Early in 1942 the Navy began the unprecedented task of building advanced bases for the war in the Pacific. This work had some background of experience in the Atlantic at Argentia and Londonderry, but, even so, it was a very new line of effort and one about which we knew very little indeed. The energy and resources thrown into this work, and the resultant development of the bases themselves reached tremendous proportions. There are important lessons to be derived from this part of the Navy’s war effort, no less than from its combat operations.
The magnificent distances of the Pacific Ocean and what amounted to nonexistence of any real base facilities nearer than Pearl Harbor absolutely compelled their establishment in some form closer to Melanesia, then the theater of combat operations. It may be stated parenthetically that, while some facilities existed in New Zealand and Australia, and there was oil storage at Suva and Tutuila, these were not only inadequate but were themselves (excepting possibly Suva) unacceptably far from the fighting front.
It was very natural at that time that the tendency should be to establish base facilities ashore. Ships were extremely critical. The submarine war in the Atlantic was at its worst, tankers particularly being the victims. The potentialities of Japanese submarines were as yet not fully known, but there were strong indications that they might be serious. It seemed highly important to release bottoms, turn ships around; store fuel, ammunition, and other supplies where they couldn’t be sunk and might be (though they seldom were) dispersed for safety. Tank farms, ammunition and supply depots, and shore-based ship and boat repair units became the order of the day.
So natural did this trend seem that apparently we did not realize that we were abandoning, temporarily at least, our excellent old principle of keeping the Navy afloat. Ever since the World Cruise of 1907-08 we have prided ourselves on our mobility, the endurance of our ships, our ability to replenish at sea, the adequacy and efficiency of our tenders and repair ships. Indeed, the famous 100-day stint of the Carrier Task Force during this very spring of 1942 was a proud realization of that idea. But, for the combination of reasons described above, plus, it is believed, lack of completely full and clear exchange of ideas on the subject between the Fleet and the Department, the advanced bases were planned—and largely built— completely of shore establishments.
It is true that some floating facilities were beginning to appear simultaneous with those based on land. There were the wonderful floating dry docks, of course, and a trickle of oil storage hulks and ammunition and stores barges. By late 1943 a sprinkling of these existed through the Solomons and New Hebrides, and the number was growing. But shore-based facilities were growing even faster in the same locations, and the plans for Manus were in development.
The misconception had been recognized, however, though dimly, and Commander South Pacific was striving at this time to close or reduce rear bases and move their personnel and facilities forward. This was not easy. The effort high-lighted one of the inherent weaknesses in establishing ashore a base intended to be temporary. That is, the “dead time” during which the facility, whatever it is—tank farm, repair unit, hospital— is out of action while it is being moved. The old difficulty of lack of ships also delayed the forward movement of much material even after it had been disassembled and made ready for shipping. There was, also, the great American tendency to consider one’s own little organization of great importance, coupled, it cannot be denied, with a trend toward luxury as we dug out of the mud.
But reaction to the old, correct principle was definitely under way. In late December, 1943, Commander South Pacific submitted a brief study of the number of ships, lighters, barges, etc., required to duplicate all the shore-based facilities then at Espiritu Santo. The number was not excessive. How much this study had to do with the ensuing development of floating facilities is not known. It is believed that much thought had already been devoted to the subject. At any rate, the ultimate result was gratifying.
There was much inertia to overcome, however. Too much to be overcome entirely. Manus was built and there was a great deal of additional building of shore installations throughout western Melanesia well into 1944. The procurement program for advanced base material was so well under way that it actually appeared that there would be little “market” for the carefully salved equipment from the rolled-up rear bases. A tribute to our great industries, but just suppose all that energy and material had gone into floating facilities!
The increasing speed of advance of the Pacific war brought us back to the old principle willy-nilly, at last. It saw its ultimate development in the logistic anchorages of Ulithi and (to a lesser extent) Okinawa, and in the train which kept the Third Fleet supplied in the last strikes of the war. The latter provided the highest exemplification of our old idea of a really seagoing fleet. The former, however, provided a replenishment and repair base not only for the combatant ships but for the train ships, too. All the facilities at these anchorages could be moved readily with no “dead time” except that required for passage to the next location. It is believed that they provided every service with their floating facilities that our most completely equipped island advanced bases did, with the possible exception of major ship dry-docking.
There are, of course, certain facilities needed in or close to the theater of operations of an amphibious war which cannot be provided except on land. These are:
(1) Airfields
(a) For local air cover and support
(b) For support of succeeding operations
(c) For long-range bombing
(d) For training
(e) For staging or ferrying
(2) Aircraft overhaul and repair on large scale
(3) Troop staging—including rehabilitation and training
(4) Personnel recreation
Only 1 (a), (b), (d) and 4 directly concern the fleet and none of them requires either a large amount of land space or extensive shore establishments. Most of them were realized at Ulithi, even with the extremely limited land available.
Large shore-based naval air establishments may become necessary, as in the Solomons Campaign, but the building of too- permanent shops should be carefully avoided and kept afloat if at all possible. A slightly different problem from that of the surface navy is posed here, in that the field may be several miles from navigable water (e.g., Henderson at Guadalcanal, Luganville at Santo, Bauer and Quoin Hill at Efate). However, many of the fields at our island bases were virtually on the water and shop barges could have been used very easily. In general, surface ships have little interest in any shore- based facilities that cannot be provided from ships or barges except for recreation. These require little of a permanent nature.
Besides “dead time” another objectionable feature of shore-based facilities is “overhead.” In addition to the facility itself, berthing, messing, water supply, transportation—all have to be provided for personnel. More personnel just for “housekeeping” are required. Tremendous savings are possible by performing all the labor in the home shipyard instead of a grueling part of it in a malarial jungle.
There must always be some large bases, of course, with facilities for storage and repair so extensive that it would be uneconomical even if it were necessary to establish them elsewhere than ashore. It will not be necessary because it will not be the intention to move these facilities. They will constitute the permanent bases, so located and constructed that their resources will be very large and relatively easy to replenish. But it should be an axiom that advanced bases are also temporary. That axiom was somewhat overlooked, it is believed, in the Pacific war. We never hear of advanced bases in peacetime. They are established only in war, and in a theater as vast as the Western Pacific it quickly became obvious that many of them, after a commendably short time, were no longer “advanced.” Then it became equally obvious how completely the axiomatic “temporary” had been forgotten.
The advanced base program was a tremendous achievement, into which went the untiring effort of a great number of officers and men. It contributed indispensably to winning the Pacific war, with its fantastic distances and problems of supply. But its whole history bears careful study and analysis, for mistakes were made, beyond doubt.
The principal answer which should be sought through this analysis is, how far ahead of the permanent bases can the advanced bases be pushed? That answer will determine our base policy for peace as well as war. It will determine what and where our permanent bases should be.
Certain answers to questions on bases are obvious enough without further analysis. The advantages of floating facilities are too well proved to admit of any argument. The only question there is, have the ultimate possibilities of floating facilities been fully developed? Many improvements are possible; many of the facilities developed were improvisations.
Another great truth demonstrated again and again by the war in the Pacific is that bases by themselves—without mobile, aggressive forces operating from them—might just as well be the barren atolls which many of them once were. The Sunday supplement boys used to speak glibly of the deterrent effect of Singapore, Gibraltar, Pearl Harbor on enemy operations as if their mere existence were a barrier. It will be well to ensure that the general public appreciates this truth; that the significance of the by-passing of Manila and Singapore by the Japanese and later of Truk and the lesser enemy bases by our forces was not due to weakness of those bases, but to weakness of the forces that could have operated from them. Then perhaps we can keep a sufficiently strong fleet, with sufficient train and other floating facilities to keep it mobile.