribute to Mr. McMurtrie’s careful compilation, selection, and analysis of material. The naval student will find this edition particularly enjoyable and profitable reading.
MAHAN ON SEA POWER. By William E. Livezey. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma. 1947. 334 pages. $3.50.
Reviewed by Richard S. West,
Jr., Associate Professor, U. S.
Naval Academy
Alfred T. Mahan, America’s great naval philosopher and prophet, was more fortunate than most prophets in that his main thesis was widely acclaimed during his own lifetime. In 1890, when there appeared his first “sea-power” book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, the nations of Europe were poised for a naval building race to back up their imperialistic aims in Africa and Asia. Mahan’s fresh analysis of the dependence of Britain’s empire upon her sea power tipped the scales, as the unbiassed opinion of an expert outsider, in favor of “Big Navy” interests in England and in Germany, and eventually in Japan. American naval men, toward whom Mahan’s ideas were particularly leveled, happened at the moment to be so engrossed with technological problems as to neglect his theories at first, but Senator Lodge and young Theodore Roosevelt were at hand to hail Mahan as the inspired prophet of a new American imperialism.
Two world wars have occurred since Mahan’s day. It is fitting now for historians to appraise Mahan’s ideas, to correlate them with the thought currents of his time, and estimate their influence upon the course of events. Such is the considerable historical chore which the historian William E. Livezey has taken upon himself in his competent and scholarly volume Mahan On Sea Power.
After an excellent biographical chapter, Mr. Livezey presents chapters on Mahan as an historian, Mahan’s sea power doctrine, the doctrine’s reception abroad, and its implications for the United States. The bulk of Mahan On Sea Power is then devoted to analyses of Mahan’s ideas on such topics as strategic interests in the Caribbean, Hawaii, the Philippines, and the Far East.
Mr. Livezey’s study is the most thorough of its kind that has been made. The author has critically examined the whole corpus of Mahan’s writing—collection of personal letters, magazine articles, and books—and has brought together for appraisal all of Mahan’s main ideas. Through emphasis of these ideas, and especially through chronological study of their development, the author builds up a picture of the very special type of historian which Mahan was: “ . . . with a tinge of mysticism, a touch of dogmatism, and an air of omniscience, in schoolmaster fashion and in language with a strong moral undercurrent.”
In his concluding chapter, “Mahan Yesterday and Today,” Livezey proclaims Mahan as “a geopolitical thinker,” a precursor of Halford Mackinder and a preceptor of Karl Haushofer. But in other respects Mahan’s niche in history is made somewhat smaller in size. His prime doctrine of the superiority of the line-of-battle ship has been undermined somewhat, thinks Livezey, by phenomenal developments of submarines and aircraft. Mahan was greater in the role of “propagandist-publicist” than as an historian. “His interpretation of history was both too simple and too inclusive, and often misleading.” As an empire builder “he must be viewed as one of many who played a part in shaping the policies of the United States as she came of age.”
An eleven-page chronological list of books and articles written by Mahan and a fifteen- page select bibliography are useful additions to this scholarly study.
PEARL HARBOR: THE STORY OF THE SECRET WAR. By George Morgen- stern. New York: The Devin-Adair Company. 1947. 425 pages. $3.00.
Reviewed by Associate Professor E. B. Potter, U. S. Naval Academy
Chicago Tribune editorial writer George Morgenstern has waded with a not unbiased mind into the more than 10,000 pages of testimony gathered by the four official investigations of the Pearl Harbor tragedy, and has come up with some original and startling conclusions. Going considerably beyond the opinions set forth in the minority report of last year’s Joint Congressional Committee, he contends that President Roosevelt and his top civilian and military advisers deliberately thrust the United States into an unpopular and unnecessary war for reasons of personal ambition and political aggrandizement, in order to conceal failure of New Deal domestic policies, or through subservience to foreign interests.
According to the Morgenstern version, the Washington Administration first tried to prod the European Axis Powers into committing an overt act by waging an undeclared and unconstitutional war on their vessels in the Atlantic. When this maneuver failed, the President and the Secretary of State calculatedly set about provoking Japan into making an attack, which by the terms of the Tripartite Pact would also force Germany and Italy into war with the United States. While the machinery of provocation was underway, American Army and Navy leaders went into collusion with the British and Dutch in the southwest Pacific area and concocted an agreement for joint action in the event of war or the threat of war in that area. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Hull, made fully aware of the effect of his policies by Japanese reaction, brought the situation
rapidly to a head and on November 26, 1941, presented Japan with terms which he knew would be taken as an ultimatum and mean war. Further information now made it abundantly clear that the Japanese were about to strike, and that their plans included an air raid on Pearl Harbor. During this critical period the U. S. War and Navy Departments sent to commanders at Pacific stations only ambiguous dispatches which could certainly not properly be termed “war warnings” but were merely calculated to confuse. When on December 6 the very hour of the coming attack was known, Washington withheld information from the forward bases until late in the morning of the 7th and then deliberately routed it in such a manner that it arrived after the first blows had been struck. “The silence in Washington,” says Morgenstern, “can yield to no other explanation than a desire to do nothing that would deter or forestall the attack which would produce the overt act so long and so fervently sought. When the price of silence proved to be 2,326 lives, it was necessary to add two more victims to the list—Admiral Kimmel and General Short.”
Morgenstern’s book will no doubt remain the classic statement of the extreme position of arch-isolationists and Roosevelt haters. As such it should prove of value if only as a straw man for future historians to demolish. Its major assumptions, meanwhile, fall by their very absurdity. Few persons in this day of new and terrible weapons will agree that the United States had no vital stake in the problem of halting the spread of fascism over Europe, Asia, and Africa, or that we could have permitted friendly powers to be overrun by aggressor nations without peril to our own way of life. Students of military strategy will recognize that our Army and Navy were acting normally and prudently in planning for joint action with the British and Dutch in the face of the growing threat in the Orient. Failure to make such plans would have been nothing less than criminal negligence. To call such an agreement an “alliance” is to overlook the fact that ratifying treaties and declaring war are functions of Congress. Credulity becomes strained to the point of nonsense when one is asked to believe that the Administration and high Army and Navy leaders, in their determination to force the Japanese into an overt act, deliberately exposed the Pacific Fleet to destruction and the United States to possible defeat. Few, moreover, will be willing to concede that men of the caliber of Roosevelt, Stimson, Knox, Marshall, and Stark were willing for personal advantage to involve themselves in a tissue of lies and deceit, to compel silence on the part of their subordinates by threats and intimidation, and finally to destroy documents and rig government files in order to throw suspicion off themselves. Posterity may decide that in Washington there was bungling and perhaps too precious a regard for secrecy; it is inconceivable that history will stigmatize the administration leaders of 1941 as partners in a sort of criminal collusion.
SJOMANSUNIFORMEN I OLIKA MARINER GENOM TIDERNA (The Seaman’s Uniform in Various Navies at Different Epochs). By Bertil Jacobsen. Stockholm, Orlogspostens Forlag, 1946. 31 pages text, 7 plates of colored drawings. Price not given.
Reviewed by Commander C. P. Lemieux, U. S. Naval Reserve
This monograph gives a brief but detailed discussion of the seaman’s uniform in various maritime countries. The Swedish uniforms are considered in greatest detail.
It is interesting to consider the similarities of the enlisted man’s uniform the world over, and yet there are details in each model that mark the wearer as a member of a given national fleet. In wartime, our navies seek only the destruction of the enemy; but in time of peace, naval smartness, pride in the uniform, and a certain aesthetic fitness of the sea make all seamen members of a world-wide family. Up to the year 1800 the variations in seaman’s dress from one nation to another were more marked. From the time of Nelson, navies great and small have copied the British pattern.
The text of 21 pages is supplemented by 7 plates of color drawings representing 63 different uniforms from 1550 to 1946. There are 10 pages of textual comment on the 63 figures.