In the waning days of World War lithe public began to catch on to the fact that there is a lot more to a far-flung naval war than just the shooting. Newspapers began saying that the American answer to the most gigantic logistics problem in naval history—that of supplying provisions, fuel, ammunition, and repairs for warships far from bases and docking facilities—was the true "secret weapon" that upset Japanese strategy.
Though this many-edged weapon was many months in the forging, its plan was writ in the fire and chaos of the attack on Pearl Harbor and the dark months that followed it. During the desperate days when the Japanese tide was flooding southward through the Pacific, overrunning island after island, somebody foresaw the ebb of that tide and had the moral courage to prepare for it. The strategic pattern was clear. Jap-held islands would have to be recaptured, one by one; units of the Jap fleet would be engaged whenever and wherever they could be caught; and the enemy merchant fleet would be strangled so that it could not support the outposts of the new Empire of the Rising Sun.
All this had to be done with a Navy far from home; indeed, often far from ports of any sort. This meant that every striking force of the Navy must constitute an advanced naval base in itself. And so, as the Japanese tide began to recede, and the islands began to be reconquered, tenders and repair ships and other ships with specialized duties became an important part of the battle fleet.
Repair ships steamed in toward conquered islands even before the famed Seabees could get ashore to begin their construction of shore installations. The repair crews aboard those floating shops began their work of servicing and repairing everything from combat vessels to amphibious tanks the minute the anchors of their ships touched bottom in coral lagoon or malarious roadstead. As the fleet advanced slowly, pushing the enemy back step by step toward his homeland, other repair crews went ashore on reconquered islands and set up shop on a more stable basis. In the meantime the combat arm of the fleet was moving northwestward and the repair ships—the Adonis the Jason, the Luzon, and the other ugly ducklings of the Navy—followed in its wake, patching up battle damage as fast as the Japs could inflict it.
Big ships, badly hurt, might return to one of the island bases. There an advanced base sectional dock—literally a mobile dry dock, and a device new to the Navy—might help to overhaul a ship near the scene of action, or to effect temporary repairs so she could make it safely back to her home port. By use of these advanced base sectional docks, generally known as ABSD's, many a ship was spared a time-consuming trip back to a mainland port for repairs; indeed many a ship was saved by them.
The circle of Japanese domination grew smaller and weaker, but there still remained a broad area, even at the last, in which the surface ships of the United Nations could strike only spasmodically, and it was in that area that the Japanese were most sensitive to attack, for it was over those waters that their lines of communication ran, dependent upon their attenuated mercantile marine and their rapidly dwindling escort vessels. Upon the fringe of this circle the tenders and the repair ships hovered. Battle-damaged ships were repaired and resupplied in days, instead of weeks, and were back in the fray again. Instead of sending them back to naval bases, the naval bases were taken out to them.
The beginning of the "Monkey Wrench Navy."—Against this strategic backdrop a mere 20,000 men played one of the most important supporting roles in the war. They were the men who kept the combat ships in fighting trim—the repair crews on repair ships and on almost-forgotten island bases in the rear areas. They had no worthy champion to make them glamorous in the public eye, no tangy name, like the Seabees, to lend romance to their work. They just worked, these men of the "Monkey Wrench Navy."
Known formally by the prosaic name of "Ship Repair Units," these repair forces had their beginning while a pall of smoke still hung over Pearl Harbor, while fires still smoldered, before anybody really knew how much damage had been done by the Japanese sneak attack. It was merely by fortuity that the Navy already had the nucleus of a Ship Repair Unit at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. The assembly of two destroyer-repair units had been authorized in June, 1941, and the Destroyer Base at San Diego was designated as the place at which the units were to be trained and assembled.
The original plan was to send Destroyer Repair Unit No. 1 to Londonderry, Ireland, to man the Naval Operating Base nearing completion at that time. This base was being built as part of the plan for transferring 50 overage destroyers to the Royal Navy in exchange for the use of naval bases scattered throughout the British Empire. The ultimate destination of Destroyer Repair Unit No. 2 was to be some point in Scotland.
Personnel to man those bases were carefully selected by name from various repair ships of the United States Fleet. Materials and equipment with which the bases were to be supplied were being assembled at a point on the east coast. Material for the two units, with the exception of diving equipment, was already arriving in the British Isles at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. In fact, a small group of men already had been detached from Destroyer Repair Unit No. 1 for the purpose of setting up machinery before the arrival of the main contingent. By December 7, 1941, Destroyer Repair Unit No. 1 consisted of 671 officers and men, and No. 2 was made up of some 480 officers and men.
Almost immediately after the Japanese attack on December 7 the two units were consolidated and sent to Pearl Harbor to assist in the repair and salvage of ships damaged there. All men with artificer ratings were selected for that duty. All commissioned officers and warrant officers of Destroyer Repair Unit No. 1 and all warrant officers of Unit No. 2 were sent.
The battle to save the remains at Pearl Harbor.—The first contingent of the Ship Repair Unit arrived at Pearl Harbor on December 21, 1941, just two weeks after the disastrous attack. When it arrived no arrangements had been made for berthing or messing the 1,100 men, and they were forced to sleep in the open on the grass and live on whatever food they could find. Much of it was salvaged from the stores of the sunken vessels until better arrangements could be made. Some of the men slept in a sports arena, which they later screened to keep mosquitoes out. The officers fared slightly better. They were billeted in unfurnished houses and slept on canvas cots, eight officers being assigned to each four-room house.
Before the unit could begin its all-important job of salvaging the sunken vessels, it had to build barracks in which to live. Men who could be spared from the job of constructing living quarters were put to work on the salvage job immediately; the others joined them as the barracks were completed.
Among the members of this first Ship Repair Unit were about 30 divers. They were completely equipped, because they had been using their diving gear for training at San Diego, and had not shipped it to Ireland with the other equipment. These men took over the biggest part of the diving job at Pearl Harbor, because only a few divers were in the regular navy yard complement there. Thousands of man hours of feverish underwater labor resulted in only one fatal accident. The work was arduous and often extremely dangerous. Food and other supplies decayed in the flooded compartments of ships as the work progressed, and as the ship repair men used cutting torches and drills there was constant danger of touching off inflammable gases generated by the decomposing matter. Parts of the structures of the sunken ships had been seriously weakened, and sometimes only a slight impact would cause them to collapse.
Much of the initial work was necessarily salvage work, because no salvage crew was available at that time. This included the removal of the bodies of many men trapped in compartments deep down in the ships. Some of the divers found compartments that had remained watertight, and the men sealed in these underwater tombs had kept logs that indicated that they had survived for many days. In vessels that had been gutted by fire, terrific heat had burned all of the stores, and most of the remains of the crews that had stayed behind to combat the flames. In one such ship several helmets on the deck concealed the mute evidence of the fight a gallant crew had made against the inferno. Each helmet concealed a small heap of ashes and a few fragments of teeth. In other ships the salvage crew of the Ship Repair Unit had to stand at the mouth of the suction hose and push bodies away until the flooded compartments could be pumped.
Diving equipment was utilized to salvage as much apparatus and as many tools as could be clawed from the sodden bowels of the sunken warships. Everything was scarce, and frequently the repair unit had to salvage the necessary tools before it could go ahead with a repair job. Electric motors were salvaged to drive salvaged machine tools, and eventually a whole machine shop and an electrical shop were built from these retrieved materials. Much of the office equipment—desks, typewriters, filing cabinets, and other furniture—was recovered from the sunken ships. Something had to be done with it. So the Ship Repair Unit extended its activities and soon had an efficient typewriter- repair shop going at full speed.
The idea begins to grow.—Five months after the first Ship Repair Unit went into action 140 officers and men were detached from it and sent back to San Diego to become the nucleus of a second unit. Meanwhile, the warrant officers of Destroyer Repair Unit No. 2 were detached and sent to Londonderry, the original destination of the group. It was at about this same time that the two units were merged and designated as the Pearl Harbor Salvage Detail.
None of the equipment originally set aside for Destroyer Repair Units No. 1 and No. 2 ever reached Pearl Harbor, Moreover, the new unit never was officially commissioned, which was a drawback, for no maintenance fund was available. Though some funds were available in a roundabout way, the unit never had any of its own. As a result, everything the Ship Repair Unit acquired had to be salvaged from the sunken ships or "procured" through various ingenious means.
For example, much equipment was "acquired" from stores destined for such places as the Dewey Drydock at Manila, which was at that time in Japanese hands. This stock of machinery, according to orders, was to be stored at Pearl Harbor, so the Ship Repair Unit worked out a new system of storage. A large warehouse was built, the machinery was uncrated, some person or persons unknown promptly bolted it to the floor, and a new repair shop went into operation in the warehouse. These somewhat irregular methods of getting things done earned the name "Scavengers" for the Pearl Harbor Salvage Detail and its officer-in-charge was ignominiously dubbed "Jake the Snake." Since those ribald days all Ship Repair Units have acquired an aura of respectability.
As the demand for salvage personnel decreased, the unit was called upon to make many voyage repairs on ships, and in November, 1942, the unit became known officially as Ship Repair Unit, Pearl Harbor. Its complement was established as 1,329 officers and men.
At about this same time the repair ship Medusa departed from Pearl Harbor, and most of the ship-repair work of the base was left to the Ship Repair Unit, though its equipment was far from equal that aboard the Medusa. Much of the ship-repair work came unexpectedly, and had to be done in a short time, so some long-term jobs such as erection of buildings and ordnance alterations were taken as "filler" on a low-priority basis. The Ship Repair Unit undertook installation of all of the Mark 14 sights in the area, and claims the distinction of installing the first 20-mm. guns on cruisers of the Pacific Fleet.
Installation of the 20-mm. guns posed a Special problem, one entirely new to the Ship Repair men. Nobody seemed to know much about the firing characteristics of the guns. Would they require special reinforcing or strengthening members for their mounting aboard ship? To remove any doubt, men of the Ship Repair Unit mounted both 20-mm. and 50-caliber guns on an old truck and attached a vibrometer to it. Comparative firing tests on the range showed that the bigger 20-mm. gun causes less vibration than the 50-caliber Browning machine gun. Consequently, installation of the 20-mm. gun was simplified, and much material and time was saved. This was but one of the many problems Ship Repair men had to solve in their own way.
Ingenuity averts a naval disaster.—At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor six United States battleships, several cruisers, a few destroyers, and the base force were lying at anchor or were undergoing minor repairs at the Naval Base. Fortunately, the larger part of the fleet, including the aircraft carriers, was on maneuvers at the time.
The battleships Pennsylvania, West Virginia, California, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Nevada were all damaged in the attack. Of these, all except the Oklahoma and Arizona were returned to service and piled up impressive action records during the rest of the war, partly as a result of the initial work of the Ship Repair Unit. The Arizona and Oklahoma were so badly damaged that they were not considered to be worth repair, but they yielded tremendous quantities of machinery and equipment which were salvaged and reconditioned by the Ship Repair Unit for subsequent issue to the fleet.
One of the first jobs undertaken by the unit was the raising of the floating dry dock YFD-2 upon which the destroyer Shaw was docked at the time of the attack. This job was an extremely cumbersome one, and took about four weeks. Diving was made difficult by large quantities of fuel oil in the water, which made visibility poor, even with the strongest lights. To complicate the job even more, the divers had to burrow through mud to repair the forward end of the dry dock, which was under 2 feet of water at low tide. As soon as the dry dock had been raised the Ship Repair Unit rebuilt and returned to service the Sotoyoma, a yard craft that had been in the dock with the Shaw, and had been gutted by fire. The unit also prepared the Shaw for the installation of her new bow.
Some of that first repair work was filled with discouragement and frustration. For example, the Nevada had suffered a bomb hit on her bow, leaving a hole almost 25 feet in diameter. The Ship Repair Unit was assigned to the job of installing a wooden patch over that hole, which exposed several of the forward compartments. The patch had been put in place, pumping had been started, and the Nevada was beginning to come off the bottom according to schedule. Then suddenly all hell broke loose for a few minutes. In one of the forward compartments a work man innocently lighted his welding torch and touched off a pocket of hydrogen sulphide gas that had been generated by decaying supplies. The low-pressure explosion blew off the wooden patch, down went the bow of the Nevada, and work had to be started all over again. Fortunately, none of the repair unit was seriously injured.
One of the more interesting and exacting phases of the Pearl Harbor salvage project was the transfer of the destroyers Cassin and Downes back to the United States. The hulls of both destroyers were badly damaged by bombardment as they were laid up in dry dock. Almost as soon as a survey of the damage at the base was begun the hulls of the Cassin and Downes were declared useless. All but a few items of machinery seemed to be repairable, though, and some 20 frames of the stern sections of both ships were in reasonably good condition. These sections were cut off and shipped back to the States, to be used in the construction of two new ships on the ways on the west coast. The machinery was carefully crated and returned to the west coast for use in other ships.
The turret top of the California bore a hole 3 feet in diameter, jabbed through its 8 inches of tough steel by a 1,000-pound bomb. It had not exploded, so the Ship Repair Unit went on a hunt for it, found it, and returned it to the United States for analysis. The nose of the bomb that could penetrate 8 inches of armor plate was harder than any steel then known. On the California the mechanical ingenuity of the repair unit saved a good deal of time, money, and materials. Turbine-electrically driven, the California had been under water for about four months before salvage work began. Ordinarily all motors and generators in such a ship would be dismantled, rewound, and reassembled. Such treatment of the main-drive motors of a battleship is a big repair job in itself, so the Ship Repair Unit threw the rule book out the porthole and went to work on the submerged No. 4 main motor. The whole motor was flushed with fresh water to remove salt deposits, its parts were carefully cleaned, then it was dried by electrical heating elements connected to welding machines. The entire job cost only about $500, although a quarter of a million dollars originally had been appropriated.
One of the most interesting things about the salvage of the West Virginia was the way in which the Ship Repair Unit went about repairing a large jagged hole that had been torn in her side. Though the damaged part of the hull was entirely under water, a drawing of the hole was needed, so that a suitable patch could be fabricated. The repair workers tied knots in strings, a knot marking every foot of length. Then they weighted the strings and dropped them into the water so that they crossed the hole in the West Virginia's hull at intervals of one foot. With this simple device the unit's divers were able to give accurate information about the size and shape of the hole. They merely counted the number of strings and the number of knots and relayed the count to plotters on the surface.
The SRU comes of age.—In the Navy's eyes the Ship Repair Unit proved its worth by the quick and efficient way in which it solved many of the knotty problems of ship salvage and repair at Pearl Harbor, and so on May 15, 1943, Ship Repair Units became firmly entrenched in the organization of the Navy Department by a directive of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, ordering official establishment of more units, to be under Joint control of the Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Naval Personnel.
One of the major obstacles to rapid organization—an obstacle that never has been completely countered—was the shortage of men properly qualified for work in Ship Repair Units. A comprehensive recruiting program was worked out by the Bureau of Naval Personnel to attract men skilled in some 50 different trades to this new kind of naval service. The plan worked, but not well enough. Too many other organizations wanted men of the same brand: shipyards and other industries, the Army, and the Seabees.
So the organizers had to lower their sights a little. Since they could not get enough skilled men quickly enough, they began to accept semiskilled men and those who displayed special aptitude in some skill. Plans for training Ship Repair Units were laid accordingly. On the average, trainees were expected to be men newly inducted into the Naval Service, some only partly skilled in their civilian trades. Most of them were expected to require further adaptation of their skills to naval repair work. Some of the trainees were needed, of course, for the repair departments of tenders and repair ships, but a far greater number was needed for the so-called "ship repair functional components" of advanced-base units. These ship repair functional components were to receive, besides individual training in repair work, whatever training was necessary to make the members of a unit work together as a team.
SRU training and how it worked.—The fundamental principle behind the training of Ship Repair Units was that they should learn by doing actual repair jobs, and that the training should be thoroughly practical. For these reasons Ship Repair Training Units had to be centered where a reasonable number of ships would be available for repair of battle damage or for overhaul. Men selected for this service were sent to one of the navy yards at Boston, Philadelphia, Mare Island, or Puget Sound; to the Naval Frontier Base at Tompkinsville, N. Y.; or to the Naval Repair Base at San Diego or New Orleans. The Industrial Manager of the Navy Yard or Repair Base (under the Commandant or Commanding Officer) was made responsible for the actual training of all Ship Repair personnel assigned to his organization for training. To assist the Industrial Manager in discharging this responsibility the Bureau of Naval Personnel assigned to each industrial command a well-qualified Ship Repair Training Officer and a staff of officers and enlisted men. Officers for repair units were trained at navy yards within the continental limits of the United States.
A somewhat specialized Ship Repair Training Unit was established under the Commanding Officer of the U. S. Naval Landing Force Equipment Depot at Albany, California. At that station only advanced base functional components were trained in the repair of small boats and amphibious craft.
Toward the end of the war the number of enlisted men in training at each of the training activities was about as follows:
Navy Yard, Boston, 500
Navy Yard, Philadelphia, 1,000
Navy Yard, Mare Island, 1,500
Navy Yard, Puget Sound, 1,500
Naval Frontier Base, Tompkinsville, 1,050
Naval Repair Base, New Orleans, 800
Naval Repair Base, San Diego, 7,500
Naval Landing Force Equipment Depot, Albany, 1,150
When Japan capitulated in August, 1945, some 33,400 enlisted men and 1,700 officers were serving in Ship Repair Units on repair ships and tenders, and in advanced base functional components overseas. At the same time about 12,000 more enlisted men were in training within the continental limits of the United States, ready to be used as replacements or to man new units to counteract the mounting Japanese kamikaze tactics.
In general, an enlisted man assigned to a Ship Repair Training Unit went through two periods of training. The first was a four week period of regular indoctrination at a Naval Training Station, where he was taught naval history, naval traditions, and Navy Regulations, and was given rigorous physical training to put him in top physical condition for hard work to follow. The next phase of the training was the actual ship-repair training at navy yards or repair bases. Although men of this "monkey wrench Navy" were not intended to be combatants, they were taught to use weapons to defend themselves in hand-to-hand combat, and to man battle stations aboard a ship.
Development of versatility in mechanical skill and the all-round toughness of a hard-hitting fighter were the primary objectives of the intensive Ship Repair training program, which last from two to six months, depending on the individual and the type of unit to which he was to be assigned eventually.
Versatility was almost an essential qualification for these men, for units were called upon to do such diversified jobs as repairing and rebuilding engines, installing radio and radar devices, repairing damaged armament. Or they might have to install magazines, repair gun mounts, make underwater repairs, clear harbors of wrecked enemy ships, or put captured enemy ships back in action. At times the job had to be done under harassing enemy fire.
How one training unit handled the job.—Though the general objectives of all Ship Repair Training Units were identical, the curricula and methods of instruction varied somewhat from unit to unit. Probably the program of the Naval Repair Base at New Orleans is representative. At that base the training of Ship Repair personnel was divided roughly into four categories: (1) military training; (2) individual training in trade skills not normally found outside the Naval Establishment, for example, gyrocompasses, Selsyn motors, hydraulics, and electric coding machines; (3) component or group training; and (4) improvement in the individual's trade skills.
Trainees received at the Repair Base were first sent to the so-called "schools division," where for the first three days they received further indoctrination in the general policies of the unit and a more specific explanation of their military duties. This was especially important, because many of the men enlisted in the Navy as petty officers (later, when all enlisted men came into the Navy through draft-board quotas, specially qualified men became petty officers only after they had completed the Ship Repair training) and had only a vague conception of their military duties. Included in the general naval training were such topics as petty-officer training, leadership, malaria, booby traps, firefighting, small arms, eye training, Polaroid trainer, anti-aircraft measures, rescue-breathing apparatus, and night lookout.
After this general training the men were divided into divisions in which they worked at the base, and later aboard ship. In those groups they received practical instruction in the types of work they were to perform in the Navy. They were then sent into the shops or aboard ships to work at tasks corresponding with their ratings and trade abilities. While they were doing practical work they were given further instruction. Operating units, models, motion pictures, charts, and other visual training aids were used as much as possible to shorten and simplify instruction.
All trainees attended firefighting school. During a two-day course they were taught the fundamentals of modern shipboard firefighting, using dummy compartments and simulated shipboard conditions. The purpose of this course was twofold: to teach the men how to fight fires, and to teach them teamwork and co-ordination. Every student was required to learn how to operate rescue breathing apparatus in a smoke-filled structure.
One of the phases of military training that proved its value many times was the anti-aircraft training. Men from the Ship Repair Training Unit at the Naval Repair Base at New Orleans were sent to Shell Beach for a period of one week for instruction and actual firing of all anti-aircraft guns up to 3 inches in bore. This course was particularly valuable because it taught the men to defend themselves against aerial attack, and—perhaps even more important—it taught the essentials of teamwork, which is all-important in fusing a group of men together into a working component.
Under the Schools Division Officer at New Orleans were three other division officers, each in charge of the practical training of certain groups of men, according to trade skills. In the Machinery Division the course provided general instruction in most kinds of engineering repairs aboard ship. The course in the Electrical Division was designed to give the trainee a working knowledge of some phases of the electrical trade that are not familiar to the average civilian electrician. Courses given by the Hull Division were broken down according to naval ratings or trade skills, because most of the hull ratings have little relation to each other. All Hull Division classroom instruction was followed by an instructional period in the shop. For example, welders were made to qualify on Navy standards; carpenters—most of them house carpenters—were taught to apply their knowledge of house construction to ship framing and shop work.
The Training Unit at New Orleans also maintained six other courses of instruction in which attendance was governed entirely by selection, request, or aptitude. These were (1) refrigeration school, (2) hydraulic mechanism repair, (3) Higgins Diesel school, (4) velocity power tool school, (5) diving school, and (6) welding school.
Refrigeration school was open to machinist's mates and electrician's mates. It lasted six days and emphasized the repair of small refrigeration apparatus, which has caused a great deal of trouble in the fleet. Selection of students was made entirely by Division Officers.
Hydraulic mechanism repair was a 12-day course providing instruction of machinist's mates in the fundamentals of Vickers, Waterbury, and Northern hydraulic gear. Training aids used in this course included actual hydraulic equipment and many operating models manufactured by the trainees themselves. Students were selected for the course on the basis of previous experience and aptitude.
The Higgins Diesel school was operated with the help of the Higgins Boat Company, and was located on the premises of that company. The course was a thoroughly practical one, and the model engines used for instruction were actual landing-craft engines. The course was divided into three phases—basic, intermediate, and advanced—each of which required two weeks. In the advanced course men were taught "spot" diagnosis of engine troubles, as well as boat operation and fundamental navigation. All motor machinist's mates were required to take the course.
As many machinist's mates and shipfitters as could be accommodated were given the course in the use of velocity power tools. Some damage control was taught in this course, but only as it applied to the use of velocity power tools. The course required six days.
After completing the diving school the men had enough training to enable them to qualify as divers, second class. The course took six weeks and the trainee was taught not only diving but also underwater burning and welding. Before a student was permitted to make an actual dive in deep water he was given several opportunities to make trial descents in the diving tank to get the "feel" of it. The diving school worked closely with the Industrial Command at the Naval Repair Base at New Orleans, and the students and instructors did most of the routine diving at the base. Before a student could graduate from the course he had to demonstrate his proficiency at diving, and to demonstrate to his instructors that he could convert a standard gas mask into a shallow-water face plate. This was considered important, because with this knowledge a man's services as a diver could be utilized during many emergencies, even though regular diving equipment might not be available. During the course a student was required to make at least 12 dives with full equipment, not including tank dives, in addition to his qualifying dives.
To help fill the almost insatiable demand for trained welders, the Ship Repair Training Units at New Orleans and some of the other bases established welding schools to provide welders for smaller repair ships and advanced-base components. These training units recognized that in small organizations such as Ship Repair Units the actual allowances of welders as established by the Bureau of Naval Personnel could not be increased. But if the number of trade skills in a unit could be increased, the over-all effectiveness of the unit could be increased. On this basis, as many men as possible were trained to work at more than one trade. All shipfitters and metalsmiths were taught to weld, and many of them became proficient. Another reason for conducting the welding school was that quite a few trainees, though welders by trade, could weld in only one position; others could not qualify as welders according to Navy standards. Those men were taught to improve their skill and increase their usefulness.
Training of the men in groups was on a "made to order" basis, so to speak. Orders to assemble a certain type of unit usually went from the Bureau of Naval Personnel to the Ship Repair Training Unit about two months before the team or component was to be ready. As soon as the orders were received, assembly of the group was started and all training thereafter was on a group basis. The men were assigned to their own barracks, which were policed by their own master-at-arms and maintained by their own compartment-cleaning details. They were organized into sections, and all ship-repair work was done under the supervision of the section leaders.
Trainees attended the anti-aircraft and firefighting schools in teams. In this way they learned first-hand the value of teamwork and esprit de corps and attained a high caliber of self-sufficiency many weeks before they reported to their ships or bases. This kind of group training probably decreased the length of the shakedown and adjustment period and engendered the proper spirit of co-operation before the units reached combat areas.
After the courses were completed the teams were held in reserve in a pool, doing actual ship repair work, until they were eventually assigned to advanced-base components or repair ships or tenders. Almost all Ship Repair Training Units used similar curricula, although the Unit at the Naval Repair Base, New Orleans, emphasized the repair of landing craft more than the other Units; consequently a Ship Repair Unit to specialize in the repair of destroyers or capital ships would receive training somewhat different from that described here.
Organization of advanced-base components.—Every Lion Base—which as far as the Navy was concerned, was a small navy yard—had a Ship Repair component known familiarly as an El component. It was the shore equivalent of a repair ship (AR) in addition to the special facilities of a destroyer tender (AD) and a submarine tender (AS). The total complement of the Lion Base was about 13,500 Navy personnel and 35,000 Army personnel. For a Lion working on a two-shift basis the El component consisted of 22 officers and 720 enlisted men with enough ship-repair facilities to repair any vessel afloat, providing mobile docks were available. The aviation facilities at Lion Base could support the 250 planes assigned to its five or more airfields, besides any others that might be operating in the vicinity. It had complete shore-to-shore, shore-to-ship, and shore-to-plane radio equipment, hospitals, shore and harbor protection, supply depot, and recreation facilities. It was outfitted to support the entire fleet.
The E1 Ship Repair component was equipped by the Bureau of Ships to repair battle damage inflicted on any type of fleet vessel, and to maintain all types. Repair facilities were not designed for the complete overhaul and repair generally done in a continental navy yard; instead, they were designed so that the component could accomplish extensive major and minor repairs. It is difficult to estimate the number of ships that could be repaired at a Lion, because the estimate would have to depend on the types of ships and the extent of the repairs to be made. The ship-repair facilities of a Lion, considered on a weighted value of machine-tool sizes, was about one-fourth those at Pearl Harbor.
Functions of an E2 component were similar to those of an El unit, except that it specialized on repairs to capital ships. It was the shore-based equivalent of a repair ship (AR), but had no ordnance shops. For two-shift operation it had a complement of 21 officers and 695 enlisted men. For heavy hull work it had a boiler and ship fitter shop; a welding shop; a foundry and blacksmith shop; a sheet-metal shop; and a coppersmith, pipe, and welding shop. For repairs to main and auxiliary machinery of vessels it maintained three machine shops and an internal-combustion-engine shop; and for various small repairs it had six other shops.
Convoy Bases were escort repair and service bases established at convoy-escort maintenance and turn-around points. At each such base was an E3 Ship Repair component, which was approximately the shore-based equivalent of a destroyer tender (AD) except that it had no ordnance shops. The actual size of the component depended on the size of the anticipated repair load. The repair facilities of some Convoy Bases were equivalent to two destroyer tenders; others were equivalent to only one and a half, one, or even one-half an AD.
Facilities planned by the Bureau of Ships under the escort-maintenance program included the shops necessary to provide the repair equivalent of one or more destroyer tenders. In addition, it provided such collateral items of equipment as radio equipment, small boats, and mess gear.
All planning for the repair facilities of a convoy base was based on the assumption that the shore-based equivalent of a destroyer tender operating on a three-shift basis could maintain 40 destroyers, destroyer escorts, or corvettes, or 75 PC's. For three-shift operation an E3 Ship Repair component required a complement of 22 officers and 729 enlisted men. At convoy bases having docking facilities the Ship Repair component could make all voyage repairs to vessels assigned to those bases, although a few such bases were not prepared to make gyro, optical, or fire-control repairs.
Amphibious-boat repair bases were manned by two somewhat different types of Ship Repair components. One was the E6, a landing craft base repair component; the other was the E10, designated as a standard landing craft unit-maintenance component. The E6 component repaired both hulls and engines of all types of landing craft, but was specifically designed to maintain the following craft and provide them with spare parts for six months:
12 LST
12 LCI (L)
12 LCS (L) (3)
12 LSM (6 with Fairbanks Morse engines and 6 with General Motors engines)
36 LCT (5) or LCT (6)
200 LCM
100 LCV(P)
For two-shift operation an E6 component had a complement of 21 officers and 499 enlisted men. Besides the initial six months' supply of spare parts for hulls, machinery, and internal-combustion engines it carried a stock of spare parts for radio, radar, and sonar equipment.
The E10 component complemented the E6 component, although the two components were not necessarily at the same base. The El0 component, designated as a standard landing-craft unit-maintenance component, was prepared to maintain 60 landing craft (40 LCM and 20 LCV(P)), assuming one-fifth of them to be undergoing repair at all times. For two-shift operation this component required 5 officers and 199 enlisted men. To maintain and repair hulls and engines of small boats at advanced bases of small or medium size, the E8 component was established. Assuming a base with 25 assorted craft, including 50-foot tank lighters and 36-foot landing craft, the standard two-shift complement for this Ship Repair component was 4 officers and 102 enlisted men.
An entirely different kind of component was the E9, which was assigned to an Acorn Base, which was an offensive air-base unit. Design of the Acorn facilitated rapid construction of mutually supporting island air bases for quick repair and operation of captured enemy airfields in conjunction with amphibious operations. There were various species of Acorns; some operating from the usual portable landing strips, some from carriers' decks, and still others that could be landed from ships and put into operation in an extremely short time. The E9 component, officially designated as a motorized repair component for small amphibious craft, was completely mobile. All its equipment was mounted on trucks, and it was designed to make hull and engine repairs on 50- and 36-foot amphibious craft and other small boats at any point beyond the range of stationary repair facilities.
Basically, it had three distinct functions. First, it could be moved from its parent base as a working unit to a single disabled craft. Upon arrival, it could make all hull repairs and overhaul engines so that the craft could return to its base. Second, it could move out as a self-contained unit for about a week and maintain approximately 25 LCV(P) and LCM. This maintenance period could be extended by establishing a flow of supplies from the parent base. Third, its two truck-mounted shops could be divided, and each could be attached to one of the shops of the E10 component to increase the capacity of the E10 by about 15 per cent. Normal two-shift complement for the E9 was 18 enlisted men.
Similar to the E9 was the E9A, a mobile LVT repair component, which was intended especially for repairing and salvaging amphibious tractors. All its shops were designed to be transported in amphibious tractors, and went ashore with one of the first assault waves of an invasion force. Men of an E9A component made spot repairs on battle-damaged LVT's and generally helped the beachmaster to keep the beach clear. It could be dismantled quickly and moved wherever it was needed. It was self-sustaining in food, fuel, materials, and berthing for a period of four days. The component had, besides its repair shops, an LVT (4) equipped as a retrieving and limited salvage vehicle. Each of its seven shops was a complete unit built on skids with a working platform, designed to be fitted into the LVT(4) that carried it. The LVT(4) retriever was equipped for towing tractors out of difficult positions. Under ordinary conditions it could retrieve tractors disabled in surf, sand, or mud, and with its crane could salvage engines and transmission units. For normal two-shift operation the E9A consisted of one officer and 19 enlisted men.
Other components for small craft.—Motor torpedo boats, the fast-hitting little "stingers" of the fleet, were berthed and maintained at two different types of bases: PT Operating Bases and PT Major Engine Overhaul Bases. An Operating Base was a self-sustained unit for which the Bureau of Ships supplied repair facilities, communication equipment, and miscellaneous items such as office equipment, special clothing, bedding, mess gear, and galley gear. Repair facilities were adequate for top engine overhaul and major hull-repair work. An operating base ordinarily had a Ship Repair component (E11) of 3 officers and 134 enlisted men, who could do this repair work for one squadron of 12 motor torpedo boats, assuming the component to be organized on a two-shift basis.
In general, about one PT Operating Base in every four was made into a PT Major Engine Overhaul Base by adding to it enough additional repair facilities so that it could support one PT squadron and undertake major engine overhaul and major hull repair for three other squadrons in its immediate vicinity. The Ship Repair component that did this major engine overhaul work was designated as the E12, and normally consisted of two officers and 82 enlisted men. Engines that needed overhaul were removed at outlying operating bases and shipped by tender or other means to an operating base containing this component. Because both the Ell and E12 components were relatively immobile and could not readily keep up with the strategic moves of PT squadrons, much of their work was taken over by motor torpedo boat tenders (AGP's) toward the end of the war. The shore-based components then were used for major salvage work that could not be undertaken by the tenders.
The only other two types of advanced base Ship Repair components were the E20, designated as a base LVT repair component; and the E22, which was known as a landing and patrol craft repair component (mobile). The E20 provided facilities for the major repair and overhaul of 100 LVT's per month, where such repairs could not be made by the regularly established Army or Marine Corps repair and maintenance groups. Such a component completely overhauled worn or battle-damaged hulls and overhauled or replaced armor, engines, transmissions, differentials, and radio gear. LVT's damaged or worn too badly to be repaired by an E20 component were returned to the United States to be salvaged or rebuilt. Spare parts for tractors were stocked by the E20 for its own use, and to replenish the stocks of E9A components. For normal two-shift operation such a component consisted of 15 officers, 7 of whom were warrant officers, and 285 enlisted men, including 158 rated men.
Using tray-mounted self-powered tools, the mobile E22 component could be operated in four different ways. As a self-contained unit it could be established on a beach early in an invasion for combat repairs on all types of landing craft along an extended section of the combat area. It could move with a group of about 100 LCM's and LVP's and do routine maintenance and minor repairs for a period of about two weeks. The maintenance period could be extended, of course, by establishing a flow of supplies to the component. It could also move in with the first echelon of a large repair base, such as a Lion, and maintain lighters, ferries, and other equipment until the main repair facilities were set up. In a congested area the E22 component could be used to help a large activity, but at some distance away from it. Its normal complement for one-shift operation was 4 officers and 82 enlisted men.
If there's glamor in sweat, they had it.—This plan of organization was the skeleton upon which the flesh of the Ship Repair Units was built. How well it worked can best be described by telling of some of the jobs done by the men of the SRU. It is a saga of sweat and salt and mud and flame. It is a story very few laymen ever heard, because these men had no Ernie Pyle to sing a song of praise for them. Not many of them wore decorations when the job was done. It wasn't very glamorous.
And yet once in awhile back from the fleet would come a story that did put just a tinge of glamor on the whole tiresome business of fixing ships, sending them out to blast the enemy—and get blasted—then fixing them all over again. One of these was the story of the Honolulu, a rampaging Pacific Fleet veteran that fought through a dozen close-up engagements with the enemy on borrowed luck. Each time she sustained some damage, but always managed to make it back to port, get patched up and be back in the next scrap. But on October 20, 1944, her luck changed, and she was forced to limp home over a long 12,000 miles to repair the damage done by a Japanese aerial torpedo.
Part of a task group assigned to shore bombardment in support of troops invading Leyte, the Honolulu moved into position on the afternoon of October 18, and on the morning of the 19th the fireworks began. She poured round after round into enemy positions, but drew no return fire from the beach. The Honolulu resumed bombardment the next morning, meanwhile fighting off occasional Japanese planes, and continued firing until the assault troops hit the beach. She then took up her station off the beach to await fire-support assignments.
That afternoon the torpedo ripped into her. Members of the crew spotted the plane as it streaked in low from Leyte, and the men scrambled for battle stations. They opened fire as the skipper started maneuvering the ship to dodge bombs or torpedoes. The plane—a Kate—dropped her fish and got out fast, and a few seconds later the torpedo wake was seen speeding toward the ship. There was not time enough to maneuver her out of the way; a violent explosion rocked the ship as the torpedo knifed into her hull amidships.
Then began a different kind of fight—a fight to save the ship or get her into shallow water before she sank. As the crew rallied from the blast to the job of stopping the influx of water, the Honolulu's skipper began moving her out of deep water. The destroyer Richard P. Leary came alongside to remove the injured and give whatever other aid she could, and the tugs Potowatemi and Menominee and the repair ship Prometheus gave her enough first aid so that she was able to reach an advanced base and take stock of the damage.
The truth wasn't pretty. Decks and bulkheads were damaged and more than 50 compartments were flooded. Ventilating ducts, electric cables, steam lines, all sorts of machinery, navigating devices, and ordnance equipment were damaged. Divers of the Ship Repair Unit immediately went down to inspect the underwater damage to the hull. Then the Honolulu was dry-docked in the sectional dock at the base and work was begun by Ship Repair personnel from the base and a repair ship. Wreckage was cut away and removed, and all salvable equipment was put aside. Temporary beams were put in place to strengthen the deck, plates were welded over the hole in the hull, and a vertical strap was put on to strengthen it.
Pumps, motors, and control panels were removed and repaired aboard the repair ship. Temporary electric wiring was rigged so that the Honolulu could operate at full capacity on her way to a permanent repair base. Permanent repairs could not be under taken, because the sectional dock was needed for other important jobs. Much of the time was consumed in cutting away damaged structures, for oil and ammunition was mixed in the wreckage, and the use of cutting flames was hazardous. The use of fog nozzles prevented any accidents.
Repairs were completed in 19 days, and the Honolulu was refloated on November 18, ready to make the homeward trip for permanent repairs. She made the long trip home under her own power, and at virtually full speed.
Another symbol of the power of the Ship Repair Units in this battle of the monkey wrench and the welder against the shell and the bomb was the Ross, a fabulous destroyer that still went prowling for the enemy after two mine explosions, 286 bombing raids, a Japanese aerial strafing, a typhoon, and a Kamikaze crash in less than a month! After all this the Ross was so badly damaged that 806,000 man hours of repair work were required to put her back in fighting trim at the Mare Island Navy Yard.
Damaged twice by mine explosions while she was screening a minesweeping unit south of Homonhon Island in the Gulf of Leyte, the Ross was towed to an anchorage. There she was immediately strafed and bombed by a two-engine Jap plane. Moved again to a safer place, she sustained a hit on a forward gun mount by a Kamikaze pilot. During these attacks she shot down at least three enemy aircraft. For a month the Ross's crew and members of a Ship Repair Unit assigned to her alternately manned battle stations and worked on battle damage. Sometimes the work was not even stopped by air attacks.
It was after a bombing attack and a battle with several Japanese planes that the Ross struck the first mine. Several men were killed and the forward engine-room and fireroom were put out of commission. The commanding officer ordered the crew to start salvage operations. About 20 minutes later, while all hands were working on the damage already done, another mine exploded aft, flooding living compartments, the after engine-room, and magazines.
Although the crew members knew the ship was drifting helplessly in the middle of a mine field, they went ahead with damage-control operations, patching holes, shoring weakened bulkheads, and shifting ballast to overcome a list that threatened to capsize the ship. Finally the flooding was halted, the list was checked at 14 degrees, and the Ross was towed to Homonhon Island. If the crew had any illusion of safety at Homonhon, it was quickly dispelled by a two-engine Jap bomber, which immediately made a low bombing run on the ship. Its approach was masked by a near-by hill. The bomber strafed the ship and dropped a bomb so close that two men were critically injured. The Ross then was moved to a more secluded anchorage. In this relatively safe place air attacks became nightly routine, and the destroyer was moved again to the center of a transport area, where the guns of larger ships could protect her. Morale improved when Ship Repair workers had restored all the 20- and 40-mm. guns to service, and the Ross's crew bagged a Jap Lily before other ships had opened fire.
Temporary repairs were progressing well when a typhoon struck the anchorage. Though the storm did additional damage, it also put a stop to the persistent aerial attacks, so that the Ross could be floated into the advanced base sectional dry dock for a more thorough evaluation of the underwater damage to her hull, and for temporary repairs. With these emergency repairs completed, she made an uneventful trip across the Pacific. A summary of her damaged included a broken keel, propulsion shafts out of line, a hole 20 feet in diameter in her hull, electrical system completely demolished, the high-pressure steam system wrecked, and the engines, reduction gears, condensers and pumps ruined by flooding.
But today the Ross is afloat and ready for a fight, if one comes.
Repair of the Pittsburgh after her bow was torn off in the Pacific typhoon of June 5, 1945, was a good example of teamwork of the Ship Repair Units with the rest of the Navy. A new bow was planned for the Pittsburgh by the Bureau of Ships as soon as the report of the damage was received. Plans of the ships were forwarded to the Puget Sound Navy Yard, and prefabrication of a new bow was begun. The original bow, floating stein up in the ocean, was caught and towed to Guam. Arriving there a week later than the cruiser, and badly weather-beaten, it was beached outside the harbor. Later it was salvaged, so that it can be used on another cruiser, if it is needed.
The Pittsburgh was taken to an advanced base sectional dock and was repaired by the Ship Repair component at the base. Eventually, with a stub bow to insure water-tightness, she moved safely under her own power to Puget Sound.
Many other stories of the work of Ship Repair Units, some of them even more spectacular, might be recounted. But they all add up to the same thing: The enemy cannot win a battle with a ship he cannot sink in the open sea. Time after time the Japanese damaged ships of the United States Fleet so badly that they were officially reported as "sunk" in enemy communiques. Then a few weeks later those same ships would show up in an invasion force, or in a sea battle somewhere. This not only helped to win the tremendous battle of production in the shipyards and on the assembly lines back home, but also it must have been most disheartening and confusing to enemy strategists to be unable to keep any accurate account of the fighting strength of the U. S. Fleet.
And so the men of the Ship Repair Units did not need official "well dones" and decorations to assure them that they had done an important job, and had done it well. The "ships that came back"—the Pennsylvania, the California, the West Virginia, the Nevada, the Pittsburgh, the Ross, and scores of others—these are proof enough. As some unknown poet laureate of the SRU put it:
"Theirs not the glory of the kill,
The tale to which the people thrill;
Theirs but the pride in work well done
And peace of mind when war is won
Their motto 'Do the job in hand,
Forget the fanfare and the band.'
In shop and ship with forthright skill
These men gird ships to make the kill.
All hail I these men in dungarees
Whose skill creates our victories."
Lieutenant Williams graduated from Purdue University in 1934 with a B.S. degree in electrical engineering. After a short period with Gibbs & Cox, Inc. (marine architects), became assistant editor of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers. In 1938 became a member of the public relations staff of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pa. Commissioned lieutenant (jg) in the Naval Reserve in 1943. After indoctrination training at Princeton University, was assigned to the Bureau of Ships, Washington, D. C., in its Training Liaison Branch. Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and associate member of the Society of the Sigma Xi, national honorary research fraternity.