The inherent traditions of the British Navy received a bad jolt in December, 1945, when the Admiralty made the announcement that the payment of prize money in World War II would be the last occasion on which it would be distributed.
Thus passes into oblivion one of the most ancient prerogatives remaining to the Royal Navy. The decision was gracefully camouflaged as “conforming to modem conditions of service.” However, it doubtless was the result of the same combination of complications that brought about an act of Congress in 1899 abolishing prize money for the United States Navy, namely, the great difficulty experienced in adjudicating claims.
Prize money existed when the earliest surviving records of England’s Navy were written. In 1205 King John of England issued a distribution list for prize money, and in 1340 Edward III decreed,
If ships in the King’s pay, either the whole fleet or a part of it, take prize, the King to have one- fourth part, the owners one-fourth, and the other half to be shared in equal portions among the captors. Of the half the Admiral shall have out of each ship two shares, i.e., the portion of two mariners, if he be present, but if absent, one share only.
In those days very few ships were regularly maintained as men-of-war. When a navy was required, ships were hired, the owners furnishing the crews, more or less paralleling the method then in use for raising armies.
In time distinct types of ships were designed as men-of-war, and about the reign of Henry VIII, the Royal Navy emerged as a permanent force, although it did not entirely supersede the private ship hired or licensed to prey on enemy shipping.
Men-of-war had the primary mission of engaging enemy men-of-war, the taking of prizes being in the nature of an avocation. As men-of-war usually carried no cargoes, they were of little monetary value to their captors, and in addition, taking them exposed the personnel of the capturing ship to the dangers incident to a sea battle.
For centuries the prospect of prize money had been a compelling inducement in persuading men to accept the privations of life at sea, and the absence of such opportunity in men-of-war made it difficult for them to secure crews.
To stimulate the procurement of crews for men-of-war, and to lessen the inducement for them to shun battling enemy men-of-war when a more easily taken and more valuable private ship could be overhauled instead, an additional variety of prize money came into use. Officially designated a “bounty,” and known to sailors down through the years as “head money,” this method of reward was based on the number of guns and the size of the crew carried by a defeated enemy ship.
Although in those days every vessel sighted at sea was a possible prize, and many sizeable awards came the way of those fortunate enough to share in the capture of valuable enemy ships, life on board ship was made exceedingly unattractive by the brutal methods used in enforcing discipline on board men-of-war, the poor living accommodations, and the miserable food. As a result recruiting did not begin to provide the necessary men, and recourse was made to the press gangs of evil fame.
Prize money came into full flower during the reigns of Henry VIII and his daughter Elizabeth. Both of these rulers were intensely interested in the proceeds from captures made at sea, many of which were little short of piracy.
The Elizabethan era was marked by rich hauls from Spanish treasure ships which ploughed both the Atlantic and the Pacific. It is said that Elizabeth made private bargains with the adventurous seamen of her time to insure a steady flow into her hands of needed money.
Sir Francis Drake, who sailed completely around the world plundering Spanish possessions as he went, returned to England with loot valued at some $8,000,000, a fabulous sum of money in those days.
Seymour, Frobisher, Cavendish, Hawkins, and Raleigh were all historical figures in the raids on French and Spanish commerce, to be succeeded in the next generation by Sir Henry Morgan, the greatest freebooter of all time.
The Seven Years’ War, which extended to all the waters of the globe, was another period of rich reward to victors on the sea. Admiral Lord Anson made a cruise which netted him personally $600,000. The Spanish treasure ship Hermione had an appraised value of $2,500,000 which gave every seamen who participated in the capture the tidy sum of $2,300. One British admiral of around that time must have been fortune’s favorite as he left an estate of some $6,000,000, which his will stated had practically all come from prize money.
In World War I, the British Navy shared in a fund of some $67,000,000, and it is anticipated that the pot to be divided this time will total about $96,000,000.
Taking its cue directly from British law, the Continental Congress authorized prize money and regulated its distribution. In 1799 the United States Congress provided a scale of participation that remained in effect with only slight modifications until 1862.
In accordance with this law all captured men-of-war became the, property of the United States. All other ships superior in force to the captor in either crew or gun power became the sole property of the victor, but if of inferior force, the United States took half the value.
The law went on to prescribe a bounty scaled on the ordnance of the period, $220 for every 24-pounder on down to $50 for guns smaller than 9-pounders, and $40 for every prisoner taken. As this law provided nothing unless the prize was brought into port, it was later amended to allow $20 for every person on an enemy ship that was sunk in an engagement. It, however, remained more profitable to take prizes into port.
The ship’s share was divided into 20 parts, of which the captain took 3 unless he had to share with a superior when it became 2, commissioned officers divided 2, warrant officers 2, chief petty officers 3, petty officers 3, and seamen and marines 7.
In 1862 the ratio of distribution was slightly changed, but the “head money” was increased to $100 for every person on an enemy ship of inferior force, and $200 if of equal or superior force to the United States ship which captured or destroyed it.
Although the fabulous sums realized when British ships captured treasure-carrying Spanish galleons were never duplicated by United States crews, many rich captures were made. The Continental ship Ranger had a successful cruise which gave each seaman a $700 share, and in 1812 the little sloop-of-war Peacock during one short cruise sent in prizes valued at $635,000.
Congress allowed the crew of the frigate United States $200,000 for capturing and bringing into port the British frigate Macedonian, but for the captures of the Java and the Guerrière, which were burned at sea, the crew of the Constitution received only $50,000 for each victory.
It must have been a bitter disappointment to Commodore Hull when he ordered the still seaworthy Guerrière destroyed for lack of a prize crew to take the ship into port, as he estimated it had a prize value of $300,000 delivered to a prize court in the United States.
During the Civil War the prize money distributed^, totaled about $12,500,000, a relatively modest sum considering the length of the war. Some of the captured blockade runners carried cargoes of cotton that netted capturing ships as much as a half million dollars.
Strange as it may seem, the Mississippi River was the scene of several lucrative seizures by ships of the Mississippi River Squadron, from which at least one navy family acquired a fortune that provided three generations with a competence.
Lieutenant Commander William B. Cushing and his 14 companions received $77,000 for sinking the Confederate ironclad Albemarle, an exploit that was one of the daring deeds of the war.
The sinking of the Alabama by the Kearsarge in 1864 brought the crew of the latter only $190,000 in “head money,” illustrating the inconsistency in terms of cash between a hard fought battle and capturing a valuable but innocuous blockade runner. Furthermore, although it was a popular victory, Congress for some now unknown reason did not appropriate money to meet the award until 1872.
Another quirk in prize money law was the share allotted the flag officer to whose command ships taking prizes belonged. To participate in the money he did not need be anywhere near the scene of the action. Admiral Lord Nelson received $62,000 when ships under his command, but on detached duty, captured Spanish vessels with valuable cargoes.
Commodore Chauncey did not take part in the Battle of Lake Erie, but the ships belonged to his command and he drew $12,750 from the $255,000 appropriated by Congress for distribution. Chauncey’s part has long since been forgotten while the memory of Oliver Hazard Perry lives on despite his share having been only $7,140.
An interesting side-light on the Lake Erie prize money is the fact that the distribution list contains the names of the members of an Army detachment which helped man Perry’s ships, being one of the few instances when the Army participated in such awards. The allocations ran from $2,295 for an Army captain down to $215 for a private.
The Navy’s prize money prerogative was long a source of pique to the Army. When Santiago, Cuba, was captured in 1898, Army personnel was first to board several Spanish vessels found in port, and the Army made claim for prize money. The courts denied the claim, much to the Army’s chagrin, and the money went to the Navy for having maintained the blockade which kept the ships in port and permitted the capture.
Very little prize money came to the Navy for its part in the Spanish American War. The $760,000 allocated by Congress was practically all “head money” resulting from the Manila Bay and Santiago actions. It had such a wide distribution that it was spread very thin, and when Congress in 1899, wearied with the difficulty of reconciling prize money claims and in keeping with new ideas on the subject, abolished all prize money and bonuses, the Navy registered little objection. Since then a new generation, to which prize money is only a name in history, has held the helm in the Navy.
The British found an equitable distribution of World War I prize money no easy task, and now that the Royal Air Force has been granted participation, the increased difficulties, together with the relatively small sum for the forces engaged and the length of the war, has evidently broken down traditional British antipathy to meddling with old customs, and they are following the lead set by the United States 47 years ago.